The Air Force View of IAMD in a Joint Environment

Transcription

1 Headquarters U.S. Air Force The Air Force View of IAMD in a Joint Environment This Briefing is Unclassified Maj Gen Timothy M. Ray Director, Operational Planning, Policy & Strategy 11 Jul 2013

2 INTRO / BLUF Air Force View Homeland Defense Regional Challenges Air Force IAMD Lines-of-Effort Operational C2 Tactical C2/C3 Sensors Engagement Systems 2

3 Air Force View of IAMD JP 3-01: Countering air and missile threats requires a holistic approach that includes: OCA attack ops Active AMD Passive AMD C2 and ISR framework IAMD OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR Attack Operations Attacks on missile sites, airfields, command and control, infrastructure Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Fighter Escort Fighter Sweep COUNTERAIR DEFENSIVE COUNTEAIR Active Air & Missile Defense Air Defense Ballistic Missile Defense Passive Air & Missile Defense Detection & Warning CBRN Defenses Camouflage, Concealment, & Deception Hardening Reconstitution Dispersion Redundancy Mobility 3

4 Homeland Defense Missile Defense Missile Warning Air Defense C2 Deterrence Integrity - Service - Excellence 4

5 Regional Challenges Our focus should always be on returning to the offense we cannot be content to play catch. 5

6 A2/AD Challenges Force Projection Networked Integrated Attack in Depth Disrupt Destroy Defeat Offensive Counter Space Space Strategic Mobility Secure Communications Electronic Attack Battlespace Awareness Cyber Homeland as Sanctuary US Sovereign Territory Offensive Counter Cyber Expeditionary Land Basing LABM LACM 3 rd Party Sovereign Territory ASBM ASCM Sea Basing Submarines Mines Qualitatively Superior Units ASUW Expeditionary Operations Advanced Aircraft SAMs Adversary Sovereign Territory Air Land Maritime Permissive Contested Highly Contested 6

7 Four Pillars of IAMD No Threat No Launch No Impact No Consequences Deny or Limit Enemy Capability Deter Employmen t Prevent or Limit Launche s Minimize Impacts Mitigate Effects Non- Proliferatio n Deterrence Offensive Operations Active Defense Passive Defense POLITICAL Battle Management, Command & Control, Communication, and Intelligence IAMD PILLARS 7

8 Air Force IAMD Lines-of-Effort Command and Control Sensors Engagement Systems 8

9 Operational C2 Joint Army Navy Air Force JFC / JTF Supported CDR Supporting OPCON / TACON Lines of Coordination Engagement Authority JFMCC JFACC/AADC DAADC JFLCC TAAMDCOORD CTF IAMD RADC CRC RADC RADC ADAFCO AAMDC Maritime Sensors and Shooters Airborne Sensors and Shooters Land-based Sensors and Shooters JFMCC JFMCC and and JFLCC JFLCC are are supporting supporting commanders commanders to to JFACC/AADC JFACC/AADC for for IAMD IAMD Navy Navy retains retains OPCON/TACON OPCON/TACON of of multi-mission multi-mission IAMD IAMD ships; ships; Army Army retains retains OPCON/TACN OPCON/TACN of of Army Army ADA ADA forces forces AADC AADC engagement engagement control control and and authority authority for for multi-mission multi-mission IAMD IAMD ships ships is is normally normally through through a a RADC RADC designated designated by by JFACC JFACC and and approved approved by by the the JFMCC JFMCC 9

10 Tactical C2/C3 CRC Modernization AWACS 40/45 Joint Aerial Layer Network 5 th 4 th Integration Joint Track Management Capability 10

11 Sensors 3DELRR TACAIR sensors AWACS sensor way ahead BMD tracking and discrimination Space sensors 11

12 Engagement Systems Air-to-Air Air base defense BMD engagement 12

13 Airborne Weapons Layer Concept C2BMC Sensor / Interceptor Platforms Fighter, Bomber, RPA IR Assisted Infra-Red Sensor Search Ranging Air Defense Networks Radar Search IR Stereo Ranging Sensor-Only Platforms RPA Infra-Red Sensor Search Fighter aircraft as launch platforms Leverages evolving sensor and weapon technologies to develop Upper-tier weapon focused on exo-atmospheric intercepts long range, fast (approx 3.5 km/s at burnout) Lower-tier weapon focused on endo-atmospheric intercepts AMRAAM body, shorter range, slower (approx 1.75 km/s burnout) Ballistic Missile 13

14 Questions? 14