North Korean Nuclear and Missile Programs and Capabilities

Transcription

1 North Korean Nuclear and Missile Programs and Capabilities National Security Agency 6 June 2001 Steve Fetter University of Maryland

2 Origins DPRK nuclear and missile programs began in mid-60s, given higher priority late 70s Initially, substantial assistance from Russia and China Strategic weapons: prevent involvement of US and Japan in a second Korean War US nuclear threat, ROK missile (and nuclear?) programs also factors

3 History of Nuclear Program s Scientists, engineers train in USSR, China Research center established at Yongbyon USSR delivers 2-MW IRT research reactor DPRK separates Pu from IRT fuel IAEA safeguards begin at IRT reactor Construction begins on 20-MW t reactor USSR pressures DPRK to sign NPT 20-MW reactor starts up Construction begins on 200-MW t reactor, reprocessing plant

4 History of Nuclear Program MW t reactor shut down for 70 days Plutonium separated from spent fuel Bush removes tactical nuclear weapons, suspends Team Spirit; JDDKP signed Safeguards agreement signed, six IAEA inspections; discrepancies discovered IAEA requests special inspections DPRK announces withdrawal from NPT US begins negotiations, DPRK suspends withdrawal from NPT

5 History of Nuclear Program MW t reactor shut down and fuel unloaded; IAEA unable to tag selected fuel rods; US moves to impose UN sanctions Carter goes to Pyongyang, secures freeze from Kim Il Sung Agreed Framework: freeze and ultimate dismantling of facilities, spent fuel packaged for removal, full compliance with IAEA safeguards, in exchange for fuel oil, easing of sanctions, normalization, two PWRs

6 North Korean Nuclear Facilities Yongbyon: 3 reactors (IRT, 20 MW t, 200 MW t ), fuel fabrication, plutonium separation Taechon: 800 MW t reactor

7 Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center

8 Original Site: IRT Reactor

9 Concealed Waste Site

10 20-MW t Plutonium Production Reactor

11 Plutonium Production Reactors produce 1 gram Pu per MW t -day! 365 d "! 1g "! kg " kg 20 MW t $ %$ %$ % # 7 & y '& MWtd '& 1000 g ' y ( ) MW t Total kg(pu)/y bombs/y

12 Inside the 20-MW t Reactor

13 Fuel-Fabrication Facility

14 Plutonium Separation Facility

15 Inside the Plutonium Separation Facility

16 Samples Reveal Undeclared Reprocessing DPRK declared reprocessing only one batch of fuel (86 damaged rods of 8000 total) If true, Pu-240 concentration would be constant throughout the process

17 Was the Reactor Reloaded in 1989? Burnup (MWd/t) DPRK declaration reload scenario Plutonium (kg)

18 Suspect Waste Building

19 Possibilities Past Limited reprocessing, small amount of separated Pu Reactor refueled, enough separated Pu for bomb Deliverable bomb completed Future Existing facilities dismantled; spent fuel removed; past resolved Facilities remain frozen; spent fuel stored; threat of restart and completion Spent fuel reprocessed, reactor restarted, other reactors completed

20 DPRK Missile Program Most advanced of emerging missile states Largely indigenous, but significant assistance from Russia, China, and other emerging states Existing threat to South Korea and Japan; possible future threat to United States Chemical warheads, possible biological and nuclear warheads Willingness to exports missiles, production facilities to any buyer: Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Libya, Egypt, UAE, Vietnam, Sudan

21 History: Short-range Scud B Soviets supply FROG missiles Agreement with China, DF61 cancelled Egypt transfers Scud B, DPRK reverseengineers (Hwasong 5) with Chinese help First flight test at Musudan-ri Full-scale production (5-10/mo) Iran buys 100 Scuds, production facilities for $500 million; uses 77 against Iraq

22 History: Extended-range Scud C s Extended-range Scud C (Hwasong 6) developed (lighter frame, payload) to reach all targets in ROK Test at Musudan-ri Full-scale production begins (4-5/mo) Indigenous TEL production, hardened underground bunkers throughout country; sales to UAE, Iran, Syria, possibly Egypt, Vietnam, offered to Sudan

23 History: Medium-range No-dong Scaled-up version of Scud (No-dong) developed to target Japan (with nuclear warhead?) Test failures/cancellations Only test at Musudan-ri, km Full-scale production (2-4/mo) Iran and Pakistan buy No-dong missiles and production facilities Iran tests Shehab, Pakistan tests Ghauri Reports of interest by Egypt, Syria, Libya

24 History: Long-range Taepo-dong 1990s Taepo-dong 1 developed to master staging: No-dong first stage, Scud C second stage Taepo-dong 2 developed to deliver large payload to US bases, territory Reports of Russian, Chinese assistance Mock-ups spotted, launch facility expanded Test of 3-stage SLV at Musudan-ri IC judges Taepo-dong 2 launch possible anytime

25 History: Turn to Diplomacy Perry review; negotiations begin, DPRK suspends missile tests while talks continue Albright trip: end development, testing, and production of long-range missiles, exports of missile technology in exchange for assistance, satellite launch Existing missiles? Facilities? Verification? Bush policy review

26 North Korean Ballistic Missiles

27 North Korean Ballistic Missiles Missile stages range (km) payload (t) status Scud B Scud C IOC 1985/ built; half sold (Iran and Syria) 36 launchers IOC 1993; 6-9 TELs No-dong 1 1, built; third sold to Iran and Pakistan Taepo-dong ,500 4, Aug 98 test Taepo-dong ,000 10,000 10, Not tested; IC believes ready for test in 1999

28 DPRK Missile Range Chart Scud B Scud C No-dong Taepo-dong 2

29 Musudan-ri Launch Facility

30 Musudan-ri Launch Facility

31 Missile Assembly Building

32 Taepo-dong Launch Facility

33 Evolving IC Estimates: NIE 93 At a minimum, North Korea would require nearly 10 years to develop an ICBM capable of delivering a chemical or biological weapon warhead and 10 to 15 years to develop an ICBM to carry a nuclear warhead. However, the probability of North Korean ICBM development is currently low because of competing demands for dwindling resources among existing high priority military programs.

34 Evolving IC Estimates: NIE 95 In the next 15 years no country other than the major declared nuclear powers will develop a ballistic missile that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada. North Korea is developing a missile that could reach Alaska and the far western portion of the Hawaiian Island chain. North Korea is unlikely, in the next 15 years, to obtain the capability to develop and deploy a longer range ICBM capable of reaching the contiguous 48 states. North Korea would have to develop a new propulsion system, improved guidance and control systems, and conduct a flight test program. Meeting these challenges will take time, given the infrastructure of North Korea, and the political and economic situation in the country.we have no evidence that Pyongyang has begun or intends to begin such a program.

35 Gates, GAO Reviews of NIE 95 Gates: The Panel found no evidence of politization; the IC s conclusions with respect to the ICBM threat to the US are based on a stronger evidentiary and technical case than was presented in the Estimate. GAO: The level of certainty was overstated but judgments are consistent with available evidence

36 Rumsfeld Comission (1998) North Korea is working hard on the TD-2. Its status cannot be determined precisely. Once the system is assessed to be ready, a test flight could be conducted within six months. If North Korea judged the test to be a success, the TD-2 could be deployed rapidly. It is unlikely the US would know of such a decision much before the missile was launched. TD-2 could reach major cities and military bases in Alaska and the westernmost islands in Hawaii. Light-weight variations could fly as far as 10,000 km, placing at risk western US territory from Arizona to Wisconsin. These variants would require additional time to develop and test.

37 Evolving IC Estimates: NIE 99 We project that during the next 15 years the US most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea North Korea would view their ICBMs more as strategic weapons of deterrence and coercive diplomacy than as weapons of war. North Korea could convert its TD-1 SLV into an ICBM that could deliver a light payload (sufficient for a biological or chemical weapon) to the US, albeit with inaccuracies that would make hitting large urban targets improbable. North Korea is more likely to weaponize the larger TD-2 as an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload (sufficient for early generation nuclear weapons) to the US. Most analysts believe it could be tested at any time, probably initially as an SLV, unless it is delayed for political reasons.

38 Future Possibilities US-DPRK negotiations continue, culminating in agreement to end missile production, testing, exports in exchange for aid; probably no on-site verification US-DPRK negotiations break down; TD-2 is tested and deployed; agreed framework goes down with it

39 For More Information Albright and O Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (ISIS, 2000). Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, 1998). Bermudez, A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK (CNS, 1999).