1 Introduction to ITC-26. Introduction to the ITC and DEPO. October 24 November 11, 2016 Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA Greg Baum

Transcription

1 Introduction to the ITC and DEPO October 24 November 11, 2016 Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA Greg Baum L2 Learning Objectives After completing this module, you should be able to: Recognize the basic goal and structure of ITC List the objectives of a State s physical protection regime List the three basic steps in the Design and Evaluation Process Outline (DEPO) Identify the fundamental approach used in ITC to design and evaluate PPS 2 Page 1

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3 Course Goal At the end of this training course, participants will be able to: Apply the principles of a performance-based methodology to design and evaluate a physical protection system (PPS) for nuclear facilities and materials against the threat of theft or sabotage Principles and methods are taught in each subject module Learning objectives and daily quizzes focus on these principles and methods 3 Course Structure The course consists of: Lecture sessions (30) Subgroup exercise sessions (20) Application of lecture material through practical exercises Final exercise is a comprehensive design and evaluation problem Field trips for equipment demonstration, performance testing, and implementation examples Guest lectures Physical protection in the US and other countries 4 Page 2

4 Course Sections I. Defining Physical Protection System Requirements (Define) II. Designing a Physical Protection System (Design) III. Evaluating the Physical Protection System Design (Evaluation) IV. Guest Lectures and Supporting Information Hypothetical Facility and Exercise Data 5 L5 Course Sections Each section in the red-green-blue menu is a subject module that has 3 subsections: Copy of viewgraphs from lectures Subgroup exercises Text with additional information Hypothetical Facility and Exercise Data are used in all subgroup exercises You will receive copies of the guest lectures later in ITC 6 Page 3

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6 Typical Daily Activities at ITC Breakfast Review of previous day s lessons Review of current day s schedule Lecture Subgroup Lunch Lecture Subgroup Module evaluation Participant quiz 7 Module Evaluation The daily questionnaire helps us determine if the material that we have presented to you is useful. The questions will relate to the questions below: Was the material clear and understandable? Was the instructor clear and understandable? Was the subject valuable to your work? Survey evaluations can be found under each module on the ITC App 8 Page 4

7 Participant Quiz Short quiz is given at the end of each day Quiz results provide feedback to staff and participants on training effectiveness Results will be discussed in the daily review session each morning Quizzes are anonymous Two types of questions are used: True - False Multiple choice 9 Other Class Activities Weekly off-site dinner Class team building picnic Weekend cultural activities Evening shopping trips 10 Page 5

8 Administrative Requirements Attendance is required for all lectures, subgroup exercises, and field trips Completion of daily module evaluations and quizzes is required Be on time after breaks and lunches, and for the bus in the morning Turn off all personal wireless communication devices during lectures and subgroups 11 Brief History of the ITC 1. In the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, the US made a commitment to conduct training for other IAEA Member States on the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities 2. First ITC was conducted in November ITC has been conducted approximately every 18 months since then 4. As of the end of ITC-25 in 2015, there have been 841 participants from 71 Member States 12 Page 6

9 Participating Member States in Past ITCs Albania (1) Algeria (3) Argentina (23) Armenia (5) Australia (16) Austria (2) Bangladesh (9) Belarus (11) Belgium (4) Brazil (29) Bulgaria (16) Canada (50) Chile (11) China (21) Croatia (5) Cuba (2) Czech Republic (20) Denmark (1) DR of Congo (2) Egypt (25) Finland (9) France (19) Germany (15) Ghana (8) Greece (3) Hungary (12) India (28) Indonesia (24) Iran (1) Iraq (5) Israel (5) Italy (6) Jamaica (1) Japan (29) Jordan (1) Kazakhstan (8) Korea (21) Latvia (2) Lithuania (18) Malaysia (12) Mexico (25) Morocco (6) Netherlands (6) Nigeria (2) Norway (2) Observers (14) Pakistan (17) Philippines (16) Poland (17) Portugal (2) Romania (22) Russia (21) Saudi Arabia (1) Serbia (3) Slovakia (17) Slovenia (14) South Africa (20) Spain (11) Sweden (19) Switzerland (7) Syria (1) Thailand (17) Tunisia (4) Turkey (10) Ukraine (19) United Arab Emirates (2) United Kingdom (1) Uzbekistan (1) Venezuela (3) Vietnam (6) Zaire (3) Total Participants: (44) ITC-26 Participants from 33 States Algeria Australia Bangladesh Belarus Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Canada Czech Republic Finland Germany Ghana Hungary India Indonesia Japan Republic of Korea Libya Lithuania Malaysia Mexico Nigeria Poland Romania Russia Slovakia Slovenia South Africa Spain Turkey Ukraine United Arab Emirates Vietnam 14 Page 7

10 Sponsors US Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Office of Global Material Security US Department of State (DOS) Office of International Security and Nonproliferation Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety, and Security International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Nuclear Safety and Security Office of Nuclear Security 15 Presenters Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) prepares and presents this course because we: Developed the methodology used in this course, beginning in the 1970s Have extensive experience in using this methodology for the design and evaluation of our domestic physical protection systems Work closely with the IAEA and Member States on international physical protection, using this same methodology 16 Page 8

11 Scope The ITC material Is designed for security professionals who work in physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials Government officials and competent authorities Facility operators and transport shippers and carriers Uses an approach consistent with the recommendations in: Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles, GOV/2001/41 The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 17 Objectives of a State s Physical Protection Regime Protect against theft and other unlawful taking of nuclear material in use, storage, and transport Ensure the implementation of rapid and comprehensive measures to locate and, where appropriate, recover missing or stolen nuclear material Protect nuclear material and nuclear facilities against sabotage Mitigate or minimize the radiological consequences of sabotage Note: In this course sabotage means radiological sabotage. 18 Page 9

12 Introduction to the DEPO Methodology The DEPO methodology is a systematic approach with three major steps: 1. Define the PPS requirements 2. Design a new, or characterize an existing, PPS 3. Evaluate the PPS 19 Define PPS Requirements Note: Numbers refer to lecture sessions Introduction to DEPO (1) INFCIRC 225 Revision 5 (2) Facility Characterization/ Target Identification (3) Introduction to Hypothetical Facility (4) Threat Definition (5) Risk Management/ Regulatory Requirements (6) Detection Intrusion Detection Systems (9) Entry Control (10) Contraband Detection (11) Alarm Assessment (12) Alarm Communication and Display (15) Insider Design (25) Design PPS Physical Protection Systems (8) Delay Access Delay (13) Response Response (14) Contingency Planning (28) Performance Testing (16 and 17) Evaluate PPS Evaluation of PPS (18) Adversary Sequence Diagrams (19) Path Interruption Analysis (20) Multipath Analysis (21) Neutralization Analysis (22) Scenario Analysis (23) Tabletop Analysis (24) Insider Analysis (25) Transportation Security (26) Information Security (27) Design and Evaluation Process Outline (DEPO) Nuclear Material Accounting & Control (7) Human Reliability Programs & Security Culture (28) Final PPS Design Redesign PPS 20 Page 10

13 Alternative PPS Design and Evaluation Approaches Expert approach: The PPS design and evaluation is conducted using subject matter expertise Prescriptive features approach: The PPS design and evaluation is conducted based on specifications and implementation of a required set of features Component criteria approach: The PPS design and evaluation is conducted using performance criteria for some required security features System performance approach: The PPS design and evaluation is conducted using a systems engineering approach based on specifying and achieving an overall level of system effectiveness against the Design Basis Threat (DBT) 21 ITC Design and Evaluation Approach ITC emphasizes the performance-based PPS effectiveness, design, and evaluation approach (DEPO) In practice, State physical protection regimes generally include a mixture of performance-based and prescriptive approaches 22 Page 11

14 Regulatory Requirements Physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials is the right and responsibility of every sovereign state Stated in Amended CPPNM State government establishes laws for the state s physical protection regime Risk management Competent authority(ies) establishes regulations and is responsible for oversight of physical protection Prescriptive and performance-base requirements Facility operators implement physical protection and are responsible for satisfying state requirements Resource management 23 Summary ITC objective Apply the principles of a performance-based methodology to design and evaluate a physical protection system for nuclear facilities and materials against the threat of theft or sabotage Objectives of a State s physical protection regime Protect against theft of nuclear material Protect against radiological sabotage of nuclear facilities and material Three basic steps of DEPO are (1) define PPS requirements, (2) design PPS, and (3) evaluate PPS ITC emphasizes a performance-based approach of evaluating PPS effectiveness against DBT 24 Page 12