Somalia (UNDP/ROLS DDR Phase I, )

Transcription

1 Somalia (UNDP/ROLS DDR Phase I, ) Basic data Population: 8.5 million (2006) Food emergencies: Yes IDPs: 1 million (2007) Refugee population: 463,000 (2007) GDP: - Per capita income: - HDI: - GDI: - Military expenditure: - Social / military expenditure: - Military population: - Arms embargo: ONU: since 1992; EU: since 2002 Map Summary Type of DDR Groups to demobilise Executive bodies Budget Timeline Status / synopsis Context Conflict 1 In Mogadishu: modest disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of diverse, organisationally fragmented militias in a context of armed conflict. In Somaliland and Puntland: disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of security forces as part of a security-sector reform process in a context of low-intensity armed conflict between the two Somali regions. More than 50,000 members of militias The UNDP with cooperation from the National Demobilisation Commission (NDC) in Somaliland, the Puntland DDR Unit (PDDRU) in Puntland, and various NGOs acting as partners in programme execution. $3 million Pilot project in Mogadishu from 2003 to Other programmes in Mogadishu, Somaliland, and Puntland from 2005 to The programme in Somalia has developed fragmentary and tentative projects due to the security situation in the country. These initiatives have turned out positively but have been limited in the absolute numbers of combatants demobilised, less than 1,500 in total, a number appropriate for pilot programmes awaiting opportunity for an expansion of work. The armed conflict and the absence of any effective central authority dates back to 1988, when a coalition of opposition groups rebelled against the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre, finally 1 Extracted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008: 25, 52) 1

2 succeeding in bringing him down three years later. This situation led to a new struggle within the coalition to take advantage of the power vacuum, which has caused the destruction of the country and the deaths of more than 300,000 people since 1991, despite failed attempts at intervention by the international community at the beginning of the 1990s. The different peace processes aimed at creating some form of central authority have come up against various obstacles, a significant one being the particular nature of Somali society, which is divided into a number of clans. Other factors include interference from Ethiopia and the power wielded by the warlords. The last peace initiative in 2004 led to the formation of the TFG, which has looked to Ethiopia for support in its attempts to recover control of the country. The situation in Somalia worsened considerably after fighting broke out at the end of December 2006 between the TFG, supported by Ethiopian troops, and UIC militias, who were rapidly defeated. This led to a new period of violence and insecurity, mainly in Mogadishu. Meanwhile, the regions of Somaliland and Puntland have been involved in a dispute over control of the Sool and Sanaag border regions since Sool and Sanaag fall geographically within the borders of Somaliland, but the majority of clans living in the region are linked with those in Puntland. In December 2003, forces from Puntland took control of Las Anod, capital of the Sool region. Previously, both authorities had been officially represented in the city. Since then there have been sporadic confrontations and attempts at mediation. Before coming to power in Puntland in 2005, General Muse came up against the then Puntland warlord, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, now president of Somalia, whose militias defeated Muse s forces, which withdrew to the western region of Sanaag where they were taken in by Somaliland forces, a fact that reflects how difficult it will be to resolve this dispute. Other disarmament initiatives Arms embargoes Through Security Council Resolution 733, the United Nations proclaimed an arms embargo on Somalia in January Resolution S/RES/1725 of 2006 lifted this embargo for member states of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and for interventions by the African Union in order to assist the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In 2002, the European Union adopted Resolution 733, Council Common Position, 2002/960/CFSP (SIPRI 2007). Mine action UNDP/ROLS in cooperation with UNMAS, the UN Mine Action Service, UNICEF, and other national and international organisations coordinates an Anti-mine Action Plan. The main aim of this plan is to remove landmines currently located in the south and central regions of Somalia. UNDP/ROLS also cooperates with Mine Action Centres in Somaliland and Puntland, where antimining activities in those regions have controlled the situation for many years (UN Mine Action Service, n.d.). Background to DDR We can view Somalia as an experiment in initiatives for demobilising combatants, though by looking at the current security situation, the amount of success that several programmes have had is questionable. A brief review of the different initiatives carried out from the 1990s until 2005 can be found in Morse (2005: fig. 7). 2

3 Programme design Type and designation of DDR DDR in the capital Mogadishu involves the small-scale disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of diverse, organisationally fragmented militias in a context of armed conflict. In Somaliland and Puntland, DDR includes disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of security forces as part of a security-sector reform process, in a context of low-intensity armed conflict between the two Somali regions. All programmes are part of phase one of the DDR component for the UNDP s Rule of Law and Security Programme (ROLS), known as UNDP/ROLS DDR, Phase I. The most recent programme in Mogadishu is called the UNDP DDR Programme for Mogadishu, Phase II, whose first phase, conducted in , was a pilot programme. When dealing with the programme in the capital, it is common to find reference to activities in the south-central region of the country. Given their limited reach, implicit goal of extending activities to all parts of the country, and goal of expanding the numbers of militia combatants in the programme (at least to 50,000), we can also view programmes in Somaliland and Puntland as pilot projects. In addition to the multitude of projects in Somalia, Morse (2005: 13ss) warns of the numerous different ways in which DDR is understood as a result of, amongst other things, the diverse nature of militias. Executive bodies Mogadishu [Gráfico 1] UNDP/ROLS is in charge of the financing of Mogadishu and the Somali-Australian NGO SAACID is in charge of implementation (Saacid 2007a). Somaliland The National Demobilisation Commission, NDC, is responsible for planning and execution in Somaliland with cooperation from UNDP/ROLS. Four local NGOs manage the reintegration component (Mission Report 2005; UNDP Somalia 2008). In its project Strengthening Somali Civil Society, Phase III, the Dutch NGO Oxfam Novib encourages participation from civil society in DDR processes (Oxfam Novib 2007). Puntland The Puntland DDR Unit, PDDRU, and UNDP/ROLS administer planning and execution in Puntland. According to the UNDP s 2005 Policy Framework for DDR, PDDRU is a technical unit of the Department of Mine Action, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, a dependent of the Ministry of Interior, Security, and DDR (UNDP Somalia 2005: 7-8). Three local NGOs are responsible for the execution of reintegration (UNDP Somalia 2008). UNESCO s Programme of Emergency Education and Rehabilitation, or UNESCO/PEER, provides education to former militia combatants, amongst others (OCHA Somalia 2007a). Basic principles According to the UNDP, DDR in Somalia involves reducing the armed forces to levels that are sustainable to government in order to free up resources for utilisation in productive sectors. The agency puts emphasis on sustainable and realistic reintegration programmes which contribute to larger development goals (UNDP Somalia 2007). 3

4 Participants Estimates vary on the number of militia combatants in Somalia. The World Bank (2005: 38) gathers data from six organisations and different reports, which put numbers at anything from 45,000 to 200,000. Both the UNDP and the World Bank contend the chief objective for DDR in Somalia to be the demobilisation of around 53,000 militia combatants, perhaps a third of these active in Somaliland and Puntland (Mission Report 2005). Eligibility criteria In Mogadishu, DDR Phase II, community leaders choose militia combatants to participate in the demobilisation process. These combatants are required to surrender a machine gun in good working condition (Saacid 2007a). In Puntland according to a draft proposal (Mission Report 2005), combatants are required To be on the payroll of the country s security forces; To formally commit to a complete demobilisation without the possibility of rejoining the armed forces; To surrender an arm and its ammunition; To participate in all obligatory programme activities; and To not commit any criminal act whilst participating in the programme. Budget and financing By the end of 2007, the UNDP, within the 2005 Contracts, Assets and Procurements Committee, or CAP, had asked for $3.8 million for UNDP/ROLS DDR Phase I, of which the programme had received almost $3 million, or 80 percent. At the same time, UNESCO required $1.2 million for the basic education and vocational training of demobilised youth, but the record does not show the agency receiving any of the UNDP s funds. In the 2008 CAP, UNESCO has re-requested funding, this time for to $800,000 (FTS 2007, 2008). A detailed breakdown of funding has not been made available. Known data include an agreement with the government of Puntland consisting of the UNDP contributing three times more to programming than to local administration, or the government of Somaliland contributing 20 percent of NDC salaries. Schedule Lacking a comprehensive DDR project in Somalia (World Bank 2005), there is no real concrete programming but rather an administration of diverse processes, depending on what the political and security situations in the different regions of the country permit. The schedule in Mogadishu has been the following: DDR Phase I (pilot phase): from August 2003 to July DDR Phase II: registration and disarmament, conducted in December The arms collected were destroyed in April Reintegration occurred from January 2006 to January In Somaliland: Registration occurred in July DDR in the proper sense aimed to conclude in 2005, but only started in 2006 and then concluded in December 2007 (UNDP Somalia 2005, 2008). In Puntland: 4

5 Registration occurred in June 2005, demobilisation in 2006, and reintegration began in April 2007 (OCHA Somalia 2007b). Phases Mogadishu From August 2003 to July 2004, the UNDP financed a pilot DDR programme designed for 150 militia combatants and 150 civilian youth in the reintegration phase from six districts of the capital. Executed by SAACID, the programme was called the UNDP/SAACID DDR Programme for Mogadishu, Phase I. It offered literacy courses, practical training in local enterprise, vocational training, and support for training in small business. The current Phase II of the programme is a widening of the pilot project (Saacid 2007a, UNDP Somalia 2007). The following is a description taken from a variety of SAACID evaluative reports (Saacid 2007a, 2007b; International Aid Services 2006). DDR Phase II began with workshops on programming for community leaders, who act as guarantors of the process, and on criteria for selecting militia combatants. Registration and disarmament took place in December Combatants surrendered 512 arms. SAACID notes that the requirement to surrender a machine gun instead of a small arm caused the market price for machine guns to rise from $30 to $150 in only a month. Arms destruction should have occurred in an official ceremony at the end of the programme, but SAACID decided to expedite the event and hold it in April 2007 due to the insecurity situation in the capital and after having received a number of threats. In January 2006, basic training and literacy began. This lasted for three months with 100 percent of ex-combatants enrolled in the training. One of the additional goals of these courses was to discourage participants from consuming khat, a widespread habit amongst militia combatants. Participants received payment in cash according to the number of days they attended courses. In the first few months, only a small percentage of participants abandoned their studies. Other individuals substituted them. In January 2006, the UNDP undertook a socioeconomic survey of participants. In terms of specific training within this programme, 75 percent enrolled in 11 months of Vocational Enterprise Business Training, or VEBT. This contradicted a forecast which said two months of business training and an allowance in cash for the creation of a business was a better incentive (Business Principles and Practice, or BPP). According to this forecast, 190 excombatants were anticipated to participate in the VEBT training and 312 in the BPP. According to SAACID, the reasons for this choice had to do with the following: The climate of insecurity in Mogadishu, which did not lend itself to opening a business. The quantity of allowance, $440, which was insufficient for opening a business, particularly if a portion of this amount had to go to loans to family members. Fear of failure and thus losing the allowance, paid out in three instalments. The salary given to continue training was more secure. Belief that training was more useful in the long term. These reasons, as well as the fact that vocational training of this sort was more expensive than giving grants for creating businesses, for it was based on apprenticeships in small businesses for which the business owner was remunerated for the training he or she provided, forced the UNDP to increase financing to the programme. VEBT and entrepreneurial training through BPP, began in April Three quarters of participants chose automobile mechanics, tailoring, or electrical work. Assistance normally 5

6 exceeds 95 percent. Community leaders ( guarantors ) are informed at every moment on the progress of ex-combatants and they organise regular visits to see them. In June 2006, the UNDP paid out a $200 per capita allowance with one month of delay. Only one of the 126 participants left the training after receiving the money. Various surveys on the conditions of businesses created were conducted up to November The rest of the allowance was paid out in two instalments of $150 and $90. At this time, 12 participants forsook their business. SAACID, who anticipated that 85 percent of participants would take their allowance and disappear, considers the more than 90 percent who continue with their project a success. Throughout all of the process, armed confrontations in the south of Mogadishu affected the normal progress of the programme, which had to be cancelled a few days each month. Three participants died from gunshots in this period. Nevertheless, in December 2006, 505 of 512 participants from both training options completed all aspects of their programme. SAACID considers the success of the programme to be due in large part to the fact that community, including all clans, participated in it. For this reason, it is a model for DDR in the rest of Somalia. In its evaluation, SAACID recommended for future programmes lengthening training periods, giving subsidies to community and political leaders who collaborate in the selection of militia combatants and who do not have other independent sources of income, and including micro-credit for VEBT and BPP. Since during fighting between the Transitional Federal Government and Islamic Courts Union in , there was no remobilisation of militia combatants, the UNDP also considered DDR Phase II to have been successful (UNDP Somalia 2008). In May 2007, UNDP/ROLS promoted a United Nations Working Group on DDR, however, this group did not provide any solutions due to the situation in the country. In September 2007, UNDP/ROLS partnered with the Somali Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme, which was created in June as a part of the new National Security and Stabilisation Plan. The agency developed a roadmap for DDR as part of a short-term agreement (UNDP Somalia 2008; UN Security Council 2007: 15). Somaliland The design of the strategy in Somaliland concluded in May 2005 and by July all security personnel had registered, except in the Sool-Sanaag region. In 2006, UNDP/ROLS initiated a voluntary DDR programme together with the NDC as its governmental counterpart and four local NGOs responsible for the reintegration of 494 demobilised combatants (UNDP Somalia 2005, 2008). There is not much information on the process, however, according to the UNDP, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery evaluated the programme at the end of the 2007 and in its report recommended that the project become more transparent (UNDP Somalia 2008). Puntland There is even less information available on the programme in Puntland. We know that 272 former members of security forces were demobilised in 2006 and that their reintegration began in April 2007 (OCHA Somalia 2007b). The UNDP feels that despite the current challenges in the Somaliland and Puntland programmes, DDR can still guarantee demobilised combatants are not kept on the state s payroll and document both how much money is being saved through the reduction of security personnel and on what areas the money is later spent (UNDP Somalia 2008). 6

7 Bibliography and sources consulted FTS (2007). Consolidated Appeal: Somalia Webpage. New York: OCHA. [Accessed: 30 October 2007] < (2008). Consolidated Appeal: Somalia Webpage. New York: OCHA. [Accessed: 30 October 2007] < International Aid Services (2006). Post War Trauma Counseling Training Report. Report for Saacid-Australia. Mogadishu: IAS, March. Mission Report on DDR/SSR/SALW. Somaliland and Puntland 3-11 April 2005 (2005). Nairobi: UNDP. < Report on DDR - Sompunt April.doc>. OCHA Somalia (2007a). Puntland. Nairobi: OCHA. < (2007b). Somalia: Puntland Factsheet. Nairobi: OCHA, April. < Oxfam Novib (2007). Somali Civil Society Phase 3. Webpage. Nairobi: Oxfam Novib. [Accessed: 20 December 2007] < Saacid (2007a) Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) Programme UNDP- SAACID. Mogadishu, Somalia. 1 December January Mogadishu: Saacid, June. < (2007b). Dissappointing Conclusion to Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Programme. Press statement. Mogadishu: Saacid, 27 June. School for a Culture of Peace (2008). Alert 2008! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peacebuilding. Barcelona: Icaria. < SIPRI (2007). International Arms Embargoes. Webpage. Stockholm: SIPRI. [Accessed: 25 November 2007] < UN Mine Action Service (s.f.). E-MINE. Electronic Mine Information Network. Website. New York: UN. [Accessed: 25 November 2007] < UN Security Council (2007) The Situation in Somalia. Report of the Secretary-General. (S/2007/658), 7 November. < UNDP Somalia (2005). Policy Framework for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Puntland State of Somalia. Nairobi: UNDP. < (2007). Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Webpage. Nairobi: UNDP. [Accessed: 25 November 2007] < Demobilization-and-Reintegration.html>. (2008). UNDP Somalia Careers. Nairobi: UNDP, 23 April. < World Bank (2005). Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics. Washington: World Bank, January. Glossary BPP IGAD NDC NGO OCHA PDDRU PEER ROLS TFG Business Principles and Practice Intergovernmental Authority for Development National Demobilisation Commission in Somaliland Non-Governmental Organization UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Puntland DDR Unit Programme of Emergency Education and Rehabilitation Rule of Law and Security Programme (UNDP) Transitional Federal Government 7

8 UNESCO FTS UNDP UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation Financial Tracking Service United Nations Development Programme 8