Exploring New Ways to Provide Enduring Strategic Effects for the Department of Defense

Transcription

1 APRIL 2014 A Reprt f the CSIS Defense and Natinal Security Grup Explring New Ways t Prvide Enduring Strategic Effects fr the Department f Defense 1616 Rhde Island Avenue NW Washingtn, DC t f ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham Bulder New Yrk Trnt Plymuth, UK 4501 Frbes Bulevard, Lanham, MD t f Cver pht: Pht by Frntpage, Shutterstck.cm. ISBN Ë xhsleocy2 8573z v*:+:!:+:! authrs Clark Murdck Samuel J. Brannen

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3 Explring New Ways t Prvide Enduring Strategic Effects fr the Department f Defense Authrs Clark Murdck Samuel J. Brannen A Reprt f the CSIS Defense and Natinal Security Grup April 2014 ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham Bulder New Yrk Trnt Plymuth, UK

4 Abut CSIS Fr ver 50 years, the Center fr Strategic and Internatinal Studies (CSIS) has wrked t develp slutins t the wrld s greatest plicy challenges. Tday, CSIS schlars are prviding strategic insights and bipartisan plicy slutins t help decisinmakers chart a curse tward a better wrld. CSIS is a nnprfit rganizatin headquartered in Washingtn, D.C. The Center s 220 fulltime staff and large netwrk f affiliated schlars cnduct research and analysis and develp plicy initiatives that lk int the future and anticipate change. Funded at the height f the Cld War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated t finding ways t sustain American prminence and prsperity as a frce fr gd in the wrld. Since 1962, CSIS has becme ne f the wrld s preeminent internatinal institutins fcused n defense and security; reginal stability; and transnatinal challenges ranging frm energy and climate t glbal health and ecnmic integratin. Frmer U.S. senatr Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Bard f Trustees since Frmer deputy secretary f defense Jhn J. Hamre became the Center s president and chief executive fficer in CSIS des nt take specific plicy psitins; accrdingly, all views expressed herein shuld be understd t be slely thse f the authr(s) by the Center fr Strategic and Internatinal Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: (pb); (ebk) Center fr Strategic & Internatinal Studies Rwman & Littlefield 1616 Rhde Island Avenue, NW 4501 Frbes Bulevard Washingtn, DC Lanham, MD

5 Cntents Executive Summary IV Intrductin 1 Methdlgy 3 New Way 1: Reginal Security Task Frces 7 New Way 2: Federated Defense Architectures 12 New Way 3: Recalibratin [frmerly Reversibility] Actins 18 New Way 4: U.S. [Cst-Impsing] Asymmetric Strategies 24 Next Steps 29 Appendix 1. Experts Cnsulted 31 Appendix 2. High-Pririty Strategic Ends vs. Ways, bth Current and New 32 Appendix 3. New Strategic Ways Organized by Level f Interest fr Future Study 42 Abut the Authrs 44 III

6 Executive Summary A CSIS study team led by senir adviser Clark Murdck and senir fellw Sam Brannen undertk an eight-mnth study t explre new ways f using U.S. military pwer t achieve enduring strategic effects. As the defense budget decreases ver the cming decade, and with defense strategic pririties f the United States taken as a cnstant, the CSIS study team sught t identify new appraches, reflect n U.S. lessns learned frm histrical cases, cnsider internatinal defense best practices, and examine ptentially transferrable appraches frm the private sectr t achieve defense strategic ends. Insights frm the study were shared thrughut the prcess with the spnsring OSD Strategy Office in supprt f its rle in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Infrmed by independent research and vetting thrugh defense expert interviews and a Cre Wrking Grup (including frmer senir defense fficials, nngvernmental rganizatin experts, and private-sectr experts), the CSIS study team identified New Ways that culd prve mst beneficial fr the United States in years t cme in achieving high-pririty defense strategic bjectives, as derived frm the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). The ways cnsidered were designed t be immediately executable by the Department f Defense. They were based n appraches that wuld nt mean radical adjustments t rles and missins f the military services, wuld nt entail legislatin, and wuld nt rely upn any fundamental change r expectatin f greater utput frm nn-dd U.S. gvernment departments and agencies. The fllwing New Ways are detailed in this study, with examples, recmmended implementatin actins, and analysis f strategy and plicy implicatins f each. 1. Reginal Security Task Frces U.S. security cperatin shuld fcus n identifying and building active agents willing and able t tackle reginal challenges, and then mve t supprt them. This requires fresight, but als the ability t seize the pprtunity f the mment by ensuring availability f critical enablers and standing cncepts f peratin (CONOPS) t effectively supprt partners. Instead f leading (r nt leading) every respnse, the United States shuld be prepared t encurage and enable thers wherever pprtunity exists and interests align. This apprach is nt weak; it is smart. Such emphasis n greater selectivity in reginal engagements and investment in critical partners is widely reflected in the 2014 QDR. 2. Federated Defense Architectures Federated Defense Architectures take int accunt declining defense budgets f the United States and its strngest traditinal allies and blends the 2010 QDR s reginal defense architectures and CSIS s nging examinatin f federated defense fr the glbal industrial base. The apprach mves beynd simple rles and missins r cdevelpment discussins between the United States and its allies and partners, and recmmends cmmn platfrms, greater jint use f facilities, and emphasis n IV CLARK MURDOCK AND SAMUEL J. BRANNEN

7 interperable architectures where jint acquisitin creates greater net capability fr key reginal challenges. This apprach is immediately applicable t East Asia, the Gulf Cperatin Cuncil cuntries, and amng NATO allies and ther partners (as part f a respnse t grwing Russian aggressin). 3. Recalibratin [Frmerly Reversibility ] Actins The cncept fr reversibility f certain DD decisins first entered strategic guidance in the 2012 DSG. Hwever, there is brad agreement that DD is talking the reversibility talk, but nt walking the walk. The CSIS study team recmmended instead the New Way f recalibratin a cncept that entails systemic applicatin, rigr, and dedicated funds. Recalibratin as a planning cncept suggests bth a prcess and an analytic methdlgy. Frm a prcess perspective, senir leadership needs t take wnership f the cncept and t empwer a small analytic cell t run the prcess. Analytically, the strategic pririties and vectrs that might need t be recalibrated/reversed have t be identified, as well as the events r cnditins that wuld trigger the recalibratin. In additin, actin plans needed fr the recalibratin wuld have t be frmulated, including the near-term steps needed t ensure future capability fr strategy recalibratin. Walking the [recalibratin] walk invlves mre than refining the cncept (frm reversibility t recalibratin); it als requires a prcess fr senir-level engagement, and an ffice respnsible fr the functin and the resurces needed t execute the functin. 4. U.S. [Cst-Impsing] Asymmetric Strategies Defense planning during an age f austerity and in a cntext f strategic uncertainty requires bth tugh decisins (in setting pririties) and smart decisins (in finding new ways t cunter adversary strategies and capabilities). When ptential adversaries develp asymmetric ways t ffset U.S. cnventinal pwer, DD needs t think asymmetrically itself n smart, new ways t cunter, negate, r distract their strategies. The gal f any gd strategy is t impse high csts n ne s adversary at relatively lw cst t neself. The fcus f this New Way is n the explratin f U.S. asymmetric strategies, nt n hw the U.S. military cpes with adversary asymmetric strategies. Cuntering existing and evlving threats by develping cst-impsing U.S. asymmetric strategies and capabilities takes the initiative by frcing adversaries t respnd t U.S. asymmetric attacks as ppsed t pursuing their main lines f peratin. In many cases, the best U.S. respnse t an adversary s asymmetric strategy t cunter U.S. military pwer may be an asymmetric strategy f its wn. The release f the 2014 QDR ffers an excellent pprtunity fr implementing the New Ways methdlgical apprach, which begins by identifying the high-pririty ends that the QDR implementatin prcess shuld fcus n. The 2014 QDR will need a priritizatin phase t ensure that the implementatin effrts are prperly fcused n high-pririty ends. Once these have been established, QDR implementatin shuld be fcused n immediate and near-term actins. EXPLORING NEW WAYS TO PROVIDE ENDURING STRATEGIC EFFECTS V

8 The Budget Cntrl Act (BCA) caps n the defense tpline, which will be exacerbated by the cntinued hllwing ut f the defense budget by internal cst inflatin, will create unrelenting pressure n DD t d mre with less. Frmulating a plan f cherent 2014 QDR implementatin actins and then actually taking them is by far the best cunter. DD may have less in the way f resurces, but that des nt mean it has t d less. VI CLARK MURDOCK AND SAMUEL J. BRANNEN

9 Intrductin Over the next decade, the U.S. defense budget culd effectively decrease by as much as 40 percent. 1 In even a best-case, nnsequester scenari, the cuts t the defense budget enacted under the Budget Cntrl Act f 2011 will cntinue t challenge the ability f the Department f Defense (DD) t achieve the key missins and pririties identified in the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). 2 In additin t majr decisins n tradeffs between frce capacity and capability and between mdernizatin and readiness, ver the next decade DD will have t chse between decreasing its glbal security bjectives r determining hw t change and innvate and cntinue t uphld and implement its current strategic ends despite a decrease in means. The chice is clear: DD must find new ways t achieve enduring strategic effects. In his assessment f the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Chairman f the Jint Chiefs f Staff General Martin Dempsey wrte: Strategy is abut balancing ends, ways, and means; that is, ur natinal bjectives, ur peratinal cncepts, and the resurces available t us. Clearly this QDR addresses the fact that fr the freseeable future the Department f Defense will have fewer means t apply t defending ur natinal security interests. Nt surprisingly, given ur respnsibilities as a glbal pwer, the strategy articulated in the QDR preserves the ends articulated in the Defense Strategic Guidance f 2012 as they are cnsidered necessary t prtect the cre interests f the United States. With ur ends fixed and ur means declining, it is therefre imperative that we innvate within the ways we defend the Natin. 3 Experts in the brader defense plicy cmmunity have suggested that DD shuld view the decade ahead as the beginning f an interwar perid and fcus n planning and preparing fr the future. 4 These bservers urge the type f strategic thught exercises undertaken after the First Wrld War at the Army War Cllege in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the Naval War Cllege in Newprt, Rhde Island, that resulted in the Rainbw (r Clr) Plans that prvided the fundatin fr the 1 This figure is based n analysis cnducted by Clark Murdck and Angela Weaver under the auspices f the Affrdable Military Wrking Grup. Murdck and Weaver fund that, Thugh the budget deal f Octber 2013 prvides mdest relief (abut $30 billin less in defense cuts in FY14 and FY25), the Budget Cntrl Act will still result in a 21 percent reductin in the defense budget tpline thrugh In additin, internal cst grwth (i.e., persnnel pay and benefits; acquisitin; peratins and management) is reducing defense dllar purchasing pwer by 18 percent ver the same time frame, making what is a 20 percent reductin feel like a 40 percent reductin. See Angela Weaver, Reality Check: Shaping an Effective, Affrdable Military fr 2021, FYSA: Fr Yur Situatinal Awareness (February 2014), 2 Department f Defense (DD), Sustaining U.S. Glbal Leadership: Pririties fr 21st Century Defense (Washingtn, DC: DD, January 2012), 3 DD, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 [hereafter QDR 2014] (Washingtn, DC: DD, March 2014), 59, 4 See, fr example, Peter W. Singer, Lessns n Defense Strategy frm the Interwar Years, Brkings Institutin, August 2013, 1

10 victrius U.S. campaigns against the Axis pwers in the Secnd Wrld War. 5 While the interwar analgy tracks in identifying the present as a strategic inflectin pint, U.S. defense resurces and verall capacity will draw dwn nly incrementally as cmpared t the dembilizatin fllwing Wrld War I (including the all-vlunteer, prfessinal nature f the current U.S. military), and verall glbal cmmitments and peratinal requirements fr the U.S. military will remain high fr the freseeable future, with a range f ptential cntingencies frm the Krean Peninsula t the Sahel. Other key strategic trends, including the nging infrmatin technlgy revlutin and glbal plitical unrest, have established a highly cmplex envirnment in which events mve mre rapidly than ever befre. With that recgnitin f what is new and different abut this perid f histry, the purpse f this study is t systematically accelerate Secretary f Defense Chuck Hagel s brad theme f innvatin as he articulated it in a June 2013 speech in Singapre in the cntext f DD s Asia strategy: The United States military is nt nly shifting mre f its assets t the Pacific we are using these assets in new ways... t enhance ur psture and partnerships.... Cmbined with new cncepts, dctrine, and plans that integrate... technlgies and ther game changing capabilities, we will ensure freedm f actin thrughut the regin well int the future. 6 That same apprach applies t regins arund the wrld, albeit with a ptentially prprtinally reduced U.S. defense psture. As the 2014 QDR reprt bserves, Reginal and glbal trends in the security envirnment, cupled with increasing fiscal austerity, will make it imperative that the United States adapt mre quickly than it has in the past and pursue mre innvative appraches and partnerships in rder t sustain its glbal leadership rle. 7 Under cntract frm the Office f the Secretary f Defense (OSD) fr Plicy, a CSIS study team led by senir adviser Clark Murdck and senir fellw Sam Brannen undertk an eight-mnth study t explre new ways f using U.S. military pwer t achieve enduring strategic effects. The CSIS team sught t identify new appraches, reflect n U.S. lessns learned frm histrical cases, cnsider internatinal defense best practices, and examine ptentially transferrable appraches frm the private sectr. Insights frm the study were shared thrughut the prcess with the OSD Strategy Office in supprt f the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In the fllwing chapters, reprt authrs Murdck and Brannen explain the prject s methdlgy and then examine in depth fur New Ways highlighted fr attentin by DD in the cntext f the QDR and fllw-n implementatin. The reprt cncludes with actinable prpsals fr rganizatinal change t cntinue t generate and explre highest-pririty New Ways, alng with recmmendatins fr next steps t build n the 2014 QDR reprt. 5 Fr an excellent review f this perid, see Henry G. Gle, The Rad t Rainbw: Army Planning fr Glbal War, (Annaplis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003). 6 Secretary f Defense Chuck Hagel (speech at the Internatinal Institute fr Strategic Studies [Shangri-La Dialgue], Singapre, June 1, 2013), 7 DD, QDR 2014, 3. 2 CLARK MURDOCK AND SAMUEL J. BRANNEN

11 Methdlgy The CSIS study team cnducted the prject at an unclassified level thrugh a cmbinatin f internal research, careful review f tp-level DD strategy dcuments and public statements by DD senir leaders, a cre wrking grup f selected experts (described in greater detail belw), and targeted expert interviews cnducted ver the curse f eight mnths (July 2013 February 2014). Deputy Assistant Secretary f Defense fr Strategy Daniel Chiu and his staff pressed the study team t ffer independent, bjective perspectives. Indeed, the pinins in this reprt reflect nly thse f the authrs, which cmprised the CSIS study team. The CSIS study team began its examinatin f new ways with in-depth study f the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). The DSG was the result f a defense strategy review rdered in 2011 by President Barack Obama and then-secretary f Defense Rbert Gates (transitining t Secretary f Defense Len Panetta) t ensure that current defense guidance was, in the wrds f the president, a smart, strategic set f pririties cmpatible with budget cuts mandated by the 2010 Budget Cntrl Act. At the time the review was cnducted, it accunted fr nly the $487 billin cut ver 10 years (ut t FY2021). 8 The DSG was nt designed t mitigate the additinal $500 billin in cuts enacted under sequestratin. 9 During the rllut f the Strategic Chices and Management Review an additinal, internal strategic review t accunt fr the ptential impact f sequestratin Secretary f Defense Hagel said, [T]he inbetween budget scenari we evaluated wuld bend ur defense strategy in imprtant ways, and sequester-level cuts wuld break sme parts f the strategy, n matter hw the cuts were made. 10 Pentagn and White Huse fficials invlved in the review have emphasized that the DSG is in fact nt a strategy but guidance t priritize and adjust as necessary the implementatin f existing defense strategy in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. 11 These ends include, in particular, the s-called 4 Ps : Prevail in tday s wars. Prevent and deter cnflict. Prepare t defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range f cntingencies. Preserve and enhance the All-Vlunteer Frce. 8 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President n the Defense Strategic Review (speech at the Pentagn, Washingtn, DC, January 5, 2012), 9 Catherine Dale and Pat Twell, In Brief: Assessing the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), Cngressinal Research Service, August 13, 2013, 10 Secretary f Defense Chuck Hagel, Statement n Strategic Chices and Management Review (speech at the Pentagn, Washingtn, DC, July 31, 2013), DD, Quadrennial Defense Review Reprt: February 2010 (Washingtn, DC: DD, February 2010), 5 16, EXPLORING NEW WAYS TO PROVIDE ENDURING STRATEGIC EFFECTS 3

12 Perhaps the mst significant strategic vectr taken in the 2012 DSG is the Asia-Pacific rebalance: [W]hile the U.S. military will cntinue t cntribute t security glbally, we will f necessity rebalance tward the Asia-Pacific regin [riginal italics]. 12 Yet neither the 4 Ps nr the Asia-Pacific rebalance appears in the 10 key missin areas f the DSG, which seems surprising given cnsistent senir-leader emphasis n these pints. Mrever, the insistence f DD and White Huse fficials invlved in the final drafting f the DSG that the 10 missin areas are nt listed in pririty rder is perplexing. Althugh viewed by many defense experts (including the CSIS study team) as a cherent and well-dne strategy-level dcument, the 2012 DSG is ften criticized inside and utside f DD fr having failed t establish clear pririties fr these reasns. 13 In its wn detailed review f the dcument, the CSIS study team identified 25 distinct pririties r ends. These areas f emphasis are listed belw. The CSIS study team recgnized the need t priritize amng the 25 DSG strategic pririties in rder t fcus the explratin f new ways t achieve these. At its first 12 DD, Sustaining U.S. Glbal Leadership, See, fr example, Dale and Twell, In Brief: Assessing the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), CLARK MURDOCK AND SAMUEL J. BRANNEN

13 meeting f the Cre Wrking Grup (see list f utside experts at appendix 1) n August 15, 2013, the CSIS study team reviewed several appraches t identifying the highest-pririty ends frm which t develp New Ways. The Cre Wrking Grup agreed with CSIS schlars that, in the current resurce-cnstrained envirnment, it is imprtant t identify specific threats f greatest cncern and nt just needed capabilities. While prtflis f capabilities are a sund apprach when resurces are relatively plentiful, resurce scarcity makes it necessary t fcus n the highestprbability and highest-cnsequence identifiable threats. A mre threat-based apprach, ne that fcused n specific threats and specific adversaries, seems prudent. Fllwing discussin at the Cre Wrking Grup meeting and in private fllw-up with specific members f the grup n particular cncerns r pints raised, CSIS ffered the belw list f high-pririty ends. 1. Defend U.S. territry and citizens, including cuntering al Qaeda and vilent nnstate extremists glbally. 2. Overcme challenges t U.S. pwer prjectin, including anti-access/areadenial (A2/AD), fcusing first n the challenges in East Asia and the Persian Gulf. 3. Cunter asymmetric threats t U.S. warfare dminance, including disruptive adversary capabilities in space, cyber, and thrugh the use f prxies and irregular warfare. 4. Cntinue t encurage the peaceful rise f China while deterring and if necessary defeating Chinese aggressin in East Asia. 5. Maintain nuclear parity with Russia and nuclear superirity versus China. 6. Deter and defend against prvcatins frm a nuclear Nrth Krea and a nuclear-aspirant Iran. 7. Cunter prliferatin f ballistic missiles and WMD, including nuclear weapns frm a cllapsing regime. 8. Prmte stability in regins arund the wrld thrugh pre-cnflict defense engagement (security cperatin activities such as military-t-military exchanges, exercises, presence, etc.). The prpsed list f high-pririty ends was reviewed at a secnd sessin f the Cre Wrking Grup n September 26, As discussed extensively belw, high-pririty end #8 was added t the CSIS-prpsed list. Hwever, it was readily apparent that the grup culd nt reach a cnsensus n the pririty rdering f the CSIS list f highpririty ends. While the Cre Wrking Grup believed that the high-pririty ends themselves shuld be rank-rdered, they were unable t d s (at an acceptable cst f time and effrt), s the rdinal values given t each end are thse assigned by the CSIS study team. During the next phase f the study, the CSIS study team identified, thrugh a series f internal CSIS-wide meetings, literature search and interviews with selected subjectmatter experts, the current ways fr pursuing each f the high-pririty ends, and then EXPLORING NEW WAYS TO PROVIDE ENDURING STRATEGIC EFFECTS 5

14 generated new ways f pursuing these same ends. The summary list was reviewed at the September 26, 2013, meeting f the Cre Wrking Grup, whse feedback and additinal suggestins were incrprated int the dcument attached at appendix 2. The CSIS study team divided the prpsed ways (bth current and new) int three bins: (1) recmmended fr further study; (2) put n hld; and (3) nt wrth further investigatin. The summary chart is attached at appendix 3. After cnsulting with OSD-Plicy (Strategy), the remainder f the study effrt fcused n the fllwing New Ways: 1. Reginal Security Task Frces 2. Federated Defense Architectures 3. Reversibility Actins 4. U.S. Cst-Impsing Asymmetric Strategies The CSIS study team had riginally envisined cnvening wrking grups n each f these tpics. Hwever, after initial trial and errr, it prved mre effective fr the CSIS study team t frequently meet internally t discuss the New Ways, and then t engage with the right subject-matter experts and defense thught-leaders t stress-test the New Ways being explred. This allwed fr cntinued iteratin and refinement, as well as mre in-depth cnversatins with frmer senir fficials t capture their views. After several mnths f study thrugh this apprach, a final Cre Wrking Grup sessin was cnvened n January 30, 2014, t discuss findings. Based upn extensive feedback received at this sessin, a final vetting brief was prepared and reviewed with OSD-Strategy n February 10, This reprt expands n the vetting brief and incrprates feedback frm that meeting. 6 CLARK MURDOCK AND SAMUEL J. BRANNEN

15 New Way 1: Reginal Security Task Frces Security Cperatin with Fcused Objectives During the first Cre Wrking Grup meeting, there was spirited exchange regarding the exclusin f any building partnership capacity (BPC) r security cperatin ends frm the CSIS-develped list f high-pririty ends. The CSIS study team felt that the inclusin f BPC in defense strategy was ften t ambiguus, and thus wuld nt be high pririty enugh fr the purpses f this study. The CSIS study team als wanted t avid prviding pprtunity fr military services t justify frce structure and cmbatant cmmanders t request frce structure based slely n presence. The CSIS study team nted past experiences with just that tactic f inflated demand withut cmpelling evidence fr what presence really achieved in supprt f U.S. defense bjectives. Cre Wrking Grup members pushed back, highlighting that security cperatin activities are demnstrably linked t verall defense bjectives f prmting stability in regins arund the wrld thrugh preventative activities and engagement. As the defense budget draws dwn, they argued, the United States will need t find new ways t encurage ther natins t take n mre reginal respnsibility and t deal with issues that may nt be n a U.S. tp ten security pririties list, but which are nnetheless extremely imprtant. Thus, security cperatin activities can be a frce multiplier and nt a net drain fr the United States. Newly cnvinced f the utility f these activities, the CSIS study team ultimately prpsed numerus New Ways that fell in the categry f imprving U.S. ability t leverage partners t achieve reginal security bjectives. Mst prmising f these was a general apprach riginally described as fllws: Establish a Reginal Security Partnership Apprach t d X with Y in Z, where X=a specific threat that the United States will supprt partner cuntries t prevail against, Y=the willing cuntry r calitin, and Z=the regin(s) in which the threat exists. Thrugh cnversatins, including with the OSD client, this New Way was refined t its current frmulatin. Current Way Security cperatin is a brad missin set widely regarded as imprtant t stability in regins arund the wrld, but ften yielding ambiguus utcmes frm significant inputs. U.S. frces engage freign cunterparts primarily t (1) build interperability fr future cntingencies; and/r (2) build freign capacity t uphld reginal security r address a particular issue with minimal r n U.S. assistance. Even with special peratins frces (SOF), security cperatin is ften dne in a peanut butter-spread fashin that des nt cncentrate effrt. As DD plans fr a range f ptential cntingencies (particularly at the gegraphic Cmbatant Cmmands, r COCOMs), the prclivity f U.S. reginal planners is t engage as many cuntries as pssible. Effective use f jint funding authrities (sectin 1206, 1208, and the Glbal Security EXPLORING NEW WAYS TO PROVIDE ENDURING STRATEGIC EFFECTS 7

16 Cntingency Fund) between the Department f State (DOS) and DD can be uneven, with particular disagreement between cuntry embassies and reginal bureaus within DOS. Such disagreements require frequent, high-level interventin frm bth departments (at the under secretary level and abve), cnsuming decisin-maker time that wuld be better spent n strategic-level issues. New Way U.S. security cperatin shuld fcus n identifying and building active agents willing and able t tackle reginal challenges, and then mve t supprt them. This requires fresight, but als the ability t seize the pprtunity f the mment by ensuring availability f critical enablers and standing cncept f peratins (CONOPS) t effectively supprt partners. Instead f leading every respnse, the United States shuld be prepared t encurage and enable thers wherever pprtunity exists and interests align. The 2014 QDR crrectly emphasizes greater selectivity in reginal engagement activities and investment in critical partners is reflected in. 14 Examples The mdel fremst n the minds f the CSIS study team, the Cre Wrking Grup, and ther interlcutrs was nging U.S. supprt t French peratins in Mali (Operatin SERVAL) and mre recently, the Central African Republic (Operatin SANGARIS) widely judged as successes in disldging al Qaeda linked grups and returning stability t the regin. U.S. supprt has primarily cnsisted f prvisin f unique enablers including lift, air refueling, and intelligence, surveillance and recnnaissance (ISR) including jint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS) and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Ntably, assistance has excluded U.S. bts n the grund. In cntrast, France currently has sme 1,600 grund frces in Mali 15 (dwn frm a high f apprximately 4,500) and 1,600 trps t the Central African Republic. 16 The United States was in fact part f a brader French-led calitin fr its peratins that included reginal frces such as the African Unin, Chad, Uganda, and use f reginal airfields including in Niger. Operatins have been clsely crdinated between U.S. and French frces, including thrugh liaisn fficers and embassies in Paris, Washingtn, Stuttgart, and elsewhere. This apprach f the United States supprting thers rather than taking the lead itself has derisively been called leading frm behind an unfrtunate phrase attributed t an unnamed White Huse staffer. 17 Hwever, it is imprtant t nte that supprting thers in nging peratins rather than always taking the lead is nthing new in the U.S. apprach, particularly in cuntries and regins where stability is desirable but the interests f ther U.S. allies and partners are mre prnunced. Fr example, the Internatinal Frce fr East Timr (INTERFET r Operatin WARDEN) was 14 DD, QDR 2014, Agence France-Presse, French t Cut Trps in Mali, Says Missin Accmplished, DefenseNews, January 8, 2014, Mali-Says-Missin-Accmplished. 16 Gregry Viscusi, Hllande s Willingness t Use Frce Defies Dubters, Blmberg, February 10, 2014, 17 Ryan Lizza, The Cnsequentialist: Hw the Arab Spring Remade Obama s Freign Plicy, New Yrker, May 2, 2011, 8 CLARK MURDOCK AND SAMUEL J. BRANNEN

17 a 23-natin peacekeeping frce led by Australia and bridged the gap befre the arrival f UN Peacekeepers. 18 The United States quietly prvided supprt t the Australians, including nshre cmmand and cntrl (C2) and intelligence elements, and amphibius frces supprt, including the USS Mbile Bay (CG-53), USNS Kilauea (T- AE26), USS Belleau Wd (LHA-3), USS Peleliu (LHA-5), 11th Marine Expeditinary Unit (MEU), and 31st MEU. 19 Beynd these brad calitins exist ther cases f fcused U.S. security assistance in the frm f what culd best be described as security frce assistance (SFA) r train, advise, and assist missins t Clmbia and the Philippines in cmbating terrrism and insurgency. These missins differ starkly frm the large-scale assistance missins t Afghan Natinal Security Frces r Iraqi Security Frces in that the assistance t Clmbia and the Philippines 20 was meant as an alternative t U.S. interventin and cmbat missins. These instances f assistance were led by Special Operatins Frces (in particular, Army Special Frces Green Berets), but driven at the cuntry team level, and invlved significant interagency cntributins and varius authrities and funding streams. Actins fr Implementatin 1. Ensure develpment and implementatin f high-level strategic guidance that priritizes COCOM theater engagement t achieve peratinal bjectives when they arise (even n an enduring basis) and ensure frm frce prviders the rapid availability f unique enablers t supprt emerging pprtunities with partners. Traditinally, frce prviders (the military services) have nt sized and shaped frce structure t take int accunt demand fr jint multinatinal r calitin peratins in which the United States will cntribute unique enablers, particularly n an enduring basis. Strategy and frce allcatin decisins shuld encurage services t keep fenced mre unique enablers n a Glbal Respnse Frce-like basis. 2. Think pprtunistically but strategically and plan ahead: Encurage COCOMs t wrk with Embassy Cuntry Teams (keeping OSD Plicy, Jint Staff, State Department, and ther apprpriate U.S. gvernment interagency entities infrmed) t identify and encurage allies and partners wh are able t lead respnses t reginal security challenges but may need U.S. plitical and military 18 Australian Army, East Timr Peacekeeping Missin t Cnclude, December 6, 2012, gv.au/our-wrk/news-and-media/news-and-media-2012/news-and-media-december-2012/east-timrpeacekeeping-missin-t-cnclude. 19 Duglas J. Gillert, U.S. Supprt Increases t East Timr Operatin Warden, American Frces Press Services, September 29, 1999, Linda D. Kzaryn, U.S. Limits Assistance t East Timr, American Frces Press Services, September 17, 1999, U.S. Navy, Visin, Presence, Pwer 2004: A Prgram Guide t the U.S. Navy 2004 (Washingtn, DC: U.S. Navy, 2004), 172 [Appendix A: Navy-Marine Crps Crisis Respnse and Cmbat Actins], appxa.pdf. 20 Fr an excellent descriptin f U.S. security frce assistance t the Philippines, see Rbert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: The American Military n the Grund (New Yrk: Randm Huse, 2005), EXPLORING NEW WAYS TO PROVIDE ENDURING STRATEGIC EFFECTS 9

18 supprt t achieve the missin (active agents). COCOM training and exercise schedules will need t be adjusted (and carefully reviewed by OSD) t supprt this priritizatin. Be wise with resurces and wary f engagement fr its wn sake; be realistic abut the absrptive capacity f partners. Cnsider hw best t leverage existing investment streams, such as U.S. cntributins and investment in UN Peacekeeping. Fcus n increasing investment in the develpment f capable reginal multilateral respnse frces (e.g., the African Unin African Standby Frce). Cntinue t fcus n imprving strategic-level crdinatin between the Natinal Security Cuncil (NSC) staff, DOS, and DD n priritizatin and nesting DD strategy within brader cuntry and reginal strategy. 3. Develp standing CONOPS t quickly prvide critical U.S. enablers such as reginal access, lgistics, C2 (including quiet standup f jint task frces and cmbined task frces), lift, ISR, SOF, senir advisers at the ministry level (including in sme cases U.S. general and flag fficers), and unique cultural skills. 4. When pprtunity des arise, ensure that U.S. cmmitment is predicated upn understanding the end-gal f partners and assessment f their will t stay with the fight, nt just start the fight. Strategy and Plicy Implicatins Secretary Hagel endrsed this apprach in his February 1, 2014, speech in Munich: We re lking at prmising new initiatives, including Germany s framewrk natins cncept, which culd help NATO plan and invest mre efficiently and mre effectively. In Africa, the U.S. military and ur Eurpean allies are already partners in cmbating vilent extremism and wrking alngside ur diplmats t avert humanitarian catastrphes.... In Mali, in the Central African Republic, the U.S. and Eurpean partners are prviding specialized enablers, such as air transprt and refueling. We re there t supprt a leading peratinal rle fr French frces. The U.S. has supprted France s leadership and effrts, and we als welcme the German Defense Minister vn der Leyen s recent prpsal t increase German participatin in bth cuntries. 21 Secretary Hagel references the evlving understanding amng Eurpean allies that the United States will nt always be ut frnt in leadership n every single security issue, and that cnsensus at 28 within NATO als will be unlikely. 21 Secretary f Defense Chuck Hagel (speech at the Munich Security Cnference, February 1, 2014, Munich, Germany), 10 CLARK MURDOCK AND SAMUEL J. BRANNEN

19 Fr the United States, this New Way is best cast in the cntext f cmparative advantage nt sme kind f burden sharing. This can be painted by critics f current U.S. plicy as retrenchment, but nly t the extent that the United States des nt cntinue t demnstrate strng leadership n the issues mst vital t it, and des nt bth articulate and enact the use f frce when apprpriate. This is a New Way meant t reinfrce the United States unique rle as a guarantr f stability and security in all gegraphic regins, and nt as a means t step back in any f them. This apprach can yield significant benefits in plitical-military relatins between the United States and partners by expanding bilateral and reginal defense ties t new avenues f military-t-military cperatin and trust. This ultimately can affrd the United States mre influence when reginal crises erupt, as well as grwing U.S. understanding f reginal dynamics and interests, and ptentially having assets in place and lines f cmmunicatin available that wuld nt therwise exist. Recent examples abund as t the psitive utcmes f this mde f engagement, including the afrementined clseness between the United States and Clmbia, and the strengthened U.S.-France relatinship, underscred during President Francis Hllande s February 2014 visit t the United States. Finally, the 2011 Libya interventin (Operatin UNIFIED PROTECTOR) is a warning. It demnstrates what happens when thers lead and d nt have a clear plan r the plitical will t finish what they started. Pressed bth by the actins f Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi in threatening a civilian massacre in Benghazi, and by the plitical chutzpah f French President Niclas Sarkzy t demnstrate a muscular and decisive French freign plicy (fllwed a clse secnd by a determined Britain), the United States and eventually NATO mved t swiftly intervene. Hwever, there was n clear strategy fr what wuld cme next t stabilize the situatin, and a lack f plitical will (r respective legislative/parliamentary authrity) amng all participants t remain engaged in the cuntry. Having wn the air war and remved Qaddafi frm pwer (the secnd utcme nt in the riginal plans), there was n fllw-n grund presence. Libya remains a fragile state, exprting instability in the regin. It is a fair questin t ask whether Syria may have played ut differently in terms f Eurpean and ther partner supprt if Libya had nt happened the way it did. The Cre Wrking Grup and several interviewees viced cncern that adpting this New Way culd lead t a slippery slpe f U.S. glbal ver-cmmitment r cmmitment t causes withut clear end bjectives. The CSIS study team argues that these utcmes can be avided thrugh greater up-frnt cnsultatin and realistic assessment f whether the lead natin(s) have bth a plan in line with U.S. interests and the will t see thrugh the actin. EXPLORING NEW WAYS TO PROVIDE ENDURING STRATEGIC EFFECTS 11

20 New Way 2: Federated Defense Architectures Interperability and Shared Reginal Respnsibility thrugh Jint Acquisitin Multilateral cperatin is increasingly imprtant t the United States and its allies and partners wrldwide. Nearly all face shrinking defense budgets while cnfrnting an array f transnatinal threats including in cyberspace and grwing reginal challenges t preserve stability and prevent cnflict. Cperatin t frge cmmn slutins t these challenges relies upn cmplementary military capabilities, and best succeeds with high degrees f interperability. Interperability thrugh cperatin n acquisitin and clser knitting tgether f defense industry is a New Way f plitical-military engagement. Current Way Security cperatin, r increasing partner/partnership capabilities, has been a fundatinal element f every QDR strategy. The 2010 QDR, Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), and Nuclear Psture Review built n preceding defense strategic reviews in intrducing the cncept f reginal architectures... that cmbine ur frward presence, relevant cnventinal capabilities (including missile defenses), and cntinued cmmitment t extend ur nuclear deterrent. 22 This cncept harks back t Cld War jint multinatinal frce planning and psture thrugh NATO and bilaterally, including in c-develpment and c-fielding f platfrms and systems t a cmmn standard. The cncept has been at the heart f the Eurpean Phased Adaptive Apprach t Missile Defense and the less mature effrt t create a missile defense architecture fr the Persian/Arabian Gulf regin. The cncept has struggled mre in executin in East Asia, despite strng respective U.S. bilateral ties t the Republic f Krea and t Japan. New Way Federated Defense Architectures take int accunt declining defense budgets f the United States and its strngest traditinal allies and blends the 2010 QDR and BMDR reginal missile defense architecture cncept with CSIS s nging elucidatin f a cncept f federated defense. As a December 2013 cncept verview f CSIS s nging wrk n the tpic put it: It is time t shift ur paradigm with key partners frm building capacity t federated defense. A federated apprach, including frward-thinking strategies fr hw t develp and share capabilities and even facilities, can knit tgether 22 DD, QDR 2010, CLARK MURDOCK AND SAMUEL J. BRANNEN

21 a cmmunity that understands each ther and wrks mre clsely and prfessinally every day. It can build n existing alliances t deepen defense ties.... It is als distinct frm an integrated apprach because it des nt seek t create interdependencies that wuld impair autnmus actin. By sharing wnership f a larger federated fleet f assets, federated partner cuntries can be drawn clser t the United States in their training, lgistics supprt, tactics develpment, and ptentially, peratinal missins. By better leveraging select hst natin facilities, the United States can maintain the lw cst, small ftprint apprach that is bth affrdable and suited t the dynamics f particular regins. This is a strategy that leans frward in a cst-effective way, building n the natural interest f allies and partners t have clser wrking ties t the United States, while managing the varius challenges that the ecnmic and gestrategic envirnment present. 23 The purchasing f cmmn equipment lends itself t a cmmn architecture with significant psitive externalities. And if the market is truly pen t cmpetitin and cperatin between cmpanies, market frces can imprve equipment fielded. 24 This was a New Way that Secretary f Defense Hagel als endrsed during his February 1, 2014, speech t the Munich Security Cnference: The United States will engage Eurpean allies t cllabrate mre clsely, especially in helping build the capabilities f ther glbal partners. We re develping strategies t address glbal threats as we build mre jint capacity... with Eurpean militaries. In the face f budget cnstraints here n this cntinent [Eurpe], as well as in the United States, we must all invest mre strategically t prtect military capability and readiness. The questin is nt just hw much we spend, but hw we spend tgether.... [T]he United States is helping the U.K. regenerate its aircraft carrier capability, which will enable mre integrated peratin f ur advanced F-35 fighters and, mre bradly, enhance ur shared ability t prject pwer. 25 The apprach has even greater immediate relevance in light f Russian aggressin in February and March 2014 against Ukraine. Actins t shre up reginal deterrence will need t take place bth in a NATO cntext, and in a brader reginal cntext, wrking with partners including Finland, Sweden, Gergia, and even Azerbaijan and Central Asian cuntries. This New Way is well reflected in the 2014 QDR, including its discussin f strategically cmplementary appraches t deepen cperatin with clse allies and partners, including mre cllabratively planning ur rles and missins and investments in future capabilities. 26 The QDR further states that DD is wrking t 23 CSIS, Federated Defense Prject: Cncept Overview, December 16, 2013, publicatin/131216_federatedprject_cncept_overview.pdf. 24 In a U.S. cntext, see hw cmpetitin has imprved cst savings and increased quality in Jacques Gansler, T Save n Defense, Hire Rivals, New Yrk Times, February 26, 2014, /02/27/pinin/t-save-n-defense-hire-rivals.html?_r=0. 25 Hagel (speech at the Munich Security Cnference). 26 DD, QDR 2014, 24. EXPLORING NEW WAYS TO PROVIDE ENDURING STRATEGIC EFFECTS 13

22 better align ur investments and ensure that ur activities cmplement ne anther s mutual pririties. 27 Examples In additin t numerus histrical examples f this apprach, particularly amng NATO cuntries, and with Japan and Krea, many recent examples exist as well, including in specific technlgy-driven industries such as space and cyber. One f the mre enduring examples is the Nrth American Aerspace Defense Cmmand (NORAD) perated jintly by the United States and Canada. Since 1958, NORAD has prvided jint air and missile warning, and since 2006 has als shared maritime dmain awareness. 28 That shared awareness has relied upn interperable systems and aircraft weaving U.S. and Canadian militaries and defense industry clse tgether, adapting ver time t new threats. The Aegis Cmbat System is anther example f a shared system, which is particularly interesting because, while a U.S. system, it can be installed int anther natin s indigenusly prduced ships. Each Aegis-equipped ship becmes a netwrk nde easily tied tgether in jint peratins. Aegis is currently integrated int the navies f the United States, Japan, Nrway, Krea, and sn Australia. It is als the backbne f the Eurpean Phased Adaptive Apprach t Missile Defense, the U.S. cntributin t NATO ballistic missile defense. 29 There are ther mre recent examples n a smaller scale, including the British decisin t purchase Being RC-135 Rivet Jint aircraft as a replacement electrnic warfare platfrm fr its Nimrd fleet. This created immediate interperability with the United States wn Rivet Jint fleet. As an ffset t British defense industry and prprtinal t the three aircraft it perates cmpared t the United States 15 it will be guaranteed 15 percent f all future upgrades (which are frequent given the nature f the platfrm). Nt unrelated has been the United Kingdm s acquisitin f armed MQ-1 Predatr and MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial systems (UAS), which it has jintly perated frm Creech Air Frce Base in Nevada. UAS are uniquely interperable in a multinatinal envirnment, including the ability t swap crews in mid-flight thrugh cmmn cntrl systems (crews need nt be gegraphically cllcated with the UAS r with ne anther t cntrl the same UAS). Anther future example entirely utside f U.S. direct invlvement culd be cperatin between Australia and Japan n a Cllins-class replacement diesel-electric submarine that culd be attractive t thers in the regin. Within NATO, the cncept f cmmn equipment has lng been an area f emphasis, and it is reemerging bth as a decade f the Internatinal Security Assistance Frce t Afghanistan (ISAF) cncludes and amid lng-term cuts in defense spending. The first NATO cncept t emerge is that f Smart Defense, a cncept that encurages Allies t 27 Ibid., Nrth American Aerspace Defense Cmmand Office f Histry, A Brief Histry f NORAD, December 31, 2012, 20NORAD.pdf. 29 See DD, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Reprt: February 2010 (Washingtn, DC: DD, February 2010), 14 CLARK MURDOCK AND SAMUEL J. BRANNEN

23 cperate in develping, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities t meet current security prblems in accrdance with the new NATO strategic cncept. 30 This is nearly a direct fit with federated defense and is in an early phase. Secnd, NATO will pursue a range f activities t keep its frces interperable after drawdwn in Afghanistan in 2014 thrugh the Cnnected Frces Initiative, which fcuses n shared training, exercises, and technlgy. 31 Third is the Framewrk Natins Cncept, which acknwledges that it may be pssible t build calitins akin t the New Way described in the last sectin (Reginal Security Task Frces) that exist utside the cnsensus at 28 cnstruct f NATO. The Framewrk Natins Cncept instead encurages ne r several cre natins t lead and let thers fllw and cntribute what they can. As referenced abve, Secretary f Defense Hagel has suggested that, Germany s framewrk natins cncept... culd help NATO plan and invest mre efficiently and mre effectively. 32 Actins fr Implementatin 1. Identify Opprtunity: Initially OSD Plicy and OSD Acquisitins, Technlgy and Lgistics (AT&L), Jint Staff, and the military departments wrk clsely with COCOMs and embassy cuntry teams t map ut the requirements and acquisitin plans f majr allies and partners in each regin. Next, Plicy, AT&L, and Jint Staff determine ptential U.S. systems t meet thse requirements, as well as thinking abut verlapping U.S. r ther ally r partner requirements. Use this apprach t address in particular cuntries that are mving away frm cmpatible architectures (e.g., Turkey s recent chice f a Chinese air and missile defense system) r being Finlandized (e.g., Gergia r Sutheast Asian natins). Review psture in key regins with a view t rtatinal clcatin f like assets where apprpriate. This apprach is particularly imprtant t implement in Eurpe because f reductins in U.S. psture and equipment in the regin, which previusly encuraged adptin t a cmmn gld standard. An excellent example is the U.S. aviatin detachment that rtates U.S. F-16s and C-130s at Lask Air Base in Pland. Identify capabilities where interperability is mst imprtant r desirable frm a U.S. military department perspective. Mitigate risk in cntingency plans thrugh greater allied and partner cntributins in thse cases where thers are likely t be willing t prvide material supprt. 30 NATO, Smart Defence, 2010, 31 NATO, The Cnnected Frces Initiative, F616F1F6/natlive/tpics_ htm?selectedLcale=en. 32 Hagel (speech at the Munich Security Cnference). EXPLORING NEW WAYS TO PROVIDE ENDURING STRATEGIC EFFECTS 15