J}/32) AVCGT SUBJECT, 28 April Combat Operations Atter Action Report (RCS l~cv

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1 AVCGT SUBJECT, Combat Operatons Atter Acton Report (RCS l~cv J}/32) 28 Aprl 1966 {Sre repos tonccl on sevoral occasons usng sortes to move the howtzere wth the remander of,~~ttery personnel and equpment beng moved by 9 CH-47 sortes. A epaoal slng for tho 155= howhzers was fabroated by Support Command, 1st Cavalry Dvson. ~~s capablty permts 155'0 to occupy frng postons that would otherwse be nacoessble. b. Lldvdual and oraw served nght vson devces (Starlght Sccpes) lere used dudng Bon~ Son operatons. The perforlel8j1oe of these devces mat the atand/l.l.'ds foreoast by the new equpment tranns tell.1ll. No sgnfcant problems have been noted and theso devoes are consdered hghly su table for ssue md use by troop unts. ' ' c. Sentry togs have been used foraecurty of, Dvson basel, logstoal areas,to oonserve manpower requrements for many months wth " good result,s. Durng MASHER/WUTll WNG the Dvson request&d support by the Oorps Soout Dog Platoon. nl0se dogs arrved n the Bong Son area. as the oampagn was endng a.nd ware not avalable for use over a long enough perod to prope-r.j.y &Valuate ther effectveness on patrols or ambushes. d. Elttens:b', U',~l was ag~n made of the CV-2 ae:d.al rado rel~ arcraft. The CV-2 rel~ ntally went nto operaton 3 Feb 66 and was avalable for 1565 hours durng the remander of the oampagn. e. On 20 Feb 66 two speoal CH-47 medoal evacuaton mssons were performed uang the ~n-47 host and non-rgd ltter. The non-rgd ltter enables serously ~Ured personnel to be hosted nto a hoverng CH-47 : 'rom 9.11 nacoes6able'10oaton. The 11 tter used' for ths msson s' Ltter, Sem-Rs-d, Po1elos6 FSN , The Medcal Pod (CH-54 Pod converted to a medcal treatmen,t shelter) was employed for the frat tme durng the oampagn by the 15th Medoal Battalon. l f. For the frst tme, rot control l18ent (RCA) 05 was closely ntegrated n a oombat role as an effeotve lmted response weapon. On 4 February, ;00 as grenades were dropped from a hel{)opter dspenser on a suspeoted hosptal looaton to deter~tne by a CS reoonnassanoe whether any VC were present. Upon survellance, no aotvty resulted and the area was entered wth negatve oonta.ot. Had there been enemy, fres were on oall to destroy the floong"'enemy wthouj; further njury to the patents. On the same da.te a heavy ooncentraton of OS was placed on a vllage at DS and loudspeakers wor~ used to nform the people that they were not to fre at heloopters. Ths ended more than two ~s of sporado frngs from ths vllage. n another vllage helborne CS, ooupled wth a masked ground asswllt, aded n the oapture of 17 Vet Oong ~lbpeots wth only one enemy n,jury. Hand grena(les l~e:r.e use(! n a smlar role to olear a cave n the DLACK HORSE area where 4;; vc had been pursued. All 43 departed the cave and were captured, wtth only one beng klled who l:sfused to surrender. CS hand grenl\(l.e,) "C'clre 0,1:10 used thxoughout the op,n:e%on n the search of many hou.see 111:0, ',mn:nelst.) dr.ve personnel from ther hdn{; places and provde an opportunhy t() determne ~lhether '~hey were mer'~ly,o.vlans hdng or were armed VOla. Ths lmted response teohnque undoubtedly resulted n reduong the number of nonoombat deaths n ths hghly po~ulated aremo,, t also greatly shortened the tme for olearance and probably reduced frendly oasualtes. At the non TRANGLE, CS followed mmedately, by artllery and rooket fres was used to drve' the VO rom ther entrenchments and greatly noreased the offeotvenees of the/l.l.'tllery f"1. es. The teohnque prov!,d extremely effeotve and should be oonsdered n the at took of sn;y fortfed area l18a.nat unmasked enemy. A new frst n ths opere.ton was the conduot of armoble a.ssaul tel nto rot oontrol agent areas wth all personnel, noludng plota, l1sked., " o 22 / '.

2 o o AVCGT 28 Aprl 1966 SUBJECT. Combat Operatons After Aoton Report (RCS MACV J}/}2) 12. Commander's Analyss. "'~. Major Resuts of MASHER/WHTE WNG noludeu,,, '. (1) '. n coordnaton wth 1,RV.tl ths nvs~n ~e t possble to return 140,OOOVetnamase togvn control through clearng the enemy from the coastal plan north of Bong Son. So far as,e now know, the GVN, ntends to reestablsh ovl government n ths' area.., (2) nhabtants of the An Lao and Son Long (Km Song) Valleys were gven a ohanoe to be freed of VC domnaton by movng to areas whoh are under government control.. About half the people gven the ohanoe dd leave ther homes and moved to areas oontrolled by the GVN. (}) llnemy unts whch had long threatened Bong Son and Route 1 from ~ Nhon to Bong Son were dealt severe blows n personnel and equpmant losses and n foroed evacuaton of formerly "seoure" base area.s.,ths" Dvson fought all three regments of the Sao VangDvson (the ~et, Chen, the ~et Thang and the ~et Tam). There s sold evdenoe that. ' ths Dvson rendered fve of the nne ba.ttalons of ther three regments nef'feotve, and addtonally, rendered neffeotve the mortar oompany and reoolless rfle oompany of the Q;lyet Thang Regment, and the ant-arcraft oompany and s~al oompany of' the Sao' Vang Dvson. Three f'eld hosptals ~pportng that dvson were oaptured. Speoto losses no1ude.. KA (BC) - 1}42 KA (EST) W! (EST) - 1}48 VCC - 6}} (noludes a battalon commander, mortar oompany oommander, and the exeoutve offoer of a regmental headquarters oompany), ' " VCS Cheu Ho rallers ndvdual weapons - 208, :, Crew served weapons - 52, " (noludes one 105mm howtzer" ten 12. 7mm. and three 50,. ' Cal AA. ma.ohne guns) '. '. Large quant tes ot ammunton of all typanol)ldng.' 126 rounds at 105mm howtzer a.mmul. ton., ",', ' ' Many documents were oaptured (1250 pounds of' whoh 150 pounds promse useful ntellgenoe). ',' Large quant tes of oommun.catons equpment (n- and AK " rados, telephones" wre, ~ado parts, PA lyst,eml!). '. Roe - oaptured end evacuated tor refugees-.9;l,'j;ol),b.,,, ', Salt - oaptured and eva.ouated for refugees' -14 tons. ( ;, L- ~'

3 AVO~ 28 Aprl 1966 SUBJECT, C~mbat Opera.tons After Aoton Report (RCS MACV J~/!;2),. As a result of the severe damage done to ther unts the Sao Yang DvSon oan be expeoted to be ne eotve for a perod of several months. (4) The extended duraton of ths oampagn enabled muoh to.o-. toal ntellgence to be e.ooumulated to support Dvson oombat operatons and provded the bass for hgherheadquaxters.to glean muoh teohnoal and s.tratego ntellgence. The development of the Sao Vang Dvson struoture s a speofo beneft of gusta.ned operatons. The to.otoal ntellgenoe obtaned enabled ths Dvaon to' orent on the ensmy and mantan oontact every d~ for 41 oonseoutve dewfj - an aohevement vrtually unheard of n ths type of war. (5) 'l.'hs Dvson agan demonstrated an ablty to ar assault nto even the most df cul t terral. Ths oapaol ty enabled Dvson unts to surprse ths enell('{ by land:l.ne; l,bove and behldhs hllsde defenses'. The enemy was also suprsed qy the Dvsons oapablty for rapd entry "at wll" lto areas formerly regarded as VO atronsholds.. The demonstraton that formerly eafe havens are not nfe.ct safe may oause the VC to modfy ther hard base system and move more fre~ently. f ths oourss of e.cton s undertaken the enem.v wll faoe norea.sed resupply and assembly probelems as well as becomng more exposed to frendly reoonnassanoe and survellanoe efforts. (6) The. Dvson emplaced artllery (noludns the l55mm howtzer for the frst tme) on hlltops and other normally nacoessble stes to make tube artllery support ocnste.ntj.y" &.valable to nfantry and oavalry unte. (7) Dvson ensneers bult two fns arstrps - one north of Bong Son and one west of Phu C&.t. The new arstrp west of lhu Ca.t wll &Coept C-l;O aroraft. (8) Contnuous psyohologoal operatons were oonduoted whoh produoed.prsoners and Cheu Hos and also kept the nhabtants wthl the opera.tonal areas nformed as to what was happenng and what they should do to av,od harm and to return to government oontrol. The extended duraton of the oa.m:pa.gn. and tho resul t1118 taotcal ntellgence enabled advantages to be taken of "breaks" as they oouurredsuoh as the oapture of key personnel and loss of support faoltes.,, '., " (9) Combat operatons wore oonduoted n a. densely populated area, strongly defended by the VC, wth remarka.bly lttle damage to frendlj or potentally frendly nhabtants of the area. Tls reaul t s.a trbute to the oareful wew n whoh oommanders at all levels explaned and enforoed the rules of engagement anl to' the manner n whoh the ndvdual solder oarred out these dffoult nstruotons.. (10) MASHER/WlTE WNG was hghlghted by oooperaton and ooordnaton between ths Dvson and the ROKs, ARVN, US Navy,' US Marnes, and US Ar Foroe n prolonged and oomplex operatons. Tle.results wll enhaae the oonfdenoe and mutual respeot of oe.ch of these foroes for the other. (11) Ths Dvson kept at least four nfantry ba-ttalons (and sx for tho majorty of.the perod) n sustaned 'operatons for 41. d~s at an averae;e dstanoe from the Dvson An Khebase of. 65 klometers. Battalons and brgades were swtohedwth far less loss of momentum than heretofore and the ene~ was kept undsr oonstant pressure. The DvSon thus lad to rest ~ resdual doubt about an e.1rmo ble 41v:l.son' s abl:l. V to oonduotsusta1red oombat. o... ==_ ~~~~_~ = G... ~.. J... -=

4 AVCGT SUBJECT o o 28 Aprl 1966 Combat Operatons After Aoton Report (RCS 111\.01 J}/)2) b. Lessons Learned.,~~ (1) Experenoe durng 1ASHER/WH'2E WNG ndca.tes the des;!. rablty of provdng a. pla.toon sze force from a. reserve unt n readness to secure downed arcraft pendng completon of arcraft recovery. Ths procedure avods the need to use ground unts havng other ta.sks wth the msson thereby dsruptng operatons alrea.dy n prosress. Ths reserve read,y foroecan be employed as an Eagle Flght or kept on the ground prepared for mmedate take off.' (2) Flush tactos. 'l'hs technque was used effectvely durng the EAGLES CLA.. " acton n the lower Km Song Valley by the 3d Brgade and later the 1st Brgade. About two thrds of the fcrce takes up well concealed ambush pc}stona coverng natural routes n and out of the area. Ths ambush force s postoned by carefully chosen flght routes and deceptve landngs. The ambush force s preparad for 48 hours operatons wthout resupply. The remander of the force lands n the center of the.area and acts as "beaters" movng toward the ambush forces. Based on observed movements away from the beater foroe, artllery and ar nterdoton s used on routes between the beater and ambush foroes at nght. All an example 1/5 Cav: found 8 VCKU, 1 rooket launoher t and two metal oontaners of small arms ammunton on 18 Feb (BR"766747J when movng through a route nterdoted under these oroumstanoes.. (,) Atte.okng g- ound unts oan best explot olose artllery and 'lac Ar support n mountanous terran when dreotons of flght. or ~-target lnes generally parallel the long axs of the objeotvearea (.e~, valley floor or rdge lne). The ground foroe can attack from a dreoton perpendolllar to the ne of flght or fre wth greater safety. Also more of the ordnanoe wllbeexpendsd n the ntended objeotve areas. than when dreoton of flght or frng s "cross",!ompartment. o. Cvl Afrars Aotvty... () The followng s a summary of the 1st Ar Cavalry DVson ovl affars/cvo aoton actvtes oonduoted durng operatons n An Lao end Hoa Nhon dstrots (MASHER and WHTE WNG) and n Hoa An dstrot' (EAGLE'S CLAW), to nolude the BLACK HORSE phase, as of 6 Maroh (a) Refugees n Bong Son pror to the operaton totaled 7,806. As operatons began, approxmately 13,000 war votms moved to Hwy 1. Dstrot offoals ntally permtted 3,400 true refugees to enter Bong Son and kept evaouees north of area DOG. Durng An Lac Valley oparatons, 4,500 refugees moved to Bong Son. Of these, the dvson transported},491 refugees from An La.o Valley by helcopters. At the end of operatons, BOng Sonoontaned 15,8}6 refugees and Kwy 1 north of area DOG oontaned 11,806 evaollees. Koa Nhon Dstrct now oontans a total of 27,652 refugees and evaouees. (b) Refugees n Hoa An Dstrot pror to 11 Feb 66 totaled 7,514. Subsequent operatons freed over 10,000 war votms mestof whom ooollped vaoa.nt buldngs or moved :.l1to homes of frends between area. BRD and Dstrot Headquarters. The Dvson evacuated.,20 refugees by helcopter. A total of 2,876 refugees from the Song Lon Valley moved to secure areas by foot wth ther food supples and personal belongngs. The refugee populaton n Hoa An Dstrot s,presently 17,622..'... (0) n HoaNhon and An Lao. Dstrots' the DVson ~s oaptured Sld evaouated 47 tons of roe and 14 tons ot salt to the Dstrot Headquarters n BOl),g Son. Evacuaton was made by CH..41. a:j,rora.1't. n : >,.. : 25 ".,. '.. ' '.'

5 \. AVCGT '::', 28 A{lrll 1966 s\jbject. Oo~bat Oper stons After AoUon Report' (ROS MAOV J,j,2) Jb.dton a 1!ro-ton oache ot roe wasoaptured d BS 84,097 and dstrbuted tb needy, looal ovlans. '.! (d)' n H~a ~Dstr~t the Dvson oa.ptu:r:ed 42t tons of roo. Twenty and one-half tons of,ths' roe and ten pgs were delvered by heloopter to the Dstrot Heacqu9.l'ters. The remanng 22 tons of roe was evaouated!'rom BR and BR by 900 ovlans actng under orders from the Dstrot Chef. SmaU quant tes of VO medoal supples, text books, and olothng ltere oaptured and presented to VN medoal personnel. (e) Durng sok oall aotvtes n Hoa Nhon and AnLa9 Dstrots, the Dvson treated 2,,62 Vetnamese patents and evacuated 621 serously njured personnel to the Bong Son dspensary. Medoal treatment was provded along Hwy 1 and n ereas adjacent to tactoal operatons, to assst the GVN. Treatment was gven On " oooasons at 19 dfferent loostons. (f) n Hoa An Dstrot a total of 707 patente were treated. Three serously njured patents were evaouated to the dstrot dspensary. Treatment was gven on twelve dfferent oooasons n the vo 'n ty of ereas DUCK and BRD.! (g) Hod Nhon DBtrct ot:fcals, MACV advsors, and 22d ARVN Dvson personnel establshed four ovlan supply dstrbuton 'and medcal ad ponts on Rwy 1 (BS , BS 90}o98"BS , and 13RSeo997). The followng tems were dstrbuted to eva.ouees along Hwy 1 and to refugees from the An Lac Valleys Bulger wheat - 101,876 lbs, oookng ol gal, and oromed mlk oans.' (h) Hoa An Dstrot offoj,als and MACV advsor dstrbuted the followng USAD supples to refugeest 13ulgar wheat - 68,640 lbs, oookng ol - 1,520 gal, and oromed mlk oans. The followng tems were furnshed to,the dstrot headquarters by the DVson for ovo aoton. support of war votmsl blankets - 30, soap - 75 bars, VS magaznes - 200, blue medoal shrts - 120, and blue medcal trousers GVN ovlan supply support of refugees was reduoed beoause the Dstrot Chef permtted refugees to return to ther homes to retreve food and olothng. () 'A total of 75 Oh1eu. Ho s surrendered to GVN offoals, durng operatons n Holl An Dstrot. Of these fve utlzed safe oonduot passesl 50 were VC guerllas! and 25 were nf':r!aatruoture oadre.. (j) Durng operatons n Hoa! Nhon and An Lao Dstrots a,!;otal of 408 Cheu Ho surrendered to GVN offoals. '0 these,' 270 used, l(l~ets to surrender, 302 were VCguerlla.s; and 106 were n!'rastructure,',',cac\l'e. '.' (k), The 401st Soout Oompany, 22d ARVN Dvscn, ~sbsted th~, Dvson n evaouaton of oaptured supples n Hoa Nhon Dstrct by 'fur.nshng 100 solders to secure cache stes and to Back and load supples aboard arcraft. " " (1) The followng short-term, hgh-mpaot projeo'j;s were 'utlzed durng operatons. ' 1. Coordna.ton effeoted wtheod team from 184th, Ord. Bn to remove 500, 250, and 100 pound bombs from neer Vetnamese hamlets, (BS , , and ).,g,. Candy dstrbuted to chldren, '. " 26 o o 'Hl" R' f 'W

6 AVCGT SUllJECT o 28 Aprl 1966 Combat Operatons After Aoton Report (RCS MAW J'5/'52) 1. Engneer unts repared Bona Son atreets and' the. roads lead~ to the three refugee oamps.. dspensary... Water pump nstalled at Hoa Nhon Dstrot 1. vc monumert was destroyed at BS ' Dvhon asssted n obtan.ng Bong Son Catholo prest toperf'rom servoe. forvu cvlans n Hoa An D).atrot. 1. Acton ntated to oonstruot well and latrne n new Bong Son refugee oamp. 8. Unt solatulll oontrbuton, letter of oondolenoe,1 CARE fabro kt, and ooo.~ng ol presented through GVN dstrot offoals to' grandparents of 6 year old Bong Son tra.ffoe votm. ' (m) - n oonjunoton wth GVN offoal, CARE fabro kts and assstanoe n olams form preparaton gven to VN man and grl who reoeved mnor njures n ARA msfre n B.ong Son. (n) Vetnamese wdow, ohld, and relatve esoorted to oemetary n Dvson CP area to permt mournng at husband s grave. (0) Hoa }tnon Dstrot Chef presented 20,000 sheets of leanet pa.per fea.turng GVJ;T nag for use n looal VS Pay Ops program. Assstanoe gven VS n formulaton of speoal news bulletn publshed and dstrbuted n Bong Son area. (p) Gfts of oookng ol, fa.brc t ta, and clothes dstrbuted to 11 Vl~ otzens who forfeted property for forward dvson (J2 area and access roads. Assstance gven n prspare.ton of clams forms 8n4 GVN offcals enoouraged to expedte processng. (2) Conolusj.,)nl These opera.tons have beer.. the frst real test. fo;r: the Dvsol). n contectng mltary opera.tons n a very densely populated area. O.:tr ps.st ('Operatons were prmarl;;r n u.rdn!hl.b ted or sparsely settled lloxeas, where our concern was almost ex elusvely on kllng. ve. Durng present operaton a there we:te three major l?~'oblems antcpated, all of whoh dd n fact requre massve efforts to solve. Mnmzng non-combatant casualtes... ofrefu8ees. Control, segregaton and handlng of large numbers (0) Evacuaton of oaptured supples. By careful pror plannng and team work wth all GVN,. U.S. ovlan and U.S. mltary organzatons we feel we have sucoessfully met the problems, each of whoh was as serous as antopa.ted. d. Pay Wn' Actvtes. (1) Non-oombatants. Advanoe nformaton pror to Mt.SH!<JR/ WHTE lojng ndoated that a hostle or non-cooperatve atttude shollld be expeoted n areas long under VC domnaton suohas An Lac Valley, K.m Song ' Valley, and the northern porton of the ooastal plan. ~ha foreoast was not borne out durng aotllal operatons. The atttllde of the popula1;on has been favorable.to GVN but dreotly proportonal to the status of '----~'

7 , '...,.. AVCcr.r Sl1BJECTa.. Combat, ' '.. 28 Aprll 1966 Operatons After Aoton Report' (ReS MA.CVJ"}/}2).,.', ' f'ghtns troops n oontact wth the populaton. Whon US Foroos move nto an are9-, the people expoot t.o reoeve benefts and proteoton, oonsequ.ont.- 1Y' thoy' rooprooatew th nformaton and tend to de:n,y the 'lnajvo food and shelter. Whllll the US Foroes start to lea.veorwhentbe popula.ton deteots, &. reduoton.,n frendly' strength the n.forma..toll flow s redu.oed. (2) llln,omy oomba.tants. (a.) Th~ NVAjVO have beoo~eetea.dly tlloro responsve to the Psy War effort. Ths WM related. to the sta.tus of food, oa.sua.l.tes, sokness, and fghtng oapa,bj. ty of the enemy.. At the begnnng of Operaton MASHER the Cheu Ho's were looal foroe va but l.s the ensmy un ts were chaaed, bea.ten, and harr&.ssed, a. number of 'NA. oad-e surrendo:t'ed ra.ther than d1ns. ' Durng' the fnal 10 davrs of Feb, ~rva of:t.'oers and enlsted men ralled wth! safe oonduot passee. Fear,Of. art. l.leryll.'ld. Lr. at,ta. oke we.a frequen.tl;r Jllell-. \1 toned by oa.ptured persomlal<, Ths ll sgnfoant snce these rall1ars. he.ve ndoated the VC orders are to shoot any who attempt to rally.. The.. 'NA rall.ers are oon'us(1dand openlt state tb.at. thgy'woretold ther. \»non \1.. waa to free the. people rut thlly' see that the Vetlamesepeople are onjoy1.!l... a roasonably. good lfe now.. ", ' 'j...'...\'., 1 '! f (b) However, the problem of largs scale defeoton or rallyng lj stll to be sol',~d. The rallel's have been 1nd,vduall to date, and although thoy hcxvs ro$ly gven muoh.valu!tbl~l hso:cmaton and reoorded loudspea~.~(:)r t"plhl oxhor'~:~ng ther oomrades to l'()~ly by na..'le, only ndvduals have reapond,(jdre~dl$sel of ther oond t.on. Some thememuat be developed n ooordnatonw1th tactoal operatons th~t wll trke.tho rght reelponse n these 'people so' that the Ch'll Ho pr,;,gramwll norell.se.!rom a trokle ot ndvduals to e. flov of NVA. unts;. VlWous themes are beng worked on n olosa ooordnaton wth ta.otoal,0p@l;.t:l.ons w:l. th ths objeotve n mnd.. (~) Psy War Organzaton. (a) lloth. the 24th.and 245th Psy Wt\1:' Dstf'.ehments were deaotvated.durng Feb and the 245th Psy Ops Co was t'o:rmed at F.b'ORCE'/, NL\. TRANG.. The. total su.pport ava:l.la.blew the Dvson dd not olur.nge, t s normally' one }-man le loudspeaker team for oper&tonswth the Dvson's 8 m.anet1var battalon",. Ths foroe s /Xl8llented w tl, up to three addtonal. HE tea.ms as other ~jor Corps tactoal unts release,ther at.tached teams when thlly' ~enot'oollllll tted on opere.tolllo.. (b) n addton, and n,oonjunoton w ththe FPORCEV Psy Op offoer, tl),o USAF 5th Ar Commando Sqdn furnshsd & 10udsp!.\ll\ker, equpped U-O arora.ft wth crew. Ths llrora:ft was avalable d.urng the entre Bong Son oampagn exoept for short por1ods when t nae beng. exohe.nged. Dur:tng three perods, t wa.e augmented wth a.lleoond U-O aroraft.. (0) The Dv Pey Op' Offoer ooordnated mssons ~re.ot17 wth WORCEV by Op repreo$ll.tatveewho utllzedtho a.~vereoouroefj to.. acoomplsh tho requgoted mbso'lllo n addton WO).\OEV noooll'plahel other ARVN, and US Marne mssons wth the 83lle aroraft'"...,. J ' ~, (4) Psy W~Operjl.tons o. PSY'Op. >lannng \t,a olosely qoordnatr wth the tactoal opera.tonao.'.... (8.) J>W:ong atrkee' onpopule.tederee.a from whoh arcraft, reoeve fre, there were th:ee Phaseaotwml:\.nga.,''',.' ': <, ', ',,

8 ' " ~VOGT SU:BJEOT. " 28 Apr:.l 1966 Oqmbat Operatons Atter Aoton Report, (ROS MAOV J3/32) l 1. 'Warnng phase whoh oonssted,of'both loudspeaker,and leafetmessages warnng the populaton about frng on aroraft. Refer lto tem 1, nolosure, 4.,, ' t,,the Evaouaton Phase,n whoh both loudspeaker and leanet messages told the people that fre oontnued to be reoeved land the.t the VO n the vllages would be attaoked. The non-oombatants were' 'advsed to move to a specfo safe looaton. tem 2, 3, }a, of nolosure5. l. Aftsr the strke a loudspeaker message advsed the non-oombatants that the VO were responsble for the attack on the vllage.,~[em 4, 5, of nolosure 4. ', " ', ", " (b) The 1oudspeakeraroraft m~n tored the artllery d Ar Foroe fre, nets and was n a poston mme,de. te13 after a. strke ~o drop, safe oonduot passes, leaflets and broadoast a rally message. tem' 6, nolosure 4. (' '" '(0)", 'Whenever. a Cbeu Ho was nterrogatect and VOlunteered slbatements, the Pay Op porsonnel :tn oonjunoton wth the Jl.SPAO representatves taped e.r approprate rally messat)e. Ths lsted oomrade,' names and the msson was flown over known enemy 10oatons.Speofo :rally nstruotons were noluded. tem 7, 7a, 8, 9, nolosure 4. ' (d)~ght as well as dblf mssons were ooordnated to ephanoe the supersttous belefs of the enemy.,' Funeral drges and werd walng broadoast were plblfed over an area after a perod of he~y oontact. EmphasS was plaoed on VO dead not reoevng proper bural. tem 6, nolosure 4. (8), Pay Cp mssons were utlzed as part of deoepton programs to dreot the enemy attenton a.we;y from proposed opere.t5.onal areas. An effeotve approaohe was to drop "Don't Fre a.t Arora.ft" leaflets n an: area n oonjuncton wth an H& program and Cavalry Squadron opera.tons to foous the enemy's attenton awe;y from the area n whoh operatons ~,ere planned. tem 1, 2, },nclosure 4.' ' ". (f) Non-oomba.te.!lta were urged to deny the VC food, shel tel', and other help as frendly troops moved nto an area. Ths was olosely ooordnated wth ovo acton mssons of sok oall and refugee movement. tem 10, 11, 12, nclosure 4. (4) Psy Ops Ground Team Aotvtes (a) Loudspeaker surrender and demoralzaton broadoast were oonduoted n dreot suppor~ of sweep operatons. (b) Concr:ol of ovlans durng SSll'ch and:lestroy operatons was aocomplshed to reduoe ovlan oasual tes by c1lounong nstruotons before an~ durng operatons.,., (0) nterrogaton of VCC and VCS was made to obtan ~edate tactoal OB, VC troop envronment, VC troop looatons, and, other nformaton neoessary for subsequent lea.flet and. loudspeaker operatons., ".'

9 ,A.VCGT SUBJECT,, 28 Aprl 1966 Combat Operatons Af'cor Aoton Report (RCS MACV J}/~2) (f) The, teams persuaded ovlans to lead combat patrola to guerlla hdeouts resultng n ap~rehonso,n of 16 VCS and removal of 76 women and ohldren from mowltans. ~Coordnates BS 7208).,,(S),Battalon commanders were, provded wth mmedate ene~ OB learned durng nterrogatons.. (h) A team requested and reoeved demoltons to destroy VC monuments as a part of ovla ndootrnaton program. An Do (1) (BS 8520).,,. () The teams oontnously helped dentf,r. nterrogate,, prooess and,oontrol VCS durng all operatons. (j) Cvlans were oontrolled and nstruoted durng stato stuatons. (k), The CheuRo program was advertsed. ~eo. money for weapons. resettlement program. tem'14. nolosure 4. ' (5) Th,) followr4':( Psy Ops performance data ndcate that soope ' of the 1st Cavalry Dvson Pay Ops effort n the Bong Son area. durng Feb 66 (a).91 loudspeaker msdons were flown. The total speaker,) tme was 62 hours and'45 mnutes. (Representa.tve examples of sx loudspeaker tapes whch were reoorded end broadoast by thshq, durng Feb are lsted as teme 1,thru 6, nolosure 4.. (b) 72 lee.net mssons were flown. A total of }.4l~.OOO leaflets were dstrbuted n the Bong Son Campagn"area. lb;amples of message' are lsted as tems 7 thru 14. nolosure 4. (0) There were 54 HE loudspeaker tewn djl,ys n support of the 1st Cavalry Dvson s Bong Son Campagn durng Feb. (6) Vsble results ot Psy Ope support are not as readly reoorded as othertorms of support tor <;\ombat operatons and ther mpact rqllla.ns largely a matter of judgemen't wth regard to each operaton. n add ton the rebul tb of ths support oan be ganed by any frendly unts n the area~and oan extend.past the termnaton ot feld operatons by the unt ntatng the Psy'War actvty. 'Some specfo reaults that are known to, have rgsulted from the DVson Pay Ops effort ncludes. r,. ".,,, 1.1! : 11 l, f t (a) A total of 485 Chou'Ho's have been reoodded thru all avalable sources through 6 Mar. Of these 'over 270 had safe oonduot passes. All state they heard ths loudspaaker broadoasts. ~denoe ot la- tent streot of Psy War actvty s refleoted by QVN reports of 115 addtonal: Cheu Ho s n the Bong, Son area. durng the week followng termna.ton ot ' Operaton \ol!te WlrG. Moat of these returnees had leaflets or stated they had heard the louds)loaker a.ppeal::: or both. (b) n coordnaton wth G-5, 10udspull,ker messac:es were' broadoast to non-oombatants warnng them to move out of a populated areas from,whch we were reoevng fre and where we were plannng fl'es. n such oases, the value Ot the Pay War P'Ob'lZlJOan hardly be ev,a.lua.ted snoe t s' the absenoe ot non-oombant oasual tes whch s, the result. However. ther!, are the 'tangble etfeqts observed from loudspeaker mssons n :whoh the,ovlans are moved to an area by loudspeaker 'alone for screenng, sok, oall and subsequent ref\.18ee movement. Over ref\.18eas responded to suoh, appeals. ',,h, /"-\..

10 a. A nnth nfant~y battalon be added to the Armoble Dvoon to provde norea.sed" "antry strength and flexblty/or operatons n Vetnam. Justfoll.t<... for e..n addtonal nfantry bat...on noludesl (1) A two battelon brgade cannot manta.n a sgnfoant reserve prepared for mmedate oomm tment. Frequent opportuntes aree to deos!:vely engage small VC groupe provded the requred troopa oan be 'postoned on the ground. wthul a perod of a few mnutes. ' (2)' Durng 'ASHER/WHTE lyng ths Dvson was fortunate n beng a.ble to depend on ROK or 22d ARVN Dvson elemen'l;s to provde 8aourty for arcra.ft bases, forward supply ponts and oomma.nd posts. Some oombat power must be devoted to ths purpose when,these oondtons do not exst. (:;) At th,) tme t'.13 nfantry battalons. are requred. for Dvson ba.se defenol and ~'J'oa opera.tons. (4) Reserve/reaoton foroes requred. by hgher headquarters (one or two battalons) muet neoessarly be desgnated 'rom those n the area. of operatons thus restrotng ther 'reedom of employment n the operatonal area. b. Ths DVson s authorzsd 60 ~VN NCp nt~rpreters. Of ths number an avarage of 52 has been present for duty oonsderng leaves and other absenoes. Dvson G2 and 191st,M Det have a oontnung prorty requrement for 16 nterpreters to support prsoner nterrogaton and. dooument translaton reqllremtlntl:l.' The rema.nng nterpreters are so few that they oannot be assgned lower than nfantry battalon level. R~ports from all oomb!'t operatons of ths 'Dvson have oonsetontly noted. a requrement for an llterpreter at company level for mmedate questonng of vec and. suspeots as well as ssung nstructons to noncombants. Ths Dvson has submtted three letter requests for authorzaton of 45 addtonal ARVN NCO nterpreters for a total of 105 for the Dvson. The shortage of nterpreters s understood here but the urgenoy of ths requrement oannotba overstated., l, -, o. Durng Opsraton MASRER/WTE WNG (25 Jan - 28 Feb 66) Dvson ) msson ready arcraft a.veraged 62.4 peroent and the average ED!' was 15.1' percent (both averages lloluds float aroraft). l'..a.jor tems oausng the' /' hgh EDP were OH-l; bearngs, engnes, and transmssons. U'H-l man rotor blades, engnes and transmssons; and CH-47 fol:'l1a.rd and aft oontrols, t blades, and 'transmsson. Aoton was taken early n Feb, to mprove the 1 Dvsons aroraft parts st~,tuaby dspatchng a Dv~.son a.nd USARV representatve to CONUS to 1'l::' zero balanoe tems of the arcraft parts!sl., As a result of th.e speoal effort parts were shpped :L'rom comrs begnnng '[ 25 Feb and began to arrve at An Che oommenong 2 Mar 66. Ths speoal ' ' [ -nt.!!

11 AVCGT SUBJECT. '. 28 Aprl 1966' Combat Operatons After Acton Report (RCS MACV J~/~2) prooedure wll greatly assst the Dvson's aroraft parts status over the next two 01' three montha. However, t s mportlult that oontnung attenton be plaoed on establshng an arcraft repar parts supply system that wll provde a dependable response to routne arcraft parts requs:.tons... FQR THE COMMANDER., 4 no1osures 15 Overlay!!;,';.; 6 Aeral Photographs,...,":',,',' '" --; ~ "~'. "':; ':,U" 't.1-,-" :; ':';_: {, ',"\:..;'.' r,' \:'-,:-'::,.!';'~;~',:.L'('~;'t, 1';0',:(':1 ~j)l- MALCOLM R. BAER LtCo1, AGC Adjutant General',. j,. u: ". :';,'\:'(;/: '~:;~;\ ::;$;' 1::"-"'[ S \, X;~Jr:(,'. \!., '! '.,, r..y,,:; ;;' J. },;CJ/ $ ~;',:';. ',~;t!.! '. ~. f t,..,' ",> r ( " '..~,,< [ \!,,.,!

12 .~ TEASE (24-27 Jan) rl'.:sfts OF Sc~ CA7ALRY DVTSCF l'er,t;l m!ehy LOSSES P ASE 'U~Sl; 'F?".ASB V (28Jal_~::.l!eb).--l4-:::.J.O Fe~L.. J..1.L-: J6 Feb) P?.l.. SE V' ~ - 6 l<tatj. l9ta1_-,:d. (Be)' KA (l?st) F} "l '/ WJ.A (EST) vee vcs nd v ~lpns 2 Cre" Ser:ved fpns FEt!Pb': LOSSBS EA (Hote 1) ('" t \.1"0 e 2) 228 (l1ote 1-2) WA 2 ~ "~_/!la NOTE 1 _ 'ne ~'12Se.tmtel of 119 ncludes 42 vso!'. per Oru"Jel klled n a 8-P3 crash 25 Jan _ Four USP.F ore\{ me;nbers,tere klled n. the C-123 orash 25 Jan 66 and two USAF FAC' s t'lere klled n an 0-1 omsh 2 Har 66. USAF 10sseo are not XlCluded n the ta':>ulatfon above., rl rl rl () ~-'~.-'.. ~~-~---~.- H

13 1ST Alt C.W(JTO'l'E 1) AltVlr(rO'l'E 1) RCK (M)'l'E 1)' KA (Be) 1:1 ;!-: :/'t ',.. H E'l ~() ~1 H E--t c.' ".l,q t',",:1 ~ f:r.l H f~ c~ ~;! [-' () _'l" t:! t;1 7j] S? c:j ";" r, ~.", H,,'.. '0< Gl.,\tl,'~ C:.; ~: ~~ :-:'! P ;; t:: :! -'".' t-! TGTAL J XA C'ST),-~90 1) ) )5 F.> 2:) O~," ::0 7<1 1529,, 30." ~) VGG 2~ ;:> (,1 70S 459,;28 J.Ol7 30 :'17 ;' ~ 24 G ?89,. ) ( :.,...,. [' S1 "... '. 105run Eow 1- (llepro:'cnts reoovery of an AR'll! 105'"" How - tds w-::enon was recovered ~13 sepprate parts ann, "taa 6 not n,ojg.'f!1<le condton).. ' rdn 91 rds 172 rrls 22 rr'.s ' ',' : 860,,. ' 28,600 rds olodcne Documents l'asters 39 boxes 1,250 1ba 41,800 lwte 1-1st Cav D v totals are through' 6 11ar Feb f6. AllYN and ROK totals are 1 nol l 2

14 ~.. -., ( l~t CAVALRY DVSON T<lflAL AtG lw"j: 11SSONS ANl SORT.&ll 25 Jan a.r NSSONS UH-l 32,)46.OH-13 6,457 CH-47 4,1,1 SO~ES UH-l 59,272 9,156 5,957 TJlvE UH,..l 19,371 hours OR-, 4,462: CR-47 2, , '

15 " " 1ST CAVALRY DVSON AVATON/COMBAT AlMS SUPPORT STATSTCS 1.! PHASE and n (24 Jan - ; Feb). 9.0' Total n! lln's arlfted - 17 bel Total Arty lltr,ya arlfted - 10, ' ' c. Total TollS Cargo Arlfted - ;,;92.9., a.., Total Passengers Arlf ted - 24, PHASE (4 Feb - 10 Feb) a.1 Total nf llna Arlfted. -10 b.l Total Arty Btrys Arlfted - 22 ~'.! Total TollS Cargo Arlfted - 1,875. d. Total Passengers Arlfted - 16,164 ;. PHASE V ( Feb) a. Total nf llna Arlfted - ;9 b. Total Arty lltrys Arlfted - 2} c. Total Tons Cargo Arlfted. - ;,971 a.. Total Passengers Arlfted - ~7.0n 4. PRASE V (1-6 Mar) a., Total nf 11M Arlfted - 12: b:.l Total Arty ltr,ys Arlfted -0 o. Total Tons Cargo Arlfted -462 d.l Total Passengers Arlfted - 15, Campagn Totals (25 Jan - 6 Mar) a.) Total nt Bns Arl:. ted - 78 : b., Total Arty :Btr,ys Arlfted :.1 Total Tons Cargo Arlfted :, d., Total Passengers Arlfted - 9},;51 ncj. 1.4-!, " W, " " ",,,!; \.,,~ -.; : " '

16 PHASE (25-27 Jan) A. Aroraft ht '" 21 r', B. Casualt.ell = 1 KA ( W! C. Arcr.ft shet dewn.. 1 D. Alttudc of arcraft shet clewn - betwcen 100 and, 500'.. E;, A:cvcraft le3t.. 1, PHASE (28 Jan thru.3 Feb) A. Arcraft ht ". 91 B. Ca.3~te3 '" 3 KA 23 WA C. Arcraft shot down '" 6 D. Alttudes of arcraft shot dewn: 5 between 0 and 100' 1 between 100 and 500' E. Aroraft rccovere& = 5 ( 1 not reparable) F. Arcraft le~t = 2 PHASE (4 thru 10 Feb). A. Arcraft ht..,17' '''.', B. Eaaualte!!= 5 'A. C. Ar'Craft shot down =1 D. Aroraft. recovered" 1 '. E. Alttude of arcraft shot down.~ ', PHAsE V ( 11 thru 28 Fob) A. Arcraft ht.. 99.B. Casuutes '" 2 KA 21 WA. C. Arcraft shot down D. Alttudes at whoh sll.ot down to E. Aroraft recovered.. 5..F. Arcraft lost'" 1 PHASE V (1 thru 6 Mar). A. Arcraft ht == 7 B~ Casualtes =2 WA. C, Arcraft shot down" 0 TOTW): A. Al'craft ht B. Ca!!uUtes,. 6 KA and 55 WA C.' Arcraft shot down == 14. D. Aroraft recovered" 11 E. Arcraft lost...3 F. Alttu.es of arcraft shot down: 5 between 0-100' 9 between l~ and 500'. ' \ j, r : ' :, ",..' :.,,~ ~'.... \

17 \ ',! 1, +6S' 80 ~, \. "! ~, Company C, n three lfts, ha ts t.rst lft dropped nto LZ 4 at 0825 hours, and the t.nal lft was, dropped at 0845 hours. Some small arms, fre was reoeved b,y aroraft on atl thrse lfts as the aroraft were on fnal. However, no fre was reoeed by ether Company C or the a.roraft on the ground. Company C wasaep~at~d"1:~~,four separated groups approxmately loco meters from NW to SE.As the company attempted to regroup at 0851 houre, snper fre ands61l1~ :Jllortar;fre was reoeved by Compsny C. :em:!~~~r:re was from ~~ s~~~~1,('c~~~7c remaned separat~d and unable Company A (oonsstng of only 2 rfle platoons - a.r orash of 25 Jsn 66) departed LZ 2, 'shown as poston at 0900 hours. The msson was to sweep areas between LZ 2 and LZ 4 wth destnaton beng at LZ 4. By approxmately 0945 hours Oompany A reached post~on 2 and could observe t)'le a.rea of LZ 4. "Company A oontnued to move w thou enemy oontact to poston ~ where t made rado oontaot and smoke dentt.oaton wth an element of Company C., ' ',., ' 1

18 --.-~~.. ~---~ ~-._-._.--._._. - 1ST CAVALRY DVSON ~- ~-~ -=-= ~LLERY TOTAL ~ONS AND ROUNm FRED < TYPE RDS 105 How How Phase (25-27 Jan) Mans/Rds 343/1955 Phase Phase Phase V Phase V (28 Jan-3 Feb) (4-10 Feb) (11-17 Feb) (1-6 14aroh) TOTAL ~1snsLRds 'lsnslrds MslS l Rd'! Nsn~M~_ ~... ~ J1slBjRds 824/28, /16, /21, / / /6, / /2' / /11990, 8" Eow 60/ /2, / / / / _ How 10/20 10/59 200/ /523 0/0 447/1, mm RXT 87/ / / /12,270 20/ /24851 RESULTS uf A..'1T11ERY FRE ~ Phase Phase :Phase Phase V Phase V TOTAL KA (BC) TuteLAR! 2/3 18/300 20/2 1l?/6' 0l!L 152/170 KA (EST) TubeLARA WA (EST) ~belar! 8/46 6/29 80/51 44/18 11/7 3/0 128/1~1 9/ /0 227/235 62/57,"C' _.s. 1 6.L ~-~-.

19 ~~~~-~' ~,,,,, ~.-..."- ~,~ "--'N ',-".'.. -.,' ~, ' -." '.~. m 1J~.. \ll T AC AR ~U::-'1jY.w..~y HUJ:lber Sortes- 'l'0ks _{)}"1- -{)lujk~\\;e~xa~n)jed ~D~.U~ L- 1? O:,~1l Gl-' l?g.'les N.Ar ALH J<'RAG.!'..!;"{t;= ~:!';;':::'\;",'L!::T~S~ -< ~ Jen 66 8 NO HS~uNS 26 Jan Jan :tructures des.troyed 5 Structures destroya 2 8tructures dama~d 28 Jan Jan /' Structures destroyed 8 :trllctures dama~d 1 Secondary Bxploson 50 VO KllA (Est) 0 " 30 Jan :tructures destroyed 75 Structures dam~d 2 ~econdayj BxplosXn 31 Jan X,- Fsns destroyed 2 SruaJ;'ans destroyed 30 Structures destroyed 25 ~tructures o..aru.aged 12 KBA (!>st) 1 Feb Structures destroyed 21.:3 trt.;c ture s dar"a~d 5 bun~ers destroyed 1 Secondary ~x~loson n.... -V 2 Feb Feb ~'. o, Bunkers Destrvyed... 5 :truc~ures destroyed 3 Structures damaged 1 bunker damaged 1 bunker destroyed 1 Jecondary Exploson 6-8 l':8a (Est)

20 -----~ "-----~ "'=----~. ---~ !CT1:.ERY DSLAC:l rr cl'rs -- Phase }'1oase Phase Btry :'!oves b:v J\r* e Btr;rs l'~ves 17 ~ -- 5 by Ground Phase V" Phase Y o 17 *Z?'.ch Bat~er::~ move av!?rages 12 so~(tles per battery 0-

21 "'"' 'V r) , -.;; f- r "'--mw~--'- '~ r < - ( 1 "eame-? ~, F' W"'-nktlXb"t-M" 'r ~~'t: ;tff)&5'tw r j:'" po<&t -trc -e'f '""-C-- 71,-" --3)' fyt' rzj-),{ '--m~ "'-f-t~-~~y:w ' '-ff -;. n " -t' -<trw ( "z.~ r-= =-=-~ --'-- --:-: = '----~~-.-"--~ _._ :ro}lber SORTES TONS OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED DATE FLOW GP BOMBS NAPALM FRAG WP RESUlJ'S 21 Feb } } hut destroyed 5 cow KBA e.. 28 Feb buts destroyed 20 buts damaged 1 Mar O.}.4 Bomb damage assessment 2 for 1-4 Mar was 90 percent Mar target coverage. No other } Mar 66 results reported. 28 2l.} Mar Mar Mar 66 0 T<J.ULS (Note 1) 0 Note 1 - For the perod 18 Feb - 28 Feb a separate record was not kept at Frag and WP. t s estmated that 18 tona of the toal Frag expended for ths perod was actually \o"po'

22 , DAT3 4 Feb 66 lt'hb:<:r SORTES FLef)}: 8 TeES c? cad: :AY C 1.'; z:~r!:"~ded OF 3OJ.ffS "l,h.lh FP-.G '.' R::!SlLTS ~ Structu.re cestroyec 2 Eunker3 de8t.':'o~,red 5 Feb (, feb (6 7 F8-~~ 66 3 F0~) :;6 "_.LL 10 6 H-3,- )-..;~::; c_:~: -C.' ~l LZD -'r~-', ljuj::. 'C,r.:,.:,_?-:Z~ l.~l St:rruJ-! :,~:"'':: ~ r1::;:~~_ro;recl- ~~8 S~~:~~t ~.~::_ e.;;tr0~,~:d o 100 :::e-~0r -:; cf t: <3::'::'01:. 4s--.:t::'c.:.~-;d Y0G 1:;6 10 )0:; ~'.O 1.0:';.l.o 1 1 j-:r_.. et::.:~ '?.. H:. t::,~cy8d --: ::>'.:1J-;:-e:: :~, :: ::ttc-;:',::d 1 "....b,-'._, " ( Sf't "'-) 10 Feb ;'. '\..,... t-;cj 6~: '{~.t: StT11.Ctt:"-'_>t~:~ dcstroyec. 18 Str'v.c"';-'.:.:'e~~ l::-!j.18.ged 1 Secor...:'.a:':'Y e~loson 12 Feb '; S~.ructu-'C'L dest:royed 10 S-1.T'; ~.t""~':"< r,...,'!"'~:-ed R ~;'.-(~ ;~~~: ~~... a:j'"\ ~~ '" "-"-",L C~ e 13 Feb z.O.4 1 StructUJ."s8 de3troyed 1 Structure -da4:&.ged -~-----~~ ---,---, =-~-~=. -~-J "'"<h" $.,.- «: '''''%?: ""!'.,5"40)1!S.y_k.p:~"t.,"'<_:"AL?:'$;:s,-C:a._ ~-._.;:::'9,.k#"".. j,~_,";-4..",,".:: o-...",,::~,.. ",.-":: ".keg. _z~ '*.3.,%.,4.<,;.<.$OJ:.d-;3? 4t ;Q.#,,.,..-?SJ,4-lJjXP\4\J1::;:e;;,WA. _8L.~...,2'"

23 .?,r T ~ "Me nz 1 tk r EX r -Z$'TX" 3 - "Sf -t' '0 - -&'-"X e $ 'f' -~s "#-1" > rldt.'.,,... - ;',, ""?? b- Vt '4' 1:',.;;. ',w;--j'~.:~ lo~~ ~~ul'3tj'r SOhT~~- ~CCNS OF (jm:-' ~:2-'-C'S EX! E!';'DZD DA. ~?,s FLO'-:N G' EOl>'13S J':A}AU1 F!tf;.G 14 Feb Feb Feb Feb \;? RESULTS -~------~-" 4 Struc tureb. d.estroyed. 25 Stl."'l;.ct:J.res "destroyed 10 Structures t;rt...aged 7 KBA (est) 10 Foxho}~es destroyed 6 Struot~es destroyed 2 Strncture8 d~aged ~ 18?eb', (; Pel: :) Feb Feb KB.l1. 4 huts,estroyed 6 KRl (est) 1 KBA 10 "", ~.._ ( 'V~).. <... u )' 2- huto ('8(;.c.ged G 22 Feb Feb Peb Feb ~ Feb KS.'l. 6 huts '~e3t.:'oyed 39 huts de: t=yed 5 huts damaged 5 KBA. 4 huts damased 5 -hut;:; d,8stroyed 24 b te destrc;'ed 12 huts dens.eed 1 8sco!!d~'!r;;- e:::;.,loc.cn