DEFENDING AMERICA'S ALLIES FROM. SHORT-RANGE SOVIET MISSILES I

Transcription

1 580 May 14,1987 DEFENDNG AMERCA'S ALLES FROM. SHORT-RANGE SOVET MSSLES. NTRODUCTON The growng Sovet short-range ballstc mssle (SRBM) threat to Unted States alles. n Western Europe, Asa, and the Mddle Eyt has sparked nterest n defensve systems capable of destroyng these mssles n flght. Such defenses, known as Ant-Tactcal Ballstc Mssles (ATBM) could strengthen NATO deterrence aganst a Sovet attack and provde ncreased securty for such U.S. frends as Japan and srael. n the European theater, Moscow deploys, among other thngs, the Sovet SS-21,, SS-12/22, and SS-23 mssles. Armed wth chemcal, conventonal, and nuclear warheads, these could be used to launch swft debltatng preemptve attacks aganst NATO command and control centers, nuclear weapons storage stes, and other crtcal NATO facltes. NATO has nether a defense aganst these weapons nor a matchng offensve capablty. Prolferatng Short-Range Mssles. n the Mddle East and the Pacfc, concern about these weapons also mounts. The ntroducton of Sovet-made SS-21s n Syra and ra portends an ncreasng SRBM role n the Mddle East. These modern systems have txe 1. Both SRBM and Tactcal Ballstc Mssle have been used to descrbe the SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 class of weapon. SRBM wll be used n ths paper snce t seems napproprate to classfy the 300-mle SS-23 or 600-mle, SS-22 as a "tactcal ballstc mssle." The SS-21 has a 75-mle range. The U.S. Department of Defense classfes the SS-22 and SS-23 as shorter-range ntermedate-range nuclear forces (SRNF), whle the SS-21 s n the category of short-range nuclear forces (SNF). See U.S. Department of Defense, Sovet Mltarv Power (Washngton, D.C.: U.S. Government Prntng Offce, 1980), p. 69.

2 * accuracy and power to destroy ar felds, command and communcatons centers, logstc facltes, and maneuver unts. Suffcent numbers of such weapons could alter spfcantly the mltary balance n the re 'on. For Ja an, meanwhle, the mtroducton of Sovet nuclear-capable mssles on t El e Southern R urle slands, n addton to the Sovet SS-20 force targeted aganst the Far East,poses new threats. The rsng mportance of short-range ballstc mssles n mltary operatons, cou led wth ther prolferaton nto regons heretofore free of such weapons, must prompt t K e U.S. and ts alles to consder ATBM development. Western Europe, the Mddle East, and Japan could,beneft from ATBM development; all have the technologcal expertse to contrbute to such a system; and each regon has s 'fcant poltcal support for ATBM develo ment and deployment. Further, prvate n t" ustry n all three regons would welcome ATB J research as a way to mantan technologcal compettveness. Rectgng mbalances. Washngton should support a multre 'onal ATBM ntatve for a number of reasons. Amon them: Ronald r Reagan has pledge cfl that the Strategc Defense ntatve (SD) would nclu d e programs for rotectng U.S. alles; ATBMs could begn to rectfy regonal mltary mbalances created y Sovet SRBM deployments; and AT3Ms would protect U.S. forces abroad. A multregonal approach could e edte ATBM development at less cost and t also would make techncal success more l? ely. t also would alled understandng about the role of mssle defenses n Western strategy, as U.S./NATO-srael-Japanese securty tes. The U.S. thus should: 1) support alled research efforts already drected at ATBM; 2) consder encouragng the alles to take the lead n developng ther own ATBM programs; 3) establsh an offce at the Pentagon to coordnate prvate and governmental efforts n each regon; and 0 4) ntens@ ts own ATBM research and development. ATBM TECHNOLOGCAL REQUREMENTS An ATBM system must takejnto account several factors that are dfferent than those for an SD system envronment. These factors can both complcate and facltate an ATBM defense aganst short-range ballstc mssles. 2. "ATBM" systems, as dscussed n the general lterature, can range from upgraded ar defense systems (whch are desgned prmarly to ntercept arcraft) to mssle defense systems capable of also nterceptng some strategc ballstc mssles n ther termnal flght stage. Today, there seems to be a blurrng of the dstncton between ar defense unts, tactcal ballstc mssle nterceptors, and defense systems that can potentally ntercept strategc ballstc mssles such as CBMs and SLBMs. The Sovet SA-X-lB Gant surface-to-ar mssle, for example, s reported to be capable of nterceptng not only arcraft at all alttudes, but also cruse mssles, tactcal ballstc mssles, and some strategc ballstc mssles. See: U.S. Department of Defense,, - p. 61. Whle conventonal usage refers to ATBMs as a weapon system that can counter tactcal or theater ballstc mssles, the Army Strategc Defense Command adopts the term Ant-Tactcal Mssle (ATM), whch encompasses defense aganst all tactcal mssles,.e., cruse, and not just tactcal ballstc mssles. -2-

3 Easer Detecton and Dscrmnaton. To begn wth, short flght tmes for tactcal ballstc mssles (sometmes not exceedng sx to twelve mnutes) place greater demands on the ac uston, detecton, trackng, dscrmnaton, and ntercept requrements for an ATB hl system. The detecton process ma be further complcated by the mobl of enemy short-range ballstc mssles. On t e other hand, because of the short fl 8 t tmes and lower trajectores of most SRBMs, sensors for regonal defenses can observe most of a mssle's tra'ectory, unlke CBMs where the curvature of the Earth hdes much of ther trajectory. be fensve sensors can observe objects essentally throughout ther trajectores, thus makng the job of detecton and dscrrmnaton much easer. Another complcaton s that, except for the SS-20 and SS-12 mod SS-22, SRBh do not leave the atmosphere. Ths may make ntercepts usng space-base d defenses more dffcult snce some defensve technologes cannot penetrate the atmosphere. However, for ground-based termnal and late mdcourse nterceptors, SRBMs are actually easer to ntercept than are CBMs. Atmospherc drag, for example, eatlr asssts n dscrm,naton, whle lower fl t t veloctes make termnal ntercepton muc Q easer as well. n any event, snce the SS-2 and SS-22s do spend a substantal tme outsde the atmosphere, they also are vulnerable to space-based defensve systems. Hgh Probablty of Success. Earl concepts for ATBM defense nclude low and hgh endoatmospherc (n the atmosphere f nterceptor mssles and possbl space-based knetc energy weapons. Sensors for regonal defenses could nclude ground- ased radars, arborne sensors, hgh alttude probes des ed to pop-up wth sensors, and space-based sensors. Data processng requrements nc r ude detecton, trackng and processng of data, relayng nformaton to the nterceptor, and launchng the nterceptor wthn fve to twenty seconds after a hostle mssle takes off. An ATBM system would most lkely work n conjuncton wth space-based strategc defense systems, when they are develo ed. Addng a space-based com onent to a ground-based regonal defense would gve AdMs the multtered capab P fy essental to assure a hgh probablty of success aganst the SRBM and other tamcal mssles. THE SRBM THREAT The emergence of accurate and lethal Sovet short-range ballstc mssles oses a major. new threat to stablty n varous regons of the world. The new generaton o P hghly accurate Sovet SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 SRBMs makeg preemptve mlt feasble aganst key retalatory assets of the opponent. Ths potental for "r aunchng*a strkes ' successful surprse attack aganst the opponent's arfelds, mssle stes, communcatons, depots, and conventonal ground forces could alter regonal power balances sgnfcantly. The SRBM provdes a number of benefts to a potental aggressor. Among them: ++ Speed of deployment and assured.penetrablty create a surprse attack ca ablty. Some short-range mssles take only three to four mnutes to reach ther target, t K ereby makng attacks on such movable targets as enemy arcraft and mssle batteres feasble. 3. See Kerry Hnes, "Sovet SRBM now a conventonal deep strke msson," nternatonal Defense Revew, Vol. 18, No. 12,1985, and Manfred Woerner, "A Mssle Defense for NATO-Europe," Strateec Revew, Wnter

4 ++ SRBM forces are less costly to use than manned fghter-bombers, snce the loss of traned plots could keep planes grounded. ++ SRBMs allow better coordnaton of smultaneous attacks on mportant enemy targets than do arcraft and/or ground troops SRBMs'alter the mltary palance n a regon wth less effort than by addng ground forces or sophstcated ar forces. The European Theatre NATO development and deployment of an ATBM defense could counter the Sovet SS-21, SS-22, and the SS-23 mssles, all of whch have chemcal and nuclear, as well ts conventonal, capabltes. An ATBM system would mprove deterrence and NATO's defensve poston by convncng the Kremln that t would be unlkely to launch a successful preemptve SRBM strke. ATBMs also could protect France's nuclear force, thus ensunng ts credblty and survvablty aganst the ncreased accuracy of Sovet, mssle systems. A growng concern for France, for example, s the ncreasng accuracy of ' Sovet short-range ballstc mssles, whch could reach and destroy French nuclear retalatory forces wth conventonal or chemcal warheads. As for Brtan, ATBMs could protect Brtsh nuclear-carryng submarnes whle n port, as well as U.S./NATO ground-launched cruse mssles statoned n Brtan. The Mddle East Tny srael's lack of strategc depth makes t artcularly vulnerable to an Arab preemptve strke. Ths means that srael must E e able to defend ts command and control mfrastructure, m ortant troop concentratons, ar defense unts, and ar bases aganst a swft Arab ar an 8 mssle attack. srael's ablty to do so s threatened ncreasngly by Arab recept of more than 200 Sovet-suppled SCUD-B, FROG-7, and SS-21 launchers, supported by an nventory of at least 1,OOO surface-to-surface mssles. The recent delve of some 18 Sovet SS-21 mssles to Syra typfes the mountng problem for srael. nlke the FROG and the SCUD, the SS-21 has the range accuracy. and lethalty to destro hardened targets deep nsde srael, ncludng suppressng or neutralzng for 12 to h hou9 almost all srael Ar Force arfelds n northern srael as well as srael's nuclear reactors near Dmona. Whle the standard armament for Arab-de loyed SS-21s s a conventonal warhead, the SS-21 also s beleved ca able of carryng nuc f ear and chemcal charges. The SS-21 armed wth a chemcal warhea B mght force srael arbases to suspend operatons long enough for Arab ar forces to gan control of the skes. Aganst both srael mltary forces and ctes, Arab short-raqe ballstc mssles represent a sgnfcant new threat. As srael ar defenses make t more dffcult for Arab ar forces to complete ther mssons, the &ab 4. There are certan complcatons assodated wth SRBM employment. n order for SRBMs to prove decsve for an attacker, hs mssle strkes must be coordnated wth other forces necessary for follow-on attacks. For example, the suppresson of srael Ar defense unts would be less mltarly sgnfcant f Arab ar forces and ar moble forces were not at hand to complete the destructon of srael ar bases and other key assets. Effectve SRBM use may thus requre the type of command and control structure not yet avalable to Arab armes. On the other hand, srael has so few targets (.e., arbases and command centers) that target acquston should not prove to be a problem for Arab SRBM forces. -4-

5 countres wll ncreasngly need to turn to short-range ballstc mssles to carry out ther attack plans. The Pacfc Basn defense of strategx areas. 132 SS-20,100 SCUD (soon to be re laced by wth SS-22s) launchers. Most recent P y, tte on the southern Kurle slands. North sometme n the be consstent of Japanese a suted for the Sovet SS-20s and other SRBM mssles could threaten Japan s ablty to operate the arcraft needed to defend the country and ts sea lnes of communcaton. Sovet ballstc mssles also may be capable of closng mportant Japanese orts. Whle these mssons now could be erformed by Sovet naval avaton, the use o P Sovet mssles would free lanes P or other m ortant tasks. The de loyment by Japan of ATBMs, or B?p 4 the Patrot ar efense mssles that okyo recently bought from the U.S. could U.S. troops on bases n Guam, Oknawa, the Phlppnes, and South Korea. ALLED SUPPORT FOR ATBM DEVELOPMENT France, West German, and Brtan have endorsed, n varyng degrees, the concept of ATBMs. n response to t K e Sovet SRBM threat, NATO defense mnsters n summer 1986 approved the draftng of gudelnes for Europe-based ATBM development. NATO Defense Mnsters see the use of ATBMs as one of a seres of actons to strengthen the allance s conventonal forces. ATBM systems frst would be extensons of the exstng ar defense system, but later could nvolve arms emplo ng such new technologes as drected-energy weapons and ral guns. French an cr Brtsh frms already are studyng an ATBM system that could become part of an advanced Euro ean defense network aganst short-range Sovet ballstc mssles. The U.S. Strategc De P ense ntatve Organzaton, moreover, recently gave contracts to seven multnatonal consortuv for Phase studes of the archtecture of a Europe-based defense aganst tactcal mssles. Advanced srael deas. srael has expressed great nterest n the U.S. Strategc Defense ntatve (SD) and ATBM and last year asked to partcpate n SD. srael rmarly s nterested n adaptng SD technology to ts conventonal defense needs, suc R as shootng down shorter-range ballstc mssles based n Syra. Lt. General James Abrahamson, head of the U.S. SD program, notes that srael scentsts already have come up wth some very good and advanced deas, partcularly n the feld of ral guns, lasers, and electronc countermeasures. Last November, srael sgned a $5.1 mllon agreement wth the U.S., under whch srael s to research tactcal ballstc mssle defense s stems. t has been reported that srael s preparng a theater defense desgn study for R ATO s central front regon. * 5. Venbergex Urges Japan to Take Star Wars Role, The New York Tmes, Aprl 6,1986, p The U.S. SDO has ts om theater ballstc mssle defense archtecture program, and n January 1987 Deputy Secretary of Defense Wllam H. Tatl V nstructed the servces to begn developng a comprehensve plan for an ant-tactcal mssle (ATM) program to protect NATO and other alled forces aganst Sovet tactcal and cruse mssles. -5-,

6 ATBM deployment seems consstent wth Japan's three nonnuclear prncples: "not ossess' g nuclear weapons, not producng them and not permttng ther ntroducton nto Papan?' THE COMMON FRAMEWORK FORATBM DEVELOPMENT There are four consderatons common to the three regons that would beneft from ATBM deplo ent. Ths suggests that a multregonal ATBM system concept may be feasble and Cresrable. The common consderatons nclude: ++ Each regon faces potental securtythreats from contnued rolferaton of enemy ballstc mssles. n accord wth the defensve strategy of NATO, f apan, and srael and the m ortance of absorbng an ntal enemy strke and retalatng effectvely, ATBMs can re B uce an enem 's confdence n a surprse attack that reles on SRBMs. Regonal stablty s also enhance (r by removng the ncentve to strke reemptvely (Le., a country wth vulnerable forces may want to strke frst for fear of P osng these forces to an enemy frst strke). Addtonally, ATBM-related technolo es may strengthen conventonal defensve capabltes, whch would have applcaton n & three regons. ++ Technologcal com ettveness woul B Each regon's cvlan econom would beneft from ATBM cooperaton. be enhanced by the nvestment re ured by ATBM and by the ensung g usness and technolo 'cal exchan es. n addton al? three regons have the technologcal expertse to contr Ute to the.s. ATBM effort. Q ++ Each regon's securty rests on contnued good relatons wth the U.S. ATBM cooperaton would renforce securty and dplomatc lnkages. Cooperaton n ATBM research, development, and deployment also may move Japan, srael, and NATO toward closer overall securty cooperaton. ++ There appears to be sup ort for ATBM systems by many of the Western European governments and those of srae P and Japan as well. MULTREGONAL ATBM COOPERATON AND SYSTEM DESGN srael and the European alles are already developng ma'or elements of an ATBM system. A 1986 Pentagon study fnds that European researc h and development on ATBMs and strtte c defense technologes are well advanced and, n some nstances, ahead of U.S. efforts. 8.S. SD offcals e lan that the technology s now avalable to buld the components of a regonal Al%M system. Ths technology ncludes: 1) The Navy/RCA AEGS Radar pared wth a two-stage hypervelocty ant-ballstc mssle. d 7. Japan formally agreed to partcpate n the SD on September 9,1986. See n;e New York Tmes, September 10, 1986, p. A6. Despte Nakasone's support for SD, the Japanese Cabnet dd have some hestatons, wlch led them to stress Japan's technologcal role n SD and downplay ts mltary aspects. See "Offcals Antcpate Japan Jonng SD," Defense News, September 8,1986, p See Clarence Robnson, "Regonal Applcatons of SD Technologes" n SD n the Near Term: Strateev. Technolow and the ABM Treatv, proceedngs of a conference. sponsored by the Fund for an Amercan Renassance., July 15, 1986, Washngton, D.C., p ;

7 2) A modfed Army Patrot ar defense mssle or the SD small radar homng ntercept technology mssle (SRHT), capable of destroyng warheads by crashng nto them. 3) The new EMS (exoatmospherc reentry vehcle ntercepton system), whch could destroy warheads before they reenter the atmosphere. 4) The Army FLAGE (flexble lghtweght a 'le guded experment nterceptor combned wth a mllmeter wave radar techno Y ogy that could be use d to ntercept warheads nsde the atmosphere. 5) An upgraded ASTER mssle to be used for nterceptng warheads as they reenter the atmosphere. Though the technolo may be avalable or close at hand, t lacks systems ntegraton and a theater desgn be P ore t can be forged nto an operatonal system. The U.S., srael, and West Europeans are workng on theater des studes. Snce the threat s smlar for NATO-Europe, srael, and Japan, research and CFevelopment coordnaton could speed the process and brng down the costs of producton by lowern unt costs. The emergmg ' system would take nto account strategc requrements an cf poltcal restrants. Such la system would be: ++ nonnuclear; ++ based n part on such passve components as concealment, moblty, and hardenng; ++ part of a combned defense aganst arcraft, cruse mssles, and longer-range ' ballstc mssles;! ++ able to cope wth conventonal, chemcal, and nuclear armed warhead threats; ++ not ted too closely wth the U.S. Strategc Defense ntatve because the regonal ntermedate-range mssle and SRBM threat s ndependent of the ntercontnental ballstc mssle threats targeted by SD; ++ based on ether an upgraded ar defense weapon, such as the Patrot or Hawk, or on a dedcated ATBM system n response to the threat; ++ effectve but not necessarly leakproof--even a partal defense contrbutes to 1 attacker uncertanty; ++ reasonable n terms of development and deployment costs n the overalcontext of defense spendng needs; ++ generally comprehensve and ncludng low and hgh endoatmos herc nterceptors, wth space-based knetc energy weapons as soon as they are develope B, and wth sensors that could be based on the ground, n space, or on arcraft; ++ consdered as a possble termnal and late-mdcourse layer of an overall SD multlayer defense, f and when an SD deployment decson s made !

8 ATBM AND THE 1972 ANT-BALLSTC MSSLE TREATY Crtcs of SD and supporters of a narrow nte retaton of the 1972 Ant-Ballstd Mssle (ABM) Treaty contend that unconstrane 'B ATBM development and deployment would volate the purpose and letter of the ABM Treaty. The fact s, however, that the ABM Treaty does not ban ATBMs. ATBMs, after all, wll be constructed and deployed to defend aganst tactcal ballstc mssles of relatvely short range--not the strategc mssles addressed by the ABM Treaty. ATBMs are not an ABM system. U.S. SUPPORT FOR A MULTREGONAL ATBM SYSTEM The U.S. should su port the development and deployment of an ATBM meets the strategc an B poltcal needs of Western Europe, Japan, and srael. The reasons: 1) The U.S. and ts alles must rect@ regonal mltary mbalances brought about by the deployment of Sovet short-range ballstc mssles; 2) Support for ATBMs would demonstrate to Western Europe that the U.S. remans vtally commtted to West European defenses; 3) Prolferaton of short-range ballstc mssles s certan to contnue, partcularly f a U.S. strategc defense system eventually s able to check the ntercontnental ballstx mssle threat; 4) A multregonal approach to ATBM would expedte deployment at less cost by drawng on foregn expertse; 5) t could be a frst step toward the eventual deployment of U.S. mssle defenses; and 6) An ATBM system capable of operatng n dfferent regons of the world would,offer protecton to U.S. forces operatng n those regons; an srael mssle defense system, for example, could provde some measure of protecton for U.S. forces operatng n the Eastern Medterranean. A multnatonal approach to ATBM research and development s already n place. The Strategc Defense htatve, meanwhle, has begun to coordnate West European, srael, and U.S. efforts. Of the $3.2 bllon approved for SD n fscal 1987, $50 mdlon has been earmarked for ''jont development, on a matchng fund bass," of an ATBM for deplo wth NATO alles and other partners. Sad Senator Dan Quayle, the ndana Repub r"""' can who s onsored the ATBM amendment: "For the frst tme, the SD offce has been 'ven a s ec! c near-term task that wll end n a deployed system n the earl 1990s." n ad cr ton, &tah and srael receved $10 mllon and $6 mllon, respectvely, P or SD research and related applcatons n theater ballstc mssle defense. Quayle's ATBM jont development measure s only a frst step. Addtonal steps could nclude: ++ Establshng an ATBM system as an alled, rather than strctly U.S., ntatve;

9 . ++ Buldng on exstng force structures and capabltes, such as NATO's ntegrated ar defense system, and the Patrot ar defense weapon, whch s n use n Western Europe and Japan; ++ Pushn4 ATBM as a conventonal defense mprovement (CD) effort, snce the Sovet SRBM s emergng as a conventonal warfare problem; ++ Makng ATBM fundng avalable to prvate companes--rather than to governments--to "nvte, show, and test." Companes should compete to see who can'make a partcular component wth cost an mportant crteron. f prvate companes have, somethng to contrbute, addtonal funds should then be made avalable to ther respectve governments; ++ Encouragng partcpaton n computer-smulated, test-bed actvtes; ++ Focusng on subcomponent actvtes rather than com lete systems, thus encouragng cooperaton between companes. Other researc Yl and development efforts should be examned to see what they can contrbute to ATBM development.! CONCLUSON As the deployment of h hly accurate and lethal Sovet short-range ballstc mssles armed wth conventonal, c E emcal, and nuclear warheads contnues n Europe, the Mddle East, and Asa, the vulnerablty ncreases for U.S. alles and forces n those regons. The abl x of Sovet SRBMs to crcumvent exstng NATO, srael, and Japanese ar defenses and e ablty of accurate SRBMs to attack crucal targets--thus alterng s nfcantly n the early stages of conflct the regonal mltary balance--create ncentves P or the Sovet Unon and other states to consder preemptve mltary optons. Ant-tactcal ballstc mssle defenses could thwart a Sovet or Arab attack utlzng ntermedate- and short-range ballstc mssles. By denyng the Sovets--and n the case of srael, the Arabs--the prospects f a quck wn by a preemptve mssle assault, deterrence of aggresson s strengthened, and stablty n the regon s renforced. Western Europe, srael, and Japan all face a smlar threat n terms of the emergng Sovet SRBM threat. All three regons have the technologcal and scentfc expertse to contrbute to an ATBM effort, and there seems to be a great deal of support for necess% ATB s by the current governments n srael and Western Europe. Besdes the poltcal consderatons, there are technologcal and economc factors that may fgure n a naton's decson to artcpate n a multregonal ATBM develo ment scheme. t makes sense, therefore, P or the three regons to cooperate wth the 8s. tn coordnatng ther research and development efforts wth the eventual goal of deployng an ATBM system compatble wth the threat each regon faces. * Pre ared for The Hertage Foundaton by Ro l! ert M. Soofer, Ph.D. a Washngton-based defense consultant -9-