SECURITY ASSISTANCE Shooting Incident in East Timor, Indonesia

Transcription

1 Femmy 1992 SECURITY ASSISTANCE Shooting Incident in East Timor, Indonesia GAWNSIAD FS

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3 - GAO United States Genera Accounting Offke Waehin~n, D.C Nationa $ecurity and Internationa Af ah Division B February 18,1QQ2 The Honorabe AIan Cranston The Honorabe Richard Lugar The Honorabe Danie Patrick Moynihan The Honorabe Brock Adams The Honorabe Thomas A. DaschIe United States Senate As requested, we obtained information on a shooting incident that occurred on November 12,1QQ, in East Timor, Indonesia, in which eements of the Indonesian Armed Forces shot and kiiied from about 60 to over 100 civihans. This report provides information on the (1) events surrounding the shooting incident; (2) actions taken by the government of Indonesia after the incident; (3) positions of Internationa Miitary Education and Training (IMET)-trained Indonesian Army personne in the East Timor command structure and on Indonesian commissions charged with investigating the incident; and (4) recent proposas for additiona IMET t,raihg of Indonesians. This fact sheet responds to part of a request that we review U.S. security assistance programs, incuding IMET, in a changing word environment. We wi issue a report on these programs, based on reviews in severa countries, at a future date. Background On November 12,1991, eements of the Indonesian Armed Forces fired on a crowd of at east 2,000 peope in the city of DiIi, East Timor, kihing from 60 to over 100 peope, based on various estimates. U.S. and other Western journaists reported on the shooting, resuting in strong internationa pressure on Indonesia to investigate the incident. In November 1991, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed a concurrent resoution condemning the shooting incident and, among other things, asking for a reassessment of IMET funds to Indonesia. Under the IMET Progrsm, the United States provides funds for the training of foreign mihtary personne in such areas as professiona mihtary education, management, and, through observer training, U.S. miitary techniques and procedures. In fisca year 1991, Congress expanded IMET to train foreign civiian and miitary officias in defense resource management and the deveopment of judicia systems and mihtary codes of conduct, incuding observance of internationay recognized human Page 1 (3AfMUSuD FS Shooting in Eurt Timor /.,,,.

4 rights. The administration requested $2.3 miion to train 130 XMET students from Indonesia in fisca year At east $160,000 of these funds wi go towards expanded IMFI trainmg. Resuts in Brief A versions of the incident generay agree that a crowd of East Timorese staged a memoria mass and poitica demonstration in the city of Dii, a demonstrator stabbed an Indonesian Army officer aong the demonstration route, and Indonesian Army and Nationa Poice units opened tie on the demonstrators some time after the stabbing of the Indonesian Army officer. It is unknown who, if anyone, ordered the units to fire on the crowd. The Indonesian Army and Nationa Poice forces used semiautomatic weapons, incuding M-16 riies, and shotguns of unknown source and manufacture. (See app. I for a chronoogy of events.) After the incident, the government of Indonesia created nationa and miitary co mmissions to investigate the shooting and reieved from command two genera officers who hed positions of command responsibiity for East Timor operations. No ~m%ained Indonesian Army officers hed senior-eve positions in the East Timor command structure on the day of the shooting incident. Since the incident, at east seven mewrained officias have been paced in positions of responsibiity for East Timor miitary operations and on commissions estabished by the President of Indonesia to investigate the incident. In ight of the shooting incident, U.S. and Indonesian embassy officias suggested expanded IMET training in miitary justice and human rights for Indonesian civiian eaders and miitary personne, as we as U.S. training in crowd contro and riot procedures for Indonesian Nationa Poice forces. a Events Surrounding the Shooting Incident Foowing an eary morning memoria mass at a church in Dii on November 12,1991, some peope who attended the mass marched down the street carrying pro-independence banners and fags and shouting anti-indonesian sogans. About hafway to the Santa Cruz cemetery, a scuffe took pace between a sma group of demonstrators and Indonesian Army personne, resuting in the stabbing of an inteigence officer and the The Indonesian Amy and Nationa Poice are miiit.ary services under the command of the Indonesian Armed Forces Page 2 GMNNSIAD FS Shooting in Eat Timor

5 B wounding of a sodier. At the cemetery the demonstrators joined a group of peope who had arrived earier. At east 60 riot-equipped poice were stationed at the cemetery and at various points aong the demonstration route. Current information indicates that the commander of the Di miitary sector command, an Indonesian Army coone, ordered three Army units to reinforce the riot-equipped poice, as caed for n certain circumstances under Indonesian crowd contro procedures. It is unknown what specific orders the commander gave the unit eaders, a ieutenants, when he ordered them to reinforce the poice. The shooting began after some or a of the Indonesian Army units arrived at the cemetery. The United States suppied Indonesia with about 28,600 M-16 rifes from 1971 to 1978, and sod M-16 parts and ammunition to Indonesia during the 1980s. However, we coud not determine whether U.S.-suppied rifes were used during the incident or whether M-16 rifes had been suppied to Indonesia by other countries. Further, we coud not determine the source or country of manufacture for other weapons used by the Indonesian Armed Forces. Actions of the Indonesian Government After the Shooting Incident On November 17,1991, the President of Indonesia announced the estabishment of a Nationa Commission of Inquiry to investigate the shooting incident. The commission reeased its preiminary report on December 26,1QQ, which found, among other things, that Indonesian Armed Forces personne did not foow proper crowd contro procedures, opened fire without orders from their superiors, and reacted with excessive force in shooting protestom. The report aso attributed the demonstration to the poor state of the economy in the undeveoped province of East Timor and to insurgency groups there. (See app. II for a summary of the preiminary report.) After the reease of the preiminary report, the Indonesian President pubicy apoogized to famiies of innocent victims; reieved at east six Indonesian Army officers, incuding two genera officers, from their positions in the East Timor comman d structure; and ordered the a Page 3 GAO/NSIAD FS Shooting in East Timor

6 B Indonesian Armed Forces to continue emphasizing its economic deveopment mission in East Timor.2 The Indonesian President aso ordered specific miitary and civiian government officias to create a miitary co mmission, the Honorary Counci, to investigate East Timor command structures and procedures and gather information for use in future courts-martia of miitary personne invoved in the incident; account for the 90 peope reported missing by the Nationa Commission of mm; take ega steps against the peope who panned or took part in the demonstration; and create a civiian commission to assess the roe of the East Timor civiian government in the shooting incident and its functioning in terms of economic deveopment activities. As of February 6,1992, the miitary and civiian commissions had not reported on the resuts of their investigations. According to an Indonesian embassy officia, the government of Indonesia wi host a visit from a persona envoy of the United Nations Secretary Genera, who wi obtain carification on the shooting incident. The persona envoy is schedued to begin his mission on February 8,QQ2. Whie in Indonesia, this envoy wi meet with officias from the Indonesian government and the Nationa Co mmission of Inquiry and wi visit East Timor. IMET-trained Personne We found no IMET graduates among the 14 Indonesian Army officers whom we identified in the East Timor command structure on the day of the shooting incident. These officers hed ranks from major genera to ieutenant. We have not identified the number or names of other ower-ranking officers who commanded units that were invoved in the shooting incident. % December 1089 the Indonesian Armed Forces changed its miitary strategy in East Timor from one emphasizing combat operations to one emphasizing its economic deveopment mission, which incudes the buiding of roads, bridges, and water systems for the civiian popuatjon. According to Western sources, thie shift in strategy resuted in a genera improvement in East Timor human rights conditions unti about August 1991, when the government of Portuga announced pane for a visit of a Portuguese pariamentary deegation to East Timor (see app. I for a detaied description of events eading up to the shooting incident). Page 4 GAOiNSLAD FS Shooting in East Timor

7 After the incident, wxmrained personne were named to two investigatory commissions and a position of command responsibiity over East Timor miitary operations. According to IMET program records, these personne incude (1) the chairman of the Nationa Commission of Inquiry, a former genera officer who attended an IMET professiona miitary education course in 1972, and one commission member, an active duty rear admira who attended IMET professiona miitaty education and management courses during the 1979s; (2) the &airman and three members of the Honorary Counci, a major generas, three of whom attended IMET management courses and one who attended IMET observer training during the 1939s; and (3) the new commander of the miitary area command that incudes East Timor, a major genera who attended an IMET management course in Proposed U.S. Training training aimed at preventing the recurrence of incidents such as the shooting in Indonesia. For exampe, Indonesia s Ambassador to the United States suggested that the East Timor eadership team, incuding poice commanders, civiian eaders, and miitsry off%&.s, receive expanded IMET training to broaden their outook on how to sove East Timor s probems. Further, U.S. and Indonesian embassy officias suggested that the U.S. government consider training for Indonesian poice in crowd contro and riot procedures. In addition, officias from the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DUA) and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC), proposed expanded IMET courses to the Indonesian Armed Forces and Ministry of Defense, which woud cover human rights, incuding humanitarian aw, miitary justice, and defense resource management. Further, to discourage and prevent human rights abuses during aw enforcement actions, USCINCPAC officias aso proposed that senior aw enforcement eaders be aowed to attend IMET training. As part of this proposa, they recommended changes in the Foreign Assistance Acti to aow training of foreign poice forces, incuding the Indonesian Nationa Poice, which are currenty excuded from U.S.-provided training. 4 Scope and Methodoo& We obtained information on events surrounding the shooting incident from a variety of Western and Indonesian sources, incuding human rights groups. Athough we corroborated their information where possibe, we?section 660 of the Foreign As&tame Act of 1961 (P.L ), as amended. Page 6 GAO/NSIAD FS Shooting in Eut T&nor.

8 did not verify it through our own independent investigation. Investigations into the incident are ongoing; when compete, they may revea additiona information about the shooting incident. We conducted our review from November 1991 through February In the United States, we interviewed officias and obtained documentation at U~~MCPAC in Honouu, Hawaii, and the DSAA, Department of State, Indonesian Embassy, and other organizations in Washington, DC. In Indonesia, we conducted audit work at the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, Indonesian Armed Forces headquarters, U.S. Embassy, and the East Timor miitsry operations comman d. We aso met with the Governor of the East Timor Province, IMET graduates, and various miitary officias and civiian eaders in and around Dii. We did not obtain written comments from U.S. agencies invoved in this review. However, we discussed a draft of this fact sheet with responsibe U.S. officias and have incuded their comments as appropriate. We wi send copies of this fact sheet to interested parties upon request. Pease contact me on (202) if you or your staff have any questions concerning this fact sheet. Major contributors to the fact sheet are isted in appendix III. Joseph E. Keey Director, Security and Internationa Reations Issues Page 6 (LWNNSIAD FS Shooting in East Timor

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10 Contents Letter Appendix I 10 History of East Timor 10 A Chronoogy of Events Leading Up to the Shooting Incident 10 Events Surrounding Events on the Day of the Shooting Incident 11 Reports of the Number of Peope Kiied and,wounded 14 the Shooting Incident Events Foowing the Shooting Incident 14 in East Timor Appendix II 16 Preiminary Report of the Nationa Commission of Inquiry 16 Preiminary Report of Response of the US. Department of State 16 the Indonesian Response of a U.S.-based Human Rights Group 16 Nationa Commission of Inquiry and Seected Responses Appendix III Major Contributors to This Fact Sheet 18 Abbreviations DSM IMET USCINCPAC Defense Security Assistance Agency Internationa Miitary Education and Training Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command Page 8 GACMNSIAD FS Shooting in East Timor

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12 Appendix I A Chronoogy of Events Surrounding the Shooting Incident in East Timor History of East Timor The isand of Timor was first coonized by the Portuguese in the ate 16th century and was ater divided into Dutch West Timor and Portuguese East Timor in Athough Indonesia s 13,999 isands, incuding Dutch West Timor, decared their independence from the Dutch in 1946, the Portuguese did not reinquish contro over East Timor unti Fearing that East Timor woud fa to communism, Indonesia invaded it in 1976 and annexed it as a province in The United States has accepted Indonesia s annexation of East Timor, athough the United Nations does not recognize the annexation. Tens of thousands of East Timorese died in the years foowing Indonesia s invasion, mosty due to starvation or disease. Many more are estimated to have died as a resut of a protracted, ow eve insurgency arising from a separatist movement ed by the eftist, pro-independence Revoutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretiin). In December 1989, the Indonesian Armed Forces shifted its strategy in East Timor from combat operations to territoria operations, which focus on winning the hearts and minds of the East Timorese peope. The Indonesian Armed Forces began to aocate more resources to civic action projects that were designed to improve East Timor s infrastructure, assist in the overa economic deveopment of the province, and decrease the eve of instabiity in the province. Western sources and representatives of a human rights group agreed that human rights conditions had generay been improving in East Timor as a resut of the strategy shift. However, despite the change in miitary strategy, some peope, referred to as anti-integrationists, continued to oppose East Timor s integration with Indonesia. Events Leading Up to the Shooting Incident Tensions in Dii, the capita of East Timor, began to increase in the months prior to the shooting incident, according to Western and Indonesian sources.. As part of the miitary s new strategy, which incuded opening the formery cosed East Timor to outside visitors, Indonesia agreed in August 1991 to aow a Portuguese pariamentary deegation to visit East Timor in eary November This agreement resuted from discussions between Indonesia and Portuga under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary Genera. 6 Pa9e 10 GAWNSIAD FS Shooting in East Tmor!

13 Appendix I A Chronoogy of Evenm Burronndag the Siootin~ Incident in Eut Timor 0 Anti-integrationists, incuding supporters of the separatist Fretiin movement, began panning anti-integration demonstrations for the benefit of Western observers and the Portuguese deegation. 9 Eements of the Indonesian Armed Forces and East Timorese pro-integrationists began to intimidate East Timorese peope to discourage them from taking to the Portuguese pariamentary deegation. Despite this, according to Western sources, the commander of the East Timor miitary operations command issued a statement saying he woud aow East Timorese to hod demonstrations as ong as they remained peacefu. On October 26,1991, Portuga canceed the visit of its pariamentary deegation because Indonesia woud not aow a journaist, who the government of Indonesia caimed was a Fretiin supporter, to accompany the deegation. According to Western and Indonesian sources, the canceation of this visit increased the eve of frustration and emotions of peope panning the demonstrations for the Portuguese pariamentary deegation. On October 28,1991, an anti-integrationist and a pro-integrationist were kied during a cash at the Motae Cathoic Church in Dii. The circumstances surrounding the kiings are not cear, except that anti-integrationists sought refuge on the church grounds and pro-integrationists were outside of the grounds when the cash occurred. On October 29,1991, according to two eyewitnesses, a crowd of about 1,000 took part in a funera procession for the dead anti-integrationist, which incuded a few peope carrying pro-independence banners and intermittenty yeing anti-indonesian sogans. Western sources tod us that this demonstration was unusua because of its size and ack of vioence, despite the presence of Indonesian Army and Nationa Poice personne aong the demonstration route. Events on the Day of the Shooting Incident Athough various Western and Indonesian sources agreed on the basic chronoogy of events that occurred on November 12,1991, they provided differing detais of some events. The foowing sections provide a synthesis of these accounts. Events Eary in the Day of the Shooting Incident anti-integrationist kied in October According to some reports, Y 9 At about 6 a.m. a memoria mass began at Motae Cathoic Church for the about 2 days before the mass, Indonesian miitary radio invited East Timorese citizens to attend the mass. Page 11 GAONGAD-92422FS Shooting in East Timor

14 A Chronoogy of Evenb Surroudng the Shooting Incident In Eut I huor After the mass, one part of the congregation departed to the Santa Cruz cemetery to continue the memoria service at the buria site of the anti-integrationist. At the same time, another part of the congregation, numbering severa hundred peope, began a demonstration march. Anti-integrationists panned this poitica demonstration to coincide with the memoria mass. Western and Indonesian sources beieve that the demonstration was intended to coincide with the visit of the United Nations Specia Rapporteur on Torture because the visit of the Portuguese pariamentary deegation had been canceed. The march was an anti-indonesian, poitica demonstration and refected eements of the separatist F retiin group. It was arger and more vociferous than the demonstration on October 29,199. Demonstrators carried anti-indonesian and pro-independence banners and fags and shouted anti-indonesian sogans. Two eyewitnesses reported seeing a few Indonesian Army and Nationa Poice personne stationed at various points aong the route. When the demonstrators passed the miitary district command buiding, a demonstrator stabbed an Indonesian Army major who was the inteigence officer for the Dii miitary sector comman d. As it turned out, the officer was not severey wounded. An enisted Indonesian Army sodier from the miitary district command was aso wounded during the demonstration. New participants joined the demonstration aa the marchers proceeded toward the cemetery, with some peope, incuding schoochidren joining the march as it passed them on the street. Aong the way, some demonstrators threw rocks at buidings. The estimated number of demonstrators at the cemetery ranged from 2,000 to 3,600, after the marchers joined the other group aready at the cemetery. The demonstration continued at the cemetery, with most peope gathering outside the cemetery was. According to the commander of the East Timor Operations Comman d, at east 60 riot-equipped poice were stationed at the Santa Cruz cemetery before the demonstrators arrived. Depoyment of Indonesian Army Units Current information indicates that a oca miitary commander ordered Indonesian Army units to reinforce the poice forces, but it does not carify who, if anyone, gave the order to open fire or which Indonesian Army units first arrived at the cemetery or started shooting. The commander of the Dii miitary sector comman d, an Indonesian Army coone, ordered units to reinforce the riot-equipped poice, as caed for in certain circumstances under Indonesian crowd contro procedures. These Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-92422FS Shuoting in Eurt Timor

15 Appenh 1 A Chronoo~ of Evente 8 nmnudng the Shooting Incident in Eut Timor reinforcements consisted of eements of quick reaction companies from two battaions and the miitary district command. It is unknown what orders the commander gave the unit eaders, a ieutenants, when he ordered them to reinforce the poice. According to Western sources, eyewitnesses reported that one to three miitary trucks carrying uniformed Indonesian Army or Nationa Poice personne foowed the demonstration towards the cemetery. Two eyewitnesses tod us that uniformed Indonesian Army sodiers approached the cemetery on foot and in formation. Further, Western and Indonesian sources aso reported that another group of Indonesian Army sodiers ran to the cemetery out of uniform and in a state of agitation. Eyewitness accounts differ on whether the sodiers in the trucks arrived at the cemetery before or after the group of sodiers who arrived on foot. Accounts of the Shooting Incident The shooting began after some or a of the Indonesian Army units arrived at the cemetery. Athough current information indicates that these units fued upon the demon&atom in a methodica, deiberate manner, eyewitness accounts vary as to whether the troops that fired were in formation or were disorganized. The preiminary report of the Nationa Commission of Inquiry, which was created by the President of Indonesia to investigate the shooting incident, described these differing eyewitness accounts as foows: Indonesian Army sodiers arrived at the cemetery in formation and, without hesitation, fired shots aimed directy at the demonstrators. An uncontroabe group of Indonesian Armed Forces personne, who were not in proper uniform and were in a highy charged emotiona state, opened fue on the demonstrators. Demonstrators threatened Indonesian Armed Forces personne, threw a grenade, and attempted to seize their weapons, resuting in the shooting of demonstrators. The commission aso reported eyewitness accounts of Indonesian Armed Forces personne stabbing demonstrators with sharp instruments, kicking them, and beating them with their hands and bunt instruments. One other Indonesian source indicates that civiians were seen beating and stoning demonstrators. Page 18 GIAO/TVSIAD FS Shooting in East Thor

16 Appendix I A Chronoogy of Eventi Surronndng the Shooting Incident In East Thor Reports of the Number of Peope Kied and Wounded kied during the shooting incident and acknowedged hearing reports that from 60 to over 100 peope were kied. Western sources estimated the number of peope kied from 76 to over 100. The commission and Western sources indicated that the number of dead may have increased after the shooting incident, because severey wounded peope may have died ater. The Indonesian Armed Forces has not argued with the commission s findings, even though it had initiay caimed that ony 19 persons died as a resut of the shooting incident. A of our sources agreed that 91 wounded peope were treated at the miitary hospita in Dii. According to the Nationa Commission of Inquiry, 42 of these peope suffered from gunshot wounds, 14 from stabbing wounds, and 36 from wounds caused by bunt instruments. Fifty of the wounded were reeased to their famiies as of December 14,199. In addition, Western sources and the commission stated that some wounded demonstrators did not seek medica attention at oca hospitas for fear of miitary retribution. Events Foowing the Shooting Incident Western and Indonesian sources reported that the foowing events took pace after the shooting incident: According to the Nationa Commission of Inquiry, the oca poice questioned 308 demonstrators after the shooting incident, at east 32 of whom were arrested. According to a U.S.-based human rights group, 14 of these peope wi be charged under Indonesia s antisubversion aw, which carries a maximum penaty of death. One source indicated that some prisoners were beaten or tortured during their initia hours of detention, but that the beatings and tortures have since ceased. The commission reported that about 90 demonstrators were sti missing (as of Dec. 26,1991). The commission acknowedged that the missing may incude peope who died as a resut of the shooting incident, peope who were wounded, and peope in good heath who escaped to the forest or took refuge somewhere. Western sources coud find no evidence to substantiate rumors of other shootings and kiings. a Page 14 GAO/NSIAD FS Shooting in JWt Timor

17 Appendix II Preiminary Report of the Indonesian Nationa Commission of Inquiry and Seected Responses The President of Indonesia created the Nationa Commission of Inquiry to conduct an investigation into the shooting of demonstrators on November 12,1991, in the city of Dii, East Timor. The Commission reeased its preiminary report on December 26,199. We have summarized the concusions of this report and responses to the report by the U.S. State Department and a U.S.-based human rights group. Preiminary Report of the Nationa Comrnission of. Inquiry... The Nationa Commission of Inquiry reached the foowing concusions in its preiminary report: The shooting incident in Dii resuted from a cumination of the foowing factors: (1) a series of earier demonstrations and incidents occurred, incuding one on October 28,1991, during which two peope-an anti-integrationist and a pro-integrationist-were kied; (2) arge numbers of young, unempoyed peope were susceptibe to propaganda from anti-integration groups; and (3) anti-integration groups changed their mode of operations from a rura to an urban guerria strategy to obtain internationa attention through the foreign press in Dii. Anti-integrationists panned the demonstration, and non-indonesians participated in it. The demonstration, commemorating the death of an anti-integrationist, was neither ordery nor peacefu. Neither the government of Indonesia nor the Indonesian Armed Forces ordered the shooting of East Timorese citizens. The tensions surrounding the demonstration in Dii increased after Indonesian Armed Forces personne were wounded and the crowd assumed an aggressive attitude, which was perceived as a threat by the Indonesian Armed Forces. These forces reacted spontaneousy to defend themseves, without comman d, resuting in excessive shooting at the demonstrators. At the same time, another group of unorganized Indonesian Armed Forces personne, acting outside any contro or command, fired shots and beat peope. Proper riot-contro procedures were not optimay impemented, despite the presence of riot contro units. The actions of a number of Indonesian Armed Forces personne exceeded acceptabe norms and ed to the casuaties-deaths, gunshot wounds, stabbing wounds, and wounds by bunt instruments. About 60 peope were kied. This figure was higher than the officia Egure of 19 initiay reported by the Indonesian Armed Forces. More than 91 peope were wounded, and about 90 peope were missing as of December 26,1991. Page 15 GAO/NSIAD FS Shooting in F&t Timor

18 Pre-j Eeport of the ndonerh Nationa Canmuon of Inquiry and Seectad Eerponrer The deceased were not propery identified, and itte opportunity was given to famiies and friends of victims to identify the bodies. Action must be taken against aj who are suspected of vioating the aw during the shooting incident. The report recognized that many East Timorese civiian eyewitnesses woud not tak to the commias ion because of concern that they woud be directy incriminated in the incident or because of fear that they woud be regarded as beonging to the anti-integration group. Response of the U.S. Department of State According to U.S. State Department officias, the Department hods the foowing positions on the preiminary report of the Nationa Commission of Inquiry: The preiminary report refects a serious and responsibe approach to investigating the shooting incident. By acknowedging signiticanty higher casuaties than the previous officia count, concuding that the acts of some Armed Forces members were excessive and out of contro, and caing for ega measures against a those suspected of vioating the aw, the commission appears to have addressed the toughest questions appropriatey. The preiminary report is the beginning of a engthy process to dea fuy with what happened in East Timor. The key remaining issue is how the ega process wi operate against those who used or condoned excessive force. The State Department wi continue to cosey monitor that issue and the human righta issue in genera in East Timor. Response of a U.S.-based Human Rights Group In a January 1992 report, a U.S.-baaed human rights group] responded to the preiminary report of the Nationa Commission of Inquiry. Athough the human rights group acknowedged some positive aspects of the commission and its findings, the group criticized the commission s methodoogy and preiminary report for the foowing reasons: The preiminary report is Eawed because the members have ties to the government and ack experience in investigating a mass kiing. The commission exhumed ony 1 of the 18 bodies of victims buried at a cemetery, and did not attempt to identify the exhumed body or the other 17 bodies. Further, the commission did not attempt to expain what Asia Watch Criticizea Commission Report on East Timor, Asia Watch, January 3,1992. Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-92422FS Shooting in East Timor

19 Appendix rr ReIhInuy &port of the Indonemien NadonaI Ckmtmbion of Inquiry and Seected Eeepomeo happened to the re n-u&ring 31 victims it reported as kied, nor did it account for the 91 persons it reported as missing. The commission did not use any of the severa modern techniques avaiabe to ocate buried bodies. Most eyewitnesses interviewed by the commission were either inked to the Indonesian Armed Forces or were interviewed in intimidating environments, sometimes with Indonesian Armed Forces personne present.. The report acks some important information; for exampe, it does not address troop movements during the shooting and does not mention the prosecution of miitary officias. The human rights group concuded that the need for an impartia, timey internationa investigation into the shooting incident is essentia because the commission report is fawed. Page 17 GAANNsIAD F8 shooting i Eaet Timor

20 Appendix III Major Contributors to This Fact Sheet Nationa Security and Internationa AfTairs Division, Washington, D.C. Far East Office Chares A. Schuer, Assistant Director Joseph C. Brown, Evauator-in-Charge Judith A. McCoskey, Senior Evauator Robert E. Sanchez, Evauator 4 (466800) Page 18 GANNSXAD FS Shooting in Eaet Timor

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