HE!toi!.,IID<IH FOR THE PRES IDEMT. The Adequacy of NATO ' :; Conventional Forces -...~ ~- '\

Transcription

1 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHNGTON /. - ";'7 -{q) 2 0~ ~/~~E;-~:.-L~ ~ ~ HE!to!.,D<H FOR THE PRES DEMT Offce of the Secretary of Defense Chef, ROD, ESO, WHS ~~}~'> Date: 2? J' Y'J.. 0 (Z,'Authortty: EP 3526 Declassfy: X Deny n full: Declassfy n Part: Reason: MPR: -tl:_-m- '6 4 f ~ J ~ y' SUBJECT! ~~TO Defense ssues ~-@--f~ European leaders and General Lemntzer are lkely to rase wth yo ---~~ ~ your forthcomng trp some mportant defense ssues. For your bac ground nformat.on as to how these ssues look to us n the DoD, the followng summary rnay prove helpful to you. JCS cormjen ts, keyed to(fjf' ths memorandum by footnotes and ncludng dfferences o.f vew. on a ~") -- number of ssues, re attached as Tab hereto r-'t-} The Adequacy of NATO ' :; Conventonal Forces -...~ ~- '\ t s sometmes sad that ~TO's conventonal forces are today so out- /..;:t;;~.fl c~as~ed by the ~larsa Pact that NATO would have to use nuclear weapons X:::_.. _ / wth n a few days, or ev~n hours, of any substantal attack. General Lemntzer also bel ev::ls that hs NATO forces are not equal to the opposng Warsaw Pact forces, and that they are not capable of engagng n sustaned com~~t. The adequacy of the balance of conventonal forces n Europe s a sub~ ject of conslderable dfferences of vew n the Allance and n the US. All e\e~~nts of-the DoD are agreed that there s not a hopeless suparorty onthe part of the Warsaw Pact; but there s consderable dfference of opnon about what advantage, f any, the Wars~ Pact does have over ATO, under what crcumstances, and how that advantage, f any, should be measured. The OSD staff and my last two predecessors have genera_lly taken the vew tha-t NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are close to beng n balance n a varety of mportant respects, and that a s<l ncrease. n expendtures ~ld mprove the qualty of NATO forces and reserves so that a balance would be unquestonably acheved. The JCS beleve that there s nether a "balance" nor a hopeless Pact superorty; [lstead they beleve that there s a dstnct, overall Pact edge n <:onventonal capal: ty whch could be decsve unless our Alles ncrease ther conventonal forces, and unless the US ~~~antans and mproves ts ow.n forces now n Europe. --OS{( ooc l\- DECLASSFED N full Authorty: EO 3526 Chef, Records & Declass Dv, WHS Date: J~N

2 2 ; l l h'e shall revlew the ssue of the balance of forces n Europe and expect to have a report for you shortly. We are, of course, aware of General Lemntzcr's vews, and shall take them fully nto account. Some background may be useful: NATO's current strategy, formally adopted two years ago, calls for a range of adequate forces across the whole spectrum of mltary capqbl!ltes--nuclear and conventonal--to meet whatever contngency may ar.se wth a response sutable to the aggresson. n effect, the strategy calls for greater emphass on conventonal forces, snce these had been neglected for years n favor of nuclear forces, whch were generally agreed to be adequate. The Unted States has for years urged ts Alles to provde better conventonal forces. (There are some Europeans, of course, who contnue to beleve that the best defense s the threat of an Jlledate nuclear response to almost any aggresson. Havlng-a-5ubstantal conventonal opton makes that threat less credble, n ther eyes, and s therefore undesrable. The US has argued.that g 0 od conventonal forces show a determnaton to fght, and the capacty to engage strong conventonal forces at once n a forward defense s a better deterrent than the ncredble threat to go to nuclear war even over smaller aggressons.) The debate over the feaslbl ty of good NATO conventonal forces turns n part on how close to our goal we are now. Statements as to the effectveness of NAT0 s exstng conventonal forces turn on such matters as how one weghs the effect of larger numbers of Warsaw Pact dvsons aganst the effect of the exstng rough balance n numbers of men n the opposng forces n Europe s Center Regon; the sgnfcance of the varous "qual tatve ndca of combat capab ty, such as df~ ferent types and qualty of arcraft, dfferent asrounts and qualty of major equpment peces, and dfferent capactes for support, logstcs. and ammunton replenshment. etc.; how one gauges the advantage. of ntatve, the lkelhood of warnng tme, relatve speed of renfor~ement, and so forth. some of these factors are dscussed n more detal at Tab A. We wll n the near future be revewng the conventonal balance and related ssues wthn the DoD and n the course of the NSC revew of NATO strategy and alter.natve force postures. Wthout prejudce to the outcome of that revew, t s well to remember that some European countres (!lght welcome a convenent ratlonahl for cuttng back.ther own defense effort, n favor of a ~heaper, f 0re dangerous, re anee on the US nuclear guarantee. The dea that NATO Js hopelessly outclassed n oonventlonal warfare would be lkely to ncrease Congressonal and d0estc pressures n the US to reduce US forces n Europe. t '=W!!l!'./ be sa t t na eff V f our ns. ve convent ona rom DEClASSlf\ED N FULL Authorty~ EO 3526 C\\\ef Records & Oeclass DY, WHS Date:' JAN 2 6 2~\2

3 ~J)~ - ~-- 3 would therefore counsel, pendng completon of the NSC revew, aganst any suggeston that the Unted States has departed from ts past emphass ~ on the mportance and feasblty of mproved NATO tonventonal forces. ~ llurden Sharn 9 The above consderatons are closely related to the burden-sharng ssue. The Unted States has told ts Alles for the past several years that they can and should take over a greater share of Europe's -drect defense. The US now devotes about 0% of ts gross natonal product to defense; our European Alles average around 5%, wth Gennany.at 4.5%. (Arguments that the US devotes far less than 00~.of GNP to Europe-orented forces gnore the fact that NATO s an allance to defend North Amerca as well as Europe.) Congress has shown ncre~sln9 rrtaton wth Europe's fal- ure to do more to redress ths n~alance, and to help us releve the US J balance of payments. daflct>~ mlta-ry account caused by. our deployments j~ n Europe (about/t'-~lllon_~- Pressures fo~ a.substantal reducton n. ff our Europe-based~r~e grown progressvely stronger; Czechoslovaka has provded what may well be only a temporary respte. The US has urged that the European alles make ther exstng large conventonal forces fully effectve by mannng, tranng, equppng and sup-. portng them adequately. We have asked that they provde adequate stocks of war rese.rves, and desgn ~bllzaton systems capable of provdng selectve renforcements rapdly whenever needed. _Our success has been lm ted. Even n the wake of Czechoslovaka, only ~dest mprovements have been pledged by some countres.. The Europeans wll be watchng closely for any sgn from you that ther wotr es are over; that the! r effort s adequate; or that balance of payments s essentally our problem, not thers. beleve we should not suggest, even by slence, that these are our vews. To do so would, n my judgment, rsk d$5patng what lttle momentum there now s n the European Provement effort, and complcate our forthcomng dalogue w-th COngress. U Force Levels n Euroee There s some conoern n Europe about the durablty of a s~stantlal US mltary presence on the contnent. Here, would judge the need to be for a nce balance between ()" reassurances about the Amercan CDVltment to NATO, whch areclea"rly n order, and () polte reservatons n response to any nvtatons to "stablze" ([.e., freeze) US force levels ; n Europe, whch mght pose serous Congressonal and polcy problems for us'. DECLASSFED H full AJ!Jorty: EO 3526 g::~ Records & DecJass Dr, WHS JAN

4 US Forces n Europe l. ' The Unted States now mantans n Europe and the Medterranean area about 320,000 mll U\ry personne, organzed.n 4-/3 dvsons, 2 armored cavalry regments, 32 ar squadrons (640 arcraft), the Sxth Fleet of 25 combatant shps n the tedterranean, a:d the support and logstc unrts for thes~ forces. Addtooa) conventonal and nuclear forces ccmntted to or ava lab e for Europe are descrbed at Tab B. Balance of payments problems, and Congressonal pressures (whch stem n part from dssatsfacton wth burden-sharng wthn NATO) have exerted a general dowmtard pressure on US force levels n Europe. Force removals from France n 9Q7, and last year s redeployment of some Ar~ and Ar Force "dual-based" unts from Germany reduced authorzed personne.l spaces n Europe by roughly 50,000. (Actual reductons n personnel were only about half that number.) We are currently revewng (and mplementng ~ome mnor portons) of a program of streamlnng of our headquarters and admnstratve and logstc force~>, desgned to elmnate some 34,000 a.ddtonal mltary personnel spaces n Europe by md-973. No major rombat unts are nvolved. The program s desgned to save annually $400 mllon n budget costs and $50 mllon n foregn exchange costs when fully accomplshed n 972/3. Combat and Logstcs Readness of US forces n Europe General Lemntzer. ha~ told my staff that the combat readness of US forces n Europe needs sub~tantal upgradng; tl\at the forces have no lne.of communcat.lons (LOC); have a crtcal aeral port problem; lack adequate storage fac tes. for POL {petroleum, ol and lubrcants) and anvnunltlon; and are short of tanks and modern tactcal vehcles, electroncs counter~ ~~~easures equpment and modern tactcal arcraft,. We have looked nto ths matter and fnd actons underway to cure many of the problems by June 30, 969. The fact s that readness n all Servces s not as hgh as we would lke. The basc reasons for our reduced readness are twofold: CJ) the prorty dverson of resources to Southeast Asa; and (2) the on-gong process of adjustment to the removal of our lne of communcatons and ar bases n France. Agng tactcal vehcles and shps, lack of facll tes (aeral ports, depots and storage space.for ammunl ton and petroleum, o and lubrcants), and shortages of some types of ammunton, vehcles and repar parts are the prncpal defcencfes. Personnel.shortages have largely been made up, but Jack of experenced mddle range leaders and senor enlsted tech~c.::ns obtans rn Europe as else\~here. We are no\o takng a seres of.actons and studyng others to mprove the combat support of our forces n Europe, Although remedal actons w overcome many of the problems by June 30; 969,.t wll take two to three years to buld all of the storage space that s requred.,-,-+-- (More detal on the current logstcs posture n Europe s at Tab C.) _... DECLASSFED H FULL. Authorty: Chef, Records & Declass Dv, WHS Date: JAN ~ C.l

5 . ' 5 J Germany. Defense Effort. The FRG, second largest naton n NATO n both papulaton and economc power, does not make a defense effort commensurate wth ts strength, The German defense budget l s about 4.5% of GNP, com-' pared \'lth about 0"!. for the US. Of the other prncpal NATO natons, the UK and France also make relatvely greater defense efforts than the FRG. The prevous Admnstraton has pressed the Germans for years to do more n the defense feld, and after Czechoslovaka urged that they ncrease ther defense budget by about 5%. Such an ncrease by the Germans.,.ou ld have restored a 9% reducton n projected defense expendtures whch the Germans made n 966/67, and permtted some mprovements n ther forces, and some help wth our foregn exchange problems n Germany. nstead, the Germans plan an ncrease of only about 3",{,, to be used largely for pay and beneft ncreases. 2. ~ Our annual adverse balance of payments on mltary account w, n the absence of speca arrangements, average $700 m on n Germany and $200~30.0 mllon elsewhere n NATO Europe for FY 970~]2. We are about to begn (n Karch) formal ''offset'' negotatons wth the Germans. Both the Germans and we would prefer a long~term soluton, to avod the annual poltcal stran of these negotatons, n recent years the Germans have flled most of the gap by purchasng US securtes; ths only postpones the problem. n exploratory talks last fall the major new US proposal was that the Germans assume about $400 mllon annually of US costs pad out n Germany (manly local employees pay and upkeep of VS facltes). The Germans ftnd ths proposal very dffcult to accept for poltcal and fnancal reasons, but have suggested no satsfactory substl wte. n my opnon the offset problem s one of the most dffcult facng us n the Congress. Clark Clfford dscussed t wth Chancellor Klesnger and Mnster of Defense Schroeder on behalf of Presdent Johnson n October 968, stressng the mportance to both of us of reachng a 5ulsfactory long~term agreement to offset the foregn exchange cost of our mltary expendtures n Germany, (You may wfsh to see especally pages 5-7 of the memorandum of conversaton attached at Tab D.) You wll probably meet suggestons that n return for FRG offset agreement the US commt tself to stablzng US forces n Europe at ther current level. Whle a satsfactory agreement would assst you to deal wth domestc pressures to wthdraw Amercan forces from Europe, am n agreement wth the State trp papers cautonng you aganst any pledge on ths score. We may need our flexblty, not only t~ stre~m~ ne and save'costs but also to make use of our growng strategc moblty n '. the early '70's. ~ D~CLASSFED N f.ull : AJ!~orty: to 3526 Chtaf, Rec_ords & Declass Dt WHS Date: ~AN ,

6 ., 6 J.' 3. Streamlnng of US Forces n Germ9ny. We neve recently nformed. the German Government (both n NATO forums, and blaterally) of certan portons of our plan, mentoned above, to save money and foregn exchange by streamlnng our m tary establ slwent n Europe. f the Chancellor asks about ths, or about n~qspaper reports (whch have revealed the scope of the entre plan), you mght assure hm that what s nvolved s largely atlmnstratve streamlnng, thlt we are revewng a set of proposals for such streamlnng, and that we have no plans to wthdraw major combat forces --- France French defense offcals have recently expressed nterest n closer cooperaton wth the US and NATO on ml ltary matters, ncludng nuclear questons. Some of these approaches are undoubtedly known to de Gaulle; others may have been delberately made wthout nfornng hm. We shall soon be dscussng n the Nsc machnery a varety of possble. ways of cooperatng more closely wth France, even n the nuclear area. (For example, t may be possble to ta.lk about nuclear plannng wthout requrng France to jon the KATO Ku.c\ear Plannng Group outrght, by d evsng, together wth our alles, a form of assocaton or dscusson wth the French acceptable to all.) Untl such a thorough examnaton of. the exstng and lle\' possbltes has taken place, would conclude only that (a} closer french cooperaton wth NATO ~ould be to the adv!lntage of France, as well as of the Allance; and {b} we should be wllng to work toward closer blateral ltary cooperaton wth France whenever possble, and be wllng to explore new deas frol!l any source. "European Ca.ucus"--a No-te of Cauton The US has long advanced the general prncple that European unfcaton s our goal. n the defense feld nothng sold seems to be on the horzon. The so~called "European caucus" s really Brtsh Defense nster Healey's dea to try to tlevelop to0n European vews on a varety of defense ssues. So far t has amounted to no more than dnners on the occason of NATO meetngs attended by a number of European Defense ~lnsters. The Germans are extremely leary of lt because they fear trouble wth the French over ft and also fear that a European groupng could hasten Anlercan dsengagement. The "European" character of the dnner group s rapdly expandng to nclude al countres but the US and France, Many Europeans suspect that the man substantve busness of the group wll 'be Brtsh attempts to sell 8rtsh arcraft projects to the contnantal Europeans, and to make a bd for leaclenhp n Europe n a forum where the French are not present. ' D~CLASSFED N FUll Authorty: EO 3526 Cllef, Records & Declass Dl WHS Date. JAN

7 7 Whle we have generally encouraged any sgn of greater European coheson, We have also sad that we hoped that any European group would offer postve European contrbutons,!ouch as greater European defense effort, as well as jont demands upon the Unted States. t s not entrely clear that the current trend of the European caucus s _an unmxed blessng for the Unted States. Ambassador Cleveland has strongly warned aganst the ant-'us tendences latent n the European caucus and has suggested mldly_ dscouragng t. Mr. Htze, n a conversaton wth Mnster Kealey on January 6th, rased a note of cauton and expressed hs hope that the European caucus would ba,ance any demands upon the Unted States (for example, postons to be taken wth the Sovets n the strategc arms talks, US force levels n Europe, etc.) wth constructve offers of what the Europeans as a group could do for the jont defense and to releve Amercan problems. D~~LASSFED N FULL A~orty: EO 3526 Chef, Records & Declass Dv, WHS Date:. JAN Attaclvnents: Tab A- The Balance of Forces n Central Europe (S}. Tab B- Addtonal US Forces Commtted or Avalable to NATO (S) Tab C- logstcs Posture of US Forces n Europe (S) Tab D - t'temcon of C fford/schroede r Meetng n Bonn, Oct. 2, 968 (S) Tab E - JCS Footnotes on Memorandum (S) ]?!'~ v -'- '- ' - -