Introduction. GORDON R. SULLIVAN General, United States Army Chief of Staff

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2 Introduction Word War II was the argest and most vioent armed confict in the history of mankind. However, the haf century that now separates us from that confict has exacted its to on our coective knowedge. Whie Word War II continues to absorb the interest of miitary schoars and historians, as we as its veterans, a generation of Americans has grown to maturity argey unaware of the poitica, socia, and miitary impications of a war that, more than any other, united us as a peope with a common purpose. Highy reevant today, Word War II has much to teach us, not ony about the profession of arms, but aso about miitary preparedness, goba strategy, and combined operations in the coaition war against fascism. During the next severa years, the U.S. Army wi participate in the nation s 50th anniversary commemoration of Word War II. The commemoration wi incude the pubication of various materias to hep educate Americans about that war. The works produced wi provide great opportunities to earn about and renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificenty in what has been caed the mighty endeavor. Word War II was waged on and, on sea, and in the air over severa diverse theaters of operation for approximatey six years. The foowing essay is one of a series of campaign studies highighting those strugges that, with their accompanying suggestions for further reading, are designed to introduce you to one of the Army s significant miitary feats from that war. This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Miitary History by Co. Kenneth V. Smith. I hope this absorbing account of that period wi enhance your appreciation of American achievements during Word War II. GORDON R. SULLIVAN Genera, United States Army Chief of Staff

3 Napes-Foggia 9 September January 1944 The summer of 1943 found the Aies optimistic about utimate victory. They had eiminated the Axis Powers in North Africa, and their Siciian campaign was going we. The Russians had bunted the German offensive, and the Aied Combined Bomber Offensive, designed to weaken German industria capacity, was gaining momentum. Athough German U-boats continued to operate in the Atantic, they did so at increasing risk to themseves and with graduay decreasing effectiveness. In the Pacific, the Japanese were on the defensive. Aied forces were advancing on New Guinea and New Georgia, and the Japanese had withdrawn from the Aeutians. Ony in the China-Burma-India theater was the situation reativey stagnant. The approva by the American and British Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) on 26 Juy 1943 of an invasion of the Itaian mainand signaed an Aied return to the European continent for the first time since Strategic Setting President Frankin D. Roosevet and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchi had met at Casabanca in January 1943 to discuss goba strategy. Despite continued support for the Germany-first poicy adopted at the December 1941 Arcadia Conference, agreement on how to achieve that goa was far from unanimous. Churchi urged expansion of Aied operations in the Mediterranean. Roosevet wanted to undertake the massive buidup of men and equipment needed for the cross-channe invasion of France. Soviet eader Joseph Stain, preoccupied with the batte for Staingrad, was demanding immediate miitary initiatives to draw German forces out of Russia. Thus for poitica, strategic, operationa, and ogistica reasons, the Aied eaders at Casabanca agreed to invade Siciy (Operation HUSKY) in order to secure Mediterranean ines of communications and resuppy, divert German forces from the Russian front, and drive Itay out of the war. In May 1943 at the Trident Conference in Washington, Aied eaders further carified their strategy. Reuctanty, the Americans agreed that a cross-channe invasion (Operation OVERLORD) was not feasibe in The eaders confirmed their decisions regarding

4 Operation HUSKY and their commitment to drive Itay from the war. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directed Genera Dwight D. Eisenhower, commanding Aied forces in the Mediterranean, to prepare options for continuing the war in southern Europe after overrunning Siciy. Eisenhower s staff considered three primary courses of action. U.S. panners wanted to move from Siciy through Corsica and Sardinia into southern France. This option woud support the cross-channe invasion by engaging Axis forces in southern France, but might not drive Itay out of the war. British panners favored a thrust through Itay into the Adriatic area to support partisans in the Bakans, bring Turkey into the war on the Aied side, and shorten the end-ease route to Russia. The third option, a thrust up the Itaian peninsua, woud tie down German forces, provide airfieds for attacks on Germany and the Bakans, and probaby force Itay out of the war. The atter course woud remove twenty-nine Itaian divisions from the Bakans and five from France, thus requiring Germany to provide troops to repace the Itaian garrison divisions. The visit of Churchi and Army Chief of Staff Genera George C. Marsha to Eisenhower ate in May eiminated the Adriatic option. With a fina decision deayed, Eisenhower designated two separate headquarters to work on pans for operations after Siciy. One was to pan for an invasion of the Itaian mainand, the other for an invasion of Sardinia. The invasion of Siciy on 10 Juy exceeded the Aies most optimistic expectations. Their forces suffered ighter than expected casuaties and made significant progress in the first week of the campaign. On the basis of Aied successes and reports of the Itaian Army s disintegration, Genera Marsha on 16 Juy proposed a bod initiative to seize the port of Napes and the airfieds at Foggia, some fifty mies northeast, foowed by a drive on Rome. The concept was codenamed AVALANCHE. Eisenhower s staff beieved that an attack by the British Eighth Army across the Strait of Messina and into the Caabria area (Operation BAYTOWN) was a ogica foow-on to HUSKY. Aied resove to attack the Itaian mainand was strengthened by the 25 Juy 1943 announcement that King Victor Emmanue III had removed Benito Mussoini from power and appointed Marsha Pietro Badogio to repace him. Eisenhower made his fina decision on 16 August. The British Eighth Army woud attack across the Strait of Messina between 1 and 4 September and tie down forces which might otherwise be used to oppose an amphibious assaut farther north. Approximatey one week ater, on 9 September, Lt. Gen. Mark Cark s 4

5 Fifth Army woud execute Operation AVALANCHE, an amphibious anding near Napes. Athough Marsha had suggested Napes as the assaut site because of its port faciities, AVALANCHE panners had to ook esewhere. A primary consideration was the range of Aied fighter aircraft, which coud not operate effectivey over Napes because of the distance from their Siciian bases. Additionay, the beaches near Napes were unsuitabe for anding operations. The adjacent terrain, particuary the sopes of Mount Vesuvius, dominated the shore, and heaviy fortified positions bocked routes inand. As an aternative, panners seected the Saerno area. Some fifty mies south of Napes, Saerno had a twenty-mie stretch of beach, favorabe anding gradients, and numerous exits to the main coasta highway inking Saerno to Napes and Rome. The Saerno site aso had some drawbacks. The mountains surrounding the Saerno pain woud imit the depth of the initia beachhead and expose the invading troops to enemy observation, fire, and attack from higher ground. The steep vertica banks of the See River, which divides the pain into two sectors, woud require assaut forces to bring ashore bridging equipment to ink the forces on either side of the river. Nevertheess, Saerno was within range of Aied fighter aircraft based in Siciy, and Saerno s Montecorvino airfied, when captured, coud sustain four fighter squadrons. Additionay, compared to the Napes area, Saerno was ighty defended. Whie the Aies were panning AVALANCHE, Hiter gave Fied Marsha Abert Kessering responsibiity for defending southern Itay. Kessering, an Itaophie, beieved that Itay woud refuse demands for an unconditiona surrender, and he expected to fight a deaying action with his Itaian aies unti he coud estabish a permanent defensive ine in the Apennines north of Rome. Hiter aso deveoped pans in case Itay deserted the Axis coaition. In such a situation, Fied Marsha Erwin Romme, responsibe for the defense of northern Itay, was to occupy a important mountain passes, roads, and rairoads and disarm the Itaians. Kessering was to disarm the Itaians in the south and continue withdrawing north. Kessering and Romme woud remain coequa commanders, each responsibe for his own sector, under the German High Command, unti Kessering moved into Romme s area. German strength on the Itaian peninsua increased in mid-august when Romme moved five infantry and two panzer divisions from Germany into northern Itay. A few days ater, some 102,000 Axis forces fighting in Siciy withdrew to Itay, crossing the Strait of Messina 5

6 when Aied forces faied to disrupt their retreat. They increased German defensive strength on the Itaian mainand significanty. The German Tenth Army, commanded by Genera Heinrich von Vietinghoff, was estabished on 8 August to faciitate Kessering s contro of operations. Its 45,000 men had the mission of defending the hee of Itay and evacuating Caabria (the toe) when the Aies attacked. In conjunction with the Itaian Seventh Army, Vietinghoff had three German divisions to hod the Napes-Saerno area and secure routes of withdrawa to Rome. The Hermann Goering Division was on the Napes pain, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was to its north, and the 16th Panzer Division had responsibiity for defending the Saerno area to the south. At 0430 on 3 September, the British Eighth Army initiated BAYTOWN, crossing the Strait of Messina against ight resistance. The Badogio government, in response to an Aied utimatum, signed a secret armistice agreement that same day. On 8 September 1943, forma announcement of the Itaian surrender was made, and German units moved quicky to disarm their former aies and assume responsibiity for defense of the entire peninsua. The next day, in a hastiy panned operation named SLAPSTICK, and by prior agreement with the Itaians, 3,600 men of the British 1st Paratroop Division anded unopposed at the port of Taranto in the Itaian hee. The main effort in the invasion of the Itaian mainand was to take pace at Saerno a few days ater. Operations In the eary morning hours of 9 September, the approximatey 450 ships of Operation AVALANCHE assembed off the Saerno coast. Eements had saied from Siciy and from Tripoi, Oran, and Bizerte in North Africa, some as eary as 5 and 6 September. German aircraft had attacked part of the feet, so Kessering knew that an Aied assaut force was assembing but was uncertain where the bow woud fa. German units were on aert, but were unabe to defend a possibe invasion sites. Genera Sir Harod Aexander commanded the Aied 15th Army Group, composed of Montgomery s British Eighth Army and Mark Cark s U.S. Fifth Army. Cark, a Word War I veteran who had recenty commanded a U.S. corps and had been Eisenhower s deputy for Operation TORCH, commanded the invasion force. The Fifth Army comprised the British 10 Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Sir Richard L. McCreery, and the U.S. VI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Ernest J. Dawey. The invasion force s assaut echeon consisted of 6

7 HUNGARY Mian FRANCE Po Genoa River Venice YUGOSLAVIA Arno River A D Tiber R I River A T I C CORSICA S E A ROME 3d Pz 15th Pz Gaeta Foggia SARDINIA TYRRHENIAN SEA Napes Hermann Goering Div Saerno Potenza 16th Pz Paestum 29th Pz Brindisi Taranto 26th Pz 36th Inf FROM ORAN Bizerte 46th Inf Br TUNIS Messina Paermo 45th Inf EIGHTH BRITISH Reggio di Caabria 1st ABN Br FROM BIZERTE ALGERIA TUNISIA 56th Inf Br FROM TRIPOLI INVASION OF ITALY September Mies two British divisions (the 46th and 56th) from 10 Corps, but because of a shortage of anding craft, ony one division from VI Corps participated: the U.S. 36th Infantry Division, a Texas Nationa Guard unit commanded by Maj. Gen. Fred L. Waker. Three U.S. Ranger battaions, commanded by Lt. Co. Wiiam O. Darby, and the 2d and 41st British Commandos were aso in the assaut eement. Two regimenta combat teams from the U.S. 45th Division, an Arizona Nationa Guard unit commanded by Maj. Gen. Troy Middeton, served as a seaborne reserve. 7

8 The Guf of Saerno. (Nationa Archives) Cark expected to meet some 39,000 enemy troops on D-day and about 100,000 three days ater after German reinforcements rushed to Saerno. He hoped to and 125,000 Aied troops. The British 10 Corps on the eft was to and its two divisions abreast south of Saerno. The U.S. Rangers and the British Commandos were to and at beaches west of Saerno and secure the eft fank by seizing key passes through the mountainous Sorrento peninsua between Napes and Saerno. Contro of the passes woud permit a rapid exit from the Saerno pain and protect the beachhead from German counterattacks 8

9 from the north. Once the British 10 Corps was reinforced by the British 7th Armoured Division beginning on D pus 5, McCreery s corps woud swing north and advance toward Napes. On the right, after the U.S. 36th Infantry Division was ashore, the U.S. 45th Infantry Division and other American units were to foow as soon as possibe. The U.S. 34th Infantry Division, a North Dakota Nationa Guard unit commanded by Maj. Gen. Chares Ryder, the U.S. 3d Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Lucian Truscott, and the U.S. 1st Armored Division, commanded by 9

10 Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, woud come ashore through Napes, which Cark beieved woud be in Aied hands by D pus 13, or 23 September. The U.S. 82d Airborne Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, was to be hed in reserve on Siciy. Pans to drop the 82d as a diversion aong the Voturno River, sixty mies north of Saerno, and on Rome, had been canceed. Eventuay Cark s Fifth Army woud ink up with Montgomery s British Eighth Army advancing from BAYTOWN. The amphibious assaut began eary on the morning of 9 September U.S. Rangers hit the beach unopposed at 0310, twenty minutes in advance of the main assaut force, and moved quicky inand to seize their objectives. British Commandos captured the town of Saerno against ight opposition. The British 10 Corps anded under a heavy nava bombardment, meeting significant opposition as its sodiers fought their way inand. The untested men of the U.S. 36th Infantry Division came ashore at 0330 without supporting fire, hoping to surprise the Germans. Athough the eading eements took heavy casuaties, a six waves of the 36th Division assaut eement were on the beach by Two companies of German infantry that had been on the Saerno beach judiciousy withdrew inand as the assaut began. Nevertheess, the Americans encountered sma but intense resistance as they fought their way off the beaches. Eary German Luftwaffe attacks on the invasion force sackened near dawn as Aied aircraft from Siciy and supporting carriers appeared over the beachhead. Loca German commanders reacted to the invasion force piecemea. Fifteen tanks of the 16th Panzer Division made the first significant counterattack against the beachhead at 0700 but were driven off by a combination of nava gunfire, artiery, infantry, and engineers. However, German artiery and mortar fire, as we as continued forays by tank and infantry units, soon disrupted the ordery fow of Aied forces across the beach. Significanty, U.S. artiery and armor units were deayed coming ashore and disorganized when they arrived. Amid the confusion, many eading assaut eements found themseves facing enemy tanks without adequate antiarmor weapons, and ony through determination and individua heroism were some American forces abe to move inand. In such cases, the actions of men ike Sgt. Joseph M. Logan of Company I, 3d Battaion, 141st Infantry, were critica. When his unit was pinned down by machine gun fire coming from a stone wa near the beach, Sergeant Logan advanced some 200 yards toward the gun. With buets striking around him, he kied three Germans who attacked from a gap in the wa. Under a stream of heavy fire, he rushed the machine gun position and 10

11 Minori Maiori Amafi Rangers Cmdo 10 Corps British SALERNO 12 Sep 10 Br XXX VI Battipagia Eboi See R Caore R Serre 9 Sep 10 Br XXX VI FIFTH ARMY LANDINGS 9-13 September 1943 Initia Beachhead Aied Advance, 13 Sep ELEVATION IN METERS and Above 0 5 Mies VI Corps Agropoi Paestum Capaccio Ogiastro Rocco d Aspide kied the gunners and then turned the weapon on the enemy. For his heroic actions Sergeant Logan was awarded the Meda of Honor. Sma-scae and seemingy disorganized German counterattacks continued throughout the day but were repused as Fifth Army strengthened its odgment. Reinforcements, support troops, and suppies poured ashore. By nightfa, the British 10 Corps was three mies inand and had advanced to the Montecorvino airfied. On the right, the U.S. VI Corps, which had met ony imited opposition after eaving the beach, was some five mies inand. Separated by the See River, each corps operated independenty with ony minima contact. But despite the fact that the anding force was in four separated beachheads, by dusk of D-day the situation ooked favorabe for the Aies. Whie the AVALANCHE invasion force was moving ashore, German forces in southern Itay, as panned, were conducting a deiberate withdrawa northward foowing the Eighth Army andings. Genera Kessering, athough occupied with the Itaian surrender, was not surprised by the Saerno invasion. With one division in pace at Saerno and two others immediatey avaiabe, and with LXXVI Panzer Corps withdrawing from southern Itay and soon avaiabe for empoyment, 11

12 he directed Genera Vietinghoff to contain the beachhead. Vietinghoff, in turn, directed the 16th Panzer Division to prevent any deep Aied penetration unti reinforcements arrived. On 10 September he concentrated the 16th Panzer Division against the British 10 Corps, bocking its progress whie awaiting the arriva of LXXVI Corps. At first, Vietinghoff was optimistic, beieving he coud push the invasion force into the sea. Eighth Army was sti 120 mies to the south and had to traverse difficut terrain to reach the beachhead. Coincidentay, Genera Montgomery had decided on 9 September to hat his advance for two days to rest and resuppy his forces, buying more time for the German counterattacks at Saerno. Meanwhie Genera Cark, who had yet to estabish his headquarters ashore, was concerned because of the sketchy reports from the beachhead on D-day. Genera Dawey went ashore at 1300 and soon after began preparing to assume command of the VI Corps troops in the beachhead, earier than originay schedued. Eements of the U.S. 45th Division were aso sent ashore during the night of 9 September to reinforce the 36th Division. Over the next two days, the 36th Division was abe to consoidate its position ashore and expand the beachhead because of the withdrawa of most of the Germans in front of the VI Corps. However, in the British 10 Corps sector, intense fighting occurred as squads, patoons, and companies engaged in fierce exchanges with stubborn pockets of Germans who hated British advances and aunched imited counterattacks. On 10 September Cark visited both corps. Progress was satisfactory in the VI Corps sector, but the resistance in front of the British and the separation between the two Aied corps concerned him. Frustrated with the apparent staemate, Cark narrowed the British 10 Corps zone of responsibiity which woud eventuay aow an attack north toward Napes. This reaignment necessitated moving the U.S. VI Corps boundary four mies to the north and assigning two regiments of the 45th Division responsibiity for the added zone. On 12 September Cark moved his own headquarters ashore. Athough the shift in the corps boundary faciitated McCreery s operations, it stretched Dawey s American corps to the imit and forced him to commit the corps reserve to the batte. The VI Corps probems were exacerbated when Cark ordered Dawey to reinforce Darby s Rangers, who were hoding the northern passes in the British 10 Corps area, with a reinforced infantry battaion from the 36th Infantry Division. By 13 December the 36th Infantry Division was occupying a 35-mie front, we beyond what a fu-strength division was expected to defend. 12

13 The Germans rapidy reinforced the batte area, and the Aied situation continued to deteriorate. Vietinghoff aunched a major counterattack against the Aied beachhead on 13 September, abeit with divisions which were not yet fuy reconstituted after the fighting in Siciy. The Hermann Goering and 15th Panzer Grenadier Divisions attacked the British 10 Corps, whie eements of the 26th and 29th Panzer Grenadier and the 16th Panzer Divisions drove against VI Corps and the ighty defended area aong the See River. The Germans penetrated the American ines on the afternoon of 13 September, overrunning a battaion of the 36th Division and threatening the rear of the Aied position. For a time, the situation was so precarious that Cark directed his staff to begin panning to evacuate one of the two beachheads and and its forces on the other. American resistance stiffened aong the Caore River as artiery, tank, and tank destroyer units hed their ground, pouring shot after shot directy into the attacking Germans. By nightfa the German attacks fatered, and the Aies began to regroup. Genera Cark had recognized eary on 13 September that his position was precarious. Seaborne reinforcements from Siciy coud not arrive in time, and British Eighth Army advances were being sowed by heaviy damaged roads and ogistic probems. Eisenhower had earier made the 82d Airborne Division avaiabe to Fifth Army, and Cark requested its use. The airborne unit represented the ony force that coud move to the area rapidy enough to make a difference. During the night of September, 1,300 sodiers parachuted into the beachhead and immediatey moved into defensive positions bostering the 36th Infantry Division. Throughout the dayight hours of 14 September, the Germans attacked the entire Aied front, searching for weaknesses. Their efforts were unsuccessfu. Aied heavy bombers, diverted from attacks on strategic targets in Germany, interdicted German units and suppies fowing toward the beachhead and struck German units in assemby areas and attack positions. Reinforcements aso arrived: the British 7th Armoured Division began anding in the 10 Corps sector, and the 180th Infantry, the remaining regiment of the 45th Infantry Division, anded behind VI Corps to become the Fifth Army reserve. That night another 2,100 82d Airborne sodiers anded on the beaches south of Saerno to boster the defense. By the evening of 14 September, with more suppies ashore and reinforcements arriving, the crisis had passed. Athough the two night airborne drops into the Saerno beachhead had been executed fawessy, another airborne operation was ess successfu. The 509th Parachute Infantry Battaion jumped some twenty 13

14 Waging war against mud. (Nationa Archives) mies north of the British 10 Corps on the evening of 14 September to disrupt German resuppy and communications ines. The paratroopers had been ordered to harass the Germans for about five days and then either to infitrate to the beachhead or to ink up with advancing forces. Of the 40 panes invoved in the operation, ony 15 dropped their cargo within 4 mies of the drop zone; 23 panes scattered paratroopers between 8 and 25 mies from the intended target, and the drop site of the remaining 2 panes was unknown. Of the 600 men who jumped, 400 made it safey back to Aied hands severa days ater after aunching sma raids in the German rear. On 15 September, with the British Eighth Army sti some fifty mies to the south, Kessering ordered a fina effort against the beachhead. The faiure of the attacks on 15 and 16 September indicated that the Aies coud not be disodged, so Kessering directed German forces to begin an ordery deaying action and a withdrawa north. On 16 and 17 September, against diminishing resistance, Aied troops first consoidated their positions and then began sowy to push out toward the enemy. But many units needed time to rest, resuppy, and reconstitute their forces. The 1st Battaion of the 142d Infantry, 36th 14

15 Pack train moves suppies in the mountains. (Nationa Archives) Infantry Division, for exampe, had seen its effective strength reduced to sixty men; the 2d Battaion of the 143d Infantry, which had been in the See River corridor, had amost ceased to exist as a unit. Meanwhie, the British Eighth Army continued its advance as the Germans disengaged at Saerno and withdrew north. By 19 September, eements of Montgomery s and Cark s armies met at Auetta, twenty mies east of Eboi. Saerno had been costy for both sides. German casuaties were estimated at 3,500. The Americans, who assauted the beaches under fire more etha than that encountered in earier Mediterranean andings, aso suffered approximatey 3,500 casuaties, whie British osses were some 5,500. After the batte for the beachhead had ended, the VI Corps received a new commander. Genera Dawey had not measured up to the expectations of his superiors and Cark was particuary concerned about Dawey s faiure to anticipate the threat to VI Corps weak eft fank on 12 September. With the concurrence of Eisenhower, Cark repaced Dawey with Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas on 20 September. Whie Aexander s subordinates in 15th Army Group, Cark and Montgomery, ooked to the north, Kessering panned a series of for- 15

16 Wreckage in the dockyards at Napes. (Nationa Archives)

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18 tified ines across the Itaian peninsua. The Barbara Line, the first defensive bet, was an i-defined trace of barriers and hastiy constructed fortifications aong the Voturno River, some twenty-five mies north of Napes. The second bet was through Mignano, fifty mies north of Napes and ninety mies south of Rome, and extending east from the coast to Monte Camino, Monte Maggiore, and Monte Sammucro. This became known as the Bernhard or Reinhard Line. The third defensive bet, tweve mies north of the Bernhard Line and anchored on Monte Cassino and the Garigiano and Rapido Rivers, was caed the Gustav Line. Composed of interocking bunkers and fortifications, it was by far the most formidabe of the three ines. The Aies referred to these fortifications coectivey as the Winter Line. Kessering directed Vietinghoff to hod the Aies south of the first ine unti 15 October to aow adequate preparation of these fortifications. The Aies gathered their strength in anticipation of the attack toward Napes. From 9 September through 1 October, 190,000 troops, 30,000 vehices, and 120,000 tons of suppies came ashore across the Saerno beach. The remainder of the British 7th Armoured Division, the U.S. 3d Infantry Division, and the ast of Genera Ridgway s 82d Airborne Division disembarked aong with the suppies which woud faciitate the attack northward. To secure the port of Napes, Cark knew that he woud have to move we north of the city after it was captured. After seecting the Voturno River as the Fifth Army objective, he ordered McCreery s 10 Corps to conduct the main attack up the coast, sweeping around Mount Vesuvius to reach the Napes pain. Lucas VI Corps was directed to move eastward into the interior, and then whee northward to protect McCreery s fank. The British 10 Corps attack toward the two major passes of the Sorrento hi mass began on 23 September and immediatey met stiff resistance. Expoiting the rugged terrain, the Germans used a sma number of we-chosen strongpoints to sow the numericay superior Aied forces amost to a standsti. In addition, the defenders carried out a scorched-earth poicy as they retreated. On one seventeen-mie stretch of road, they destroyed twenty-five major bridges, forcing the Aies to ford a series of rivers and streams against opposition and then buid bridges to faciitate the onward fow of reinforcements and suppies. McCreery s progress toward Napes was sow but nonetheess steady. On 30 September British forces moved through the eastern outskirts of Napes and continued north. On 1 October Ridgway s 82d 18

19 Pescara Avezzano Pescara Chieti 15 Nov Pagieta Atessa 6 Oct Termoi Terracina Frosinone Liri Minturno Gaeta Rapido Cassino i a n o G a r i g Sessa Aurunca 10 Corps Br Capua Voturno XXX Sangro VI Corps Venafro 10 Corps Br EIGHTH BR XXXX FIFTH Isernia Voturno Agnone Caserta Montesarchio VI Corps Gugionesi Larino EIGHTH BRITISH Benevento San Bartoomeo FOGGIA NAPLES SALERNO Eboi See Caore Rocco d Aspide ALLIED GAINS 6 October 15 November 1943 Front Line, Date ELEVATION IN METERS and Above 0 30 Mies

20 Airborne Division, reinforced by Darby s Rangers, entered the city. Within three days British patros were at the Voturno River as German forces withdrew behind that natura barrier. By 7 October, the buk of the British 10 Corps had cosed on the Voturno. Lucas U.S. VI Corps had started its move inand on 20 September in preparation for the northward thrust. Its troops confronted the same probems that bedevied McCreery s corps. Restricted to narrow roads through steep mountain passes, the Aied routes of advance were crisscrossed by fast-running streams in deep ravines. German engineers had destroyed most of the bridges, and German infantry doggedy defended crossing sites. Often, it was ony through the courage and heroism of individua Americans that some sembance of forward momentum was maintained. On 23 September, for exampe, Cp. James D. Saton of the 45th Infantry Division was ead scout of a squad which had been directed to eiminate a German position deaying the advance of his company. Moving ahead of his feow sodiers, Saton assauted the machine gun nest, kiing the gunner with his bayonet. Unabe to extricate the bayonet, he detached it from his rife and shot another gunner. Subsequenty, he advanced under heavy fire and eiminated two more machine gun positions with grenades and rife fire, opening the way for his company to advance. For his courageous actions, Corpora Saton was awarded the Meda of Honor. As the VI Corps continued its sow push northward, sma infantry units, operating with itte or no artiery and armor support, continued to carry the batte. Mud, rain, and cod became the troops arch enemies. Units used budozers and Baiey bridges to advance in stages. Sure-footed pack mues became the primary resuppy vehice in the rugged terrain. Utimatey, the reentess pressure paid off. By the end of September, the VI Corps had cawed its way through sixty mies of mountains and rugged vaeys and occupied the south bank of the Voturno River. Meanwhie, to the east, advancing against ony ight enemy resistance, Montgomery s forces seized the vita Foggia airfied compex on 1 October and outfanked German defensive positions by empoying a sma amphibious raid to seize the port and town of Termoi. On 9 October, Montgomery paused to reorganize and resuppy as the Germans occupied defensive positions aong the Trigno River. The capture of Napes and the Foggia airfied formay ended Operation AVALANCHE. The Aies suffered approximatey 12,500 casuaties (2,000 kied, 7,000 wounded, and 3,500 missing). Foggia, captured intact, woud soon be used by Aied bombers. Athough 20

21 Napes had been a key objective in the Aied pan, its capture was initiay disappointing because it had been virtuay destroyed. The Aies had bombed and sheed the city, but German demoition teams accounted for most of the damage. Kessering had been expicit about protecting churches and monasteries, but nothing ese was spared. Departing Germans removed or destroyed a communications, transportation, water, and power grids. They burned hotes, mined buidings, coapsed bridges and ripped out rairoad tracks. Ships in the harbor were sunk, adding to those aready destroyed. To the credit of the Aies, and despite intense German air raids, the port of Napes was reopened to traffic within a week of its capture. By the end of October, neary 7,000 tons of suppies were fowing ashore daiy, amost at the prewar eve. However, much rebuiding remained to be done, and neary 800,000 Neapoitans depended upon the Aies for basic surviva items for many months. With Napes secure, the Aies turned their attention to the north. In eary October it appeared to Aied panners that the Germans woud withdraw sowy north, perhaps pausing on good, defensibe terrain south of Rome, to gain time to compete fortification of their main defensive ine in the Pisa-Rimini area. This course of action woud shorten German ines of communications and eiminate the threat of an Aied fank attack, now possibe because of the German withdrawa from Sardinia and Corsica in September and eary October. The advance of Aied forces to the Pisa-Rimini ine woud gain additiona airfieds near Rome and provide security for a Aied airfieds in centra and southern Itay. However, an advance to northern Itay might be difficut, particuary if the Germans chose to defend south of Rome. Moreover, in accordance with earier agreements, four American and three British batte-tested divisions were withdrawn from the Mediterranean theater to participate in the cross-channe invasion of France. Concurrenty, an invasion of southern France was being panned which woud require additiona troops from Itay. Aexander s 15th Army Group coud no onger count on significant reinforcements or massive air support as it attempted a push toward Rome and beyond. In mid-october, batte ines were drawn aong the Voturno and Trigno Rivers. The Voturno itsef was a formidabe obstace. Varying in width from 150 to 200 feet, and normay running 3 to 5 feet deep, the river was in food stage and overfowing banks which were 5 to 15 feet high. Behind this barrier Vietinghoff paced the 35,000 men of the XIV Panzer Corps directy in front of Fifth Army, whie the equay formidabe LXXVI Panzer Corps opposed Eighth Army aong the Trigno River. 21

22 December, South West of Venafro, Itay, by Tom Craig. (Army Art Coection) Genera Cark ordered a genera assaut on the Voturno ine for 13 and 14 October. Initiay, Fifth Army attacked with two corps abreast, each empoying three divisions. The Aies encountered strong resistance and purchased each inch of progress with bood. A feint executed by the U.S. 3d Infantry Division on VI Corps eft fank deceived the Germans and contributed to Lucas success. The British 56th Division, repused in its zone, attacked through the 3d Infantry Division sector and joined the British 7th Armoured Division, the Desert Rats of North Africa fame, and the U.S. 46th Infantry Division north of the river. To the east, Montgomery s attacks aso proved successfu. But Vietinghoff had hed the Voturno River ine unti 15 October as ordered. He directed his sodiers to conduct a fighting deay northward to the Barbara Line where the next major battes with the Aies woud take pace. Cark sowy pushed forward of the Voturno toward Rome. Fifth Army divisions moved in coumn, usuay with a battaion eading each division. Progress was steady but sow. Determined resistance at a roadbock or ford often hated the advance, forcing units to strugge through the mountains to enveop the obstace. When they finay con- 22

23 ducted an assaut on the position, the Aies frequenty woud find that the Germans had meted away. With the roadbock reduced or the ford secured, the units woud resume their forward progress, perhaps to be hated ony a few hundred yards farther on by another obstace. In twenty days during October across a forty-mie front, Fifth Army forces advanced ony between fifteen and twenty mies. However, the Aies finay breached the vague and i-defined Barbara Line. In the interim, German forces had aid 45,000 mines in the Bernhard Line, and another 30,000 mines on its approaches. By the end of October, Rome was sti a ong way off. The month-ong strugge by the Aies as they advanced from the Voturno River to the Bernhard Line brought both Fifth and Eighth Armies near the point of exhaustion. The Aies had pressed the Germans continuousy, maintaining the momentum of the attack. But with the drawdown for OVERLORD, neither Cark nor Montgomery had the option of puing units out of the ine for rest and rehabiitation. Athough Itay had decared war on Germany as a cobeigerent, its contributions to the fighting woud be minima. Additiona reinforcements woud not arrive unti December and January. On 15 November, succumbing to both weather and fatigue, Cark received approva to hat Fifth Army s progress for two weeks to enabe his sodiers to rest, refit, and regroup. Whie German and Aied sodiers were fighting from Saerno to the Bernhard Line, the poitico-miitary eaders on both sides made a series of decisions which woud affect the future of the Itaian campaign. The American secretary of state and the British and Russian foreign secretaries met in Moscow from October. Concrete agreements on miitary matters were deferred, but the secretaries produced the Four-Power Decaration which aid the groundwork for estabishing the United Nations. Cose on the hees of the Moscow Conference came meetings between Roosevet and Churchi at Cairo with Chiang Kai-shek, at Tehran with Stain, and again at Cairo with their combined staffs. Lasting from 22 November 7 December, the Cairo-Tehran meetings confirmed both OVERLORD and ANVIL (the invasion of northern and southern France, respectivey) for mid-1944; the Itaian theater was formay reegated to a position of secondary importance. Genera Eisenhower woud command the OVERLORD forces gathering in southern Engand and be repaced in the Mediterranean theater by Sir Henry Maitand Wison. Churchi insisted that Rome was sti a prize. American eaders agreed, but they imited the Aied advance north of Rome to the Pisa-Rimini ine in northern Itay. They hoped that a continued advance woud maintain enough 23

24 pressure on the Germans to keep them from diverting forces to France or Russia without requiring significant Aied reinforcements of men or suppies. The Americans, however, were wary of continued British proposas to attack Germany proper through the Aps or to expand the Mediterranean theater into the Bakans or the Aegean. The Germans aso were reevauating their commitment to and command structure in Itay even as the Aies debated the date for OVERLORD. Hiter had considered pacing Romme in overa command of German forces in Itay but instead seected Kessering, who beieved that a defense south of Rome was feasibe. Hiter transferred Romme to France and eevated Kessering to supreme commander in Itay and commander of Army Group C. Kessering quicky confirmed his strategy of hoding Itay south of Rome. On the Aied side, events were in motion to break the staemate that had sowed the Aied advance through mid-november. In eary October, Cark had estabished an amphibious task force to find aternatives to the agonizingy sow and costy mountain warfare. On 8 November Eisenhower, sti in command of the Mediterranean theater, decided on a two-pronged attack on Rome. Whie Montgomery s and Cark s armies attacked the Winter Line, Cark s VI Corps woud conduct an amphibious assaut at Anzio, south of Rome and some forty-five mies behind the Gustav Line. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved Eisenhower s request to keep sixty-eight LSTs (anding ship, tanks) in the Mediterranean to support this assaut but directed him to reease them by the end of January 1944 so that they woud be avaiabe for OVERLORD. The Fifth Army s interim goa between mid-november and mid-january was to continue moving north and prepare to ink up with the Anzio beachhead once it had been estabished. By mid-november, Kessering had 11 divisions in southern Itay to oppose the Aies and another 12 divisions in northern Itay. In contrast, by eary December the Aies woud have 14 divisions and possiby 2 more by the end of the year. The headquarters of the U.S. II Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Geoffrey T. Keyes, had arrived from Siciy and moved into the ine between the British 10 and U.S. VI Corps, assuming command of the U.S. 3d and 36th Infantry Divisions. Cark s inventory of units aso incuded the Itaian First Motorized Group and the Canadian-American 1st Specia Service Force, a regimenta-size commando unit commanded by U.S. Co. Robert T. Frederick. In addition, the French Expeditionary Corps, commanded by Genera Aphonse Juin and composed of the 2d Moroccan and 3d Agerian Divisions, woud join Fifth Army in ate November and December. 24

25 The arriva of these units eventuay woud aow VI Corps to be pued out of the ine for the Anzio andings. Two additiona, green U.S. divisions, to repace those pued from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD, woud not arrive unti January. Aied combat power was not simpy a product of the sheer number of divisions. It stemmed from the numerica strength of those divisions and their combat support and combat service support units, augmented by substantia tactica air support and an efficient mutiservice resuppy effort. Fortunatey for the Germans, the rugged terrain, and now the winter weather, woud favor the defense. The Aied offensive in Itay resumed on 20 November when Montgomery attacked the Winter Line with three divisions. Torrentia rains staed the assaut for a week. By 2 December Eighth Army was again on the move, but both weather and German resistance sowed its progress. Suppy movement became increasingy difficut as roads and trais turned to mud. Tanks bogged down and casuaties mounted. On 27 December Montgomery hated we short of the objectives. Two days ater, he eft for Engand to assume command of the British and Canadian forces schedued to and in Normandy and was repaced by Lt. Gen. Sir Oiver Leese. The Fifth Army assaut met equay stiff resistance. To the east, VI Corps aunched probing attacks on 29 November and subsequenty attacked Monte Pantano and the surrounding high ground. In the west, the British 10 Corps, aready aong the Garigiano River near the coast, initiated demonstrations on 1 December to draw German forces toward the coast and then attacked toward Monte Camino. On the night of 2 3 December, II Corps attacked in the center of the Fifth Army sector and captured Monte Camino, but required another week to cear it competey of Germans, who directed a number of savage counterattacks at the advancing forces. As a resut of sow progress and imited reinforcements and shipping, the Aies sheved the Anzio invasion pans. Continuing the Fifth Army drive, II Corps next took on German defenses in the San Pietro area. The Itaian First Motorized Group, attached to II Corps, attacked Monte Lungo on 8 December whie the Americans attacked Monte Sammucro and the key viage of San Pietro. The assauts received intensive artiery support. Over 75,000 rounds were fired in the first forty-eight hours of the attack. The Itaians received rough treatment from the Germans, who enjoyed commanding positions and superior fire power, and were forced back to their attack positions. Of some 1,600 sodiers in the assaut, Itaian casuaties were 84 kied, 122 wounded, and 170 missing. The 36th Division fared itte better. It seized the peak of Monte Sammucro but faied to cear the 25

26 entire mountain. German forces in San Pietro hed out for over a week in some of the fiercest and boodiest fighting of the campaign. Repetitive Aied assauts, incuding a two-pronged tank-ed attack during which most of the armored vehices were destroyed, incurred heavy osses. Finay, on 16 December, to prevent enveopment foowing an American surprise attack that had seized Monte Lungo, the Germans abandoned San Pietro and withdrew to Monte Porchia and the viage of San Vittore. But the Aied success had been costy. The batte for San Pietro had cost the 36th Infantry Division 150 kied, 800 wounded, and 250 missing; casuaties for supporting airborne, Ranger, and tank units were aso high. Meanwhie, to the east, VI Corps continued its attacks, seizing his and ridges often at heavy costs in terms of casuaties and nonbatte injuries. Finay, a year-end bizzard gave the weary Fifth Army sodiers some respite from combat, but the New Year hed itte hope for improved conditions. January brought significant changes in the Aied command structure. As schedued, British Genera Sir Henry Maitand Wison became Supreme Aied Commander of the Mediterranean theater, repacing Eisenhower. U.S. Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers became his deputy. With the British assumption of primacy in the theater, Churchi s desire to press toward Rome took on new ife. Pans for the amphibious anding at Anzio were dusted off and D-day was set for ate January. Fifth Army directed VI Corps to assaut Anzio with two divisions. The operation woud have ony minima suppies and a thin resuppy ine because of the ack of adequate amphibious shipping avaiabe in the theater. However, Cark was enthusiastic about the pan, which woud faciitate his drive to Rome. But to reieve the beachhead, Fifth Army had the formidabe task of reaching and then assauting across the Garigiano and Rapido Rivers, rupturing the Gustav Line, and breaking through its defenders. To faciitate the amphibious assaut preparation, the newy arrived French Expeditionary Corps headquarters repaced U.S. VI Corps headquarters on the eastern fank of Fifth Army. Additionay, the presence of the U.S. 1st Armored Division gave Cark a strong mobie reserve and expoitation force. Between 5 and 15 January 1944, Fifth Army again moved forward across its entire front, with II Corps conducting the main attack in the center supported by French Expeditionary and British 10 Corps secondary assauts. The 1st Specia Service Force, supported by two infantry battaions, seized Monte Majo in the east and defended it during three days of fierce German counterattacks. San Vittore fe on 6 January after bitter fighting, and Monte La Chita and Monte Porchia fe on the 7th. To the 26

27 Monte Sammucro with San Pietro on the right. (Nationa Archives) west, Germans opposing the British 10 Corps hed out unti 8 January, then withdrew to prevent being trapped. Fifth Army continued to press the attack, and a fina assaut on 14 January met ony imited resistance. The Germans had withdrawn behind the Rapido River the previous night. The Fifth Army had broken the Bernhard Line, but the formidabe Gustav Line defenses and Rome ay ahead. Cark schedued his attack on the Gustav Line in the Garigiano- Liri-Rapido River area to support the 22 January Anzio invasion and draw German forces away from the beachhead. The British 10 Corps crossed the Garigiano River on the evening of 17 January. The 24,000 mines that the Germans had empaced aong the river banks faied to hat the crossing, which was made in boats when fooding prevented the instaation of assaut bridging. Faced with a ten-battaion bridgehead by the next morning, Kessering decided to reinforce the area and prevent a rupture of the Gustav Line. Assured by German inteigence chief Admira Wihem Canaris that the Aies woud not conduct an amphibious assaut in Itay for some time, Kessering sent the 29th and 9th Panzer Grenadier Divisions from the Rome area to oppose the Aied penetration. 27

28 Athough the British 10 Corps had expanded its bridgehead to a width of ten mies by 20 January, it faied to reach its objectives. Significanty, the Germans repused the British 46th Division attack adjacent to the U.S. II Corps area, eaving the Americans with an exposed fank for their forthcoming assaut. Faced with fresh German forces, British 10 Corps efforts bogged down and woud make itte progress for the rest of the month. In the center, Cark had directed II Corps to conduct the main attack aong Highway 6 west of Monte Cassino. The Americans were to cross the Rapido River, penetrate the Gustav Line, and aow the 1st Armored Division to pass through into the Liri vaey, which was the key to Anzio and Rome. Waker s 36th Infantry Division was to ead the assaut. However neither Waker nor his corps commander, Genera Keyes, was optimistic. The swifty fowing Rapido River was twenty-five to fifty feet wide, with steep banks. The Germans had diverted the river upstream from the assaut area, making the approaches a sea of mud. From the heights of Monte Cassino and Sant Angeo, the Germans coud observe and bring fire on the entire area. Additionay, amphibious vehices, originay panned for the river crossing, had been diverted to VI Corps to repace vehices ost in practice exercises for Anzio. The crossing woud rey on rubber and wooden assaut boats provided by Army engineers. Because of swampy banks and heavy German fire, the boats were positioned severa mies from the river and had to be carried forward by the infantry just prior to the attack. Nevertheess, despite many probems and against the aternative suggestions of his subordinates, Cark insisted that the II Corps attack proceed on schedue. The 36th Infantry Division, with two regiments abreast, attacked on the evening of 20 January. In the 141st Infantry sector, enemy fire destroyed many of the assaut boats before they reached the river, where the swift current and accurate German artiery fire hampered efforts to construct bridges. Despite extensive and mines, ost guides, and withering enemy fire, some 100 Americans managed to cross the river before German artiery destroyed the ast ponton bridge. With dawn rapidy approaching, and unabe to reinforce his forward forces during dayight, the regimenta commander hated the attack and directed those sodiers in the bridgehead to dig in and await hep. The 143d Infantry initiay fared itte better. Athough a number of its companies managed to cross the river, German resistance quicky mounted, and withering fire began destroying the regiment s bridging and boats. The regimenta commander was abe to withdraw his 28

29 men to the reative safety of the near bank before they were cut off. But the 36th Infantry Division attack was obviousy a disma faiure. Despite these setbacks, Cark and Keyes instructed Waker to resume the attack. Unfortunatey, the efforts of the 143d Infantry ate in the afternoon of 21 January mirrored those of the previous day. Approximatey 250 sodiers reached the far bank of the river, but mines, artiery, and intense enemy fire prevented reinforcement. More boats were damaged and bridges destroyed by German artiery. Fog and smoke prevented Fifth Army artiery from effectivey engaging enemy positions. By the afternoon of 22 January, eements of the three battaions of the 143d on the German side of the river were withdrawn. Meanwhie the 141st Infantry had again assauted across the Rapido at 2100 on 21 January. It found no survivors of the bridgehead that had been estabished the previous evening. As with the attack the day before, the 141st came under heavy and effective German fire and counterattacks. During the next day bridges and boats were destroyed, communications were cut, and by evening a the officers in the bridgehead except one were casuaties. With the bridges destroyed or swept away and a the boats out of action, Waker coud do itte to hep his trapped sodiers. By ate evening, a resistance on the far bank ceased. Except for some forty men who swam back across the river, the entire assaut force was either kied or captured. The 36th Infantry Division suffered 1,681 casuaties in its controversia two-day attempt to force its way across the Boody River. German osses were ight, and reports through their chain of command made ony passing reference to the II Corps attacks. Yet a postwar congressiona investigation into the abortive assauts woud exonerate a concerned. Cark maintained that the repeated attacks on the Gustav Line in the Garigiano-Liri-Rapido area were necessary to faciitate the schedued Anzio andings. The fact that the German reinforcements diverted south to the Garigiano River greaty eased the Anzio andings in the north. Nevertheess, The Napes-Foggia Campaign, which formay ended on 21 January, had marked the beginning of what woud become an increasingy difficut march up the spine of Itay. Anaysis The Aied goas, estabished before the invasion of Itay, were to gain contro of the Mediterranean, keep pressure on the Germans whie buiding for the cross-channe attack, and force Itay to with- 29

30 draw from the war. A agreed that bases in Itay woud provide support for the air war against German sources of suppy in the Bakans and the German industria heartand itsef. These sound strategic goas were vaid in 1943 and have stood the test of time. By ate August, the Itaian government had decided to withdraw from the war and break reations with Germany. The fa of Siciy had enhanced Aied contro of the Mediterranean but had not assured it. Prior to the invasion of Itay, therefore, the Aied goas were far from being totay satisfied, and an eager word watched as the Aies aunched first BAYTOWN and then AVALANCHE to invade the European continent. The success of BAYTOWN never seemed to be in doubt. Supported by a secure chain of suppy, and capitaizing on German withdrawas, Eighth Army sowy ceared the toe of the Itaian boot and by 14 September was moving up the Itaian east coast. The Saerno anding, in conjunction with the Itaian capituation, drew German forces northward away from Eighth Army. The fate of AVALANCHE was much ess assured. The operation acked adequate amphibious shipping, and the forces anded at Saerno were insufficient to hod the extensive beachhead. Montgomery s faiure to advance north as rapidy as expected further jeopardized the thrust. Fortunatey, the German units defending the area were not fuy reconstituted from their fighting in Siciy. Ony the inabiity of German commanders effectivey to muster and direct their forces aowed Cark time to reinforce the beachhead. The fact that he seriousy considered evacuation of part of the beachhead indicates the gravity of the situation. The AVALANCHE force coud have been thrown into the sea. Thanks to extremey effective nava and aviation support, quicky depoyed airborne reinforcements, the courage and capabiity of Aied sodiers, and quite a bit of uck, the beachhead survived. With the capture of Napes by Fifth Army and the Foggia airfied compex by Eighth Army and Germany s unforced withdrawa from Sardinia on 18 September and Corsica on 3 October, most strategic goas of the Itaian campaign were met. The Aies had bases in southern Itay from which to aunch strategic air attacks on the Bakans and Germany, the Mediterranean was secure, and German divisions were tied down in Itay opposing the Aied 15th Army Group and hoding those areas in northern Itay, France, and the Bakans previousy garrisoned by their former Itaian aies. Itay had become an Aied cobeigerent, pans were being deveoped to invade France both across the Engish Channe and from the Mediterranean, and the 30

31 Aied effort in Itay had become a and campaign of minor strategic importance in a secondary theater of operations. With the benefit of hindsight, some have questioned whether a continuation of an offensive campaign to gain the Rome airfieds and provide security for the airfieds in centra and southern Itay was appropriate. The cost of the Rapido crossing, and the Anzio invasion which it supported, must be weighed against the imited strategic gains. No one can question the courage, capabiity, and tenacity of the Aied sodiers who fought in Itay. In retrospect, greater cooperation and coordination between British and American eaders, a more reaistic appraisa of the strategic vaue of the campaign once contro of southern Itay was gained, and a better meshing of resources and missions at the tactica eve woud have enhanced the effectiveness and decreased the human cost of the Napes-Foggia Campaign. Nevertheess, from a strategic perspective, the Napes-Foggia Campaign was an unquaified success. Notwithstanding the Rapido incident and subsequent operations, a secure Mediterranean, exceent bases from which to wage the air war against the Germans, the engagement of at east twenty-three German divisions, and Itay s change in status to an Aied cobeigerent shortened the war and contributed significanty to the defeat of Germany. 31

32 Further Readings There are a number of works avaiabe on the Word War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations for those who wish to earn more about wartime operations there. Strategic Panning for Coaition Warfare, (1959), by Maurice Matoff and Saerno to Cassino (1969) by Martin Bumenson, both pubished in Washington, D.C., by the U.S. Army Center of Miitary History, are semina works. Saerno: American Operations from the Beaches to the Voturno, 9 September 6 October 1943, pubished in Washington, D.C., by the Miitary Inteigence Division of the War Department in 1944 (and repubished in paperback by the Center of Miitary History in 1990) provides a contemporary view of the amphibious invasion. Another account of the Saerno operation is Eric Morris, Saerno: A Miitary Fiasco (1983). Samue Eiot Morison provides highights from a Navy perspective of the Saerno and Anzio invasions in voume 5 of his History of United States Navy Operations in Word War II series, tited Siciy, Saerno, Anzio, January 1943 June 1944 (1954). Martin Bumenson, Mark Cark (1985), provides the Fifth Army commander s view of the campaign. Finay, a 1990 addition to the Major Battes and Campaigns Series edited by John Eisenhower is Caro D Este, Word War II in the Mediterranean, CMH Pub Cover: The invasion of Paestrum Beach, Saerno. (Nationa Archives) PIN :