Introduction. GORDON R. SULLIVAN General, United States Army Chief of Staff

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2 Introduction Word War II was the argest and most vioent armed confict in the history of mankind. However, the haf century that now separates us from that confict has exacted its to on our coective knowedge. Whie Word War II continues to absorb the interest of miitary schoars and historians, as we as its veterans, a generation of Americans has grown to maturity argey unaware of the poitica, socia, and miitary impications of a war that, more than any other, united us as a peope with a common purpose. Highy reevant today, Word War II has much to teach us, not ony about the profession of arms, but aso about miitary preparedness, goba strategy, and combined operations in the coaition war against fascism. During the next severa years, the U.S. Army wi participate in the nation s 50th anniversary commemoration of Word War II. The commemoration wi incude the pubication of various materias to hep educate Americans about that war. The works produced wi provide great opportunities to earn about and renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificenty in what has been caed the mighty endeavor. Word War II was waged on and, on sea, and in the air over severa diverse theaters of operation for approximatey six years. The foowing essay is one of a series of campaign studies highighting those strugges that, with their accompanying suggestions for further reading, are designed to introduce you to one of the Army s significant miitary feats from that war. This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Miitary History by Cayton D. Laurie. I hope this absorbing account of that period wi enhance your appreciation of American achievements during Word War II. GORDON R. SULLIVAN Genera, United States Army Chief of Staff

3 Rome-Arno 22 January 9 September 1944 Rome was quiet on the morning of 4 June Propaganda eafets dropped during the eary morning hours by order of the commander of the Aied 15th Army Group, Genera Sir Harod R. L. G. Aexander, urged Romans to stand shouder-to-shouder to protect the city from destruction and to defeat our common enemies. Even though the retreating Germans had decared Rome an open city, citizens were urged to do everything possibe to protect pubic services, transportation faciities, and communications. Citizens of Rome, the eafets decared, this is not the time for demonstrations. Obey these directions and go on with your reguar work. Rome is yours! Your job is to save the city, ours is to destroy the enemy. Hours ater the first Fifth Army units, eements of the U.S. 3d, 85th, and 88th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Specia Service Force, reached the outskirts of the city, encountering ony scattered German resistance. The citizens of Rome remained indoors as instructed, but on the foowing day, 5 June, throngs of ecstatic Itaians spied into the streets to wecome the Americans as the main eements of the Fifth Army moved north through the city in pursuit of the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies. The stay of Fifth Army combat units in the city was brief, however, and within days the batte for Itay resumed to the north. The iberation of Rome was the cumination of an offensive aunched in ate January 1944 that Aied eaders had hoped woud both resut in the capture of the Axis capita by 1 February and compete the destruction of the German forces in Itay. Instead, the Aies faied to break through the formidabe enemy defenses unti ate May Even with Rome in Aied hands, the Itaian campaign woud ast another eeven months unti fina victory. Strategic Setting The Aied andings in Itay in September 1943, foowed quicky by the iberation of Napes and the crossing of the Voturno River in October, had tied down German forces in southern Itay.

4 By year s end a reinforced German army of 23 divisions, consisting of 215,000 troops engaged in the south and 265,000 in reserve in the north, was conducting a sow withdrawa under pressure from the U.S. Fifth Army under Lt. Gen. Mark Cark and the Commonweath and Aied forces of the British Eighth Army under Genera Sir Bernard L. Montgomery. South of Rome the Germans constructed three major defensive ines: the Barbara Line, i defined and improvised, stretching from Monte Massico to the viage of Teano, to Presenzano, and to the Matese Mountains; the Bernhard, or Reinhard, Line, a wider bet of stronger fortifications forty mies north of Napes between Gaeta and Ortona, extending from the mouth of the Garigiano River near Mignano to Monte Camino, Monte a Difensa, Monte Maggiore, and Monte Sammucro; and the most formidabe of the three bets, the Gustav Line, a system of sophisticated interocking defenses, anchored on Monte Cassino, that stretched across the rugged, narrowest point of the peninsua aong the Garigiano and Rapido Rivers. In mid-january 1944 the Aied armies were through the first two bets and were facing the Gustav Line. Yet the Aied forces were exhausted from months of heavy fighting in bitter weather. The terrain aso favored the defenders, who used the Apennine Mountains, with their deep vaeys, foggy hoows, and rain-swoen streams and rivers, to sow the Aied advance to a craw. Aied sodiers endured icy winds and torrentia rains, ived in improvised sheters, ate cod rations, suffered from exposure and trench foot, and haued their own munitions and suppies up and down steep mountainsides where vehices and even mue trains were often unabe to negotiate the few crude tracks or rocky crags. The Fifth Army drive aong the western haf of the peninsua hated at the Garigiano and Rapido Rivers severa mies from the base of Monte Cassino, a massif which bocked the entrance to the Liri vaey, the most expeditious route to Rome. The Eighth Army drive aong the eastern portion of the peninsua was aso staed we short of Pescara on the Adriatic coast. In describing the difficuties of the campaign, and the eusiveness of its goa, the Fifth Army s VI Corps commander, Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, wrote that Rome seemed a ong way off and that briiant maneuvers were impossibe in the mountainous terrain. The prospect of renewed fronta assauts over difficut ground, in poor weather, against a we-entrenched and determined enemy adversey affected the morae of a ranks. Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Waker, commanding 4

5 Pescara Chieti Ortona Tiber R 5 Corps Avezzano ROME Veetri Vamontone HIGHWAY 6 Frosinone 13 Corps Littoria Nettuno ANZIO VI Corps the U.S. 36th Infantry Division of Fifth Army s II Corps, wrote in ate December that there was itte hope that the Itaian campaign woud end anytime soon. Taking one mountain mass after another gained no tactica advantage as there was aways another mountain mass beyond with Germans on it. The composition and capabiities of the Aied armies in Itay, and the nature of their operations, refected the disagreement be HIGHWAY 7 Terracina Liri R Gaeta Rapido Cassino G arigia no VenafroFEC II Corps EIGHTH BR XXXX FIFTH US 10 Corps Caserta ALLIED STRATEGY IN ITALY January 1944 Aied Offensive Gustav Line ELEVATION IN METERS and Above 0 30 Mies 5

6 tween the American and British high commands about the overa Aied strategy in the Mediterranean. The British had ong favored a periphera, or indirect, approach to defeating Germany. They sought to engage the Axis in the Bakans and Mediterranean, drawing enemy forces from other fronts and whitting away their strength. Ony after the Aies had amassed an overwheming superiority in men and materie were they wiing to think favoraby of a knockout bow across the Engish Channe. The Americans favored an immediate cross-channe assaut, but they saw their 1942 and 1943 invasion pans deayed by materie and manpower shortages as we as by the reuctance of their aies to undertake the cimactic bow. To the Americans, each diversion of men and equipment to the Mediterranean theater, especiay amphibious shipping, which was in short suppy throughout the word, ony deayed the main event. When the Aies decided to schedue the invasions of Normandy (OVERLORD) and southern France (ANVIL) for the summer of 1944, Itay was destined to become a hoding action of secondary importance. Genera Dwight D. Eisenhower reinquished command of the Mediterranean theater eary in January 1944 to assume command of the Overord invasion forces. His successor, Genera Sir Henry Maitand Wison, turned over the main responsibiity for directing Mediterranean operations from the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the British Chief of Staff, Genera Sir Aan Brooke, and to Prime Minister Winston S. Churchi, who immediatey attempted to revitaize the Itaian campaign. Churchi wanted the theater to receive increased support, commenting in mid-december that the stagnation of the whoe Itaian front was becoming scandaous. He added that the capture of Rome was essentia since the success or ruin of the Itaian campaign depended on it. To restore maneuver to the battefied, Aied eaders in November had discussed an amphibious anding behind enemy ines at Anzio, thirty-five mies southwest of Rome. The ack of troops and anding craft, however, caused the canceation of the pan in December. With the change in theater eadership and the concomitant British insistence on an increased effort in Itay, the Anzio idea was revived. The new pan caed for the Fifth Army to and two divisions at Anzio and rapidy drive inand toward Rome to cut enemy suppy and communication ines. To faciitate the invasion, the main body of the combined Fifth Army, consisting of the British 10 Corps, the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC), and 6

7 the U.S. II Corps, woud draw German forces away from Anzio by attacking toward the Rapido and Garigiano Rivers. Cark s forces woud then cross the rivers, take the high ground on both sides of the Liri vaey, and advance north to ink up with the Anzio beachhead. Eighth Army, under Lt. Gen. Sir Oiver Leese, woud support these operations by crossing the Sangro River and capturing Pescara, further tying down the enemy. The offensive in the Fifth Army area woud start on 17 January, and 40,000 Aied troops woud and at Anzio five days ater. Operations The British 10 Corps attacked with two divisions across the Garigiano River near Minturno on 17 January. The 5th and 56th Divisions ferried ten battaions to the far bank and estabished a bridgehead. This posed a serious threat to the Gustav Line and stunned the XIV Panzer Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Fridoin von Senger und Etterin, whose forces opposed Fifth Army. Senger knew that the hard-pressed 94th Grenadier Division coud not stop the British without hep. On 18 January he appeaed to Fied Marsha Abert Kessering, the commander of German forces in Itay, to send immediate reinforcements to the Garigiano front. Having been informed by miitary inteigence that no Aied andings were expected in Itay, Kessering sent the 9th and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, units he had hed in reserve to counter a possibe amphibious operation, south from Rome. These German units hated the British drive far short of the heights the Americans considered vita for their Rapido assaut, and attempts by the British 46th Division to cross on 19 January faied against heavy resistance, eaving the U.S. II Corps fank unprotected as the Americans prepared to storm the Rapido the next day. The British did draw enemy reserves away from the Anzio area, thus obtaining one vita Aied goa, but at a cost of more than four thousand casuaties. The 36th Infantry Division of the II Corps had been ordered to cross the Rapido River in the vicinity of Sant Angeo, a viage atop a forty-foot buff. The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, considered one of the best enemy units in Itay, opposed the Americans. The Rapido was a sma but swift-fowing river, 25 to 50 feet wide and 10 to 15 feet deep, with banks varying in height from 3 to 6 feet. There were few covered approaches to the river. Because the British 10 Corps and the French Expeditionary Corps had 7

8 The Rapido River viewed from Monte Trocchio. (Nationa Archives) faied to expe the Germans from the heights on both sides of the Liri vaey between January, the entire area was under enemy observation. The 141st and 143d Infantry regiments of the 36th Division were to cross the river on the night of 20 January and enveop Sant Angeo from the north and south. Both the division commander, Genera Waker, and the II Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey T. Keyes, feared heavy osses. The assauting units were beow strength and contained many unassimiated recruits and inexperienced sma unit eaders who had ony recenty arrived to fi the gaps eft by the heavy osses suffered in earier battes. Additionay, the troops acked sufficient boats, bridging equipment, and training in river crossings. The engineers assigned to assist the crossings had obtained over a hundred rubber and wooden assaut boats, but were unabe to move them to the river bank because of withering enemy fire, poor roads, and mines, and spongy ground. They eft the craft severa mies to the rear near Monte Trocchio for the aready heaviy aden infantrymen to carry to the river on the night of the attack. 8

9 Despite aternative suggestions from his subordinates, Genera Cark insisted on crossing the Rapido at the panned point and time to keep pressure on the Germans during the Anzio anding and to gain a bridgehead so that armored units of Combat Command B (CCB), 1st Armored Division, coud dash north up the Liri vaey toward Anzio. Like Waker and Keyes, Cark expected heavy osses, but he considered the Rapido attack vita to draw enemy forces away from the Anzio area. In the days before the attack, Waker expressed his pessimism in his diary, confiding that the attack might succeed, but that he did not see how it coud. Waker beieved the mission was poory timed and that a fronta attack across the Rapido woud end in disaster. He wrote that he was prepared for defeat. At 1905 on 20 January, after an artiery barrage of 31,000 shes, the 1st Battaion, 141st Infantry, began its assaut. As expected, the unit immediatey came under heavy enemy mortar, artiery, and sma arms fire. The unit suffered severe casuaties, especiay from artiery and and mines one company ost thirty men to a singe she and quicky became disorganized. Rumors ran rampant, markers indicating ceared paths through minefieds were destroyed or ost, guides became disoriented in the fog and darkness, infantrymen refused to cooperate with the engineers, and men wandered away from their units. Enemy fire damaged or destroyed most of the assaut boats on the river bank, and the remainder were hit soon after they entered the water. Much of the bridging equipment was destroyed before it reached the river, and efforts by the engineers to construct bridges faied amid a rain of enemy shes. By 0400 about a hundred men of the 1st Battaion had crossed the river, but the ony remaining footbridge was soon destroyed, isoating them on the far bank. German artiery knocked out teephone wires, fied radios were ost or mafunctioned, and engineer and infantry units were quicky pinned down on both sides of the river. At dawn on 21 January the regimenta commander suspended the attack, ordered the troops on the near bank to fa back, and directed those on the other side to dig in unti hep arrived. The 143d Infantry fared itte better. It began its attack at 2000 on 20 January using two crossing points a mie to the south of the 141st. Two companies of the 1st Battaion crossed the rain-swoen river at the northery site by 0500, 21 January. Enemy artiery fire destroyed most of their boats, and with casuaties on the far bank 9

10 increasing, the regimenta commander ordered his sodiers to withdraw across the river, a movement competed by At the other site accurate enemy artiery fire and and mines inficted such a to in men and boats and caused such confusion that an assaut was not even attempted. The units withdrew to their preattack positions at daybreak. On orders from Cark and Keyes, Waker prepared a renewed assaut by both regiments for the night of 21 January. Confusion, shaken morae, destruction of equipment, and the dispersa of forces, however, deayed the assauts. The 143d Infantry attempted a crossing between on 21 January under heavy artificia smoke. Athough three battaions succeeded in reaching the far bank by 0200 on 22 January, enemy artiery stymied efforts to pace bridges across the river to aow reinforcement by armor and infantry units. Heavy fog caused by the weather and artificia smoke pots prevented counterbattery fire, mines accounted for sti more casuaties, and demoraization and disorganization gripped most units. Amid the confusion and heavy enemy fire, many sodiers behaved bravey. S. Sgt. Thomas E. McCa, Company F, 143d Infantry, commanded a machine gun section providing fire support for rifemen crossing the river. Under cover of darkness, Company F advanced to the crossing site and despite intense enemy mortar, artiery, and machine gun fire traversed an ice-covered footbridge. Exposing himsef to the deady enemy fire that swept over the fat terrain, McCa, with unusua camness, weded his men into an effective fighting unit. He ed them forward across barbed-wire entangements and personay paced the weapons of his two squads in positions covering his battaion s front. A she anded near one of the positions, wounding the gunner and kiing the assistant gunner. Amid the artiery barrage, McCa crawed forward and carried the wounded man to safety. After the crew of the second machine gun was wounded, Sergeant McCa was the ony effective member of his section. He picked up a machine gun and ran forward firing the weapon from his hip, successfuy assauting a series of enemy positions singe-handed. Severey wounded in his fina attack, Mc- Ca was captured and spent the duration as a prisoner of war in Germany. His actions heped stabiize the battaion s position, and he was ater awarded the Meda of Honor. Despite such individua acts of courage, by the eary afternoon of 22 January the second 10

11 crossing attempt had faied, and the bady maued and disorganized battaions on the far bank were ordered to withdraw. The efforts of the aready battered 141st Infantry were even ess successfu. The 2d and 3d Battaions crossed the river beginning at 2100 on 21 January, but they found no survivors from among the hundred men stranded on the far bank the night before. Army engineers began constructing a heavy vehice bridge amost immediatey after the crossing began, but enemy artiery hated work at 0945 the next day, and construction never resumed. The remaining footbridges either were washed away or were destroyed by enemy artiery. The troops in the bridgehead, unabe to move forward farther than 600 yards, endured a merciess pounding by enemy mortars and artiery. By 1800, 22 January, a officers except one were casuaties. A boats and bridges were destroyed, communications were out, and the units were cut off. As other units farther downstream competed their withdrawas, the Germans attacked the stranded men of the 141st. Forty men managed to swim back across the river; the remainder were either kied, wounded, or captured. A sounds of firing from the far bank ceased at In forty-eight hours the 141st and 143d Infantry regiments had suffered 2,128 casuaties: 155 kied, 1,052 wounded, and 921 missing or captured. Enemy osses were negigibe, and their scarce reserves were never committed. Genera Waker ater wrote in his diary that the 36th Division had been sacrificed for no justifiabe end and that he fuy expected Genera Cark to fire him to cover Cark s own error in judgment. Cark, Waker wrote, admitted that the faiure to cross the Rapido was as much his faut as anyone s. But the Fifth Army commander s admission of faiure was not an admission of error. The attack was part of Aexander s overa offensive pan and not the resut of Cark s own initiative, and it did succeed in tying down enemy forces during the Anzio andings as intended. Cark hed that some bood had to be spied on either the and or SHINGLE (Anzio) front, and that he preferred it be on the Rapido, where Aied forces were secure, rather than at Anzio where the Aies had the sea at their back. He maintained that the attack was necessary within the context of the overa offensive a position supported by a postwar congressiona inquiry and then Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson. As the Rapido crossing attempts ended on 22 January, preventing the panned Fifth Army drive up the Liri vaey, the VI Corps successfuy impemented Operation Shinge and anded unop- 11

12 Cassino: the monastery, the caste, and the town. Archives) (Nationa posed at Anzio. During the foowing weeks the combined Ango- American corps estabished a 15-by-22-mie beachhead, forcing the Germans to divert the Fourteenth Army under Genera Eberhard von Mackensen from northern Itay to the south. Other German units had to be dispatched to Itay, weakening enemy forces in Germany, France, and the Bakans. Yet the VI Corps commander, Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, in a controversia interpretation of Aexander s and Cark s orders, directed the invasion forces to dig in before aunching an offensive. His intention was to ensure the surviva of the beachhead against a probabe enemy counterattack, but the effect was to deay a breakout effort unti 30 January. By that date the Germans had massed 70,000 troops around Anzio, and they effectivey hated the Aied offensive with heavy osses on both sides. Whie subsequent enemy counterattacks faied to destroy the beachhead, which eventuay contained 110,000 sodiers, the panned rapid advance on Rome had been staed. 12

13 Faced with the necessity of breaking through to the beeaguered Anzio beachhead, Genera Cark aunched attacks over the high ground northeast of Cassino. The British 10 Corps resumed its attack from the Garigiano bridgehead. The U.S. 34th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Chares W. Ryder, with the aid of the FEC and one regiment of the 36th Division, attempted to outfank Cassino and to storm the Benedictine monastery on Monte Cassino above the town, Highway 6, and the Liri vaey. In a series of costy engagements the II Corps and the FEC bent, but faied to break, the Gustav Line in an area hed by six enemy divisions under the overa contro of Tenth Army commander Lt. Gen. Heinrich van Vietinghoff. American and French units gained a sight foothod on the northeastern sopes of Monte Cassino itsef, whie units of the 34th Division crossed the Rapido by 26 January. The 34th Division renewed attacks on Cassino in eary February to pave the way for yet another attempt at the Liri vaey by the recenty created New Zeaand Corps under Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard Freyberg. This corps consisted of the 2d New Zeaand and 4th Indian Divisions and the CCB of the U.S. 1st Armored Division. The 34th Division drive encountered stiff resistance a the way to Cassino, with advances characterized by sma unit attacks on successive German defensive positions. Second Lt. Pau F. Riordan ed his patoon into the town after personay destroying a pibox that had pinned his unit down. Attacking the jai, a major strongpoint, Riordan again took the ead, managing to penetrate a ring of enemy fire covering the approaches to the buiding. Finding himsef cut off and aware that his men were unabe to assist him, the young officer continued the attack aone. He was finay kied by sma arms fire after a bitter fight with the defenders. Lieutenant Riordan s bravery was an inspiration to his men, and he was posthumousy awarded the Meda of Honor. But despite such heroic efforts by sodiers in the 133d, 135th, and 168th Infantry regiments, the Germans sti hed the town after six days of fighting. One ast American attempt to take Cassino was aunched on 10 February with heavy artiery support, but the troops of the II Corps and FEC were nearing exhaustion, and the drive faied. The newy formed New Zeaand Corps took over the sector from the Americans, who, according to Aexander s American deputy chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, were so disheartened as to be amost mutinous. With the withdrawa of the British 56th Divi- 13

14 sion from the Garigiano front to reinforce the hard-pressed force at Anzio, the drive toward Cassino stopped. The Aies had reaized eary in their campaign against the Gustav Line that the historic monastery dominating the summit of Monte Cassino (1,703 feet above sea eve) was a crucia strategic point. Nevertheess, they exempted the monastery, founded in 524 A.D. by St. Benedict, from air, artiery, and ground attacks during the American assauts on Cassino. Even though the Aies ater earned that the monastery itsef was never permanenty occupied by the Germans, frequent sightings of enemy personne within its was raised suspicions. In addition, the enemy buit heaviy fortif ied empacements and observation posts within feet of the monastery to take fu advantage of the terrain and Aied firing prohibitions. But there was no consensus that the Aied exemption regarding Monte Cassino was wise. Genera Aexander and his superiors had ong maintained that the safety of such areas woud not be aowed to interfere with miitary necessity. When Genera Freyberg began to pan his assaut, he concuded that the monastery woud have to be reduced and requested air attacks. Genera Cark, Freyberg s immediate superior, disagreed with this assessment, and he was supported in his view by French Genera Aphonse Juin and Generas Keyes, Waker, and Ryder. Cark hoped to avoid destroying a historic reigious site, and in the process providing the enemy with vauabe propaganda. Nonetheess, Cark aso wanted to give the New Zeaand Corps every possibe advantage in jump-starting the Aied drive. In addition, sensitive to the combined Aied command structure in the Mediterranean, he was hesitant to deny Freyberg s request because of the serious poitica repercussions that woud resut if Commonweath forces ater sustained substantia osses. Cark therefore passed on Freyberg s request to attack the monastery to Aexander and his chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Sir John Harding. Both British officers decided that if Freyberg thought the monastery s destruction was a miitary necessity, the attack shoud proceed, with Aexander concuding that he had faith in Genera Freyberg s judgment. Their opinion was confirmed by Genera Sir Henry Maitand Wison, the Supreme Aied Commander of the Mediterranean theater. After making his own position cear, Cark compied with the wishes of his superiors and granted his subordinate s request. Genera Freyberg s decision, widey condemned at that time and since, is sti mired in controversy. 14

15 Freyberg s pan caed for an air attack on the monastery foowed by a ground attack by the 4th Indian Division. This infantry assaut woud cear Monte Cassino whie the 2d New Zeaand Division forced the Rapido to the south. Teamed with armored detachments, the two divisions woud then converge for the drive up the Liri vaey. Freyberg s request for an air attack, however, was greaty expanded by air force panners, and probaby supported by Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, the American commander in chief of the Mediterranean Aied Air Forces, and Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Wison s American deputy theater commander. The Americans sought to use the opportunity to showcase the abiities of the U.S. Army air power to support ground operations. Foowing the dropping of eafets warning civiians in the monastery to evacuate, the Tactica and Strategic Army Air Forces, consisting of the 319th, 340th, 321st, 2d, 97th, 99th, and 301st Bomber Groups, began their bomb runs at 0945, 15 February A tota of 142 B 17s, 47 B 25s, and 40 B 26s dropped 1,150 tons of high exposives and incendiary bombs on the abbey, reducing the entire top of Monte Cassino to a smoking mass of rubbe. Between bomb runs the II Corps artiery pounded the mountain. The controversia bombing destroyed much of the monastery and its outer was but did not penetrate the subterranean chambers the Aies thought the Germans were using as bomb sheters. When the 4th Indian Division aunched its attack on the night of 15 February, it was repused with heavy casuaties. Over the next three days fighter-bombers provided cose support of further Indian assauts, a of which faied with tremendous osses. Even though the 2d New Zeaand Division, aided by 34th Division and 36th Division artiery, crossed the Rapido and made significant headway into Cassino, the heavy osses sustained by Aied units, especiay the Indians, forced a hat in operations and a withdrawa from the sopes. In mid-march the Aies attacked Monte Cassino again. The new assaut was to coincide with an attack on the town of Cassino by the 2d New Zeaand Division and CCB, 1st Armored Division. The atter units hoped to force a further crossing of the Rapido, capture Sant Angeo, cut Highway 6, and assist the British 78th Infantry Division to penetrate the Liri vaey. Athough most commanders now doubted whether air assauts coud reduce the Cassino defenses to the point where the infantry coud succeed, a arge air attack was nonetheess panned. Successive waves of bombers were to puverize Cassino between 0830 and noon, deiv- 15

16 ering 750 tons of 1,000-pound bombs with deayed-action fuses. During the afternoon, every artiery piece on the Cassino front woud target the town and provide a creeping barrage for the attacking Indian infantry. On 15 March 1944, Generas Cark, Aexander, Eaker, Freyberg, and Devers watched the air attack on Cassino from three mies away. On schedue, 514 medium and heavy bombers, supported by 300 fighter-bombers and 280 fighters, dropped high exposives on the area. During the afternoon, 746 artiery pieces of the British 10 Corps, the U.S. II Corps, and the New Zeaand Corps fired 200,000 rounds, deivering another 1,200 tons of exposives. The bombardment faied to meet expectations. As the infantry and armored units advanced over the cratered and now neary impassabe terrain, they found the German positions sti intact and enthusiasticay defended. Despite new air attacks by fighter-bombers, and another 106 tons of bombs, the New Zeaanders and Indians made itte progress. Sti further air attacks on March, which dropped 466 tons of bombs, produced no tangibe resuts. By 21 March, seven days into the attack, Genera Cark caed on Freyberg to break off the assaut, a decision thought prudent by Generas Juin and Leese as we. Yet thinking that success was just within reach, Freyberg continued the attack unti Aexander compeed him to hat the offensive on 23 March. After mutipe air assauts, the firing of 600,000 artiery shes, and 1,316 New Zeaander and 3,000 Indian casuaties, Cassino, Monte Cassino, and the Liri vaey remained in German hands. The Aies had faied to break the Gustav Line three times: in January with the i-fated assauts on the Rapido River; in February with the attempt to outfank Cassino; and in March with the attempt to drive between the monastery on Monte Cassino and the town beow. The Germans remained in firm contro of the fortified ine stretching from the Guf of Gaeta on the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Adriatic, and they were now preparing the Hiter Line, five to ten mies farther north. These new defenses stretched from Terracina to the Liri vaey and Monte Cairo and were manned by the equivaent of nine divisions of the LI Mountain Corps under Lt. Gen. Vaentin Feuerstein. To meet further Aied attacks, the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies gathered 365,000 sodiers, the buk of the 412,000 German troops stationed in Itay south of the Aps. Genera Aexander used the period from March to May 1944 to rebuid his forces and pan the fina push on Rome. To assure an 16

17 overwheming victory, and to avoid the battes of attrition encountered thus far, the 15th Army Group commander estimated that he needed at east a three-to-one advantage in infantry over his adversaries, requiring a major reorganization of the Aied ine. The Fifth Army front was therefore reduced to tweve mies just the narrow coasta pain aong the Tyrrhenian Sea. With the addition of two new American infantry divisions to the II Corps, the 85th and 88th, the arriva of the IV Corps headquarters, and the addition of the 4th Moroccan Mountain and French 1st Motorized Divisions to the FEC, Fifth Army strength was over 350,276 by ate Apri. The Eighth Army front had been extended westward across the Apennines to Cassino. Its mutinationa force of 265,000 men represented twenty-one nations and incuded the British 5, 10, and 13 Corps; the Canadian 1st Corps; the New Zeaand Corps; and the 2d Poish Corps under Lt. Gen. Wadysaw Anders. As the Aies regrouped on the ground, the Mediterranean Aied Air Forces (MAAF) began Operation STRANGLE on 11 March. The goa of this air campaign was to cut enemy suppy ines south of the Aps and weaken the German armies ogisticay, thereby diminishing their abiity to withstand a new offensive. When STRAN- GLE ended on 11 May, the air forces had conducted over 65,000 sorties and dropped 33,000 tons of bombs on road, rai, and sea routes. In spite of incement weather and an inabiity to bomb at night, the air attacks disrupted transportation at a points south of a ine running from Pisa to Rimini. The Germans repaired most of the damage, however, and continued to reinforce and resuppy the front, athough at a sower and reduced pace. The Aied offensive panned for May 1944, code-named DIA- DEM, had the dua goas of tying down German forces in Itay during Overord and capturing Rome. Aexander s controversia pan, which was not to Cark s iking because of the supporting roe it assigned to the Fifth Army, caed for the Poish Corps to take Monte Cassino whie the British 13 Corps crossed the Rapido, took Cassino, and hit the northern fank of the Hiter Line. Fifth Army s VI Corps woud break out of Anzio; move inand to capture Vamontone, a viage stradding Highway 6; and cut the Tenth Army s ine of retreat. The remainder of the Fifth Army was to protect the Eighth Army s eft fank during the drive north for the ink-up with VI Corps and subsequent advance on Rome. Impicit in Aexander s pan was the destruction of German miitary forces south of Rome. 17

18 Ardea 11 May ROME Veetri VI Corps Nettuno Anzio CAESAR LINE Cori Cisterna Littoria Vamontone TENTH XXXX FOURTEENTH Liri Terracina Fondi Frosinone River HITLER LINE Gaeta GUSTAV 2 Po Cassino Venafro 13 Br 1 Cdn EIGHTH BR XXXX FIFTH US FEC Minturno II Corps LINE XXX 10 Br XXX XXX 5 Br XXX OPERATION DIADEM May 1944 Route of Aied Advance Aied Front Line German Defense Line ELEVATION IN METERS and Above 0 20 Mies Athough Genera Aexander ceary intended the Eighth Army to pay the major roe in DIADEM, Genera Cark wanted to ensure that the Americans, not the British, took Rome, and he activey sought to have the Fifth Army s roe increased to bring about this aim. Athough he was rebuffed in his efforts during a tense 1 May meeting with Aexander, the atter was aware that Cark s views differed from his own. To maintain cordia reations with his ay, Aexander provided ony the most genera orders to Cark, thus aowing him great fexibiity in determining Fifth Army depoyments during the coming weeks. The ong-awaited spring offensive commenced on 11 May 1944 at 2300 with a massive barrage by 1,660 artiery pieces aong the entire front from Cassino to the sea. When the barrage ifted, 18

19 twenty-five Aied divisions attacked. The British 13 Corps immediatey crossed the Rapido at two points and estabished a sma bridgehead, but the Poish Corps assaut on Monte Cassino faied with more than 50 percent of the attacking force counted as casuaties. In the II Corps area the U.S. 88th Infantry Division made sight progress against heavy resistance, whie the 4th Moroccan Mountain Division succeeded in taking Monte Majo on 13 May after bitter fighting, breaking the Gustav Line. This FEC penetration over rugged terrain succeeded in securing the high ground overooking the Liri vaey and threatened not ony the entire eft wing of the XIV Panzer Corps, but aso the Germans at Cassino. Sensing an opportunity to widen the breach in the Gustav Line in the Monte Majo area, both the 85th and 88th Divisions smashed into the German positions and after savage fighting forced the defenders back. Having ost over 40 percent of their combat strength in just three days, with pressure buiding aong the entire Gustav Line, and faced with the encircement of Cassino, the Germans began to withdraw to the north, fighting desperate rearguard actions the entire way. By the eary morning hours of 16 May, the II Corps and FEC had broken the Gustav Line at severa points at the cost of 3,000 casuaties, 1,100 in the 85th Division aone. To the east, the British 13 Corps aso broke through the German defenses, with the Canadians pouring across the Rapido and the British 78th Division cutting Highway 6. On 17 May the Poish Corps, supported by the 78th Division, again attacked Monte Cassino and, foowing a day of ferocious combat and heavy osses, rendered the German positions untenabe. During the night the remaining enemy forces quiety retreated, aowing the Poes to take the summit unopposed the foowing morning. Having disodged the enemy from the Gustav Line, the Aies sought to keep the offensive moving and to prevent the Germans from setting into new positions on the Hiter Line. Yet by the time the British advance up the Liri vaey resumed on May, the Germans had dug in, and the Eighth Army faced a renewed round of costy fronta assauts. In the Fifth Army sector, however, the situation remained fuid. Because the Germans were withdrawing northeast away from the coast to avoid being cut off, Cark made the decision to thrust north to Fondi and Terracina to ink up with the Anzio beachhead and head toward Rome rather than reieving the pressure on the Eighth Army s eft fank as originay instructed. Ordering the FEC to continue its offensive on the Fifth Army right, 19

20 American infantrymen advancing aong Highway 6 toward Rome. (Nationa Archives) thereby diverting German attention from II Corps movements, Cark sent the 88th and 85th Divisions racing toward Terracina. Between May the Aied armies pushed the Germans back aong the entire front. But whie the FEC and II Corps pierced the Hiter Line in severa paces, the Eighth Army advance up the Liri vaey sowed due to stubborn enemy resistance, difficut terrain, exhaustion, and heavy casuaties. The 90,000 Aied troops of VI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., started their offensive from the Anzio beachhead as panned on 23 May Attacking toward Cisterna, Truscott understood his utimate objective to be the capture of Highway 6 at Vamontone. During the foowing three days of hard fighting by the U.S. 3d and 45th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Armored Division, and the 1st Specia Service Force, VI Corps broke free of the beachhead, drove inand, and threatened to drive a wedge between the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies. In the meantime, at dawn on 24 May, a task force of motorized infantry, engineers, tanks, and sef-propeed artiery from the 85th Division met a patro of VI Corps engineers moving south from Anzio, ending the 125-day isoation of the Fifth Army beachhead. The Germans 20

21 ROME 1st SSF Frascati HIGHWAY 7 Abano 88th Inf Vamontone 3d Inf 85th Inf Incastro River Genzano Veetri 45th Inf 34th Inf Campoeone 36th Inf Cori Ardea 5th Inf Moetta River 1st Armored 31 May 1st Inf Br Apriia (the Factory) HIGHWAY 7 Cisterna Padigione Cana Conca Mussoini Littoria ANZIO Nettuno THE BREAKTHROUGH 31 May 4 June 1944 Route of Aied Advance Front Line ELEVATION IN METERS Borga and Grappa Above 0 4 Mies

22 rapidy began withdrawing to the Caesar Line, an incompete string of fortifications extending east from the region between Anzio and Rome to a point two mies south of Vamontone. Aexander had intended the VI Corps breakout to be the start of the second thrust aimed at destroying German resistance south of Rome. However, Cark had never accepted Aexander s view that the iberation of Rome was secondary to the destruction of the German armies in Itay. The American Fifth Army commander was now convinced that Aexander s pan to trap the enemy at Vamontone was impossibe because of the heavy concentration of German troops in the area. Fearing that the Caesar Line woud prove too difficut an obstace for VI Corps, infuenced by inteigence reports which indicated that the area north of Anzio was being denuded of enemy troops, and wanting Americans to iberate Rome, Cark decided to shift the buk of VI Corps to the north for an a-out drive on the Itaian capita. Brushing aside Truscott s protests, and without consuting his staff or Aexander, Cark ordered the 3d Division and 1st Specia Service Force to continue toward Vamontone, but he directed the 1st Armored and the 34th, 45th, and 36th Infantry Divisions to join the northern advance of the 85th and 88th Divisions. Some historians have argued that Cark s decision to shift the direction of the offensive aowed a significant portion of the enemy s army to escape past Vamontone, since the weakened American forces in the vicinity and the Eighth Army sti strugging up the Liri vaey thirty mies to the south were not capabe of preventing that movement. Meanwhie, north of Anzio, the redirected Fifth Army units began to encounter increasingy stiff resistance from enemy units now dug in on the Caesar Line. Athough Aexander accepted Cark s fait accompi with good grace, the Aies were unabe to destroy the German armies south of Rome and possiby end the Itaian campaign in June In addition, the sow progress made by the 45th and 34th Divisions between 27 and 30 May indicated the possibiity of a renewed staemate just mies south of Rome. Yet on the evening of May, patros of the 36th Division scored a major coup when they discovered a gap between the 362d Infantry and Hermann Goering Divisions atop Monte Artemisio. In a move which more than made up for the 36th Division s earier faiure on the Rapido, the 141st, 142d, and 143d Infantry regiments quicky occupied the heights, and artierymen soon brought High- 22

23 Troops of the 85th Division enter the gates of Rome. (Nationa Archives) way 6, the main German suppy ine, under fire at Vamontone. To Genera Truscott this was the turning point in the Aied drive to the north. Kessering was furious with Mackensen for aowing the ridgeine to fa and ordered it retaken at a costs. But a of the German counterattacks faied, and when Vamontone became untenabe because of American artiery fire, Mackensen was reieved of command and repaced by Lt. Gen. Joachim Lemesen. The new Fourteenth Army commander coud do itte to reverse the tide of events. When units of the II and VI Corps began to expoit the gap made by the 36th Division, and when the FEC and Eighth Army renewed their attacks (north of Frosinone), Kessering was forced on 2 June to order a German units to break off contact and withdraw north. Decaring Rome an open city on 3 June, the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies conducted an ordery retreat through the city. Ony the suburbs were contested. On orders from Hiter, the whoesae vandaism and demoitions that had characterized the evacuation of Napes the previous fa were not repeated. During the night of 4 June eements of the 1st Specia Service Force, 1st Armored Division, and the 3d, 34th, 36th, 85th, and 88th 23

24 Infantry Divisions entered Rome and quicky moved north. On the foowing morning arge numbers of Romans poured into the streets to give the ong coumns of American sodiers sti passing through Rome a tumutuous wecome. The American troops who actuay iberated the city, however, had passed through Rome during the eary morning hours in darkness and near sience and were again engaging the Germans aong a twenty-mie front on the Tiber River. The iberation of Rome made headines around the word and was greeted by the Aies with great joy. Yet the capture of this first Axis capita had a high price. Since the start of DIADEM on 11 May, the Fifth Army had suffered a tota of 17,931 American casuaties: 3,145 kied, 13,704 wounded, and 1,082 missing 30 percent of the tota casuaties suffered by the Americans since Saerno in September French and British Fifth Army casuaties numbered 10,635 and 3,355 respectivey. The Eighth Army counted casuaties of 11,639, bringing tota Aied osses during the campaign to over 43,000. German osses were estimated at 38,000, for both Tenth and Fourteenth Armies, not incuding 15,606 prisoners of war. The accompishments of the Aied armies in Itay, cuminating in the capture of Rome on 5 June, were quicky overshadowed by the opening of the ong-awaited second front with the Normandy invasion (OVERLORD) on 6 June Athough OVERLORD was to have been supported by a simutaneous invasion of southern France (ANVIL-DRAGOON), the heavy fighting around Cassino and chronic suppy and manpower shortages caused this anding to be postponed unti 15 August Yet both OVERLORD and ANVIL- DRAGOON had an immediate impact on the Itaian campaign by further reducing its miitary priority. After the iberation of Rome, the Aied forces in Itay received ever ess in terms of men and materie, confirming in the minds of many sodiers that the campaign was a hoding action of secondary importance. In addition, with the Aied high command convinced that ANVIL woud have a greater potentia for tying down German forces in support of northwest European operations, the armies in Itay were stripped of many of their best units and equipment. By mid-juy 1944 the FEC woud move, aong with the VI Corps headquarters and the U.S. 3d, 36th, and 45th Infantry Divisions, to the newy created Seventh Army preparing for ANVIL. By midsummer the Eighth and Fifth Armies woud have ony 14 divisions facing the 9 divisions of the Fourteenth Army in the west and the 8 divisions of the Tenth Army in the east. 24

25 PISA Eba I 23 Ju LEGHORN Cecina Lucca Arno 2 Ju 20 Jun ARNO LINE River 23 Ju EIGHTH BR XXXX FIFTH US Voterra 4 Ju 5 Aug IV Corps Pistoia Siena 22 Ju Grosseto XXX FLORENCE 5 Aug 3 Ju FEC TRASIMENO XXXX GOTHIC Arezzo LINE 5 Aug 13 Br XXX LINE Bibbiena 3 Ju 10 Br Perugia Orvieto Umbertide SAN MARINO 11 Jun 11 Jun IV Corps 11 Jun XXX FEC Viterbo 10 Jun VI Corps 10 Jun 11 Jun EIGHTH BR XXX FIFTH US 10 Corps 11 Jun Terni Tyrrhenian Sea Civitavecchia XXX II Corps VI Corps ROME Tiber R 10 Corps ROME TO THE ARNO RIVER 5 June 5 August 1944 Route of Aied Advance German Defense Line ELEVATION IN METERS and Above 0 30 Mies

26 Two days after Rome fe, Genera Aexander received orders from Genera Wison to push the Germans 170 mies north to a ine running from Pisa to Rimini as quicky as possibe to prevent the estabishment of any sort of coherent enemy defense in centra Itay. The Fifth Army, sti fighting in the western haf of the peninsua, set as its immediate goas the capture of the port of Civitavecchia and the airfieds at Viterbo, with the ong-range goa of seizing the triange of Pisa-Lucca-Pistoia on the Arno River. The Eighth Army, whose front eventuay extended neary 200 mies from the interior to the Adriatic, targeted the triange Forence- Arezzo-Bibbiena. To maintain momentum, a units were instructed to bypass enemy strongpoints, but were tod to expoit any opportunity to spit and destroy the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies separatey before they reached the Arno. Athough Aied progress was steady, neither Fifth nor Eighth Army advanced as rapidy as panned. Civitavecchia and Viterbo fe on 7 June, with extremey ight Fifth Army casuaties, whie the Eighth Army captured Terni and Perugia on 13 and 19 June, respectivey. But the constant shifting of troops between fronts to repace units withdrawn for ANVIL, growing ogistica probems, pus the ever-present rough terrain, poor weather, and sporadic but stiff enemy resistance, caused innumerabe deays. Whie the campaign had changed itte in its most fundamenta aspects, the terrain for the first 100 mies north of Rome was not neary as favorabe for the enemy s defensive purposes as that farther south. The Fourteenth and Tenth Armies did construct two defensive bets across centra Itay, the Dora and Trasimeno (Frieda) Lines, in the attempt to hat or at east sow the Aied advance, but both were overrun by the end of June. Despite increasing resistance Aied casuaties were ow, and by 21 June the Germans had been pushed 110 mies north of Rome, a stunning advance compared to the five months of agonizingy sow and boody gains the previous spring. Aexander optimisticay predicted in ate June that at that rate of advance the Aies coud take Leghorn, Ancona, and Boogna within weeks and be in the Po vaey by ate summer, ready for an assaut into Austria and the Danube vaey. In spite of the handicaps posed by growing shortages and obstaces presented by the enemy, the Fifth and Eighth Armies continued to advance. Cecina fe to the 34th Division on 1 Juy, after some of the heaviest fighting seen since before Rome. The FEC 26

27 American patros entering Pisa. (Nationa Archives) captured Siena on 3 Juy, and Voterra fe on 8 Juy to the 1st Armored Division. The newy arrived U.S. 91st Infantry Division, under Maj. Gen. Wiiam G. Livesay, entered action for the first time on 12 Juy and heped the 34th and 88th Infantry Divisions and the U.S. Japanese-American 442d Regimenta Combat Team capture the port of Leghorn on 19 Juy before reaching the banks of the Arno with the rest of the Fifth Army on 23 Juy. On the Eighth Army front, the Poish Corps captured the vita port of Ancona on 18 Juy, whie the British 13 Corps began its advance on Forence, taking that city on 5 August. Having faied to stem the Aied advance between Rome and the Arno, Fied Marsha Kessering was not optimistic that his battered, mixed force of infantry, armored, Luftwaffe, and foreign 27

28 Roman Hoiday by Mitche Siporin. (Army Art Coection) 28

29 units coud hat any Aied thrust short of the Gothic Line north of Forence and the Arno. His concern was exacerbated by the fact that the Gothic Line was not schedued for competion unti December Yet ate in Juy and eary in August Aexander, Cark, and Leese caed a hat in offensive operations to aow Aied units, many of which had been in continuous action since May, to rest, refit, and prepare for a ate-summer assaut on the Gothic Line. The midsummer hat provided a much-needed breather for the Germans as we, who now redoubed their efforts to compete their Gothic Line defenses. It was during this u in activity, as both sides prepared for what woud be the fina battes of the war, that the Rome-Arno Campaign officiay ended. Anaysis The Aied operations in Itay between January and September 1944 were essentiay an infantryman s war where the outcome was decided by countess bittery fought sma unit actions waged over some of Europe s most difficut terrain under some of the worst weather conditions found anywhere during Word War II. Given such circumstances, the growing Aied superiority in materie, especiay in armored and air forces, was of itte consequence, and ground troops were forced to carry out repeated, costy fronta assauts that quicky turned the campaign into a war of attrition on a battefied where the terrain heaviy favored the defense. Chronic shortages of troops and materie throughout 1944 exacerbated the aready difficut tactica situation in Itay and became worse as the year wore on, ensuring that the imited Aied forces avaiabe woud not obtain a quick, decisive victory, but woud rather sowy grind down their we-entrenched and determined enemies. The Aied air forces aided ground operations by providing cose air support and by disrupting enemy suppy ines and communications, but their efforts were not decisive as demonstrated during the bombings of Monte Cassino and Operation STRANGLE. To critics of the Aied effort in Itay, the repeated i-fated attempts to open the Liri vaey, resuting in the disaster on the Rapido and the three costy assauts on Monte Cassino, as we as the desperate Anzio gambe, a indicated a ack of imagination on the part of both British and American commanders. Aied commanders, however, were imited in their options considering the poitica, ogistica, and geographica aspects of the campaign. 29

30 It is difficut to justify the heavy investment of Aied ives and materie into the Mediterranean theater during The Itaian campaign, which the Americans had aways considered a subsidiary effort, had become for both sides a major drain of men and materie, especiay after the iberation of Rome, when Operations OVERLORD and ANVIL reduced the theater to secondary importance within the overa Aied strategy. Whie the Aies did tie down a significant number of enemy divisions in Itay, it was often not apparent during 1944 whether it was the Aies or the Germans who were actuay doing the tying down. Even though hundreds of mies of territory had been iberated by the summer of 1944, the Rome-Arno Campaign did not end the war of attrition. The mutinationa Aied armies in Itay faced a further nine months of campaigning, under conditions simiar to those they had endured during the previous year. 30

31

32 Further Readings For a campaign overview see Caro D Este, Word War II in the Mediterranean, (1990). Specific accounts of the Anzio anding and Rapido crossing are in Wiiam L. Aen, Anzio: Edge of Disaster (1978); and Martin Bumenson, Anzio: The Gambe That Faied (1963), and Boody River: The Rea Tragedy of the Rapido (1970). Monte Cassino is the subject of John Eis, Cassino: The Hoow Victory (1984), and David Hapgood, Monte Cassino (1984). For Operation DIADEM see W. G. F. Jackson, The Batte for Rome (1969), and Raeigh Treveyan, Rome 44: The Batte for the Eterna City (1982). For the officia view see Genera Sir Henry M. Wison, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Itaian Campaign, 8 January May 1944 (1946); Fifth Army, The Advance on Rome of the Fifth Army (1944); Fifth Army History, voumes 3 to 5 (1945); and Mediterranean Aied Air Forces, Air Power in the Mediterranean, November 1942 to February 1945 (1945). The most comprehensive voumes on the Itaian campaign remain Martin Bumenson, Saerno to Cassino (1969), and Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., Cassino to the Aps (1977), both in the U.S. Army in Word War II series pubished by the U.S. Army Center of Miitary History. CMH Pub Cover: Romans ine the streets as American armor ros by the Coiseum. (Nationa Archives) PIN :