Rotary Aviation Challenges in the Future Operational Environment

Transcription

1 The Overall Classification of this briefing UNCLASSIFIED Rotary Aviation Challenges in the Future Operational Environment TRADOC G-2 UNCLASSIFIED

2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Near (Now to 2025) Mid/Far (2025 to 2040) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Key Take Aways Trends in the Operational Environment indicate most significant change through 2040 will be technology based not new or modified tactics. A range of capable & adaptive adversaries doing things differently from what we ve seen over the last 14 years requires Aviation forces to adapt and keep pace Greater range and numbers of threat systems, proliferation of hybrid ADA systems, Introduction of 5 th generation Changing dynamic of airspace; adversary investments in ADA (multiple roles) and missiles adversary missile survivability Increasing counter precision and greater situation awareness (radars), use of lasers, increasingly autonomous systems, robotics radio frequency weapons Advances in missile survivability, precision, smaller UAVs, advanced jamming, next generation of IR SAMs high powered microwave & high velocity weapons S-5000 Growth of technology capabilities, proliferation and its increasing availability increases the potential for aviation overmatch

3 Future Rotary Wing Threats Cyber/EW Software vulnerable Directed Energy RF Laser Novel Attacks Carbon Filaments UAVs Gun-Missile Hybrids Increased engagement envelope. Advanced MANPADS Cool launch defeat IR Warning Sensor-platform-munition Advances in sensor technology. Multi-platform systems 3

4 BACK UPS BACKUPS 4

5 Agenda 1. Classical air defense missiles/guns 2. Directed energy and Electronic Warfare 3. Cyber-attack 4. Novel threats and tactics

6 Classical Air Defense Sensor-platform-munition Advances in sensor technology, radar advances (phased array, steerable, modulation schemes, IR/UV.) Multi-platform systems, confuse target signatures. Multi-sensor seekers on munitions, defeats countermeasures. Maneuverable missiles. Programmable fuzing on gun munitions. Dramatically improved passive tracking for MANPADS. Proliferation of systems especially MANPADS.

7 UNCLASSIFIED Movement Towards Hybridization Singapore example of a hybrid system Russian Model Concept of the SOSNA Launcher Driven by cost and component availability, and export market Substitution of major components traditionally associated with a system 2 or more different types of missiles available AAA and missiles Any combination of several types of radars (EO, laser range finding) Most common is to mount MANPADs on a launch vehicle in addition to primary gun or missile system Blinding lasers are expected to be mounted on SAMs Incorporation of EO/IR, RF, and acquisition radars will greatly increase the lethality of hybrid systems. Different configurations and high proliferation rates worldwide will compound U.S. planning and execution operations UNCLASSIFIED 7

8 Directed Energy and Electronic Warfare Attack pilots, aircraft sensors and electronics. Advanced avionics software Fly by wire control systems RF coupling with aircraft skin can create damage to control surfaces. Power Square law, power supplies limit current utility generate enough on target impact to cause lasting damage.

9 Cyber Attack Increased software for onboard control systems improved performance, increased vulnerability. Insider Threat industry outsourced code. Complexity and amount of code mitigates QC. Backdoors, delayed activation of malware/virus. DDOS=latency, how much is too much?

10 Novel Threats and Tactics UAV aerial mine fields Commercial UAVs as kamikazes Laser pointers Carbon filaments, rubber eating bacteria, and other hazards to aircraft Russian Snow Dome integrated air defense. ATGMs

11 UNCLASSIFIED Enduring Threats to Aviation Brownouts at field HLZs, and on heavily used helipads at bases Fast moving weather fronts, high winds, dust storms, hail storms Strong, unpredictable mountain winds, high, steep walled terrain Extreme density altitude conditions in summer (mushing) Icing conditions, whiteouts, gray-outs in winter High, rough-terrain HLZs Dust & sand abrasion of blades, optics, moving parts Pilferage of supplies by organized crime gangs Occasional pot-shots & laser play vs. passing helos by friendly locals Accidents of all types UNCLASSIFIED

12 Hostile and Unforgiving Airspace Air Defense Directed Energy/EW Cyber Advanced RW Novel Threats and Tactics 12

13 UNCLASSIFIED Discussion UNCLASSIFIED

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15 ADA FIRES UNCLASSIFIED X (-) SOF X (-) II - II - ^ II- XXXX Scale: KM UNCLASSIFIED

16 UNCLASSIFIED (U)Past Aviation Challenges 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment Deep Strike 2003 Iraqis study how Apaches ravaged their forces during DESERT STORM Iraqis prepared a defense specifically against deep attack Iraqis undetected, achieved surprise and defeated the attack 31 of 32 aircraft damaged, 1 downed in enemy territory 2 pilots captured Medina not decisively engaged 30 days to restore full capability Lessons integrated into 101 AASLT ops UNCLASSIFIED Israeli Defense Force Second Lebanon War 2006 Hezbollah presents a qualitative problem not solvable with low intensity conflict mindset Hezbollah stand-off fires (ATGMs, MANPADS, mortars) required tightly integrated and joint combined arms firemaneuver-isr solution the IDF could not execute in 2006 Army committed late and looked ineffectual in its response IDF realized it had to prepare for full range of operations COP Kahler Wanat, Afghanistan 2008 Enemy presence turns Wanat leaders into accomplices in the attack Insurgents shift against expectations, attacking within days of COP build Enemy coordinated attack (RPGs and automatic weapons, achieves tactical surprise and numerical superiority AH-64 reinforce after 1 hour of travel 9 US KIA, 27 WIA in four hours Insurgents break contact and withdraw; US withdraws in

17 UNCLASSIFIED (U)The Complex Environment through 2025 & Beyond Actions by an adversary that are short of armed conflict Technology transfer Ubiquitous media Operations among populations Hybrid Strategies Non-state actors Increased momentum of human interaction UNCLASSIFIED Capability overmatch WMD Cyber Space Urban Complex Terrain 17

18 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Emerging & Future Threats Affecting Army Aviation (1 of 2) Threat Systems Today 2025 and Beyond Fires affecting FARPS and assembly areas Massed Fires low cost, long range, area munitions Mech Bde destroyed in 15 minutes Greater velocity, accuracy, rate & range of fires..lasers, cruise missiles & hypersonic vehicles Unmanned Aerial Systems interdicting air assets Air Defense deny U.S. use of airspace Electronic Warfare, Cyber, Denial & Deception degrades operations Multi echelon integrated use of UAVs, multi-role extensive use of UAVs IADS, MANPADs with multi seekers air-to-air helos shut down airspace C 3 D & decoys GPS, comms jamming cyber & social media forced UKR into disadvantage Integrated autonomous, swarming UAVs saturated airspace unmanned ground systems Smart and jamming munitions, laser & electronic attack, high velocity & long range attack munitions GPS spoofing, electronic deception, space based jamming & ASAT quantum computing UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

19 Threat Systems Today UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Emerging & Future Threats Affecting Army Aviation (2 of 2) 2025 and Beyond Direct Fires kinetic attack against platforms Low cost, long range, increased penetration Increased range, better penetration, reduced crew requirements, improved road mobility, lower cost AAA affecting air operations Highly proliferated, cheap, capable of massing More deadly, hybrid capabilities Night Vision affecting air operation Improved infrared and thermal 3d generation devices for sale now Smaller, more effective, proliferated loss of the night Improvised Weapons and Mines affecting FARPS, assembly areas and operations Commercial Off the shelf technology, low cost, effective Low Cost, multi-spectral, EFP Future threat capabilities enabled by Advanced Power & Energy, Advanced Manufacturing, Machine-Human Interaction, Synthetic Bio, & Advanced Computing Power UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO