IAEA Activities in Nuclear Security

Transcription

1 IAEA Activities in Nuclear Security Miroslav Gregorič Office of Nuclear Security Department of Nuclear Safety and Security Briefing for the 23 IAEA CEG Plenary meeting, Rome, 7 October 2009

2 Nuclear Security Concerns Theft of nuclear weapon Theft of nuclear material to build an improvised nuclear device Theft of radioactive material or source for a radiological dispersion device Sabotage of a nuclear or radioactive material facility or transport 2

3 NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIME Interrelations in nuclear security Conventions Laws/Penal codes Regulations Regulatory bodies Enforcement Export/Import Threat assessment Trustworthiness Confidentiality Accounting and control Physical Protection Detection/response Deterrence Coordination Security culture TARGETS for CONSEQUENCES Nuclear weapons Nuclear material Radioactive material Facilities Transports/Transits Technology THREAT INDICATORS Terrorist organizations Criminal organizations Terrorist and criminal acts (murders, robberies, thefts, arson, kidnappings, past nuclear facilities incidents, airplane hijackings, drug production, smuggling of drugs and weapons) ITDB reports Political and economic instability, unemployment, social insecurity, corruption Civil wars Religious tensions Extremes International Atomic wealth-poverty Energy Agency -

4 What are the materials / technologies? Nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium in different forms) Radioactive sources Radioactively contaminated materials Radioactive waste 4

5 Inventories facilities and materials potential targets globally > nuclear weapons >3.000 tons civil and military HEU and Pu >480 research reactors (>160 with HEU) >100 fuel cycle facilities >430 operating nuclear power plants > Cat I and II radioactive sources > Cat III radioactive sources 5

6 Large terrorist attacks - examples 1995 Tokio subway, WMD sarin attack Aum Shinrikyo cult 12 dead 1000 injured 1995 Oklahoma city, truck bomb, 168 dead 1998 Kenya and Tanzania, US embassies simultaneous car bombs 257 dead 4000 injured 1998 Omagh, Northern Ireland vehicle bomb, 29 dead 2000 Yemen, suicide attack at US navy USS Cole, 17 dead 2001 New York, Washington, 9/11 suicide attack - aircrafts, 3000 dead 2002 Indonesia Bali suicide and truck bomb 202 dead 209 injured 2003 Morocco, 5 simultaneous bombs, 33 dead, 100 injured 2004 Spain, Madrid trains, 10 backpack bombs, 191 dead, 1500 injured 2004 Russia, Beslan school, 344 dead, hundreds injured 2005 UK London subway and bus suicide bombs, 56 dead, 700 injured 2005 Jordan, 3 hotels, suicide bombs, 59 dead, 150 injured 2006 India, Mumbai, 7 simultaneous bombs 714 dead 6

7 Attacks to nuclear facilities some examples - from open sources : Europe--10 terrorist incidents against European nuclear installations : United States--32 acts of intentional damage or suspected sabotage at nuclear facilities. 1978: Spain--Bomb exploded in steam generator of Lemoniz NPS 1982: France--Five rockets fired into Creys-Malville nuclear facility (Super Phenix, research reactor) 1982: South Africa-- A series of bombings occurred at the Koeberg NPP site during construction. 1983: West Germany--Four West Germans gain forced entry to a Pershing missile site and attempt to destroy a missile with crowbars Russia, reportedly 3 threats against NPPs 2002 and 2007: Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (Al Qaeda) claims that he was responsible for surveillance needed to hit nuclear power plants in US and that such attacks were considered at time of 9/11 planning 2004: Australia--Alleged plot to attack Lucas Heights research reactor 2005: Lashkar-e-Toiba operatives reportedly reveal under interrogation that Kaiga NPP in India was among their targets. 2007: South Africa--break-in at Pelindaba research reactor site. Gunmen stormed the facility's emergency response control room. Emergency services operational officer was shot in the chest. 7

8 Pre-requisite requisite for Nuclear Activities Safeguards/Safety/Security Safety Protect people and environment from nuclear and radioactive material (accidents by inadvertent human error, equipment failure, natural events..) Safeguards Prevention of spread of nuclear weapons by states Security Protect nuclear and other radioactive material from people with malicious intent 8

9 Nuclear Security: IAEA Plans of Activities September 2001: IAEA General Conference requests review of Agency s activities relevant to preventing nuclear terrorism and proposals for strengthening measures March 2002 : Plan of Activities, approved by Board of Governors September 2005: Nuclear Security Plan , approved by Board of Governors September 2009 Nuclear Security Plan , approved by Board of Governors 9

10 IAEA Nuclear Security - Three Activity Areas Information Management and Coordination Collection of data on illicit trafficking and nuclear security incidents Coordination with States and other international organizations Prevention Control of material: regulatory systems, accountancy Protection of material, facilities, transport from theft and sabotage Nuclear security culture Detection & Response Detection of and response to events involving radioactive material Radiation detection techniques and concepts Security at major public events 10

11 Promoting International Instruments for Nuclear Security Legally binding: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material & Amendment Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism Security Council resolution 1540 Non-legally binding: Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources 11

12 Nuclear Security Advisory Services International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) State System of Accountancy and Control Advisory Service (ISSAS) International Team of Legal, Policy and Technical Experts (ITE) Over 100 missions in all regions, with increasing interest since

13 IPPAS - International Physical Protection Advisory Service Peer review of State and Facility Physical Protection Link to safety and safeguards Service organized since missions to 31 States (Follow-up in 10 States) 2004: Ukraine, Iran, Kazakhstan 2005:Thailand, Switzerland, Netherlands, Egypt 2006: Uzbekistan, Slovakia, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Mexico 2007:Ghana, Indonesia, Ukraine, 2008: Netherlands, Georgia 2009: Finland, Netherlands, Belarus, Turkmenistan, (Bangladesh) IPPAS report - recommendations, suggestions good practices IPPAS report - confidential Fundamental to IAEA program of improving national physical protection Follow up: training, technical support, targeted assessments More than 90 experts from 27 countries participated in the missions 13

14 Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) A practical work-plan for nuclear security measures to be implemented over a specified period of time in a State. INSSPs are based on the findings of advisory services and developed upon State requests. Tool for cooperation and coordination with bilateral support programmes 49 country specific INSSPs developed 14

15 Structure of Safety and Security Documents Global reference point for high level of nuclear safety and security NUCLEAR SAFETY STANDARDS NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES Safety Fundamentals Security Fundamentals Safety Requirements Recommendations Safety Guides Implementing Guides Mature stage through transparent development process Initial stage of development 15

16 Nuclear Security Guidance Nuclear Security Series: 11 publications so far 10 under development 16

17 Nuclear Security Series 17

18 Nuclear Security Series Published as Technical Guidance #1: Technical and Functional Specifications for Border Monitoring Equipment #2: Nuclear Forensic Support #3: Monitoring for Radioactive Material in International Mail Transported by Public Postal Operators #4: Engineering Safety Aspects of the Protection of Nuclear Power Plants against Sabotage #5: Identification of Radioactive Sources and Devices #6 Combating Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material - Handbook 18

19 Nuclear Security Series Published implementing guides in 2008 and 2009 #7: Nuclear Security Culture #8: Preventive and protective Measures Against Insider Threats #9: Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material #10 Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis threat #11 Security of Radioactive Sources 19

20 Nuclear Security Series Framework To be published in 2009: INPRO Manual on Physical protection Identification of Vital Areas at Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Security at Major public events Radioactive Waste Security Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities Educational program for nuclear security 20

21 Nuclear Security Series In preparation, to be published in 2010/2011 Protecting and confidentiality of nuclear security information Protection Against Sabotage Nuclear Security Glossary Model regulations Physical protection of research reactors Procedures for examining legal shipments or radioactive material Security of fissile material in transport Nuclear Security of New Nuclear Power Plants Accounting and control at facilities for nuclear security Risk assessment and State management of nuclear security regime 21

22 Nuclear Security Series - Current Focus Under preparation - to be published in 2010: Nuclear Security Fundamentals (TM 16 November 2009) Recommendations for NM to be INFCIRC 225/Rev5 as well (TM 18 January 2010) Recommendations for RM (TM 5 February 2010) Recommendations for D&R (TM 14 February 2010) 22

23 Nuclear Security Human Resource Development Training 26 different nuclear security training courses are available to States through the IAEA. General Training Specialized Training Computer Based Training Training of Trainers Fellow-ships On-the-Job Training Technical Visit From : 314 training activities implemented 7850 participants trained from more than 120 countries 23

24 Education and training Example of Prevention Outreach O Training Course material in English, Russian, French, Arabic, Spanish, Chinese Lecturers from the regions involved: Course: Security of Radioactive Sources: 21 hosting States: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil China, Estonia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Namibia,Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South Africa, Syria, Spain, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine. Conducted for 92 States for total of 680 participants Several non-member States participated 24

25 Hand-on training courses at ISTC Obninsk Trainees from: Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Lithuania Kazakhstan Poland Romania Russian Federation Serbia Slovakia Ukraine Uzbekistan International Lecturers from: Atomic Energy Agency Russian Federation Bulgaria Canada Czech Republic France Germany Hungary USA Slovak Republic Pakistan Iran I A E A N S F Government of Canada Federal Atomic Energy Agency ISTC Obninsk 2005 PP Operation 2006 PP Inspections 2007 two 2008 two In total: 8 RTC-s : >170 trainees from 17 Member States

26 Nuclear Security Human Resource Development Educational Programme Provides: Guidance to universities for the development of a Master of Science Programme and a Certificate Programme in Nuclear Security Based on: Outlines: Existing academic programmes and the IAEA nuclear security training programme Required theoretical knowledge and practical skills to meet international requirements for nuclear security To be published in 2009 in the Nuclear Security Series. 26

27 Nuclear Security Support Centres Objectives: Enhancement of coordination and collaboration Implementation of tailored training programme Provision of services for maintenance of equipment Establishment of nuclear security knowledge network Phase Needs Assessment Training Facility Training Implementation Examples: ISTC Obninsk, SNUNEI Sevastopol, TPU Tomsk Phase 2 4 Technical Support Systematic Approach to Capacity Building 27

28 Risk Reduction Upgrading Technical Capabilities Detection and response equipment at border crossings and venues Physical Protection Equipment at Facilities (NPPs, RRs, Waste storage, Irradiators, Teletherapy): Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Romania, Bulgaria 28

29 Return of Spent Nuclear Fuel - HEU Foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel acceptance program involves the return of spent HEU fuel assisting bilateral donors Repatriation to USA of spent fuel from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela Repatriation to Russia of spent fuel from RR in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, Libya, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Uzbekistan, Vietnam 29

30 Risk Reduction Nuclear Security at Major Pubic Events Training Information Support Technical Assistance 30

31 Nuclear Security Coordinated Research Projects Development and Implementation of Instruments and Methods for Detection of Unauthorized Acts Involving Nuclear and other Radioactive Material Development of Methodologies for Risk Assessment and State Management of Nuclear Security Regime Application of Nuclear Forensics in Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material 31

32 ITDB - Illicit Trafficking Data Base Information services International recognized sources of information; Program began in 1995 Network of 108 States and int. organizations Includes information reported by States and open sources Interaction with inter alia Interpol, Europol, UNICRI, UNODC, WCO, OSCE Covers nuclear and other radioactive material 1742 confirmed cases since 1993 radioactive sources, nuclear material, both material, radioactively contaminated material, and unknown type of material Incidents include unauthorized acquisition, possession, provision, use, transfer or disposal intentional or unintentional with or without crossing international borders unsuccessful attempts to acquire Incidents confirmed to the ITDB during , by year when incidents occurred

33 Cooperation with International Organizations 33

34 Office of Nuclear Security Activities Promoting International Instruments Advisory Services Guidance Development Human Resource Development Risk Reduction Research & Development Information Exchange & Analysis Cooperation & Coordination 34

35 For further information please visit our website: 35