Challenges of a New Capability-Based Defense Strategy: Transforming US Strategic Forces. J.D. Crouch II March 5, 2003

Transcription

1 Challenges of a New Capability-Based Defense Strategy: Transforming US Strategic Forces J.D. Crouch II March 5, 2003

2 Current and Future Security Environment Weapons of Mass Destruction Missile Proliferation? The Unexpected Terrorism Uncertain Deterrence Hard Targets Cyber Warfare 2

3 New Environment and the President s Direction Cold War approach to deterrence no longer appropriate End relationship with Russia based on balance of terror Encourage/facilitate Russian cooperation: new framework Deploy lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with the security requirements of the United States, its allies and friends Achieve reductions without requirement for Cold War-style treaties Develop and field missile defenses more capable than the ABM Treaty permitted Place greater emphasis on advanced conventional weapons

4 Transformation of the Department of Defense Shape the changing nature of military competition and cooperation Through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, processes and organizations That exploit our nation s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities To sustain our strategic position, contributing to peace and stability in the world. 4

5 Defense Policy Goals Assure Allies and Friends Credible non-nuclear and nuclear response options support U.S. commitments Defenses protect security partners and power projection forces Second-to-none nuclear capability assures allies and public Dissuade Competitors Diverse portfolio of capabilities denies payoff from competition Non-nuclear strike favors U.S. Infrastructure promises U.S. competitive edge Deter Aggressors Nuclear and non-nuclear options provide tailored deterrent Defenses discourage attack by frustrating adversary s attack plans Infrastructure improves U.S. capabilities to counter emerging threats Defeat Enemies Strike systems can neutralize range of enemy targets Defenses provide protection if deterrence fails 5

6 Capabilities-Based Planning in a New Security Environment Dynamic security environment Threats to US not wholly predictable Capabilities-based planning focuses on the means and how adversaries may fight; not a fixed set of enemies or threats New Triad addresses Uncertainties of Current and Future Security Environment 6

7 The New Capabilities-Based Force Traditional Threat-Based Approach U.S. force size primarily reflected response to a specific threat Nuclear offensive emphasis Some flexibility in planning Missile defense considered impractical and destabilizing Capabilities-Based Approach Capabilities for multiple contingencies & new threats in changing environment Capabilities required not country-specific Maintaining capabilities for unexpected and potential threat contingencies are a priority Reduce risk to nation as reductions occur Includes active defense & non-nuclear capabilities Defenses reduce dependency on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence Non-nuclear strike forces reduce dependency on nuclear forces to provide offensive deterrent Effectiveness depends upon command and control, intelligence and adaptive planning 7

8 Nuclear Posture Review Calls for New Triad Existing Triad Nuclear strike forces: ICBMs, SLBMs, Bombers ICBMs New Triad Strike (non-nuclear and nuclear), defenses, infrastructure; operationally deployed nuclear weapons Strike ICBMs Transition Bombers SLBMs C2, Intelligence & Planning Bombers Threat-based SLBMs Defenses Responsive Infrastructure Capabilities-based 8

9 The Journey to the New Triad 2003 Near Term 2007 Mid Term Long Term START I 6,000 Eliminate Peacekeeper ICBM Four Trident submarines reconfigured No requirement to re-role B-1B for nuclear operations ,800 Operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads = Periodic assessment of International environment, aggregate capabilities, and progress of program ,700-2,200 New Triad Fielded Capabilities Improved Conventional Strike Capability, Missile Defenses, Command, Control, Intelligence, and Planning, Infrastructure 9

10 Transforming Strategic Forces Viewed through the prism of capabilities-based planning: Series of important, early NPR waypoints achieved Moscow Treaty; current & future acquisition programs Development of New Triad Leg: Missile Defense Historic Unified Command Plan Change -- new missions assigned to STRATCOM Global Strike Missile Defense Integration Military Space Missions Command, Control, Communications, Intel integration Information Operations 10

11 Transformation Building the New Triad Non-Nuclear Strike: Improved capabilities against the most demanding target sets Conversion of four Trident submarines to SSGNs Missile Defense: Robust Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation program Deploy limited and effective missile defenses in near-term Command and Control, Intelligence, and Planning: Develop secure, wide-band communications between national decision makers, command centers and operational forces Develop advanced technology programs for intelligence, e.g. for hard and deeply buried targets and mobile targets Upgrade STRATCOM capability for adaptive planning Infrastructure Expand weapon surveillance, life extension, hardening and technology sustainment programs Re-energize R&D and production capabilities for strategic systems 11

12 Illustrative New Triad Leg: Defenses Field modest missile defense capabilities in Build on test-bed activities and testing program 20 Ground-based midcourse interceptors planned Up to 20 Sea-based interceptors; begin upgrades of AEGIS ships Forward based sensors Continued deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) units Add additional capability as threat and technology develop Continue Research, Development and Testing Cooperation with allies and friends 12

13 Illustrative New Triad Leg: Defenses (cont.) No fixed, final architecture Initial capability building on test-bed Integrates new technologies for continuous product improvement Number, type, and location to change over time Modest initial interceptor inventory and investment provides useful defense capability Incorporates warfighter in development and operation Fields capability quickly: employs test assets if necessary 13

14 Enduring Challenges Break down stovepipes, yet preserve expertise Fund New Triad programs through 2012 and beyond Produce and deploy new capabilities being funded Detail work on deployment, concepts of operations Examine additional capabilities for the New Triad as concepts are developed and needs are established Periodic evaluation of international environment will inform decision-making on size and capabilities of the New Triad: Several periodic assessments between now and

15 15

16 Defense Operational Goals Shaping and Directing Transformation Protecting the homeland and other critical bases of operations Denying enemies sanctuary; providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with highvolume precision strike Projecting and sustaining force in distant denied areas Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts Assuring information systems and conducting effective information operations Enhancing the capability of space systems Goals must be integrated into military concepts of operations 16

17 Strategic Command and the New Triad Consolidation of missions under one command is consistent with need for highly-integrated capabilities of New Triad Unified Command Plan changed to give STRATCOM new missions: Global Strike (supporting or lead role) Missile Defense integration (Northern Command defends U.S. territory) Military Space missions Command, Control, Communications, Intel integration 17

18 Over The Past Year Began to implement the Nuclear Posture Review -- Presidential decisions to move ahead with missile defenses -- Moscow Treaty: US operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by Series of planning and acquisition programs to realize the New Triad are in the 2003 and DoD budget. -- Missions & Capabilities of Strategic Command (STRATCOM) aligned with Nuclear Posture Review concepts. 18

19 Security Environment More diverse, unfamiliar, threats (e.g., regional opponents, proliferation of WMD, terrorism) --Surprise likely --Deterrence unpredictable Risks of unexpected crisis and conflicts involving one or a combination of adversaries --Offense alone inadequate for deterrence --Need balance of offense and defense Reassess and adapt strategic concepts and defense policies to reflect fundamental changes 19

20 Security Environment: Yesterday vs. Today Cold War Context Enduring hostility of Soviet Union Known ideological, peer opponent Prolonged conflict, defined blocs, limited number of contingencies Survival stakes New Era Context Multiple potential opponents, sources of conflict, and unprecedented challenges New relationship with Russia Spectrum of contingencies Varying and unequal stakes Implications Emphasis on deterrence Required high confidence Reliance on offensive nuclear forces exclusive of other forces Nuclear planning reflected continuities Threat-based Some flexibility for a few contingencies Arms levels fixed by elaborate treaties; verification Implications Assure, dissuade, deter, defeat Uncertainties of deterrence Synergy of nuclear/non-nuclear & offense/defense Nuclear planning Capabilities-based Greater flexibility for range of contingencies Reductions that preserve flexibility; transparency 20

21 Nuclear Forces and Contingencies Operationally Responsive Deployed Force Capability On Alert (or available within days) Quick (within weeks) Moderate (within months) Lengthy (year or more) ICBMs, SLBMs, Bombers Bombers mated with weapons from Central Storage SLBMs uploaded Upload one ICBM squadron per missile wing per year For Immediate and Unexpected Contingencies For Potential Contingencies 21

22 Sizing the Nuclear Force A new approach to U.S. nuclear requirements to address the spectrum of immediate and potential contingencies Operationally deployed force for immediate and unexpected contingencies Responsive capability for potential contingencies and technical challenges Preplanning is essential for immediate and potential contingencies Goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads by 2012 to meet requirements of new defense policy goals Force sizing not driven by an immediate contingency involving Russia Force structure and downloaded warheads provide responsive capability in near term 22

23 Sizing the Nuclear Force (cont.) Most Nuclear Platforms Maintained; operationally deployed warheads to decrease 500 Minuteman III ICBMs 14 Ohio-class submarines, 12 deployable, each with 24 D5 SLBMs 21 B-2 (16 operational), 76 B-52 (56 operational) Bombers Peacekeeper ICBM eliminated Four Ohio-class submarines reconfigured Initial capabilities will include cruise missiles and special operations forces. 23

24 Nuclear Posture Review: Basics Nuclear Posture Review required by U.S. Congress: Delivered December 2001 Written report from Secretary of Defense Review Co-chaired by senior DoD and DOE officials Constitutes a fundamental review of U.S. nuclear policy Linked to U.S. nuclear force reductions that reflect the changed security environment

25 Conclusions of Nuclear Posture Review Shift from threat-based to capabilities-based planning Reliance on nuclear offense to deter threats is no longer sufficient New Triad is needed: 1. Strike forces including non-nuclear as well as nuclear capabilities. 2. Active and passive defenses. 3. Responsive infrastructure: to enable design, development & production of new capabilities as needed. Effectiveness of New Triad depends on robust Command and Control (C2), improved intelligence, and ability to plan adaptively. The New Triad will provide: flexibility and a broad range of capabilities to meet U.S. defense policy goals assure, dissuade, deter, defend and defeat in a dynamic security environment. Multiple options to mitigate risk from reductions of nuclear forces 25