The North Korean Nuclear Program and Extended Deterrence

Transcription

1 The North Korean Nuclear Program and Extended Deterrence Daniel A. Pinkston International Crisis Group, Seoul The 13th PIIC Beijing Seminar for International Security Beijing, 1 November 2012

2 Outline DPRK nuclear program Delivery systems DPRK nuclear motivations Deterring the DPRK: What are we trying to deter? ROK defense posture U.S. extended deterrence 2

3 DPRK nuclear program Command and control Korean People s Army Strategic Rocket Forces (KPASRF; 朝鮮人民軍戰略로케트軍 ) maintains missile assets KPASRF under General Staff and Ministry of People s Armed Forces in peacetime, but in war the General Staff is under direct control of the KPA Supreme Commander During KJI era, KPA supposedly did not have possession of nuclear bombs; probably under control of Second Economic Committee or unknown institution directed by Chu Kyuch ang 3

4 DPRK nuclear motivations Sig Hecker: National security concerns (International environment) International statement; prestige Domestic statement and politics International models or variables are not sufficient in explaining nuclear choices National identity conception or oppositional nationalist decisions are not guided by rational cost-benefit analysis, but by emotional fear and pride that places them in confrontation with the rest of the world (Hymans) Domestic political economy; leaders must build coalitions for political survival (Solingen) 4

5 DPRK nuclear motivations Chuch e ( 主體 ; self-reliance) and sŏn gun ( 先軍 ; military first) Chuch e based on national identity not international class struggle KJI built new coalition around sŏn gun Alternative narrative to Marxism-Leninism But borrows from Lenin s theory of capitalist imperialism Realist orientation state centric and obsessed with power balancing 5

6 Sŏn gun Capitalist core power is imperialist by definition No negative security assurance from U.S. can be credible The only way to avoid enslavement is to possess sufficient military power Arms control and institutional mechanisms to manage the security dilemma is anathema 6

7 Deterring a nuclear DPRK Virtually impossible for Sŏn gun Korea to abandon nuclear weapons DPRK denuclearization requires the abandonment of sŏn gun ideology not U.S. hostile policy Is the DPRK changing? How would we know? Politics Society Economics 7

8 Deterring a nuclear DPRK Until DPRK leadership changes its thinking and begins denuclearization, deterrence is critical What are we trying to deter? Nuclear test Nuclear proliferation Nuclear attack Use of EMP weapon Conventional attack Invasion Conventional provocation Sabotage Assassination Terrorism 8

9 Deterring a nuclear DPRK ROK concerns DPRK nuclear weapons pose an existential threat Nuclear DPRK could be emboldened to conduct conventional military operations Chinese protection and acceptance of DPRK behavior Fears of U.S. abandonment U.S.-ROK alliance is strong now, but OPCON transfer on schedule for

10 ROK defense posture Shift to pro-active deterrence Corresponding target strike plan ( 相應標的打擊計劃 ) disclosed in April 2012 ROK New Missile Guidelines (NMG) 800km range with 500kg payload; 550km and a 1,000kg payload; UAV with 2,500kg payload Developing submarine-launched and ship-launched cruise missiles Gradually moving to acquire more missile defense capabilities Institutional reforms to support better joint operations Defense budget to increase 8~9 percent per year over the next few years 10

11 U.S. extended deterrence Combined Forces Command to be disbanded in 2015; replaced by Korea Command Combined operations to be worked out through the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialog (KIDD) Deterrence through U.S.-ROK alliance based on tailored deterrence, including all U.S. capabilities Extended deterrence coordinated through U.S.- ROK Extended Deterrence Policy Committee 11

12 U.S. extended deterrence U.S. extended deterrence reassures ROK When polled about 65~70 percent of ROK citizens say ROK should have nuclear deterrent Some lawmakers have called for redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to ROK Requires communication between China ROK, and U.S. to avoid misunderstanding and misperception 12

13 謝謝! 고맙습니다! Thank You! 13