The Way Ahead in Counterproliferation

Transcription

1 The Way Ahead in Counterproliferation Brad Roberts Institute for Defense Analyses as presented to USAF Counterproliferation Center conference on Countering the Asymmetric Threat of NBC Warfare and Terrorism May 3, 2002

2 USAF CP Master Plan: Purpose Consolidates existing CP guidance OSD, Joint Staff, and Air Force Provides overarching guidance to coordinate the array of air & space assets on CP activity Accomplish function of a Mission Area Plan Institutes investment strategy process Identify current capabilities, deficiencies, and solutions Directs MAJCOMs to develop implementation plans to organize, train, and equip forces Responsive to CINC/other MAJCOM CP taskings Able to meet growing threat to peacetime bases [slide courtesy Col. Dutch Miller USAF (ret)] 2

3 Today s threat environment puts AF installations at risk from attacks using asymmetric weapons If ready we would expect to see: clear, executable guidance educated & aware personnel the right people responding with the right equipment training & exercises focused on these asymmetric threats with comprehensive, functioning assessment & inspection programs Threat Planning and Response: Are We Ready? [slide courtesy Col. Dutch Miller USAF (ret)] 3

4 USAF has: a vision of necessary readiness a plan for getting there made substantial headway in implementation But: How much progress? How much further to go? What is the difference between progress and success? If success is at the top of 39 steps, how many has USAF climbed? 4

5 Steps and escalators a metaphor to illuminate some counterproliferation challenges 5

6 A More Rapid Climb up the Capabilities and Learning Curves Would be Possible With Leadership from OSD Clear guidance Careful monitoring Sufficient funding A Joint Acquisition Program Timely and cost-efficient Effective at meeting USAF-specific needs Joint Planning With CINCs 6

7 But the escalator appears to be 7

8 Up the Down Escalator Regular personnel turnover in USAF Joint Staff OSD Near-crippling effect on ability to build institutional memory to accumulate necessary core of expertise. 8

9 Challenges of Staying the Course Competing Demands Within USAF Combating Terrorism Shifting OSD Leadership Priorities SECDEF: Aspin to Rumsfeld DEPSECDEF: Deutch to Wolfowitz JCS: Powell to Myers 9

10 To get from here to there looks simple But the reality is messy. 10

11 The Lure of False Remedies There is no quick fix. Not MOPP gear. Not improved detectors. Not vaccination. The solution set is broad. Counterforce. Improved CF! Improved technologies. Better readiness. Different CONOPS. In-place medical and tactical responses. Knowledgeable, aware operators. There is no 100% solution. But a 70 % solution is good. There will always be risks. Manage them. 11

12 As we climb 39 steps Our adversaries are building more. 3 rd and 4 th generation CW apply biotechnology to BW improved delivery bigger stockpiles NBC integration with their planners. 12

13 Success Requires Keeping an eye on the threat environment to understand how it is evolving, especially as adversaries pursue work-arounds. Avoiding the lure of false remedies. Don t wait for the 100% solution. Don t expect counterforce to do the whole job. Learn to manage risks. Staying the course despite many competing demands. Exploiting fully the benefits of cooperation with the Joint Staff, OSD, the CINCS, the other Services. This may require re-motivating them. And it s a two-way street. 13

14 But What Is Success? A Strategic Answer Success is the ability to protect, project, and prevail against an NBC-armed regional aggressor. Success is sustaining the war-fighting in the face of NBC threats and attacks. It does not mean no damage from NBC attacks, but damage limited to levels comparable to historical experience. Success means that the US will not be compelled to limit its war aims short of satisfactory pol-mil goals accept new limits on usability of US conventional power rely on nuclear threats to deter types of WMD attack for which such threats may lack credibility. 14

15 But What Is Success? An Operational Answer The ability to attack and defeat adversary NBC weapons and infrastructure with minimal collateral damage. The ability to recover rapidly from WMD attack and to meet CINC optempo requirements. The ability to rapidly replace or otherwise compensate for force structure components lost to attack. The ability to assure war-fight critical infrastructure. Success equates with counter-nbc war-fighting capabilities in the form of prepared tactical and operational responses. 15

16 How Good Is Good Enough? It depends on the adversary capability and will. Different operational challenges from adversary: 1. With few WMD (mostly CW) and generally risk averse. 2. With a capacity for periodic CW re-attack that matches agents and delivery systems to target characteristics and a capacity for BW attacks seeking primarily political objectives. 3. With many WMD (in a mix of NBC) and risk taking, including willingness to project CBW into US sanctuary for operational effects. 4. With enough WMD to extinguish America and the will to do so. 16

17 The Apocalyptic Scenario With enough WMD to extinguish America and will to do so. Good enough? Protection and defense seems unlikely ever to be adequate to eliminate all vulnerabilities. But for this problem, nuclear deterrence seems promising. The threat of an overwhelming and devastating response ought be credible (unless the adversary believes such an attack can successfully be conducted covertly). 17

18 The Asymmetric Scenarios With few and risk averse, good enough can be measured in ability to recover air base ops after attack. With some ability to re-attack, capabilities must be both deeper (decon, medical, personnel) but broader increased reliance on sensors (mostly CW) in effort to gain battlespace awareness. With many and risk taking, good enough requires a detailed theater-strategic plan encompassing operational adjustments at the theater level and backed by possible nuclear role. 18

19 Good enough? Depends on the challenge. Different levels of performance against different types of threats. How far up this set of stairway landings has the USAF gotten? 19

20 At the top of the steps isn t simply success but successfully passing a test of some kind. 20

21 Iraqi BW and a War of Regime Survival 1990: CIA reports that Iraq s BW program is the most advanced in the Arab world. 1995: Iraq admits to filling aerial bombs and ballistic missile warheads with three biological agents and to predeploying those weapons prior to the Gulf War. Evidence surfaces that release authority for the use of such weapons was predelegated in the event the coalition sought to remove Saddam from power. 2001: A decade after sanctions were first imposed, Iraq has foregone approximately $100 billion in lost oil revenues in its stand-off with the United Nations Security Council over its refusal to relinquish its BW capabilities. 2002: U.S. leaders begin to consider publicly the use of military force against Iraq to seek the end of Saddam s rule. 21

22 Conclusions 1. When the time comes, the USAF will go to war against a CBW-armed adversary whether or not it is good enough. It may run very large risks. 2. Consider the consequences of failure. Mission failure. Many preventable deaths. The public and the President will be angry that more was not done when it could have been done. 3. To successfully manage those risks requires having prepared tactical and operational responses. This requires a broad and deep solution set and knowledgeable, aware operators. 4. The USAF has had a decade to prepare counter-nbc warfighting capabilities. It has gotten farther than the other Services in studying the problem and creating tools to solve it. But it is not prepared. The way ahead should be an urgent rush to bring the necessary operational adjustments into being. 22