SOMALIA. Population: 8.2 million inhabitants (2005) GDP: 5,023 million dollars (2006 est.)

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1 Population: 8.2 million inhabitants (2005) GDP: 5,023 million dollars (2006 est.) Although the country is largely homogeneous from an ethnic, linguistic and religious point of view, it is nevertheless divided along the lines of five large clans which are in turn divided into subsidiary clans and groupings. General S. Barre took power in 1969 and ran the country as a dictatorship until being overthrown in 1991 after three years of civil war had led to the physical destruction of the country and left hundreds of thousands of people dead. A UN peace-keeping operation was introduced in the country in 1992, but this failed and had to be wound up in It is estimated that there may be as many as 100,000 former combatants and militia members in Somalia, belonging to more than 53 different groups. The majority are concentrated in the country s capital. The escalation of violence that took place in the country at the end of 2006 as a consequence of the confrontation between the troops of the Transitional federal Government (GFT) backed by Ethiopia, and the militias of the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SCIS), concluded with the rapid defeat of the Islamic courts militia and the fall of Mogadishu, as a consequence of the military superiority of the GFT. The USA, with the approval of the GFT itself, also participated in the persecution and bombing of the last holdouts of the Islamic militia. In this connection, the GFT set a deadline of three days from January 1 st for the Mogadishu clan militias to proceed to disarm in a voluntary fashion. However, it subsequently renounced carrying out disarmament by force, and conversations have been held between the GFT and the different clans in order to prevent new confrontations. A National Reconciliation Conference was held in Arta (Djibouti) in 2000, at which it was agreed to establish a National Transitional Assembly which in turn subsequently created a National Government of Transition. Since October 2002 (the Eldoret Conference), IGAD (a regional body formed by Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda) has centralised its peace work, holding rounds of talks in Kenya in an attempt to achieve a ceasefire and initiate a reconciliation process. It was decided to create a technical committee that would study disarmament and demobilisation. In May 2003, a research mission comprising representatives from IGAD, the AU, the Arab League and Somali delegates visited a number of cities in the country with the aim of planning the demobilisation of the militias and the collection of weapons. Much work has been done since 2004 to achieve a definitive ceasefire between all the militias, a move that would be monitored by a Military Observer Mission from the African Union, though

2 the presence of foreign troops should not be allowed to detract from the country s internal efforts to achieve progress in the talks between militias. After 14 failed attempts to negotiate a sustainable and lasting peace, both the Transitional Government and the peace process itself are currently in a poor state. The UN maintains a presence in Somalia through its Political Office (UNPOS), which assists the Secretary General in his efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation in the country. The prevailing lack of security represents a significant obstacle to the work of the various United Nations agencies and the different NGOs in the country. The African Union, which approved the deployment of a contingent of 1,700 troops as Peace- Keeping Forces, opened an office in the provisional capital Jawhar in September, to be used as a channel for its support for Somalia. IGAD made public its plans to deploy a peacekeeping force in Somalia, IGASOM, to be replaced nine months later by an AU force. By the end of 2006, the UN Security Council decided to partially ease the arms embargo, which allowed to send armament to the international peace forces and state security bodies. Background to the DDR process: Somalia can be seen as a large testing ground with many initiatives and projects aimed at demobilising combatants, though the success of these programmes is questionable due to the country s security situation. A short summary of the various initiatives already introduced is set out in the following table: UNOSOM I-II UNITAF TFG GTZ / EU UNESCO UNDP TFG Period Budget $ 4 million $ 3 million Aim 10,000 10, ,000 Somaliland 15,000 Centre/South 53,000 Southern Mogadishu/ Coverage Somalia Somalia Puntland Somalia Centre/South Partners Local NGOs UNDP/NGO GTZ/ILO/NGO Functions: Disarmament Creation of Weapons stored authorised in arsenals storing areas Demobilisation Reintegration Lack of resources Only in Somaliland Help for the government Rural rehabilitation Psychological and social support in Somaliland Type of DDR: Although the intention is to demobilise around 53,000 militia members, the programme currently underway involves a project that could be classified as security sector reform, since it consists of the demobilisation of around 4,400 members of security organisations and forces belonging to the Transitional Government.

3 Enforcing bodies: Taking the programme being run by the UNDP as the starting point, this is structured along three separate lines: a) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, both in Somaliland and in Puntland and the rest of the country. b) Somali Demilitarisation Planning Unit (SDPU), with support from the UNDP, the DFID (United Kingdom), the European Commission and Italy, with technical assistance from the African Union. This Unit was created in 2004 for an initial period of six months- It is led by Alejandro Bendaña and is aimed at designing an operational framework for the implementation of a demilitarisation strategy for Somalia. It works in close collaboration with the African Union and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This unit does not exist anymore. c) Control of Small Arms. The Somali government (TFG) has a Minister for DDR and is planning to create a National Demobilisation Committee. Community elders, women s groups and the CSO are all playing an essential role in persuading militia members to sign up to the process and reintegrate in productive activities, as well as Resettlement and Rehabilitation tasks. Strategic aspects of the programme: Former combatants and militia members are given professional training, assistance with the creation of micro-businesses and psychological and social help. Facilities are provided for the storing of heavy weapons and the collection of small arms (of which there are around two million). Groups to be demobilised: It is worth mentioning that some commentators estimate the figure to be as high as 100,000 (some even talk about 200,000), though both the UNDP and the World Bank believe that the main aim of the DDR programme should be the demobilisation of 53,000 Vulnerable groups: 2001 saw the introduction by UNICEF and Elman Peace Centre of a programme for former child combatants in which participants were offered professional training. The programme is currently in its second phase, which began in Funded by the Canadian organisation CIDA it has so far benefited 540 children from three cities, of which 20% are girls. Since 2002, UNESCO has assisted with the demobilisation and professional training of 450 militia members aged between 15 and 35 in the capital. Budget: According to an estimate by the Transitional Government, the amount required for the DDR programme is 23.3 million dollars. However, the programme has until now suffered serious funding problems as support from the donor community is very weak. At the end of 2005, the UNDP and the ECHO paid out 847,000 and 796,000 dollars respectively for the first DDR phase. In February 2006, the UNDP paid out 865,000 dollars. In July 2006 the UNDP (BCPR), with the support of the DFID with seven million dollars, announced the start of projects in the Bay region, bringing the total amount to 32.8 million dollars. The unit cost for the reinsertion of former militia members is $280, while aid for reintegration comes to $800 per head. This amount, which is regarded as insufficient to guarantee proper reintegration, contrasts with the two million dollars spent on collecting and handling weapons. If it is borne in mind that these weapons are not going to be destroyed but instead placed in storage. one can see the potential imbalance between these two parts of the programme.

4 Components Establishment of institutions and improvement of their operational capacity Registration and assistance with reinsertion (53,000 militia members) SOMALIA Funds requested Contributions Donors Shortfall EU, Italy, Sweden, USA, UNDP, UNESCO 1 st phase of reintegration (initial group of 7, 000) Management of weapons and munitions Awareness and the monitoring of arms handovers TOTAL *Amounts shown in millions of dollars In addition, the measures being implemented in Somaliland have financial support from their respective governing authorities. Although it has not been possible to obtain a breakdown of the cost of these measures, the total cost of the programme could be around 1 million dollars per year. Timetable: There is no full scale DDR Programme in Somalia for the moment. We best can describe ongoing DDR in Somaliland and Puntland in Force Reduction pilots, according to the modest number of voluntary beneficiaries so far in the process. Other issues: Security Sector Reform: There are plans to form a police force comprising 30,000 members, of which 18,000 will be stationed in the capital. The UNDP has helped to build a police academy in Puntland with places for 600 cadets. A special group of female police officers has also been trained to attend to cases involving women and children. A Police Training Seminar was held in Uganda in October 2005 with financing from the UNDP and the DFID. This set out a road map for the training of a civilian police force in Somalia over the course of the next two years The project was initially introduced in the regions of Somaliland, with the 20% from the Demobilisation National commission salaries though it is now in the process of being expanded to Mogadishu and central and southern parts of Somalia. Given that this initiative is aimed more at demobilising the militias associated with the Transitional Government rather than members of armed opposition groups, it was decided to begin in the regions in which the government has the greatest presence. In Somaliland and Puntland, the aim is to reduce the excessive numbers of militia fighters associated with the Transitional Government and thus reduce the very high levels of security spending. As regards the rest of the country, given the disparate nature of the different armed groups operating in Somalia, it is acknowledged that the requirements will be different. A bottom-up strategy has therefore been developed in which civilian and community organisations play a fundamental role, both in the identification of militia members and the provision of security, the preparation of financial and social studies and local development programmes.

5 The registration of militia fighters in the northeast of Somalia is now complete, though in central and southern regions of the country it will remain pending until the proper security conditions are in place. Disarmament: In order to benefit from the program, former combatants must hand over a firearm and ammunition. The type of weapon and the basic state in which it is handed over remain to be fixed by the authorities. Weapons will be registered and stored in the authorities arsenals, and only those that are too old, unserviceable or cannot be adapted to the requirements of the future armed forces will be destroyed. At the same time, international assistance is being sought to train the members of the security forces charged with their safekeeping in the correct handling and monitoring of these arsenals and weapons stores. Demobilisation: The government will continue to pay salaries during the 6 months following demobilisation and reintegration. However, individuals must take part in all the compulsory activities arranged as part of the DDR programme during this 6-month period, and any who do not will see their salaries immediately suspended. Reintegration: In the short term, the aid offered by the authorities consists of medical check-ups, professional guidance and basic training. It is intended that the reinsertion period should be as short as possible. In the medium term, assistance is provided for a period of 6 months, during which time a number of reintegration processes are offered, including: - Vocational training - Grants for the creation of small- and medium-sized enterprises - Rural reintegration (including agricultural projects, livestock farming and fishing) - Formal education - Job opportunities Several United Nations agencies are involved in this programme. One notable example is the ILO s project to create public sector jobs in Mogadishu, where it is estimated that 2,000 former militia fighters will be able to be employed, using funds from the EU and the UNDP. It is hoped that this programme will subsequently be extended to the rest of the country, providing a further 2,000 jobs. The ILO is also organising projects involving house-building, education and agriculture in collaboration with UN-Habitat, UNESCO and the FAO. In May 2005, for the first time in 14 years, the main warlords who controlled the capital began to hand over their weapons and a number of military vehicles, confining their militias to several bases around the capital. In June 2005, the Prime Minister indicated that the quartering of militia members would shortly begin, along with a voluntary weapons handover programme. 494 ex Security Forces ongoing reintegration assistance in Somaliland, 272 ex Security Forces out of orientation phase following demobilization phase in Puntland and 500 free lance militia ongoing reintegration assistance in Mogadishu. In July 2006 the UNDP (BCPR), with the support of the DFID with seven million dollars, announced the start of projects in the Bay region, in the south of the country, a region that as been inaccessible since 2002 due to its high level of insecurity. These activities will consist of attending to 3,000 militia members, who will be held for six months in two reception camps on

6 the outskirts of Baidoa. In this holding period, they will be given socio-sanitary care, food, education and registration for a subsequent DDR process. In addition, in support of the peace building project by districts, the Community Support project will carry out projects with the local community (training, workshops) run by they themselves. This project is supported by Norway, the WB and UNDP-BCPR. Context: - Clan-based structure in which weapons form part of the culture of protection. - Insecure borders. - Culture of impunity. - Proliferation of weapons and easy access to them. Planning: - Decentralisation, federal process. - Mistrust over the involvement of troops from neighbouring countries. Financing: - Lack of financial resources. International: - African Union: Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Support of the African Union to the Transitional Institutions of Somalia, IRIN News, at < - Somali Joint Needs Assessment, at < - UNDP, at < - World Bank: Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration of the Somalia Militia, Nairobi, May o Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics, 2005, at < Governmental: - Somalia Aid Coordination Body, at < Non-governmental: - Cliffe, L.: Armed Violence and Poverty in Somalia. A Case Study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative, Centre for International Cooperation and Security of the University of Bradford, 2005, at < - Somaliland Times, at < This briefing has been prepared by Albert Caramés, Vicenç Fisas and Eneko Sanz.