TMD IPB MARCH 2002 AIR LAND SEA APPLICATION CENTER ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

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1 ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE TMD IPB MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE FM MCWP A NTTP AFTTP(I) AIR LAND SEA APPLICATION CENTER MARCH 2002 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Apprved fr public release; distributin is unlimited. MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

2 FOREWORD This publicatin has been prepared under ur directin fr use by ur respective cmmands and ther cmmands as apprpriate. JOHN N. ABRAMS General, USA Cmmander Training and Dctrine Cmmand BRUCE B. KNUTSON, JR. Lieutenant General, USMC Cmmanding General Marine Crps Cmbat Develpment Cmmand R. G. SPRIGG Rear Admiral, USN Cmmander Navy Warfare Develpment Cmmand LANCE L. SMITH Majr General, USAF Cmmander Headquarters Air Frce Dctrine Center This publicatin is available n the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Dctrine Digital Library at

3 1. Scpe PREFACE In supprt f theater missile defense (TMD) peratins, this multiservice publicatin prvides detailed tactics, techniques, and prcedures (TTP) fr cnducting intelligence preparatin f the battlespace (IPB). TMD IPB reduces uncertainties regarding terrain, weather, and adversary capabilities t develp ptential adversary curses f actin. The 4-step IPB methdlgy detailed in this publicatin is based n Jint Publicatin , Jint Tactics, Techniques, and Prcedures fr Jint Intelligence Preparatin f the Battlespace. 2. Purpse This publicatin prvides the intelligence analyst the tls t supprt cmmander and staff planning and decisin making at the jint, cmbined, and service levels by prviding a systematic, cntinuus, and cmmn methdlgy fr analyzing the adversary theater missile frce. 3. Applicatin The target audience fr this publicatin is the intelligence analyst respnsible fr IPB develpment. It will als aid the jint frce cmmander in planning and executing chesive jint peratins against theater missiles thrughut the battlespace and be beneficial fr sensr emplyment, cllectin management, target develpment, and frce applicatin. 4. Implementatin Plan Participating service cmmand ffices f primary respnsibility (OPRs) will review this publicatin, validate the infrmatin and, where apprpriate, reference and incrprate it in service and cmmand manuals, regulatins, and curricula as fllws: Army. The Army will incrprate the tactics, techniques, and prcedures (TTP) in this publicatin in United States (US) Army training and dctrinal publicatins as directed by the Cmmander, US Army Training and Dctrine Cmmand (TRADOC). Distributin is in accrdance with Department f the Army Frm R. Marine Crps. The Marine Crps will incrprate the TTP in this publicatin in US Marine Crps training and dctrinal publicatins as directed by the Cmmanding General, US Marine Crps Cmbat Develpment Cmmand (MCCDC). Distributin is in accrdance with Marine Crps Publicatin Distributin System. Navy. The Navy will incrprate these prcedures in US Navy training and dctrinal publicatins as directed by the Cmmander, Navy Warfare Develpment Cmmand (NWDC). Distributin is in accrdance with Military Standard requisitining and Issue Prcedure Desk Guide and Navy Standing Operating Prcedure Publicatin 409. Air Frce. Air Frce units will validate and incrprate apprpriate prcedures in accrdance with applicable gverning directives. Distributin is in accrdance with Air Frce Instructin Marine Crps: PCN i

4 5. User Infrmatin a. TRADOC, MCCDC, NWDC, Headquarters Air Frce Dctrine Center (HQ AFDC) Air Land Sea Applicatin (ALSA) Center develped this publicatin with the jint participatin f the apprving service cmmands. ALSA Center will review and update this publicatin as necessary. b. This publicatin reflects current jint and service dctrine, cmmand and cntrl rganizatins, facilities, persnnel, respnsibilities, and prcedures. Changes in service prtcl, apprpriately reflected in jint and service publicatins, will likewise be incrprated in revisins f this dcument. c. We encurage recmmended changes fr imprving this publicatin. Key yur cmments t the specific page and paragraph and prvide a ratinale fr each recmmendatin. Send cmments and recmmendatins directly t ii

5 Army Cmmander US Army Training and Dctrine Cmmand ATTN: ATDO-A Frt Mnre VA DSN COMM (757) Address: Marine Crps Cmmanding General US Marine Crps Cmbat Develpment Cmmand ATTN: C Russell Rad Suite 318A Quantic, VA DSN COMM (703) Navy Navy Warfare Develpment Cmmand Dctrine Develpment Divisin (Cde N5) 686 Cushing Rad Newprt, RI DSN COMM (401) Air Frce Headquarters Air Frce Dctrine Center ATTN: DJ 216 Sweeney Bulevard, Suite 109 Langley AFB, VA DSN COMM (757) Address: ALSA ALSA Center ATTN: Directr 114 Andrews Street Langley AFB, VA DSN COMM (757) Address: iii

6 FM MCWP A NTTP AFTTP(I) FM MCWP A NTTP US Army Training and Dctrine Cmmand Frt Mnre, Virginia Marine Crps Cmbat Develpment Cmmand Quantic, Virginia Navy Warfare Develpment Cmmand Newprt, Rhde Island AFTTP(I) Air Frce Dctrine Center Maxwell Air Frce Base, Alabama TMD IPB 04 March 2002 Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Prcedures fr Theater Missile Defense Intelligence Preparatin f the Battlespace TABLE OF CONTENTS EECUTIVE SUMMARY... ix Page CHAPTER I CHAPTER II CHAPTER III OVERVIEW Scpe... I-1 TMD Missin Areas... I-1 TMD IPB Overview... I-4 TM Threat Frces... I-5 Phases f TMD Operatins... I-8 Wh Cnducts IPB... I-8 STEP-1: DEFINE THE BATTLESPACE ENVIRONMENT What Is It?... II-1 Hw T D It Fr TMD... II-1 STEP-2: DEFINE THE BATTLESPACE EFFECTS What Is It?... III-1 Hw T D It Fr TMD... III-1 iv

7 CHAPTER IV CHAPTER V STEP-3: EVALUATE THE TM FORCE What Is It?... IV-1 Hw t Create TM Mdels... IV-1 Dctrinal Template... IV-2 STEP-4: DETERMINE TM COURSES OF ACTION What Is It?... V-1 Hw T D It... V-1 APPENDI A COMMON TMD IPB PROCESSES... A-1 APPENDI B SUGGESTED TMD IPB TEMPLATES... B-1 APPENDI C AUTOMATED TOOLS AND EAMPLE ARCHITECTURES... C-1 APPENDI D TMD IPB CHECKLIST AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN... D-1 APPENDI E TMD IPB INTERNET LINKS... E-1 REFERENCES...References-1 GLOSSARY INDE... Glssary-1... Index-1 FIGURES 1 Cntinuus 4-Step TMD Prcess... ix I-1 TMD IPB and TMD Operatins... I-4 I-2 Multiple Dimensins f the TM Threat... I-6 II-1 Step 1 - Define the Battlespace Envirnment... II-1 II-2 AO and AOI Assessment Prcess fr TMD IPB... II-6 II-3 Cmpsite AOI Assessment Prcess... II-6 II-4 Ptential TM Frce Cverage Template... II-7 II-5 Ptential TM Frce Deplyment Area Assessment Template... II-8 II-6 AO and AOI Assessment fr TMD Active Defense Operatins Template... II-9 II-7 AO and AOI Assessment fr TMD Passive Defense Operatins Template... II-10 II-8 AO and AOI Assessment fr TMD Attack Operatins Template... II-11 II-9 Cmpsite AO and AOI Assessment Template... II-12 II-10 TMD Battlespace Assessment Template (1 f 2)... II-13 II-10 TMD Battlespace Assessment Template (2 f 2)... II-14 II-11 Geplitical and Reginal Threat Assessment Template... II-17 II-12 Adversary TM Frce Capabilities Assessment Template (1 f 2)... II-18 II-12 Adversary TM Frce Capabilities Assessment Template (2 f 2)... II-19 II-13 Majr Terrain and LOC Overview Template... II-20 III-1 Step 2 - Define the Battlespace Effects... III-1 III-2 Adversary TM Frce Infrastructure Assessment Prcess... III-16 v

8 vi III-3 Infrastructure Functinal Decmpsitin Assessment Template (1 f 2)... III-21 III-3 Infrastructure Functinal Decmpsitin Assessment Template (2 f 2)... III-22 IV-1 Step 3 - Evaluate the TM Frce... IV-1 IV-2 TM Natinal Level Organizatin and C2 Template... IV-4 IV-3 TM Unit Level Organizatin and C2 Template... IV-5 V-1 Step 4 - Determine TM COAs... V-1 V-2 Adversary TM COA Develpment Flw Prcess... V-2 V-3 Situatin Template Cncept... V-6 V-4 Event Template Cncept... V-9 B-1 TMD IPB Template Cver Sheet - Example... B-2 B-2 TMD IPB Template Cver Sheet... B-3 B-3 Cmmand Missin(s) Objective(s) Summary Template... B-4 B-4 Cmmand Missin(s) Objective(s) Wrksheet Template..... B-5 B-5 Cmmand Missin(s) Guidance Wrksheet Template... B-6 B-6 AO/AOI/ Battlespace Assessment Template... B-7 B-7 Geplitical and Reginal Threat Assessment Template... B-8 B-8 TM Frce General Capabilities Assessment Template (1 f 2)... B-9 B-8 TM Frce General Capabilities Assessment Template (2 f 2)... B-10 B-9 Majr Terrain and LOC Overview Template... B-11 B-10 TMD IPB Hldings, Database, Surces, and Links Assessment Template (1 f 3)... B-12 B-10 TMD IPB Hldings, Database, Surces, and Links Assessment Template (2 f 3)... B-13 B-10 TMD IPB Hldings, Database, Surces, and Links Assessment Template (3 f 3)... B-14 B-11 TMD IPB Infrmatin Surces Evaluatin Template (1 f 2)... B-15 B-11 TMD IPB Infrmatin Surces Evaluatin Template (2 f 2)... B-16 B-12 TMD IPB POC Template... B-17 B-13 Recmmended PIR/EEI/RFI/Other Requirement Request Wrksheet Template (1 f 2)... B-18 B-13 Recmmended PIR/EEI/RFI/Other Requirement Request Wrksheet Template (2 f 2)... B-19 B-14 TMD IPB Key Wrd Search Template (1 f 4)... B-20 B-14 TMD IPB Key Wrd Search Template (2 f 4)... B-21 B-14 TMD IPB Key Wrd Search Template (3 f 4)... B-22 B-14 TMD IPB Key Wrd Search Template (4 f 4)... B-23 B-15 DIA Standardized Functinal Categry Cde Infrmatin Search Template (1 f 2)... B-24 B-15 DIA Standardized Functinal Categry Cde Infrmatin Search Template (2 f 2)... B-25 B-16 DIA Standardized Equipment Cde Infrmatin Search Template (1 f 4)... B-26

9 B-16 DIA Standardized Equipment Cde Infrmatin Search Template (2 f 4)... B-27 B-16 DIA Standardized Equipment Cde Infrmatin Search Template (3 f 4)... B-28 B-16 DIA Standardized Equipment Cde Infrmatin Search Template (4 f 4)... B-29 B-17 Feature Class Data t Terrain Analysis Template Crss Reference Template (1 f 5)... B-33 B-17 Feature Class Data t Terrain Analysis Template Crss Reference Template (2 f 5)... B-34 B-17 Feature Class Data t Terrain Analysis Template Crss Reference Template (3 f 5)... B-35 B-17 Feature Class Data t Terrain Analysis Template Crss Reference Template (4 f 5)... B-36 B-17 Feature Class Data t Terrain Analysis Template Crss Reference Template (5 f 5)... B-37 B-18 Terrain Assessment Checklist and Status Template... B-38 B-19 TMD IPB Slpe Categries Template... B-39 B-20 Transprtatin and LOC Legend Symbls... B-45 B-21 CCM Overlay(s) Wrksheet Template (1 f 2)... B-46 B-21 CCM Overlay(s) Wrksheet Template (2 f 2)... B-47 B-22 Climatlgy Assessment Template... B-48 B-23 Weather Effects n Adversary TM Frce Operatins Template... B-49 B-24 Current/Frecasted Weather Effects n TM Frce Operatins Template... B-50 B-25 TM Frce Required Infrastructure Assessment Template.. B-51 B-26 Integrated TM Frce Infrastructure List Template (1 f 2) B-52 B-26 Integrated TM Frce Infrastructure List Template (2 f 2) B-53 B-27 General Facility/Area Assessment Template (1 f 4)... B-54 B-27 General Facility/Area Assessment Template (2 f 4)... B-55 B-27 General Facility/Area Assessment Template (3 f 4)... B-56 B-27 General Facility/Area Assessment Template (4 f 4)... B-57 B-28 Field Operating Area Assessment Template... B-58 B-29 Area Limitatin Wrksheet Template... B-59 B-30 Dctrinal Template Requirements Template... B-60 B-31 TM Equipment Template... B-61 B-32 TM Equipment List Template... B-62 B-33 TM System Grund Vehicle Equipment Template... B-63 B-34 TM Frce Attack Objectives Wrksheet Template... B-64 B-35 TM Unit Functinal Dctrinal Template... B-65 B-36 TM Frce Emplyment Wrksheet Template (1 f 2)... B-66 B-36 TM Frce Emplyment Wrksheet Template (2 f 2)... B-67 B-37 Time-Pattern Analysis Template... B-68 B-38 Date-Pattern Analysis Template... B-69 B-39 TM Operatinal State Dctrinal Template... B-70 B-40 TM HVT Relative Value Matrix Template... B-71 B-41 TM COA Assessment Template... B-72 B-42 TM COA Situatin Matrix Template... B-73 vii

10 B-43 NAI and HVT Assessment Template (1 f 2)... B-74 B-43 NAI and HVT Assessment Template (2 f 2)... B-75 B-44 TM COA Situatin/Event Template (1 f 2)... B-76 B-44 TM COA Situatin/Event Template (2 f 2)... B-77 B-45 TM Event Matrix Template... B-78 B-46 Recmmended Target Nminatins and TAIs Wrksheet Template... B-79 C-1 32d AAMDC Brigade G-2 TOC... C-2 C-2 32d AAMDC External Infrmatin Surces... C-3 C-3 TMD Flight Simplified Organizatinal Relatinships... C-3 C-4 Physical Layut f the 7th Air Frce TMD Intelligence Team... C-4 D-1 TMD IPB Checklist (1 f 2)... D-2 D-1 TMD IPB Checklist (2 f 2)... D-3 D-2 TMD IPB Develpment Plan (1 f 2)... D-4 D-2 TMD IPB Develpment Plan (2 f 2)... D-5 TABLES I-1 TMD Missin Areas, Objectives, and Assciated TMD IPB Requirements... I-2 I-2 Sme Organizatins and Intelligence Rles and Respnsibilities in Supprt f TMD... I-9 A-1 Matrix f General Sensr Types t Intelligence Advantages and Disadvantages...A-5-6 A-2 Typical Intelligence Reprts... A-7 A-3 Cmmnly Used Digital/Hardcpy GGI&S Prducts... A-11 A-4 Other Vectr-Based/Digital GGI&S Prducts... A-11 A-5 Other Raster-Based/Hardcpy GGI&S Prducts... A-11 A-6 Gespatial Precisin and Accuracy Cmparisns... A-14 B-1 Overlays, Dctrinal Templates, and GGI&S Prducts Supprting Terrain Analysis... B B-2 Vegetatin Type Cdes... B-40 B-3 Unified Sils Classificatin System and Assciated Rating Cne Index Values... B-41 B-4 Landfrms and Cmmnly Assciated Sils... B B-5 Lane Widths Typical f Current Military Maps... B-44 B-6 Urban Area Building Type Cdes and Descriptins... B-44 C-1 Selected Autmated Tls... C-1 C-2 Specific 7th Air Frce TMD Intelligence Team Functins... C-5 viii

11 EECUTIVE SUMMARY TMD IPB Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Prcedures fr Theater Missile Defense Intelligence Preparatin f the Battlespace Theater missile defense intelligence preparatin f the battlespace (TMD IPB) is a systematic, cntinuus prcess f analyzing the adversary theater missile (TM) frce and envirnment in a specific gegraphic area and the battlespace arund it. By determining the likely adversary TM frce curses f actin (COAs) and their assciated branches and sequels and by describing the envirnment where TM frces are perating, this TMD IPB prcess helps the cmmander and staff selectively apply and maximize cmbat pwer at critical pints in time and space in the battlespace. Applied prperly, TMD IPB prvides fr the timely and effective suppressin and/r destructin f a TM frce, while minimizing the use f friendly assets fr the TMD missin. This prvides the cmmander and staff with a cst-effective methd fr prviding frce prtectin frm an adversary s TM frce. A large number f adversary cuntries pssess r are trying t acquire TMs fr prestige and/r military purpses. TMs have the ptential t give adversaries military advantages against the United States (US) and allied frces. The TM threat these adversaries present is a cmplex multi-dimensinal intelligence prblem. T develp ptential adversary TM COAs, the TMD IPB prcedures cncept decmpses and crrelates the wh and what (equipment and units); where (infrastructure); when, why, and hw (peratins). Typically TM frces are equipped, rganized, trained, and emplyed differently. Many f these differences are relatively minr, while sme are mre dramatic. TMD IPB uses templating t standardize the prcess f analyzing adversary TM frces. Templates can be in the frm f text, tables, frms, r graphics. Templates in this publicatin prvide a starting framewrk fr analysis and develpment. They are nt meant t be all encmpassing, and they shuld be adapted fr a particular gegraphic area r situatin. TMD IPB is a cntinuus prcess cnsisting f fur majr iterative and parallel steps (Figure 1). Cntinuus Fur Step Prcess Evaluate the TM Frce 3 Determine TM COAs Cmbat Operatins Executin 2 Define the Battlespace Effects 1 Define the Battlespace Envirnment 4 Integrates with Operatins and Supprts Peacetime thrugh Cmbat Operatins Executin Figure-1. Cntinuus 4-Step TMD IPB Prcess ix

12 STEP-1 Define the Battlespace Envirnment (Fcus). This step fcuses the initial intelligence cllectin effrts and the remaining steps f the TMD IPB prcess. It identifies battlespace characteristics requiring in-depth evaluatin f their effects n adversary TM frce peratins, such as terrain, weather, lgistical infrastructure, and demgraphics. The initial effrt is riented n defining the limits f the area f peratins (the gegraphic regin where TM frces perate and/ r where TMD peratins will be cnducted) and area f interest (the area frm which infrmatin and intelligence are required). Defining the significant characteristics f the battlespace envirnment aids in identifying and filling current intelligence data gaps. STEP-2 Define the Battlespace Effects (Influences). This step evaluates the envirnment's effect n adversary TM frce peratins. This assessment examines terrain, weather, and ther battlespace characteristics (that is, adversary TM frce infrastructure) t determine hw these characteristics may limit r prvide pprtunities fr TM frce peratins. The bjective is t integrate these effects int a terrain analysis designating the mst prbable adversary TM frce peratins areas. STEP-3 Evaluate the TM Frce (Operatinal Mdel). This step examines in detail hw the adversary TM frce nrmally rganizes fr cmbat and cnducts peratins under ideal cnditins. The evaluatin is prtrayed in a threat mdel f the TM frce that includes dctrinal templates depicting hw the TM frce perates when uncnstrained by the effects f the battlespace envirnment. TM frce threat mdels are depicted graphically (dctrinal templates) supplemented by high-value target matrices and simple narratives. STEP-4 Determine TM COAs (Integrate). This step integrates the results f the previus steps int a meaningful cnclusin. Given what the adversary TM frce nrmally prefers t d, and the effects f the envirnment it is currently perating in, this step attempts t define the likely bjectives and COAs available t the TM frce. This is accmplished by creating event templates and matrices fcusing n intelligence cllectin aimed at identifying the COA the TM frce will mst likely execute. TMD IPB is a cmplicated and time-cnsuming prcess. Autmated intelligence and terrain analysis tls greatly assist this prcess. Currently, several cre intelligence systems are being develped and fielded that will greatly enhance the TMD IPB prcess. T mre efficiently slve the threat TM prblem, cntinued emphasis n these current and future autmated TMD IPB techniques is essential. Hwever, equally imprtant is the emphasis placed n develpment f the intelligence data needed fr the TMD IPB. It is critical t begin the TMD IPB prcess during the prehstilities phase, with well-develped intelligence databases, in rder t successfully impact US and allied TMD peratins. x

13 PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS The fllwing cmmands and agencies participated in the develpment f this publicatin: Jint Ballistic Missile Defense Organizatin, Pentagn, Washingtn, D.C. Jint Theater Attack Analysis Center, Kirtland AFB, Albuquerque, NM Jint Theater Air and Missile Defense Office, Pentagn, Washingtn, D.C. Unified USSTRATCOM, Jint Intelligence Center, Offutt AFB, NE Army 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Cmmand, Frt Bliss, T United States Army Intelligence and Security Cmmand, Frt Belvir, VA United States Army Intelligence Center, Frt Huachuca, AZ Marine Crps Marine Crps Cmbat Develpment Cmmand, Quantic, VA Navy Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Falln, NV Navy Warfare Develpment Cmmand (Nrflk Detachment), Nrflk, VA PEO-Surface Warfare Cmbatants, McLean, VA Air Frce 7th Air Frce, Osan Air Base, Krea 612 Air Intelligence Squadrn, Davis-Mnthan AFB, Tucsn, AZ Air Cmbat Cmmand/OIP, Langley AFB, Hamptn, VA Air Cmbat Cmmand/OFR, Langley AFB, Hamptn, VA Headquarters, Air Intelligence Agency/DOOQ, Kelly AFB, San Antni, T Anten Crpratin, Arlingtn, VA Pacific-Sierra Research, Arlingtn, VA SPARTA Crpratin, Huntsville, AL Other xi

14 Chapter I OVERVIEW 1. Scpe This publicatin gives multiservice tactics, techniques, and prcedures (MTTP) fr cnducting intelligence preparatin f the battlespace (IPB) analysis in supprt f theater missile defense (TMD) peratins. "Jint theater missile defense is an integral part f cunterair peratins.... which integrates bth ffensive and defensive peratins frm all cmpnents t cunter the air and missile threat." (This qute can be fund in Jint Publicatin (JP) 3-01, Jint Dctrine fr Cuntering Air and Missile Threats, Chapter I, page I-2.) TMD IPB is a systematic and cntinuus prcess fr analyzing adversary theater missile (TM) capabilities, weather, terrain, and related infrastructure in a specific gegraphic regin t supprt friendly TMD peratins. Althugh this MTTP fcuses specifically n the manual methd f perfrming IPB, Appendix C lists sme supprting autmated tls. This basic TMD IPB methdlgy is derived frm the steps, functins, and the structure established by the United States Army (USA) Field Manual (FM) (FM ), Intelligence Preparatin f The Battlefield, JP , Jint Tactics, Techniques, and Prcedures fr Jint Intelligence Preparatin f The Battlespace, and JP , Dctrine fr Jint Theater Missile Defense. This dcument is derived frm authritative and fieldtested cncepts. It addresses unique aspects f the TM threat such as a. Encmpass the strategic, peratinal, and tactical levels f war. b. Operate theater-wide and significantly impact n a wide array f friendly peratins. c. Operate nncntinuus, nnlinear, and asymmetric in time and space and ver large nnlinear gegraphic areas. d. D nt require direct cntact with friendly frces. e. Are a highly diversified target system including infrastructure, mvement, and highly mbile tactical target elements. f. Mve and launch using TM specific unit patterns. g. Cnceal and camuflage easily. h. Are capable f emplying weapns f mass destructin (WMD). i. Have geplitical implicatins. 2. TMD Missin Areas Jint TMD is the integratin f jint frce capabilities t destry enemy TMs in-flight r befre launch r therwise disrupt the enemy's TM peratins. This is accmplished thrugh an apprpriate mix f mutually supprtive cmmand, cntrl, cmmunicatins, cmputers, and intelligence (C4I) activities; active attack peratins; active missile defense peratins; and passive missile defense peratins. TMD incrprates several missins requiring IPB. Table I-1 shws the crrelatin between TMD missins and their required TMD IPB. I-1

15 Table I-1. TMD Missin Areas, Objectives, and Assciated TMD IPB Requirements Missin Area Include Assciated TMD IPB Requirements TMD C4I Attack Operatins Active Defense Passive Defense Timely and accurate data and systems t plan, mnitr, direct, cntrl, and reprt TMD peratins. Integrated systems f dctrine, rganizatinal structures, facilities, cmmunicatins, cmputers, supprting intelligence, and missile warning and cueing by sensrs and grund statins. OPSEC. Destructin, disruptin, r neutralizatin f TM launch platfrms; supprting C3; lgistics; and platfrms. Multi-tiered defense indepth via multiple engagements using land, sea, air, space, and special peratins frces. Active EW t disrupt remte r n-bard guidance systems. Infrmatin Operatins. Deceptin. NBC prtectin. TM early warning. EW. OPSEC. Cuntersurveillance. Recvery and recnstitutin. Camuflage and cncealment. Mbility, dispersal, and hardening. TM prbable perating areas. TM cuntermeasures. TM WMD capabilities. TM warhead types. Threat emplyment COAs. TM OB. TM system signatures. TM RDT&E infrastructure. TM field perating areas. Prbable hide sites/launch sites. TM equipment. Threat emplyment COAs. TM system signatures. Air defenses supprting TMs. TM system C2 ndes. TM prbable perating areas. Prbable TM targets. TM flight characteristics. TM WMD capabilities. Threat emplyment COAs. TM OB. Defense suppressin threat capabilities. TM time f flight. TM accuracy. TM OB. TM WMD capabilities. TM warhead types and effects. Meterlgical effects. Adversary TM targeting prcess. TM prbable targets and target areas. TM attack timing and numbers. TM TTPs. Meterlgical effects n TM peratins. Adversary knwledge f TMD deplyment. Defense suppressin threat capabilities. TM prductin infrastructure. TM Fixed peratinal infrastructure. TM TTPs. Meterlgical effects n TM peratins. TM OB. TM WMD infrastructure. Adversary TM targeting prcess. TM attack timing and numbers. TM cuntermeasures. TM warhead types. Meterlgical effects n TM peratins. Adversary knwledge f TMD deplyment. Adversary TM targeting prcess. TM prbable targets and target areas. TM attack timing and numbers. Threat emplyment COAs. a. TMD C4I. Cmmand and cntrl (C2) fr jint TMD peratins is a cmmander's exercise f authrity and directin ver frces assigned jint TMD missins. Use existing jint and service C4I systems and resurces t efficiently accmplish C4I fr jint TMD missins. This integrates ther peratinal functins and ptimizes the use f scarce resurces. The C4I system links passive defense, active defense, and attack peratins t prvide timely assessment f the threat (t include IPB); rapid disseminatin f tactical warning; and missin assignment, targeting data, and pststrike assessment t the apprpriate jint TMD element. Fr each peratinal element, the C4I system must prvide rapid cmmunicatins amng intelligence assets, the fusin and decisin-making facilities, and the warning and weapn systems, t include a capability fr rapid crdinatin with supprting cmbatant cmmanders. Space assets and infrmatin peratins are critical t attack peratins, active I-2

16 defense, and passive defense because they prvide launch warning, launch pint predictin, launch pint detectin, threat type determinatin, impact pint predictin, weapn systems cueing, cmmunicatins, and related intelligence. Jint TMD C4I capabilities must supprt the principles f centralized planning, decentralized executin, and crdinated effrts by frces assigned jint TMD tasks. b. Attack Operatins. Attack peratins are characterized by ffensive actins intended t destry and disrupt adversary TM capabilities befre, during, and after launch. Attack peratins prevent TM launch r additinal TM launches by attacking critical elements (that is, launch platfrms, recnnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisitin [RSTA] platfrms, C2 ndes, missile stcks, and infrastructure) f the verall system. The preferred methd f cuntering adversary TM peratins is t attack and destry r disrupt TMs befre their launch. Attack peratins can be preemptive r reactive as part f cunterair, strategic attack, interdictin, fire supprt, maneuver, antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, strike warfare, amphibius, r special peratins. Attack peratins are challenging because TM systems are generally hard t detect and are nrmally dispersed, mbile, electrnically quiet, and redundant. Thus, the detectin, acquisitin, identificatin, tracking, and attack tasks are highly dependent n a near-real-time C4I prcess and rapid targeting capability. c. Active Defense. The rle f active defense peratins is t prtect selected assets and frces frm attack by destrying TM airbrne launch platfrms and/r TMs in-flight. Active defense must cnsist f defense in-depth against all classes f TMs. When destructin f the TM launch platfrm befre launch is nt pssible r successful, TMs shuld be engaged by all means available thrughut their entire flight prfile. Defense in-depth prvides multiple pprtunities t negate the TMs with differing capabilities, increases prbability f kill, and prhibits the enemy frm being able t cunter the defensive system with a single technique. Active defense als includes thse actins that mitigate the effectiveness f targeting and delivery systems thrugh electrnic warfare (EW) against remte r n-bard guidance systems. d. Passive Defense. Passive defense is necessary t prvide essential individual and cllective prtectin fr friendly frces, ppulatin centers, and critical assets. Passive defense measures shuld be planned whenever United States (US) frces might face a TM threat. By examining varius cmbinatins f TM warhead accuracy and effects, numbers f available missiles, and the adversary targeting prcess, the likelihd and timing f an attack may be predicted and passive measures selected fr emplyment befre, during, and after a TM attack. e. Missin Fcus. The different missin areas f TMD require different types f IPB prducts. Fr instance, the C4I missin requires a fcus that addresses the adversary's use f ISR assets and hw t cunter them. Attack peratins need IPB prducts that highlight vulnerable ndes in the adversary's TM infrastructure and launch cmplexes. Active defense missins require IPB prducts that highlight the adversary's targeting prcess and prbable targets. Passive defense missins require IPB data n the accuracy f adversary TMs and prbable warhead selectin. The intelligence analyst shuld fcus the friendly IPB prcess t best supprt the cmmander's specific TMD missin. I-3

17 A gd IPB is essential if the peratrs are t understand hw the threat is likely t perate, t get sensrs in the mst effective cnfiguratin and t react t subtle TM activity indicatrs. The IPB infrmatin helps srt ut real TM infrmatin frm the distracting backgrund traffic. Jint Theater Missile Defense - Attack Operatins Test Frce, TMD IPB Overview a. What is TMD IPB? TMD IPB is a systematic, cntinuus prcess f analyzing the adversary TM frce and envirnment in a specific gegraphic area. The prcess is designed t supprt planning and decisin making by cmmanders and staffs. It allws them t selectively apply and maximize cmbat pwer at critical pints in the battlespace. b. What are the bjectives f TMD IPB? TMD IPB identifies facts and assumptins abut the battlespace envirnment and the TM threat. TMD IPB determines likely TM curses f actin (COAs), their assciated branches and sequels, and describes the perating envirnment fr TM peratins. This supprts cmmander and staff planning and the develpment f friendly COAs. TMD IPB prvides the basis fr intelligence cllectin, synchrnizatin, and target develpment t supprt the cmmander's chsen COA. (Figure I-1). c. TMD IPB cntains the fllwing 4 majr iterative and parallel steps: (1) Step-1 - Define the Battlespace Envirnment. Step-1 fcuses the cmmand's initial intelligence cllectin effrts and the remaining TMD IPB steps. T fcus the remaining steps, the analyst shuld identify the battlespace characteristics affecting TM frce peratins. Generally these characteristics include terrain, weather, lines f cmmunicatins (LOCs), infrastructure, and demgraphics. T limit the analytical and intelligence cllectin effrts t the gegraphic areas significant t the cmmand's missin, the jint frce cmmander (JFC) will establish the limits f the area f peratins (AO) and the TMD C4I Cmmander and Staff Attack Operatins Active Defense Passive Defense Planned Targets Cmmander s Objectives TAIs Immediate Targets Cmmander s Objectives COAs Targeting ISR COAs TAIs NAIs TMD IPB Define the Battlespace Envirnment Define the Battlespace s Effects Evaluate the TM Frce Determine TM COAs Theater Level IBP Figure I-1. TMD IPB and TMD Operatins I-4

18 area f interest (AOI) fr the TMD IPB prcess. The AO and AOI limits are dynamic and based n the lcatin and characteristics f the battlespace influencing the peratin. Defining the significant characteristics f the battlespace envirnment aids in identifying gaps in current intelligence hldings and the specific intelligence required t fill them. Similarly, the TMD IPB identifies gaps in the analyst's knwledge f the TM frce and its current situatin. Once apprved by the cmmander, the specific intelligence required t fill gaps in infrmatin regarding the battlespace envirnment and adversary TM frce dispsitin becmes the cmmander's TMD pririty intelligence requirements. (2) Step-2 - Define the Battlespaces Effects. Step-2 evaluates envirnmental effects impacting adversary TM frces. The analysis perfrmed in this step examines terrain, weather, and ther battlespace characteristics (that is, the adversary's use f the electrmagnetic spectrum and their TM frce infrastructure) t determine hw these characteristics may limit r prvide pprtunities fr TM frce peratins. The bjective is t integrate these effects int an analysis that designates the mst prbable adversary TM frce perating areas. This integrated analysis prvides key pieces f infrmatin fr evaluating COAs by fcusing n hw the envirnment impacts n TM capabilities. (3) Step-3 - Evaluate the TM Frce. In Step-3, TMD IPB fcuses in detail n hw the TM frce nrmally rganizes fr cmbat and cnducts peratins under ideal cnditins. When facing a well-knwn adversary, the TMD IPB prcess can rely n histrical databases and well-develped threat mdels. When perating against a new, changing, r less well-knwn adversary, the analyst may need t develp intelligence databases and threat mdels cncurrently. The TM frce evaluatin is prtrayed in a threat mdel that includes dctrinal templates depicting hw the TM frce perates when uncnstrained by battlespace envirnmental effects. Threat mdels are depicted graphically (dctrinal templates) supplemented by high-value target matrices and simple narratives. (4) Step-4 - Determine TM COAs. Step-4 integrates the results f the previus steps int a meaningful cnclusin. Given what the TM frce nrmally prefers t d and the effects f the specific envirnment in which it is nw perating, this step assesses adversary bjectives and available TM COAs. In additin, Step-4 includes preparatin f event templates and matrices that fcus intelligence cllectin n identifying which COA the TM frce will execute fr each phase f peratins. The TM COA mdels develped in Step-4 are the prducts that the cmmand staff will use t prtray the TM frce in their decisin-making and frce management prcesses. These mdels can nly be prduced effectively if a gd fundatin has been established during the first 3 steps f the TMD IPB prcess. 4. TM Threat Frces a. The TM Threat. The TM threat is a cmplex multidimensinal intelligence prblem, as illustrated in Figure I-2. TMD IPB aims t decmpse and crrelate the "wh, what (equipment and units), where (infrastructure), when, why, and hw (peratins)" in rder t develp ptential TM COAs fr the peratinal planning prcess. Each TM frce is equipped, rganized, trained, I-5

19 and emplyed with varius degrees f difference. Many f these differences are relatively minr, while sme are mre dramatic. TMD IPB encmpasses all dimensins f the threat. Because f the gravity f the TM threat, TMD IPB fcuses n develping this infrmatin t allw fr the best pssible chice f friendly COAs. b. TM Systems. There is a wide range f TMs currently deplyed and available t adversary cuntries. JP 3-01, Jint Dctrine fr Cuntering Air and Missile Threats, defines the fllwing majr categries as (1) Theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) with range capabilities f less than r equal t 3500 kilmeters (km). (a) Shrt range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with range capabilities f less than r equal t 1000 km. (b) Medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with range capabilities between 1000 and 3000 km. (c) Intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with range capabilities between 3000 and 3500 km. (d) Sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with range capabilities f less than r equal t 3500 km. OPERATIONS (When, Hw, and Why?) Training CCD COMSEC/OPSEC Mvement Mdels Flight Characteristics Lgistics Timelines Targeting C2 TTP Dctrine LOC RDT&E Prductin Depts Air Defense Garrisns Cmmunicatins Hide Sites Launch Sites Missiles Launchers Fire Cntrl Supprt Equipment Cmmunicatins Organizatin OB TO&E EQUIPMENT and UNITS (Wh and What?) INFRASTRUCTURE (Where?) Figure I-2. Multiple Dimensins f the TM Threat I-6

20 (2) Cruise Missiles (CMs). (a) Land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) including sea, underwater, air, and land launched types. (b) Antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) including sea, underwater, air, and land launched types. (3) Air-t-surface missiles (ASMs) r tactical air-t-surface missiles (TASM). ASM as defined in JP 3-01 excludes shrt-range, nnnuclear, direct fire missiles, bmbs, and rckets such as Maverick r wire-guided missiles. This definitin des nt adequately define the bundaries f what shuld be r shuld nt be cnsidered when addressing ASMs. T prvide bundaries, this publicatin will exclude ASMs with less than a 30-km range capability. c. TMD IPB Fcus. The examples used in this publicatin fcus n the TBM threat. This fcus is based n the inherent cmplexities invlved in TBM peratins. In shrt, there are mre steps invlved in launching a TBM vice launching a CM r ASM. By using the TBM threat as an example, this publicatin attempts t prvide a mre cmplete TMD IPB methdlgy. This fcus des nt imply a lesser imprtance t the CM r ASM threat. These systems are, and will cntinue t be, a credible threat t friendly peratins. Hwever, the methdlgy fr cnducting IPB against a grund-launched CM threat is sufficiently similar t the IPB against a TBM threat that the prcedures described are applicable fr either system. The IPB against a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), an air-launched cruise missile, r an ASM is sufficiently different in that it is much mre platfrm-centric. In these cases, the fcus f the IPB is mre n the launch platfrm and the different envirnments in which they perate. With these systems, the IPB prcess must fcus n the physical maritime and air battlespace envirnments. These system specific differences are discussed further in Chapter III. d. Deplyed TM Systems. Technlgically, TM systems span a spectrum f sphisticatin that has direct implicatins fr the IPB prcess. (1) The mst widely deplyed TMs tday are systems with technlgies (guidance and cntrl (G&C), liquid-prpellant prpulsin, and airframe) dating frm the 1940s thrugh the 1960s. Operatinally, the surface-t-surface missile system (SCUD) TBMs and SILKWORM ASCMs representative f this class are the mst widely deplyed and cntinue t be imprved and prliferated. They are manpwer and equipment intensive when cmpared t mdern systems. (2) Advanced TM systems are currently deplyed in fewer numbers and include slid-prpellant prpulsin, imprved G&C with digital flight cmputers and glbal psitining systems (GPSs), imprved airframe, and mdern grund supprt equipment (GSE) technlgies. These mre mdern technlgies result in imprved quick reactin times, accuracy, lethality, and a need fr less supprt vehicles and peratinal supprt. Operatinally these systems require significantly less manpwer and integrate autmatin in erectr-launchers and ther GSE. Althugh limited in number, these systems pse a grwing threat t TMD peratins. I-7

21 5. Phases f TMD Operatins US military peratins can be brken int 5 majr phases: prehstilities, ldgment, decisive cmbat and stabilizatin, fllw-thrugh, and psthstilities and redeplyment. a. Prehstilities Phase. The prehstilities phase encmpasses nrmal dayt-day peacetime peratins and ffers the highest leverage fr TMD IPB preparatin. During this phase, TMD IPB develpment can draw upn the distributed prductin assets f the intelligence cmmunity (natinal, theater, and service rganizatins), which have the respnsibility fr prviding the key data needed fr TMD IPB develpment. T ptimize the value f these surces, the analyst shuld begin TMD IPB develpment as early as pssible and cntinually refine t prvide as much depth as pssible given available intelligence data. b. Ldgment Phase. The ldgment phase invlves the mvement and buildup f a decisive cmbat frce in the peratinal area. It may include initial strikes frm utside the theater as well as hlding r defensive actins frm units already in-theater. During this phase, TMD IPB plays an imprtant rle in TMD deplyments, initial planning fr TMD attack peratins, ptins fr passive defense, and verall cmmand COA develpment t mitigate the effects f an adversary's TMs. Jint r cmpnent level units assigned TMD IPB respnsibilities shuld acquire as much TMD IPB data as pssible befre deplyment. Links shuld be established with apprpriate natinal intelligence rganizatins t prvide supprt t TMD intelligence peratins as required. c. Decisive Cmbat and Stabilizatin Phase. This phase initially fcuses n the cntinuing rapid buildup f jint frce capabilities. The gal is t deter hstilities, but if deterrence fails, t cnduct decisive cmbat peratins. In this phase, the TMD IPB shuld be updated and refined based n bserved and anticipated adversary cmbat peratins and used t plan and execute active defense peratins, attack peratins, and passive defense measures. d. Fllw-Thrugh Phase. The fllw-thrugh phase aims t bring the cnflict t a successful cnclusin. In this phase, TMD IPB will be updated based n bserved adversary cmbat peratins. TMD IPB will be used t ptimize active defense deplyments, attack peratins, passive defense, and the cmmand's COAs. e. Psthstilities and Redeplyment Phase. This phase includes clsing the campaign with a crdinated withdrawal while maintaining theater integrity. TMD IPB will again be updated based n bserved adversary cmbat peratins and used t establish psthstility defensive COAs. 6. Wh Cnducts IPB Organizatinal Rles and Respnsibilities. Many rganizatins have the rle and respnsibility t supprt the integrated TMD IPB effrt; Table I-2 lists sme f these thrugh the executin level. One imprtant aspect nt depicted in the table is the essential relatinship between the intelligence and peratins staffs. That relatinship must be 2-way fr the TMD IPB prcess t wrk prperly. It is I-8

22 prperly. It is essential that the intelligence staff understands the current peratins situatin and plan in rder t facilitate a smth and efficient TMD IPB. It is als essential that the intelligence staff perfrming the TMD IPB functin adequately cnvey the TMD IPB infrmatin t the peratins staff in a timely manner. In essence, neither peratins nr intelligence can functin prperly withut each ther. Teamwrk is essential fr TMD IPB and TMD t succeed. Table I-2. Sme Organizatins and Intelligence Rles and Respnsibilities in Supprt f TMD Sme Organizatins and Intelligence Rles and Respnsibilities in Supprt f TMD Organizatin Subrdinated T Rles and Respnsibilities in Supprt f TMD Natinal Level DIA Secretary f Defense General Military Intelligence NSA Secretary f Defense SIGINT and ELINT CIA President General Military Intelligence Central MASINT Office DIA MASINT USAF Directr ISR USAF/Deputy Chief f Staff Air and Space Operatins General Military Intelligence n Threat TM Frces USA Deputy Chief f Staff fr Intelligence Chief f Staff USA General Military Intelligence USN Chief f Naval Intelligence Chief f Naval Operatins General Military Intelligence USMC Assistant Chief f Staff C4I Cmmandant f the USMC General Military Intelligence Jint Infrmatin Operatins Center US Space Cmmand Infrmatin Operatins US Strategic Cmmand JIC CINC Strategic Cmmand General Military Intelligence n Ballistic Missiles US Space Cmmand CINC NORAD J-2 US Space Cmmand CINC TBM Indicatins and Warnings NORAD MSIC DIA DIA executive agent fr TMD IPB, S&TI n SRBMs and Air Defense Systems NAIC USAF S&TI n M/IRBMs, Aircraft, and Cruise Missiles NGIC USA Deputy Chief f Staff fr Intelligence S&TI n Grund Systems, ELs, and GSE Armed Frces Medical Intelligence Center DIA S&TI n CBW Office f Naval Intelligence Chief f Naval Operatins S&TI n SLBMs, Ships, and ASCMs NIMA Secretary f Defense Overhead Intelligence Cllectin & MC&G Supprt Defense Special Missile and Astrnautics Center DIA Freign Missile/Space Activity Indicatins & Warning Department f State Intelligence Secretary f State Arms Cntrl and Plitical Cnsideratins Theater Level Natinal Military JIC Secretary f Defense Natinal Level Intelligence Pint f Entry fr JTF J-2 & JISE Cmbatant Cmmand CINC The CINC s Immediate Intelligence Staff JTF J-2 and JISE JFC The JFC s Immediate Intelligence Staff NIST JFC and NMJIC Natinal Level Augmentatin t JTF J-2 & JISE USAF Theater Intelligence Elements JFC and Air Frce Frces USAF Theater Intelligence Elements USA Theater Intelligence Elements JFC and Army Frces USA Theater Intelligence Elements USN Theater Intelligence Elements JFC and Navy Frces USN Theater Intelligence Elements USMC Theater Intelligence Elements JFC and Marine Frces USMC Theater Intelligence Elements I-9

23 Chapter II STEP-1: DEFINE THE BATTLESPACE ENVIRONMENT 1. What Is It? a. Definitin. Step-1 f the TMD IPB prcess identifies fr further analysis specific features f the envirnment r activities within it that affect the battlespace fr bth adversary and friendly peratins. b. Desired End Effect. (1) Fcus the IPB effrt n the battlespace areas and characteristics that influence the cmmand's missin. (2) Acquire the intelligence needed t cmplete the TMD IPB prcess t the degree f detail required t supprt the decisin-making prcess. (3) Save time and effrt by fcusing nly n thse areas and features that influence TMD peratins. Infrmatin must be t a level f detail required t supprt the cmmand's decisin-making prcess. 2. Hw T D It Fr TMD The primary sub-steps are shwn in Figure II-I. The prducts are a series f templates used t direct, fcus, and feed the analytical effrts f Steps-2, -3, and -4 with intelligence data/infrmatin. Step 1 - Define the Battlespace Envirnment Steps Step-1.1 Analyze the Cmmand s Missin in Relatin t TMD Step-1.2 Identify the Limits f the AO, AOI, and Battlespace Step-1.3 Determine the Significant Characteristics f the AO Envirnment Step-1.4 Identify the Amunt f Detail Required and Feasible Within the Time Available Step-1.5 Evaluate Existing Databases and Identify Gaps Step-1.6 Cllect the Material and Intelligence Required t Supprt Further TMD IPB Analysis Prducts Cmmander s Missin(s) & Objective(s) Summary Cmmander s Missin(s) Guidance Summary TM Frce Cverage Assessment Ptential TM Frce Deplyment Area Assessment AO and AOI Assessment fr TMD Passive Defense Operatins AO and AOI Assessment fr TMD Active Defense Operatins AO and AOI Assessment fr TMD Attack Operatins Cmpsite AO and AOI Assessment TMD Battlespace Assessment Geplitical and Reginal Threat Assessment TM Frce Overview Assessment Adversary Active Defense Suppressin Threat Assessment Majr Terrain and LOC Overview TMD IPB Checklist - All Steps TMD IPB Develpment Plan - All Steps TMD IPB Hldings, Data Bases, Surces, and Links Assessment TMD IPB Infrmatin Surce Evaluatin TMD IPB POCs Recmmended PIR(s) / EEI(s) / RFI(s) Key Wrd Infrmatin Search DIA Standardized Categry Cde Infrmatin Search Equipment Cde Infrmatin Search Majr Cnsumers TMD IPB Functin JFC J-2 and Staff Cllectin Management Staff JFACC and Immediate Staff AADC and Immediate Staff Figure II-1. Step 1 - Define the Battlespace Envirnment II-1

24 a. Step Analyze the Cmmand's Missin in Relatin t TMD. The TM missin is determined by understanding prvided bjectives and guidance. Objectives and guidance identify what is t be achieved and under what cnditins and parameters. This is an imprtant stage in the TMD IPB prcess. Withut a clear understanding f what is t be achieved, it is impssible t achieve efficient TMD IPB develpment. Objectives and guidance begin at the natinal level as brad cncepts and shuld end as shrt-term, well-defined missin bjectives at the apprpriate cmmand level. (1) Objectives. An bjective must be understandable, attainable, measurable, and allw rm fr a slutin. It defines the specific TMD IPB prblems t be slved. When pssible, identify the specific starting and ending times fr the bjective as knwledge f the timing is critical t prviding TMD IPB supprt. If pssible, estimate latest time infrmatin is f value (LTIOV). This is the time by which infrmatin abut the bjective must be delivered in rder t prvide decisin makers with timely intelligence. Anther significant part f an bjective is identifying the area in which t affect the adversary activity. This infrmatin narrws the gegraphical scpe and simplifies the TMD IPB analyst's jb. (a) Relatinship f Objectives. The 3 brad levels f bjectives are natinal, theater, and cmpnent. The bjective levels are intertwined and each successive level dwn becmes mre detailed and specific. The cmpnent cmmander's bjectives are based n the bjectives set by the theater cmmander, the assigned missin(s), the resurces available, adversary characteristics, and the military characteristics f the AO. Cmpnents nrmally supplement peratin and cntingency plans. The theater cmmander sets bjectives fr the theater f peratins, which are cntingent upn the natinal bjectives. Operatin/cntingency plans nrmally specify the cmmand bjectives, cmmander's cncept f peratins, the threat, and frces available. The President and Secretary f Defense are respnsible fr setting the very brad natinal bjectives, which generally utline the verall desired utcme f the campaign. There shuld be n cnflicting bjectives amng the levels and the TMD IPB develpers must be cgnizant f all bjectives. (b) Objectives Template. A simple questinnaire wrksheet can prvide a template fr evaluating and recrding missin bjectives. Once a cmplete set f bjectives is defined, summarize them in a list frm. First develp the bjectives fr the cmmand's verall missin if nt already btained frm higher headquarters. Next evaluate TMD specific missin bjectives. See Appendix B, Figure B-3 fr suggested template examples f an bjectives summary template and Figure B-4 fr an bjectives wrksheet template. The bjectives wrksheet template shuld be cmpleted fr each identified bjective. (2) Guidance. Guidance prvides the framewrk t achieve the bjectives and establishes the frce emplyment scpe and restrictins. (a) Types. The law f armed cnflict (LOAC) (als referred t as law f armed war) is that prtin f internatinal law that regulates the cnduct f armed hstilities. The LOAC includes treaties, cnventins, internatinal agreements and custmary internatinal law. Ratified treaties, cnventins, and II-2

25 internatinal agreements, as well as applicable custmary internatinal law legally bind the US. Rules f engagement (ROE) are directives issued by cmpetent military authrity that delineate the circumstances and limitatins under which US frces will initiate and/r cntinue cmbat engagement with ther frces encuntered. The ROE can change within each cnflict, based n directives issued by cmpetent military authrity. (b) Cmmand Guidance. Cmmand guidance cmes in many frms and can entail a brad range f subjects, frm apprved tactics fr active TMD t prper behavir in lcal establishments. A template fr recrding the cmmand's missin and TMD missin guidance is at Appendix B, Figure B-5. List each f the identified cmmand guidance, ROE, and applicable LOAC n the wrksheet and describe each in as much detail as needed. Nte: Objectives and guidance are the crnerstnes f the TMD IPB prcess. They guide the 4 majr steps f the TMD IPB prcess and shuld be clear and well defined. Once develped, theater and cmmand bjectives are cnstantly reviewed t assure they accurately reflect the current cmmand TMD missin. Everyne invlved in the TMD IPB prcess shuld fully understand the cmmander's bjectives and guidance r request further clarificatin. A starting pint fr receiving and assessing the cmmander's bjectives and guidance fllw: Operatins Plan (OPLAN). Operatins Order (OPORD). Warning Order. Alert Order/Deply Order. Planning Order. Air Tasking Order/Integrated Tasking Order. Fragmentary Order. Operatin Plan in Cncept Frmat (CONPLAN). Cncept f Operatins (CONOPS). Time-Phased Frce and Deplyment List. Defended Asset List (DAL). Standing ROEs. b. Step Identify the Limits f the AO, AOI, and Battlespace fr the TMD IPB Prcess. T assist in the crdinatin and decnflictin f jint actin, JFCs may define peratinal r jint areas. Fr peratins limited in scpe (such as TMD) gegraphic cmbatant cmmanders can designate peratinal areas such as jint peratin areas, jint special peratins areas (JSOAs), jint rear areas II-3

26 (JRAs), amphibius bjective areas, r AOs. An AO is the gegraphical area where a cmmander is assigned the respnsibility and authrity t cnduct military peratins. An AOI is based n peratinal factrs and the cmmand's cncept f peratins, as defined by higher headquarters. The intelligence cell recmmends the AOI t the cmmander based n IPB. (1) AO fr TMD IPB. T save time and fcus the IPB effrt n the areas and characteristics f the battlespace that mst directly affect the cmmand's missin, the intelligence analyst will limit the analysis t the gegraphical areas supprting trps and capabilities that can influence TMD peratins. This publicatin refers t that gegraphical area as the AO. AOs fr TMD IPB are thse gegraphical regins analysts use t define missile threat envelpes, the lcatins where TM frces perate, and/r where TMD peratins will be cnducted. Nte: The Army and Marine Crps use the term area f peratins (AO) in their IPB manual [FM /MCRP 2-12A] whereas the Air Frce uses peratinal area (OA) in their IPB pamphlet. Fr the purpse f TMD IPB, these terms are analgus. Bth references define these terms as that prtin f an area f cnflict necessary fr military peratins. This publicatin uses the term AO; hwever, the definitin differs frm that in JP The use f AO in this publicatin des nt infer that a specified AO cmmander, as defined in JP 1-02, has respnsibility and authrity fr TMD peratins, nr des it limit the size f the gegraphical area r limit it t nly naval r land cmmanders. This term nly defines a gegraphical area necessary t fcus the IPB prcess fr the intelligence analyst. The maximum attack depth f the cmmander's available TMD attack peratins assets usually limits the AO fr TMD IPB. The evaluatin f the battlespace's effects in the AO is generally mre thrugh and detailed than it is within the AOI. The AO fr TMD IPB is derived frm the DAL, OPLAN, OPORD, CONPLAN, and/r CONOPS. Remember that the DAL requires an analysis, which includes several IPB prducts, f the adversary's targeting strategy. Generally the DAL is established based upn what the friendly cmmander wants t prtect that may leave pssible targets unprtected. (2) AOI fr TMD IPB. The TM peratins battlespace defines the AOI fr TMD IPB. T plan and successfully cnduct the TMD missin, AOI infrmatin and intelligence are required. The limits f the TMD cmpsite AOI are based n the ability f the adversary t prject pwer r mve TM frces int the AO. Gegraphical lcatins f ther activities (fr example, terrrists) r characteristics f the envirnment that might influence COAs r the cmmander's decisins, are als cnsidered. Because the limits f the TMD cmpsite, AOIs are based n threats t missin accmplishment rather than strictly terrain cnsideratins; they might crss int ther cuntries. Fr example, if plitical develpments in a neutral cuntry might influence the accmplishment f the cmmand's missin, that cuntry shuld be included in the TMD cmpsite AOI. Likewise, if anther cuntry prvides a base f supprt fr the adversary cuntry's TM frce, it shuld be included within the TMD cmpsite AOI. The fllwing templates shuld be created fr defining the AOs and AOIs fr TMD IPB: II-4

27 Ptential TM Frce Cverage. Ptential TM Frce Deplyment Area(s). TMD Active Defense AO and AOI Template. TMD Passive Defense AO and AOI Template. TMD Attack Operatins AO and AOI Template. Cmpsite AO and AOI Template. Tw basic cnsideratins the TMD IPB analyst shuld keep in mind are divisin f AO and AOI templates int multiple sets and knwledge f TM frce infrastructure data. Depending upn the situatin, it may be beneficial t divide the AO templates int multiple areas based upn TM frce weapn system categry. Fr example, there are significant differences between TBMs and ASCMs. In mst cases, it is better t build a set f AO templates fr TBMs and anther set f AO templates fr ASCMs. Sme cuntries have many mre SRBMs than MRBMs. Because f the differences between missiles, this is a case when separate AO templates may again be better. Each situatin is different, and the TMD IPB analyst will have t use the best judgement in determining hw t divide the AO templates. One final cnsideratin is the extent f knwledge f the adversary TM frce infrastructure data. If the TM frce perating areas are unknwn, then assume that the TM frce (air, land, r sea-based) can perate frm any part f the adversary's battlespace. This can include ccupied prtins f neighbring cuntries such as Kuwait fr Iraq during the Gulf War f (3) TMD Battlespace. The AO and AOI are gegraphic areas that can be defined nt nly in three-dimensins (height, width, and depth) but in ther dimensins as well. In determining ther dimensins f the TMD battlespace, the TMD intelligence functin must mve beynd addressing nly the cncrete, physical aspects f the gegraphic envirnment. The TMD battlespace includes all elements f the envirnment that are relevant t the cmmand's TMD missin. The TMD frces use f the electrmagnetic spectrum (fr example, radis and radars); the capabilities f the TMD frce t use satellites fr cmmunicatins and intelligence gathering; and TMD frce infrmatin systems capabilities and vulnerabilities, bth inside and utside the TMD IPB AO, are examples f ther envirnment elements that must be cnsidered when determining the dimensins f the cmmand's TMD battlespace. Figure II-2 and Figure II-3 prvide the basic prcesses fr assessing the AO/AOI fr TMD IPB. Using these prcesses, Figures II-4 thrugh II-10 prvide illustrative examples f assessing the AO, AOI, and battlespace fr TMD IPB. See Appendix B, Figures B-6 thrugh B-9 fr crrelating blank templates. II-5

28 Select adversary cuntry brder(s) fr land-based TMs and/ r castlines fr sea-baser knwn/assessed Tms and/ TM perating areas/bases. Query active defense planners fr active defense areas and cverages. Calculate frward adversary TM frce range arcs. Calculate reverse adversary TM frce range arcs frm brder(s). Plt active defense cverage by TMD weapn system type. AO and AOI Assessment Prcess fr TMD IPB Select unin f frward range arcs with AO. Select unin f frward range arcs with AO. Template Ptential TM frce cverage. Template Ptential TM frce deplyment area. Template Plt knwn lcatins f adversary TM frce perating bases and areas. Calculate frward adversary TM frce range arcs frm perating areas. Select unin f frward range arcs with AO and AOI. Query surces fr adversary TM frce targeting dctrine. Plt ptential adversary TM frce targets frm TMD IPB Step-3 if available. Query cmmand staff fr DAL/critical asset list. Plt ptential adversary TM frce targets and DAL. Select Unin f Targets/DAL with frward Range Arcs and AO. Template Query surces fr adversary TM frce targeting dctrine. Plt ptential adversary TM frce targets frm TMD IPB Step-3 if available. Query cmmand staff fr DAL/critical asset list. Plt ptential adversary TM frce targets and DAL. Select Unin f Targets/DAL with Frward Range Arcs and AOI. Plt knwn lcatins f adversary TM frce RDT&E and prductin infrastructure. Plt all ptential airspace and gegraphic areas attack peratins frces may use in mving the attack peratins AO (this is typically all f the adversary and ccupied territry). Plt knwn lcatins f adversary TM frce peratinal infrastructure r the reverse range arc. Plt knwn lcatins f adversary TM frce LOC infrastructure and chke pints. Plt cverage f adversary air defense system which can threaten attack peratins. Plt current and planned perating areas fr attack peratin sensrs. Template Attack peratins AO and AOI. Ntes: If perating areas are unknwn, use adversary cuntry brders (r the brders f ccupied territry) t calculate the AO fr active defense TMD IPB. Fr any f the templates, the AOs can be divided int multiple areas. Fr example, the AO fr active defense TMD IPB can be subdivided int a SRBM applicable AO and an MRBM applicable AO. This can be useful t highlight parts f an AO based n weapn systems with significantly different capabilities. Anther example wuld be t separate different classes f TM weapn systems frm each ther, such as TBMs frm ASCMs. Plt active defense AOs and AOIs Figure II-2. AO and AOI Assessment Prcess fr TMD IPB Plt passive defense AOs and AOIs TMD Cmpsite AOI Assessment Prcess Identify ther gegraphic areas f the adversary cuntry and ccupied territry currently nt part f the TMD AOs which culd supprt the develpment and maintenance f the adversary s TM frce Identify ther cuntries currently nt part f the TMD AOs which may be supprting the develpment and maintenance f the adversary s TM frce Plt attack peratins AOs and AOIs If pssible, identify activities and lcatins within these cuntries prviding the supprt and plt its lcatins Identify ther cuntries currently nt part f the TMD AOs which are currently neutral but may becme hstile r supprt the adversary in the future If pssible, identify activities and lcatins within these cuntries prviding the supprt and plt its lcatins Cmbine all influencing areas int a single plt Template Cmpsite TMD AOI Identify friendly and neutral cuntries currently nt part f the TMD AOs which the adversary may threaten with TM frces t influence the TMD As If pssible, identify activities and lcatins within these cuntries which the adversary wuld target with its TM frce and plt their lcatins Nte: Grss identificatins f areas may be required. This may result frm a less than cmplete understanding f factrs influencing the TMD AO. Fr example, ther areas within an adversary s ccupied territry capable f supprting TM frce peratins shuld be analyzed as well as the legitimate areas f the adversary cuntry. Anther example, utside influences may be entire cuntries, but if particular targets, develpment facilities and activities, prductin facilities and activities, prts f departure, and LOCs can be identified they shuld be pltted. Figure II-3. Cmpsite AOI Assessment Prcess II-6

29 180600Z MAR 00 UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 Ptential TM Frce Cverage Su-24 FENCER + AS-17 ARM (500 km) Ocean YELLOW PG Operating Area RED TBM (300 km) SLCM (300 km) BLUE GRAY PG Launched ASCM (300 km) Ocean SLCM Operating Area Ntes: 1. Patrl cmbatant (PG) perating area is knwn. 2. SLCM perating area is knwn. 3. TBM and ARM perating areas are unknwn. 4. TBM and ARM range arcs are based n frward range arcs frm the brders f the cmbined territry f RED and GRAY. 5. ARM cverage is based n a maximum launch range f 400 km fr the Su-24 FENCER and an additinal 100 km fr the AS-17 after launch. The cmbined range cverage is 500 km. TMD IPB Template March 2000 UNCLASSIFIED Figure II-4. Ptential TM Frce Cverage Template Lcal Reprductin Authrized II-7

30 180600Z MAR 00 UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 Ptential TM Frce Deplyment Area Assessment Ptential ARM deplyment areas (reverse 500-km range arc) Ocean YELLOW RED BLUE GRAY Ptential TBM deplyment areas (reverse 400-km range arc) Ocean Ptential SLCM deplyment areas (reverse 500-km range arc) Ntes: 1. Reverse range arcs are frm the BLUE cuntry brder and represent the maximum ptential deplyment areas. 2. GRAY is currently ccupied by RED frces and has t be cnsidered as a ptential area fr deplyment f RED frces. 3. The ptential ARM deplyment area includes all airfields capable f supprting Su-24 FENCER peratins within the shaded area. 4. RED PGs under cntinuus patrl have a maximum range f 2,000 km at 25 kph. This range cvers the entire cmmand AO and mre. Since the PGs are nt blue water capable, they have nt been pltted. Refer t the TM Frce Cverage Assessment Template fr their deplyment area. TMD IPB Template March 2000 UNCLASSIFIED Lcal Reprductin Authrized Figure II-5. Ptential TM Frce Deplyment Area Assessment Template II-8

31 180600Z MAR 00 UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 AO and AOI Assessment fr TMD Active Defense Operatins Su-24 FENCER + AS-17 ARM (500 km) Ocean Outlined area is the AOI fr TMD IPB supprting active defense peratins YELLOW PG Operating Area RED TBM (300 km) PATRIOT THAAD SLCM (300 km) BLUE GRAY PATRIOT PATRIOT PG Launched ASCM (300 km) THAAD PATRIOT PATRIOT Navy Theater Wide SM-2 Blck 4 SLCM Operating Area Ocean Ntes: 1. Dashed lines represent nminal interceptr cverages. 2. Slid lines represent nminal radar cverage. TMD IPB Template March 2000 UNCLASSIFIED Lcal Reprductin Authrized Figure II-6. AO and AOI Assessment fr TMD Active Defense Operatins Template II-9

32 180600Z MAR 00 UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 AO and AOI Assessment fr TMD Passive Defense Operatins Su-24 FENCER + AS-17 ARM (500 km) Passive defense AO is defined by the slid black symbls YELLOW Ocean RED GRAY # ^^ TBM ^^ (300 km) SLCM (300 km) ^^^ ^^ ^ ^ BLUE PG Launched ASCM (300 km) # $$ ^ Ocean Passive Defense AO Symbls Bth DAL and Ptential RED Target List ^ DAL Only $ Ptential RED Target List Only Ptential Mbile Naval Targets Ntes: 1. Passive defenseaos are pints r small areas represented by the passive defenseao symblgy. 2. There are n passive defense AOIs. An example f a passive defense AOI is ptential adversary targets r DAL targets utside f the current cmmand AO. A specific DESERT STORM example is ptential Iraqi targets within Israel prir t Iraq launching its first TBMs at Israel, which then became part f the passive defense AO. TMD IPB Template March 2000 UNCLASSIFIED Lcal Reprductin Authrized Figure II-7. AO and AOI Assessment fr TMD Passive Defense Operatins Template II-10

33 180600Z MAR 00 UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 AO and AOI Assessment fr TMD Attack Operatins YELLOW RED TM frce RDT&E and prductin infrastructure Ocean RED Air Defense Cverage Su-24 Airfield RED PG Prt TBM Operating Area # Predatr Orbit RED Air Defense Cverage BLUE Su-24 Airfield JSTARS Orbit Advanced synthetic aperture radar rbit GRAY Ocean Symbls and Black Shaded Areas Dente Attack Operatins AO Gray Shaded Areas Dente Attack Operatins AOI Ntes: 1. Given the capabilities f US aircraft t apprach targets frm all aspects and at any range, the entire cuntries f RED and GRAY are cnsidered an AOI fr attack peratins. 2. Only the targets and RED TM frce perating areas are cnsidered as the attack peratins AO. 3. Given the capabilities f US aircraft t apprach targets frm all aspects and at any range, ingress and egress rutes/areas are nt cnsidered as part f the attack peratins AO. TMD IPB Template March 2000 UNCLASSIFIED Lcal Reprductin Authrized Figure II-8. AO and AOI Assessment fr TMD Attack Operatins Template II-11

34 180600Z MAR 00 UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 Cmpsite AO and AOI Assessment Cmpsite f All AOs Cmpsite f All AOIs YELLOW RED BLUE GRAY Nte: The cuntry YELLOW is cntained in the cmpsite AOI because YELLOW is supplying RED with cmplete TM systems and prductin capabilities. The whle cuntry represents an AOI while the small circles dente identified facilities within YELLOW knwn t be supprting RED. TMD IPB Template March 2000 UNCLASSIFIED Lcal Reprductin Authrized Figure II-9. Cmpsite AO and AOI Assessment Template II-12

35 180600Z MAR 00 UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 TMD Battlespace Assessment TMD Related Radi Frequency Battlespace Nrth West East YELLOW Suth Cellular Telephne Cverage RED BLUE Fixed Air Surveillance Radar Cverage GRAY Mbile Air Surveillance Radar Cverage Mbile Air Surveillance Radar Cverage Therefre Spectrum in Hertz , ,000.0 Ntes: Map Sheet Name Map Sheet Series Map Sheet Number Map Sheet Editin Map Sheet Scale Hrizntal/Vertical Datum NA NA NA NA NA NA Legend / Key / Symbls / Scale Fixed Air Surveillance Radar Mbile Air Surveillance Radar ARM Passive Radar Seeker Cellular Telephne Cmmunicatins Vice / Data RED Imagery Satellite Data RED Imagery Satellite Km Scale 5 10 Nm TMD IPB Template March 2000 UNCLASSIFIED Lcal Reprductin Authrized Figure II-10. TMD Battlespace Assessment Template (1 f 2) II-13

36 180600Z MAR 00 PG perating area End Time 1237z 18 MAR00 RED Imagery Satellite Cverage Start Time 1233z YELLOW End Time 1107z 18 MAR00 RED Imagery Satellite Cverage Start Time 1103z RED GRAY UNCLASSIFIED Page 2 TMD Battlespace Assessment TM Frce Related Satellite Battlespace End Time 0937z 18 MAR00 RED Imagery Satellite Cverage Start Time 0933z BLUE End Time 0817z 18 MAR00 RED Imagery Satellite Cverage West Nrth Suth East RED Cmmunicatins Satellite Cverage Start Time 0813z RED Cmmunicatins Satellite Cverage SLCM Operating Area Therefre Spectrum in Hertz , ,000.0 Map Sheet Name Map Sheet Series Map Sheet Number Map Sheet Editin Map Sheet Scale Hrizntal/Vertical Datum 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 Legend/Key/Symbls/Scale Fixed Air Surveillance Radar Mbile Air Surveillance Radar ARM Passive Radar Seeker Km Scale 5 10 Nm Cellular Telephne Cmmunicatins Vice / Data RED Imagery Satellite Data RED Imagery Satellite Ntes: The RED cmmunicatins satellite is capable f supprting 2 simultaneus ftprints with t 3.2 GHz bent pipe transpnders per ftprint fr bth uplink and dwnlink. Each transpnder can supprt 50 multiplexed vice channels r ten 500 kilbits per secnd data channels. The RED cmmunicatins satellite has n stre-dump r EP capabilities. The RED imagery satellite makes 4 passes ver the AO every five days with a west t east grund track walk. The RED imagery satellite has a best grund reslutin f 15 m and has n ff-axis imaging capability (i.e. vertical imaging nly). Dwnlink is thrugh a 2 megabits per secnd link at 2.8 GHz and nly dwnlinks within LOS f the RED dwnlink site which requires 2 t 5 minutes fr acquisitin and 15 t 25 minutes fr image transfer. The RED imagery satellite has n stre-dump capability. TMD IPB Template March 2000 UNCLASSIFIED Lcal Reprductin Authrized Figure II-10 (Cntinued). TMD Battlespace Assessment Template (2 f 2) II-14

37 c. Step Determine the Significant Envirnmental Characteristics f the AO. Battlespace characteristics that affect the cmmander's decisins r the available cmmand r adversary COAs are f special significance in the TMD IPB prcess. Fr TM peratins include (1) Geplitical and Reginal Threat Assessment. An assessment f the geplitical and reginal situatin (Figure II-11) is useful in develping a framewrk in which TMs will likely be emplyed. This definitin shuld address natinal security gals, reginal factrs, and relatins with the US and allies, and be cndensed int shrt bulletized statements. Use the theater level IPB, military capabilities study (MCS), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as surces and supplement as apprpriate where gaps exist. (2) General TM Frce Capabilities. A general understanding f the TM frce's capabilities helps rient the TMD IPB prcess. T develp an understanding, determine, at a minimum, the fllwing TM frce parameters: (a) TM rle/missins/targeting. (b) Histrical use. (c) Order f battle (OB) data. Missile and launcher types and numbers. WMD capabilities and numbers. Knwn r ptential mbile (that is, field perating areas) and fixed TM infrastructures, (that is, research, develpment, test and evaluatin [RDT&E], prductin and peratinal garrisns/strage). Perfrmance data (that is, basic flight trajectry and accuracy and lethality data). Examine each characteristic in general terms t identify thse f significance t the cmmand and missin. Further evaluatin f characteristic effects ccurs later in the prcess. Figure II-12 prvides an example template. (3) TM Frce Active Defense Suppressin Capabilities Assessment. Assessing the adversary's intent and capability t suppress active TMD peratins prvides valuable inputs t active TMD peratins and security planning. Cnsider the fllwing infrmatin when ding this assessment (template at Figure II-12): defenses. (a) Histrical use f suppressin against theater air and missile (b) Distinctin between theater air defense and TMD. (c) Mtivatin and intent t suppress active TMD peratins. (d) Capability t suppress TMD peratins. TMs t suppress TMD peratins. TM tactics t penetrate active TMD peratins. TMs cnfigured with penetratin aids (signature reductin, decys, jammers, etc.). II-15

38 Aircraft t suppress active TMD peratins. ASCMs t suppress ship-based TMD elements. Antiradiatin missiles and/r electrnic cmbat t suppress TMD radar and C4I elements. WMD, special peratins frces, terrrist and insurgent frces, cmbined arms tactics, and/r cnventinal grund and naval frces (artillery, armr, infantry, naval surface warfare, underwater warfare, etc.) t suppress TMD peratins. Capabilities t lcate TMD assets fr suppressin. (4) Majr Terrain and Envirnment. An understanding f the general terrain envirnment is gained by cmpleting TMD IPB Step-1. Fr TMD IPB Steps-1 and -2, review and update the current hard cpy, digital glbal gespatial infrmatin and services (GGI&S) databases, and imagery. The Natinal Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), a primary surce fr this data, can prvide terrain maps depicting surface cnfiguratin (plains, hills, and muntains) and vegetatin (frested area, scrub, swamps, desert and pen grassland). Figure II- 13 is an example f a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) prduced map shwing an analysis f terrain. Digital chart f the wrld (DCW) II can prvide an alternative view. TMD IPB Step-2 addresses terrain and envirnmental effects n TM peratins in detail. (5) Majr LOCs. Defining the LOCs (rad, rail, and telecmmunicatin netwrks) is imprtant fr the detailed area limitatin analysis in TMD IPB Step-2. TMD IPB Step-1 defines and uses the primary rad/rail netwrk as an verlay when determining the AO and AOI. Rail netwrks will typically be less significant fr TM peratins in mst cuntries. An verlay is nt needed if its TM frce des nt use a particular adversary cuntry's rail netwrk. Als, an verlay fr telecmmunicatin netwrks shuld be develped. The military telecmmunicatins netwrk is mre imprtant than the civilian netwrk, thugh in many cuntries the military uses the civilian netwrk. Landlines are f particular imprtance t TM peratins. Use MCS, cuntry studies, r digital intelligence databases t btain infrmatin. Available data within DCW-II and cmmercial GGI&S systems generated the example (Figure II-13) f a kind f graphic needed fr this step. d. Step Identify the Amunt f Detail Required and Feasible Within the Time Available. Understanding the TMD IPB develpment prcess is essential in rder t cllect the required infrmatin and t deliver that infrmatin in a timely manner. Failing t get the right infrmatin t the right place at the right time can result frm trying t d t much. Yet, ding t little results in getting the wrng infrmatin t the right place at the right time. T avid this, develp a TMD IPB checklist t gauge the amunt and detail f wrk that needs be accmplished, then build a TMD IPB develpment plan t schedule the wrk identified in the TMD IPB checklist (Appendix D). This helps in fcusing the develpment effrt t get the right infrmatin t the right place at the right time. II-16

39 180600Z MAR 00 UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 Geplitical and Reginal Threat Assessment Adversary Natinal Security Gals and Desired End State Ensure survival f current plitical regime Limit freign, primarily US andallies, influence in the regin Adversary Reginal Strategic Vulnerabilities RED has a weak, but stable ecnmy RED has a lng- standing dispute with GRAY ver brder, claims GRAY is their furth prvince RED has engaged in armed cnflict with GRAY twice and BLUE nce within the last 50 years YELLOW has sld 250 TBMs t RED ver the last five years YELLOW is assisting RED in establishing a TBM prductin capability YELLOW has sld 150ASCMs t RED ver the last tw years YELLOW has sld an additinal 100ASCMs t RED fr delivery ver the next three years Principal Strategic and Operatinal Objectives Absrb GRAY int RED Dminate BLUE Deter perceived GRAY and BLUE aggressins Intent and Strategic Cncept f Operatins RED views US ecnmic and military aid t GRAY and BLUE as a direct threat t RED s natinal security RED views strng US and Blue ecnmic ties as a threat t RED ecnmic security Annex GRAY thrugh military invasin Frce the remval f US and allied frces in the regin thrugh the annexatin f GRAYand military intimidatin f BLUE Dminate BLUE thrugh the cntinued intimidatin f BLUE Ntes: TMD IPB Template March 2000 UNCLASSIFIED Lcal Reprductin Authrized Figure II-11. Geplitical and Reginal Threat Assessment Template II-17

40 180600Z MAR 00 Su-24 FENCER+ AS-17 ARM (500 km) YELLOW PG Operating Area Ocean PG Launched ASCM (300 km) # RED # # # # GRAY TBM (300 km) SLCM (300 km) BLUE SLCM Operating Area UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 Adversary TM Frce Capabilities Assessment General Capabilities Ocean Types and OB f TMs ASMs Nne ARMs 72 x RussianAS-17a 12 x Launch Platfrm - Russian Su-24D FENCER ASCMs 96 x YELLOW SSY-N-4 8 x Launch Platfrms - Russian OSAII PG LACMs - SLCMs 120 x YELLOW SSY-N-2 2 x Launch Platfrm - FrenchAgsta SS TBM s- SRBMs 400 x YELLOW SSY-6 18 x Launch Platfrm - MAZ-543 Rle/Missin/Targeting f TM TBMs, LACMs, and SLCMs Strategic weapns - fundatin fr reginal military influence Primary deep strike weapns Key military airfields, key C4I ndes, air defense/tmd sites, and large fixed military lgistics/materials sites Pssible nuclear and CW dimensin, n bilgical weapn capability ASCMs Castal defense Largesurfacegrupfrmatins, aircraftcarriersandthermajr capitalandamphibius ships ARMs Defense suppressin f air and TMD PATRIOT radars, THAAD radars, and pssiblyaegis radars Histrical Use Knwn Flight Tests/Training Launches (successes/failures) AS-17aARMs (15/5), SSY-N-4 (35/6), SSY-N-2 SLCMs (6/0), and SSY-6 TBMs (22/3) RED-GRAY War 6 SSY-6s - used against GRAY airfields RED-BLUE War 2 BLUE frigates attacked with 8 RED SSY-N-4ASCMs. 1 frigate sunk and ne severely damaged RED-GRAY War 12AS-17aARMs used in three separate attacks. AS-17a targeted Russian-supplied GRAY SA-2 radars. 46 SSY-6 TBMs used against key GRAY airfields. 12 SSY-6 TBMs used against key GRAY C4I ndes. 4 SSY-N-4ASCMs used against a GRAY PG. SSY-N-2SLCM neverusedincmbat. RED never used WMD in cmbat. Emplyment Cncepts TBMs Deply befre cnflict initiatin t cnduct mbile field peratins. Launchers mve int hide sites, then t launch sites and launch. After launch, launchers mve t different hide site, then t translad site. Missiles/fuel/warheads mve frm field strage sites t translad sites. Translad site prepares and relads missile/relad launchers upn arrival. After relad, launchers mve t new hide site. Cycle repeats. SLCMs Deply t perating area ff BLUE cast prir t cnflict initiatin. ASCMs Deply t perating area ff RED cast/capital prt prir t cnflict initiatin. Cnduct defensive peratins against hstile navy attacking capital. ARMs Operate frm hme airfields. Su-24D FENCERs fly t BLUE brder and launch ARMs. Primary target: THAAD and then PATRIOT radars. TM Characteristics and Perfrmance Parameters AS-17a SSY-N-4 ASCM SSY-N-2 SLCM SSY-6 TBM Prpulsin Type Turbjet Turbjet Turbjet Single Stage Liquid Length (m) Diameter (m) Wing Span (m) (tail-fin span) Maximum Range (km) Minimum Range (km) Accuracy (circular errr prbable) (m) Maximum Range Apgee (m) 120,000 (lfted prfile) NA NA 100 Nminal Launch Altitude (m) ,000 Sea-level Sea-level t -90 Grund-level Nminal Cruise Altitude (m) Lft-dive r direct descent ,000 (burnut altitude) Nminal Cruise Speed (mach) ,700 m/s (burnut velcity) Maximum Time f Flight (minutes) Paylad Mass ,000 Warhead Mass Paylad Optins Semi-Armr Piercing Semi-Armr Piercing Unitary HE, CW, & Nuclear Unitary HE, CW, & Nuclear HE & CW Submunitins TMD IPB Template March 2000 UNCLASSIFIED Lcal Reprductin Authrized Figure II-12. Adversary TM Frce Capabilities Assessment Template (1 f 2) II-18

41 180600Z MAR 00 UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 Adversary TM Frce Capabilities Assessment Active Defense Suppressin Capabilities Mtivatin and Intent Mtivatin - US and allied TMD and TAD frces can destry r at a minimum neutralize RED theater air and missile frces, effectively rendering them useless. Intent - Given RED pririty fr TM frces and histrical use f SEAD, RED is assessed t be highly mtivated t cnduct active defense suppressin f US and allied TMD frces. Therefre, it is assessed that RED intent is t suppress active defenses with available military frces when peratinally feasible. Histrical Use f Suppressin f Active Air r TMD During the 1992 RED-GRAY war, RED cnducted 3 separate SEAD attacks against GRAY SA-2 radars. In each attack, RED used 2 Su-24 FENCER Ds, with each launching 2 AS-17a ARMs. Capability t Lcate TMD Assets fr Suppressin TAD Versus TMD RED places a higher strategic value n its TBM and SLCM frce and is therefre assessed t place at least the same pririty n cuntering US and allied TMD as n cuntering US and allied TAD frces. Hwever, defense against air attack by the US and allied air frces is first pririty fr the RED air frce. The primary intelligence asset available t RED will be indigenus persnnel sympathetic t RED and inserted intelligence cvert peratins. These in-place agents will likely blend in with the lcal ppulace t avid detectin. They may carry still r vide cameras, as well as small hand-held GPS receivers fr recce in supprt f targeting US and allied TMD assets by ther RED frces. They are nt expected t carry laser ranging equipment, laser designatrs fr PGMs, r weapns. The use f SOF teams is pssible, but will likely have difficultly in being inserted in a timely fashin. If inserted, they are nt expected t present a physical threat unless RED perceives that hstilities are a direct threat t the current plitical regime. The SOF teams will likely cnduct recce t supprt targeting by ther RED frces. SOF teams may include laser designatrs fr directing PGMs nt US and allied TMD assets. RED has 6-8 French built Mirage III fighters cnfigured fr recce and culd use them against US and allied TMD assets. Hwever, their survival against US and allied TAD is questinable. See dctrinal templates fr these recce cnfigured Mirage IIIs and details n deplyment, perfrmance, characteristics, and tactics. RED perates a handful f mbile ELINT vehicles; hwever, their range is limited t less than 50 km, placing them ut f range f the current deplyment fr US and allied TMD assets. Suppressin Capabilities Suppressin Capability Applicable T: TMs in Suppressin Rle - Prbable against land-based TMD assets and very PATRIOT, THAAD, and TMD equipped AEGIS CGs and DDGs. prbable against sea-based TMD assets using ASCMs. TM Penetratin Tactics - Only salv launch is expected with 6-12 TBMs r PATRIOT, THAAD, and TMD equipped AEGIS CGs and DDGs. SLCMs against a single target within a 1-minute time span. TM TMD Cuntermeasures - Only simple RCS reductin expected. PATRIOT, THAAD, and TMD equipped AEGIS CGs and DDGs. Aircraft - Very prbable if aircraft can survive t weapn release pints. ASCMs t Suppress TMD Capable Ships - Very prbable. ARMs - Very prbable if aircraft can survive t weapn release pints. Infrmatin Warfare (Including EC) - Very unlikely, n knwn capability. WMD - Nt expected in a active defense suppressin rle. SOF - Medium prbability in an intelligence cllectin rle and very lw prbability fr physical attack rle. Terrrist and Insurgent Frces - Very prbable fr intelligence cllectin rle and very lw prbability fr physical attack rle. Cnventinal Grund Frces - Very unlikely. Cnventinal Naval Frces - Unlikely. Cmbined Arms Tactics - Unlikely. PATRIOT, THAAD, and TMD equipped AEGIS CGs and DDGs. TMD equipped AEGIS CGs and DDGs. PATRIOT, THAAD, and TMD equipped AEGIS CGs and DDGs. PATRIOT, THAAD, and TMD equipped AEGIS CGs and DDGs. PATRIOT, THAAD, and TMD equipped AEGIS CGs and DDGs. PATRIOT and THAAD. PATRIOT and THAAD. PATRIOT and THAAD. TMD equipped AEGIS CGs and DDGs. PATRIOT, THAAD, and TMD equipped AEGIS CGs and DDGs. TMD IPB Template March 2000 UNCLASSIFIED Lcal Reprductin Authrized Figure II-12 (Cntinued). Adversary TM Frce Capabilities Assessment Template (2 f 2) II-19

42 180600Z MAR 00 Majr Terrain Features UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 Majr Terrain and LOC Overview Majr LOC Features meters meters 900-2,100 meters Rads Railrads CIA Physical Map f RED Area: 2 Ttal: 71,740 km 2 Land Only: 71,620 km 2 Water Only: 120 km Area-Cmparitive: Slightly smaller than Suth Carlina Terrain: Castal belt f mangrve swamps, wded hill cuntry, upland plateau, and muntains in the east Elevatin Extremes: Lwest Pint: Highest Pint: 0 meters ( Ocean) 1,948 meters ( Lma Mansa) Land Bundaries: Ttal: 958 km Brder with GRAY: 306 km Brder with YELLOW: 652 km Castline: 402 km Maritime Claims: Territrial Sea: 200 km Cntinental Shelf: 200-m depth r t the depth f explratin Land Use: Arable Land: Permanent Crps: Permanent Pastures: Frests and Wdland: Other: Irrigated Land: 7% 1% 31% 28% 33% (1993 estimate) 2 290km (1993estimate) TMD IPB Template March 2000 UNCLASSIFIED Lcal Reprductin Authrized Figure II-13. Majr Terrain and LOC Overview Template II-20