DRT Feb 05 NIC %LVN. Iraq's Weapons of Mass. Destruction Programs

Transcription

1 DRT Feb 05 %LVN NC raq's Weapons of Mass Destructon Programs July 2002

2 Summary raq-whch has the expertse, facltes, and equpment to expand ts WMD arsenal-s workng to reconsttute prohbted WMD programs. Snce December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow UN nspectors nto raq as requred by UN Securty Councl resolutons; n the absence of such nspectons, raq's ablty to work on prohbted programs wthout rsk of dscovery undoubtedly has ncreased. raq has stockples of CW and BW agents and muntons, s rebuldng ts dual-use producton facltes, and s aggressvely pursung delvery platforms-ncludng UAVs-for chemcal and bologcal agents. raq retans a small force of prohbted Scud-varant mssles and launchers and s developng two short-range ballstc mssle systems that could volate UN-mposed range restrctons. All of these raq weapons could have warheads that delver chemcal or bologcal agents. raq stll has much of the nfrastructure needed to pursue ts goal of buldng a nuclear weapon, but t s unlkely to produce ndgenously enough weapons-grade materal for a delverable nuclear weapon untl late n the decade. Baghdad could shorten the acquston tmelne sgnfcantly f t were able to procure fssle materal abroad. raq has been able to mport dual-use, WMD-related equpment and materal through procurements both wthn and outsde the UN sanctons regme. Baghdad dverts some of the $10 bllon worth of goods now enterng raq every year for humantaran needs to support the mltary and WMD programs.

3 ) raq's Weapons of Mass Destructon Programs n Aprl 1991, the UN Securty Councl enacted Resoluton 687 requrng raq to declare, destroy, or render harmless ts weapons of mass destructon (WMD) arsenal and producton nfrastructure under UN or nternatonal Atomc Energy Agency (LAEA) supervson. UN Securty Councl Resoluton (UNSCR) 687 also demanded that lraq forgo the future development or acquston of WMD. Baghdad's determnaton to hold onto a szeable remnant of ts arsenal, agents, equpment, and expertse has led to years of dssemblng and obstructon of UN nspectons. Elte lraq securty servces orchestrated an extensve concealment and decepton campagn to hck ncrmnatng documents and materal that precluded resoluton of key ssues n each WMD category: Lraq's mssle, chemcal warfare (CW), bologcal warfare (BW), and nuclear programs. raq obstructons prompted the Securty Councl to pass several subsequent resolutons demandng that Baghdad comply wth ts oblgatons to cooperate wth the nspecton process and to provde Unted Natons Specal Commsson (UNSCOM) and LAEA offcals mmedate and unrestrcted access to any ste they wshed to nspect. Whle outwardly mantanng the facade of cooperaton, raq offcals frequently dened access to facltes, personnel, and documents n an effort toconceal crtcal nformaton about ther WMD programs. successve raq declaratons on Baghdad's pre-gulf war WMD programs gradually became more accurate between 1991 and 1998 but only because of sustaned pressure from UN sanctons, coalton mltary force, and vgorous and robust nspectons facltated by nformaton from cooperatve countres. Nevertheless, raq never has fully accounted for major gaps and rconsstences n ts declaratons and has provded no credble proof that t has completely destroyed ts weapons stockples and producton nfrastructure. Despte the destructon of most of ts prohbted ballstc mssles and some Gulf war-era. chemcal and bologcal muntons, raq probably stll has a small force of Scud-varant mssles, chemcal precursors, bologcal seed stock, and thousands of muntons sutable for chemcal and bologcal agents. raq has managed to preserve and n some cases even enhance the nfrastructure and expertse necessary for WMD producton and has used that capablty to mantan a stockple and possbly to ncrease ts sze and Snce December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow Unted Natons nspectors nto haq as requred by the Securty Councl resolutons. Techncal montorng systems nstalled by the U N at known and suspected WMD and mssle facltes n raq no longer operate.

4 UN Securty Councl Resolutons and Provsons for nspectons and Mont0rng:Theory and Practce Resoluton Requremenl Res. 687 (3 Aprl 1991) Requres lraq b dechre. deslroy, remove. or rerder harmless under UN or hea suwrvson and ndto use. devebp, construct, or acqure all c'hem.ka and bologcal weqons, all ballstc mssles wth ranges greler l han 150 an, and all wlear weapons-usame mderal, ncludng related materal. equpmenl. and laclles. The resoluton also lormed he Specal Commsson and authorzed the AEA lo carry out mmedate on-sle nspectons ot ~ lvo-re~g kltes based an raq's declaratons nd UNSCOM's desgnaln of ary addlonal locatons. Realt y BagW relused lo dedare all parts ol each WMD program, slbmlled sewrd declaratons as parl ol ts aggressve elbrts to deny and dweve nspedors, end ensured that cerlan elemenls ol the pcogram would reman concealed. The prohbton aganst devebphg delvery platkrms wth ranges greatef lhan 150 km albwed Baghdad lo research and devebp shorter-range systems wth applcatons lor longer-range systems and dd not allecl ra eltorts loconverl lull-sze araatl nb unmanned aeral vehes as potentla WMD dehery syslems wth anges lar beyond 150 km. Res. 707 (15 August 1991) Requres raq lo allow UN ard ~AEA nspeclors mmedate and unrestrcted access to arw slo they wsh lo nspect. Demands raq pmvde lull. lnal, and com~lde dsclasure 01 all asoects ol ls WMD Drwrams. Ee&e nmeddeb any altempt to conceal. m've.'br deroy WMD-rebled materal or equpment; allow UNSCOM md AEA learns to use ltxed-wng ancl helcopter llghts hrougbul raq; and respond dly, complelety. and promplly lo any S p d Commsson queslom or requests. - - Res (1 1 October 1991) Requres lraq to submt lo UNSCOM and laea long-term manlorng ol lraq WMD programs; and approved detaled plans called lor n UNSCRs 687 ad 707 br bng-ten morlorng. Res (27 Mach 1996) Establshed he raq exporumporl monlorng system, requrng UN members lo provde AEA and UNSCOM wllh nlormalon on mlerals exporled lo lraq lhal may be applcable to WMO producton. a~d requrng rq to reprl mporls ol all dual-use lems. Res (12 June 1996) and Resolllons 1115, 1134, , and 1205: Demand raq cooperate wth UNSCOM and allow nsoectsn teams mmedate. u~~onblonat, and unr&trcted access to la~te br nspeclon and access lo raq olllcals lor ~nlerv~ews. UWCR 1137 mndemns Baghdad5 relusal lo alow enlry b lraq to Uf.SCC)M oflcals #:n he grounds ol ther nalonally and ts lhreats to the safety ol (.N reconn2ssance arcralt. Res (2 March 1998) Demands lraq comply wlh UNSCOM and AEA nspectons ancl erxlorses he Secrelary General's memolafwm ol underslardng wlh raq, provdng lor "severest consequences" l lraq lals lo comply. Res (9 September 1998) Condemns raq's decsbl lo susperd cooperalon wth UNSCOM and he AEP. Res (5 November 1998) Condemns raq$ decson to cease amperaton wlh UNSCOM. Res (17 December 1999) Establshed he Unted Natons Montwna. Verlton. and nsdeclon Commsson (UNMWC), repd;dng UNSC&; and decdes lraq shall allow UNMOVC teams mmedate. unconcktonal. md unrestred access lo ary and all aspects ot lraq WMD program. Ba'ghdad n 1996 negolaled wlh UNSCOM'Executve Charman Ekeus modasles that used to delay ~nspeclo~ls. b reslr b lour he wmber 01 nspectors allowed nto any sle Baghdad dedared as Senstve: and to prohbt hem altogether from sles regarded as soveregn. These modaltes gave lraq leverage wer ndmdual nspectons. lraq ewntudly allowed lager numbers ol nspectors nto such stes but only aller lengthy negotatons al each ste. lraq generally accommodated UN montors decbred sles bul mcrasbnalk obstructed access and man~ubled monlorng c ~~&~~~unscom and laea montorag ol raq's WMD progams does no( have a specled end dale under currenl W resouons. lraq s negotalng corlracts lor procurng--oulsde ol UN conlrols-dual-use lems wth WlvO appbcatons. The U\l lacks the stall needed lo conducl thorough nspectons d goocls d raq's borders and lo montor mporls nsde raq. Baghdad conslentty.wughl to mpede and lml UNSCOMS msson n lraa bv bbckna access lo numerous Lacles throu&h the nsecbon process. often santzng sles belore he arrval of nspectors and routnely allemplng to deny nspectors access 10 requested stes and ndvduals. Al lmes. Baghdad WOUM promse complance lo awd consequences, only lo renege later. UNSCCW.4 could nd exercse ts mandate wthoul lraq complance. B agw relused lo work wth UWCOM arkl nslead negolwed wlh he Seaelary General, whom t beleved woukl be more sympalhelz l b raq's needs. lraq repeatedly has rqecled \he return ol UN arms tu~e~brs and clams thal t has satsted all UN resbtutbns relevant lo dsarmamenl. Compared wth UNSCOM gves the UNMOVC charman less authorly, gves he Searly Councl a greater role n delnng key dsarmanenl lasks. and requrbs that nspeclors be dl-tme UJ employees.

5 ~ - After four years of clamng that they had conducted only "small-scale, defensve" research, raq offcals fnally admtted n 1995 to producton and weaponzaton of bologcal agents. The raqs admtted ths only after beng faced wth evdence of ther procurement of a large volume of growth meda and the defecton of Husayn Kaml, former drector of raq's mltary ndustres. raq admtted producng thousands of lters of the BW agents anthrax,' botulnum toxn, (whch paralyzes respratory muscles and can be fatal wthn 24 to 36 hours) and aflatoxn, (a potent carcnogen that can attack the lver, kllng years after ngeston) and preparng BWflled Scud-varant mssle warheads, aeral bombs, and arcraft spray tanks before the Gulf war, although t dd not use them. m Two R-400A bombs ~n foreground (wlth black strpe) photographed by UNSCOM nspectors at Murasana Arfeld near the A1 Wald Alrbase n late 7997 bear markngs ~ndjcatlng they were to be fllecl wth bohlllnum toxn. Omer bomb5 appear to have markngs consstent wth bnary chemcal agent fll. Thls evdence contradcted raq's declaratons that rt dld not deploy BW muntons to operatonal arbases and that t destroyed all 8W bombs n July 199 -declaratons that were subsequently retracted ln the face of overwhelm~ng evdence to the contrary - -'An nfectous dose of anthrax s about 8,000 spores or less than one-mllonth of a pram n a non mnunocompromsed person. lnhala~on an~hrax hs~orcally has been W percent b~al wthn tve to seven days. although n recent cases agressve medcal treatment has reduced the fatalry rate.

6 -0 Chemcal-Flled Muntons Declared by raq raq 250-gauge chemcal bomb. raq 500-gauge chemcal bombs. raq 06-2 chemcal bomb. raq R ~OO chemcal bombs. a raq 155-mm chemcal shell. raq Al Husayn chemcal warheads. 722-mm rockets flled wth the chemcal nerve agent sarn pror to destructon.

7 raq: CW-Related Producton Facltes and Declared Stes of Deployed Alcohol-Flled or Chemcal Agent-Flled Muntons Durng Desert Storm ap-l.m---.-b 8 4 u.r.-. Turkey NOTE: Names n parenttwes,a<,>repent US names.., j Syra Saddam Alrbase (Oayarrah Wcs!) r 1:.. 1 Al Fallujah t1 L. [Al tfadbarvy~h l Mfsnn Al T u Alrbs* j OW Khlna~J L -, - Al Fallujah 4,.-- (Al Habtranyah ll) Al Therthar ' Qadlsl ah Alrbase c M, Murazsna Alrf)eld 37 Sam.. '_. - '-'' Al Mutnslm; - N ~ u '. -..,! &mrn Estj ':, Al- Alrbsse (X Mukmnad~J. QT.' W g e L. k,'., * '- *BAGHDAD 1;.. 4! Arbase ' Zagadd ~ordnr. Al Tabaat 'OUbaVsah! (A] laqaddum). 44,. Alntrp Talhe Alrbase (. Al Fallujah / -!-3 SWj (Mubays; ----'.. - P.: UWlsvdlr Saud Araba st ' An Naslrlyah (An Nartph SWJ, 1 Khsmlslyah ' kl Bas:ah.. (Tau a1 Lahm 1,. Bnarf (ACOhdj G&rGF Nem HD Mustard. -.. ;.., 1. Bomb c / ArclleyrockeVshll - 8 Kuwa -.. : ; Mssle warhead WAT * p";:".' C OV-related producton facdtes Tear gas bomb : m W-~U, -- 0 W urn , Saud Araba...- T;;!; M Du-*p* GWLWPG A (R

8 Baghdad contnues to rebuld and expand dual-use nfrastructure that t could dvert quckly to CW producton. The best examples are the chlorne and phenol plants at the Fallujah 1 faclty. Both chemcals have legtmate cvlan uses but also are raw materals for the synthess of precursor chemcals used to produce blster and nerve agents. raq has three other chlorne plants that have much hgher capacty for cvlan producton; these plants and raq mports are more than suffcent to meet raq's cvlan needs for water treatment. Of the 15 mllon kg of chlorne mported under the UN Ol-for-Food program snce 1997, Baghdad used only 10 mllon kg and has 5 mllon kg n stock, suggestng that some domestcally produced chlorne has been dverted to proscrbed actvtes. Fallujah 1 was one of raq's prncpal CW precursor producton facltes before the Gulf war. n the last two years the raqs have upgraded the faclty and brought n new chemcal reactor vessels and shppng contaners wth a large amount of producton equpment. They have expanded chlorne output far beyond pre-gulf war producton levels--capabltes that they could dvert quckly to CW producton. raq s seekng to purchase CW agent precursors and applcable producton equpment and s tryng to hde the actvtes of the Fallujah plant.

9 Nuclear Weapons Program More than ten years of sanctons and the loss of much of raq's nuclear nfrastructure under LAEA oversght have not dmnshed Saddam's nterest n acqurng or developng nuclear weapons. raq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that focused on buldng an mploson-type weapon usng hghly enrched uranum. Baghdad was attemptng a varety of uranum enrchment technques, the most successful of whch were the electromagnetc sotope separaton and gas centrfuge programs. After ts nvason of Kuwat, raq ntated a crash program to dvert AEA-safeguarded, hghly enrched uranum from ts Sovet and French-suppled reactors, but the onset of hostltes ended ths effort. raq declaratons and the UNSCOM/lAEA nspecton process revealed much of raq's nuclear weapons efforts, but Baghdad stll has not provded complete nformaton on all aspects of ts nuclear weapons program. lraq has wthheld mportant detals relevant to ts nuclear program, ncludng procurement logs, techncal documents, expermental data, accountng of materals, and foregn assstance. Baghdad also contnues to wthhold other data about enrchment technques, foregn procurement, weapons desgn, and the role of raq securty servces n concealng ts nuclear facltes and actvtes. raq stll has much of the nfrastructure needed to pursue ts goal of buldng a nuclear weapon. raq retans ts cadre of nuclear scentsts and techncans, ts program documentaton, and suffcent dual-use manufacturng capabltes to support a reconsttuted nuclear weapons program. raq meda have reported numerous meetngs between Saddam and nuclear scentsts over the past two years, sgnalng hs contnued nterest n revvng a nuclear program. Before ts departure from raq, the L4EA made sgnfcant strdes toward dsmantlng raq's nuclear-weapons program and unearthng the nature and scope of raq's past nuclear actvtes. n the absence of nspectons, however, raq easly could have begun to reconsttute ts nuclear program and to unravel the AEA's hard-earned accomplshments. Lraq's expandng nternatonal trade provdes growng access to nuclear-related technology and materals and potental access to foregn nuclear expertse. An ncrease n dual-use procurement actvty n recent years may be supportng a reconsttuted nuclear-weapons program. The acquston of suffcent fssle materal s Lraq's prncpal hurdle n developng a nuclear weapon. raq s unlkely to produce ndgenously enough weapons-grade materal for a delverable nuclear weapon untl md-to-late n the decade. Baghdad could shorten the acquston tmelne sgnfcantly f t were able to procure fssle materal abroad.

10 f/" raq: Nuclear-Related Facltes c:.. L, C la lw TURKEY...- r,/\ \ 0 P my kgu- \.--'.,- - / -. Jarnl! uranrc:~! ( :+ rcosrock lactory 7 ( '8 f.-.,. 1: :-, / SYRA \ L H./ 1 Ast Snargst EA.f!.5 zc;,;). : rv '. C d < ; /A Ou'rn ur~r;r.m c-.: >&, crt: rel;rr:?r.$ A :,' 1,. hr- fash1dry;lh ccntr!!upc ;= ~ornrr~a.4 t:+r~re: ~a-1;~ c t~cl!f:y 1.' Petrochemcal-2 Cm!rr.,:,;:,m cnc cr>rrrper *BAGHDAD "\L orc nnc ;.. A! Fursf centrr!uge - v dcvol~;.r;rnc;ll ccnfrr =', :c;-.,ar!r~s NUC>.,.. A;.trrclt.;!~t~clear -.-'. f?~s~~;l'../: Ce;:c; \ we;r,~orr SC' c~ofe, \.-../"- * eevetc:;n>en.nl f.4k,s/,,:. :. 1 ',,, k~b-,,s<. 8-o-w. L,..~ RAN \ 5e 1

11 Ballstc Mssle Program Compellng nformaton reveals that lraq s developng a ballstc mssle capablty that exceeds the 150-km range lmtaton establshed U ~~~~UNSCR 687. raq had an actve mssle force before the Gulf war that ncluded 819 Scud-B mssles (300-km range) purchased from the former Sovet Unon and a program to extend the Scud's range and modfy ts warhead. raq admtted fllng at least 75 of ts Scud warheads wth chemcal or bologcal agents and deployed these weapons for use aganst coalton forces and regonal opponents ncludng srael n raq Ballstc Mssles 3,lst~.rc Scud 13 A1 Husayn A Abbas (SLV) Al-Abd BADR-2000 Al Sarnoud Ababl Estmated 300 ' N A 750 1, range ( ~) Propellant Lqud Lqud Lqud Lqud SoldlLqud SoldlSold Lqud Sold Use lrannraq lranllraq Flght Flght lested Never Never Flght testng Under war. 1980s and Gulf tested 1989 developed developed 1997-presenl develop Wrt war a~he Al Sarnoud s capable of flyng beyond the allowed 150 km range.

12 Most of the approxmately 90 Scud-type.mssles Saddam fred at srael, Saud Araba, and Bahran durng the Gulf war were al-husayn varants that the lraqs modfed by lengthenng the arframe and ncreasng fuel capacty, ex tendng the range to 650 km. Baghdad was developng other longer-range mssles based on Scud technology, ncludng the 900-km al-abbas. raq was desgnng follow-on mult-stage and clustered medumrange ballstc mssle (MRBM) concepts-some smlar to the A1 Abd space-launch vehcle (SLV)-wth ntended ranges up to 3,000 km. raq also had a program to develop a two-stage mssle called the Badr-2000 usng sold-propellants wth an estmated range of 750 to km. raq never fully accounted for ts exstng mssle programs. Dscrepances n Baghdad's declaratons suggest that raq retans a small force of Scud-type mssles and an undetermned number of launchers and warheads. Further, raq never explaned the dsposton of advanced mssle components, such as gudance and control systems, that t could not produce on ts own and that would be crtcal to developmental programs. raq contnues to work on UN-authorzed short-range ballstc mssles (SRBMsfthose wth a range no greater than 150 km-that help develop the expertse and nfrastructure needed to produce longer-range mssle systems. The al-samoud lqud propellant SRBM s capable of flyng beyond the allowed 150 km range. The al-samoud and the sold-propellant Ababl-100, both of whch may be nearng operatonal deployment, appeared on launchers n a mltary parade on 3 1 December 2000 n Baghdad. Other evdence strongly suggests raq s modfyng mssle testng and producton facltes to produce even longer-range mssles: The Al-Rafah-North Lqud Propellant Engne RDT&E Faclty s raq's prncpal ste for the statc testng of lqud propellant mssle engnes. Baghdad has been buldng a new test stand there that s larger than the test stand assocated wth al-samoud engne testng and the defunct Scud engne test stand. The only plausble explanaton for ths test faclty s that raq ntends to test engnes for longer-range mssles prohbted under UNSCR 687. The Al-Mutasm Sold Rocket Motor and Test Faclty, prevously assocated wth raq's Badr-2000 sold-propellant mssle program, has been rebult and expanded n recent years. The al-mutasm ste supports sold-propellant motor assembly, rework, and testng for the UN-authorzed Ababl- 100, but the sze of certan facltes there, partcularly those newly constructed between the assembly rework and statc test areas. suggests that Baghdad s preparng to develop systems that are prohbted by the At the Al-Mamoun Sold Rocket Motor Producton Plant and Research, Development, Testng and Evaluaton (RDT&E) Faclty, the raqs, snce the December 1998 departure of nspectors, have rebult structures damaged n the Gulf War and dsmantled by UNSCOM that were orgnally bult to manufacture sold propellant motors for the Badr-2000 program. They also have bult a new buldng and are reconstructng other buldngs orgnally desgned to fll large Badr-2000 motor casngs wth sold propellant.

13 dm Also at al-mamoun, the raqs have rebult two structures used to "mx" sold propellant for - - the Badr-2000 mssle. The new buldngs-about as large as the orgnal ones-are deally suted to house large, UN-prohbted mxers. n fact, the only logcal explanaton for the sze and confguraton of these mxng buldngs s that Lraq ntends to develop longer-range, prohbted mssles. SA-2 (Al Samoud) Engne Test

14 raq: Ballstc-Mssle-Related Facltes TURKEY L, C Y) m- 0 Ca..~~- / SYRA ' j ( Salahsdn SE -.. ( /- 1 Nasser SE 1 bn A1 tfaflharn ,- --, : / /.' 1 A! Anrln. - BAGHDAD D m, ef., v'- 2 : ).:>. /" 21 K"~U SE SE:- -. \ 1 Seddam SE ~adr,+' r :. RAN ' j \ \.. 1, \ - : * 1 '\ h. \., -..! [ -.\ \ \ \. SAU Dl \\.., KUWAT pe;:ra;: j ARABA ' GLJy L 1 j SE - State Establshmant 1 w- --- Dl Canqmpq Cmw.9dff TSOlOJAl(~7: 6-02

15 raq has managed to rebuld and expand ts mssle development nfrastructure under sanctons, suggestng that Baghdad mantans an actve procurement network n support of ts proscrbed programs. raq ntermedares have sought producton technology, machne tools, and raw materals n volaton of the arms embargo. The raqs have completed a new ammonum perchlorate producton plant at Mamoun that supports raq's sold P-opellant mssle program. Ammunton perchlorate s a common oxdzer used n sold propellant mssle motors. Baghdad would not have been able to complete ths faclty wthout help from abroad n August 1995, raq was causht tryng to acqure senstve, proscrbed gudance systems (gyroscopes) for ballstc mssles, demonstratng thal Baghdad has been pursung mss le

16 technology for some tme. lraq offcals admtted that they had receved a smlar shpment earler that year. Unmanned Aeral Vehcle Program and Other Arcraft raq s contnung to develop other platforms capable of delverng chemcal and bologcal agents. mmedately before the Gulf War, Baghdad attempted to convert a MG-21 nto an unmanned aeral vehcle (UAV) to carry spray tanks capable of dspensng chemcal or bologcal agents. UNSCOM assessed that the program to develop the spray system was successful, but the converson of the MG-21 was not. More recently, Baghdad has attempted to convert the L-29 jet traner arcraft nto a UAV that can be ftted wth the CBW spray tanks, most lkely a contnuaton of prevous efforts wth the MG-21. Although much less sophstcated than ballstc mssles as a delvery platform, an arcraft, manned or unmanned, s the most effcent way to dssemnate chemcal and bologcal weapons over a large, dstant area. lraq L-29 UAVTest-Bed Arcraft at Samarra East Arbase lraq already has produced modfed drop-tanks that can dsperse effectvely bologcal or chemcal agents. Before the Gulf war, the raqs successfully expermented wth arcraftmounted spray tanks capable of releasng up to 2,000 lters of an anthrax smulant over a target - area. raq also has modfed successfully commercal crop sprayers and tested them wth an anthrax smulant delvered from helcoptel-s.

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18 Baghdad has a hstory of expermentng wth a varety of unmanned platforms. Lraq's'use of newer, more capable arframes would ncrease range and payload, whle smaller platforms mght be harder to detect and therefore more survvable. Ths capablty represents a serous threat to raq's neghbors and to nternatonal mtary forces n the regon. raq used tactcal fghter arcraft and helcopters to delver chemcal agents, loaded n bombs and rockets, durng the Lran-raq war. Baghdad probably s consderng agan usng manned arcraft as delvery platforms dependng on the operatonal scenaro. Procurement n Support of WMD Programs raq has been able to mport dual-use, WMD-relevant equpment and materal through procurements both wthn and outsde the UN sanctons regme. Baghdad dverts some of the $10 bllon worth of goods now enterng raq every year for humantaran needs to support the mltary and WMD programs nstead. UN montors at raq's borders do not nspect the cargo-worth hundreds of mllons of dollars-that enters raq every year outsde of the Ol-for-Food program; some of these goods clearly support raq's mltary and WMD programs. For example, Baghdad mports fber-optc communcaton systems outsde of UN auspces to support the raq mltary. raq mports goods usng planes, trans, trucks, and shps wthout any type of nternatonal nspectons-n volaton of UN Securty Councl resolutons. Even wthn the UN-authorzed O-for-Food program, Lraqdoes not hde the fact that t wants to purchase mltary and WMD-related goods. For example, Baghdad dverted UN-approved trucks for mltary purposes and constructon equpment to rehabltate WMD-aff~lated facltes, even though these tems were approved only to help the cvlan populaton. On several occasons, raq has asked to purchase goods-such as neutron generators and servo valves-that the UN Montorng, Verfcaton, and nspecton Commsson (UNMOVC) vews as lnchpns for raq prohbted programs; alternatve, non-dual-use tems would serve the stated cvlan purpose. The UN raq Sanctons Commttee dened such sales under the former sanctons regme, and UNMOVC and AEA wll contnue to forward these tems to the Sanctons Commttee for consderaton under the revsed Goods Revew Lst that began 30 May raq has been able to repar modern ndustral machne tools that prevously supported producton of WMD or mssle components and has mported addtonal tools that t may use to reconsttute Baghdad's unconventonal weapons arsenal. UNMOVC began screenng contracts pursuant to UN Securty Councl Resoluton 1284 n December 1999 and snce has dentfed more than 100 contracts contanng dual-use tems as defned n UNSCR 1051 that can be dverted nto WMD programs. UNMOVC also has

19 requested that supplers provde techncal nformaton on hundreds of other goods because of potental dual-use concerns. n many cases, raq has requested technology that clearly exceeds requrements for the stated commercal end-use when t easly could substtute tems that could not be used for WMD. On some UN contracts, Baghdad clamed that the requested goods are desgned to rehabltate facltes-such as the A1 Qa'm phosphate plant and Fallujah-that n the past were used to support both ndustral and WMD programs.