THE KOREAN MILITARY BALANCE:

Transcription

1 THE KOREAN MILITARY BALANCE: COMPARATIVE KOREAN FORCES AND THE FORCES OF KEY NEIGHBORING STATES MAIN REPORT Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, With the assistance of Varun Vira, Alex Wilner, and Robert Hammond Revised: February 15, 2011

2 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 2 The Korean Military Balance SUMMARY... 5 THE ASYMMETRIC OR IRREGULAR WARFARE BALANCE... 6 THE NUCLEAR AND CBRN WARFARE BALANCE... 7 THE BALANCE OF WEAPONS OF MASS EFFECTIVENESS AND OFFENSIVE VS. DEFENSIVE WEAPONS THE BALANCE OF DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS SECTION 1: KOREAN AND NORTHEAST ASIA MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND COMPARATIVE RESOURCES EAST ASIAN MILITARY SPENDING NORTH KOREAN MILITARY SPENDING NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN CAPACITY FOR MILITARY EFFORTS Figure 1.1: Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP: (SIPRI) Figure 1.2: Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP (IISS): Figure 1.3: Military Expenditures by the Major Asian Powers: (SIPRI) Figure 1.4: Northeast Asian Defense Expenditures: (IISS) Figure 1.5: Northeast Asian Per Capita Defense Expenditures: (IISS) Figure 1.6: North Korean Defense Budget Figure 1.7: Military Modernization Trends on Korean Peninsula Figure 1.8: Defense Reform 2020 (2005) Plans for ROK Modernization SECTION 2: THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY BALANCE IN THE KOREAS AND NORTHEAST ASIA UNCERTAIN PATTERNS OF CONFLICT AND ESCALATION LOOKING AT KEY TRENDS WESTERN DATA FROM INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES DATA FROM KOREAN DEFENSE WHITE PAPERS DATA FROM THE JAPANESE WHITE PAPER FOR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES CONVENTIONAL FORCE ESTIMATES Figure 2.1: Northeast Asian Military Manpower in Figure 2.2a: Army Manpower and Equipment in Northeast Asia Figure 2.2b: Northeast Asian Modern Main Battle Tanks versus Total Holdings: Figure 2.2c: Northeast Asian Armored Fighting Vehicles: Figure 2.2d: Northeast Asian Modern AFVs (MBTs, APCs, AIFVs) versus Total Holdings of Other Armored Vehicles: Figure 2.2e: Northeast Asian Artillery Strength: Figure 2.3a: Navy Manpower and Equipment in Northeast Asia Figure 2.3b: Northeast Asian Naval Combat Ships: Figure 2.3c: Northeast Asian Naval Combat Ships by Category: Figure 2.3d: Northeast Asian Submarines by Type: Figure 2.4a: Air Force Manpower and Equipment in Northeast Asia Figure 2.4b: Northeast Asian Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft by Branch: Figure 2.4c: Northeast Asian Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft by Type: Figure 2.4d: Northeast Asian Rotary Wing Combat Aircraft by Branch: Figure 2.4e: Northeast Asian Rotary Wing Combat Aircraft by Type: Figure 2.4f: Northeast Asian Modern Air Force Combat Aircraft versus Total Combat Aircraft: Figure 2.5a: Korean and Northeast Asian Air/Missile Defenses Figure 2.5b: Northeast Asian Air Defense Strength: Figure 2.5c: Northeast Asian Air Force Air Defenses: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) CONVENTIONAL FORCE ESTIMATES Figure 2.6a: ROK Estimate of Korean Force Balance in 2010: Manpower Figure 2.6b: ROK Estimate of Korean Force Balance in 2010: Army Figure 2.6c: ROK Estimate of Korean Force Balance in 2010: Navy Figure 2.6d: ROK Estimate of Korean Force Balance in 2010: Air Force... 61

3 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 3 Figure 2.6e: ROK Estimate of Northeast Asian Force Balance in 2010: Manpower Figure 2.6f: ROK Estimate of Northeast Asian Force Balance in 2010: Army Figure 2.6g: ROK Estimate of Northeast Asian Force Balance in 2010: Navy Figure 2.6h: ROK Estimate of Northeast Asian Force Balance in 2010: Air Force Figure 2.6i: ROK Estimates of DPRK Military Manpower Trends from 2004 to Figure 2.6j: ROK Estimates of DPRK Army Equipment Trends from 2004 to Figure 2.6k: ROK Estimates of DPRK Navy Equipment Trends from 2004 to Figure 2.6l: ROK Estimates of DPRK Air Force Equipment Trends from 2004 to Figure 2.6m: ROK Estimates of ROK Manpower Trends from 2004 to Figure 2.6n: ROK Estimates of ROK Army Equipment Trends from 2004 to Figure 2.6o: ROK Estimates of ROK Navy Equipment Trends from 2004 to Figure 2.6p: ROK Estimates of ROK Air Force Equipment Trends from 2004 to GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN CONVENTIONAL FORCE ESTIMATES Figure 2.7a: Japanese Summary Estimates of Forces on the Korean Peninsula in Figure 2.7b: Japanese Estimates of Japanese Self Defense Forces Figure 2.7c: Japanese Estimates of Chinese Armed Forces in SECTION 3: US FORCES IN KOREA AND THE PACIFIC THE PACIFIC US FORCES IN KOREA US FORCES IN JAPAN AND USPACOM Figure 3.1: Japanese Estimates of US, South Korean and North Korean Forces in the Korean Peninsula Figure 3.2: Relocation of U.S. Forces in Korea from Figure 3.3: Japanese Estimates of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) in Figure 3.4: US Forces in the Pacific in 2010: Equipment by Type and Location Figure 3.5: US Forces in the Pacific in 2010: Forces by Role and Location SECTION 4: SPECIAL, ASYMMETRIC, AND PARAMILITARY FORCES SPECIAL AND ASYMMETRIC FORCES PARAMILITARY, POLICE, AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES Figure 4.1: Northeast Asian Special Forces Figure 4.2 DPRK Infiltration Routes: Tunnels Figure 4.3: DPRK Artillery Figure 4.4: Reserve and Paramilitary Forces DPRK Reserve and Paramilitary Units Figure 4.5: Internal Security Portions of US State Department Human Rights Report: Democratic People's Republic of Korea Figure 4.6: Internal Security Portions of US State Department Human Rights Report: Republic of Korea SECTION 5: COUNTERTERRORISM, TERRORISM AND LOW-LEVEL ASYMMETRIC WARFARE Figure 5.1 Counterterrorism and Terrorism in North Korea (DPRK) Figure 5.2 Counterterrorism and Terrorism in the Republic of Korea (ROK) SECTION 6: KOREAN MISSILE AND WMD FORCES NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS Key Nuclear Weapons Developments Arms Control Chronology NORTH KOREAN MISSILE PROGRAMS UNDERSTANDING NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN CAPABILITIES IN MORE DETAIL NTI OVERVIEW OF SOUTH KOREA South Korean Nuclear South Korean Biological South Korean Chemical South Korean Missile Figure 6.1 South Korean Missile Forces: NTI OVERVIEW OF NORTH KOREA North Korean Nuclear Figure 6.2: North Korean Plutonium Production and Separation, as of Mid

4 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 4 Figure 6.3 Known North Korean Nuclear Tests Figure 6.4: Timeline of North Korea s Nuclear Program North Korean Biological North Korean Chemical North Korean Missile Forces Figure 6.5: North Korean Missile Forces: Figure 6.6: Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles SECTION 7: THE BROADER BALANCE OF WMD, MISSILE, AND STRATEGIC FORCES THE BALANCE OF WEAPONS OF MASS EFFECTIVENESS CHINA AND STRATEGIC ASYMMETRIC WARFARE THE US AND EXTENDED REGIONAL DETERRENCE THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE CHARACTER OF DEFENSIVE WEAPONS Figure 7.1: US and Asian Nuclear Capable forces Figure 7.2: Chinese Missile Forces:

5 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 5 Summary There is no one Korean military balance that can be used for policy planning, negotiations, or arms control. The tensions between the Koreas -- and the potential involvement of China, Japan, in the US at political and military levels create a virtually open-ended level of possible conflicts. This is particularly true if one consider the number of times that war has grown out of unpredictable incidents and patterns of escalation, the historical reality that the probability of less probable forms of war actually occurring has been consistently higher than what seem to be the most probable contingencies in peacetime, and the patterns of escalation that seem most likely from the viewpoint of a rational bargainer. Moreover, far more data are available from a South Korean, Japanese, US and Western perspective than from a Chinese or North Korean perspective. While individual Chinese or North Korean experts may issue more detailed estimates, it was not possible to find such data in Chinese or North Korean official statements and white papers or such material from Chinese or North Korean NGOs by conducting a search of the Internet or material easily available in the West. As a result, the data presented in this analysis have an inherent bias. They reflect the views of Western, South Korean, and Japanese experts and have been selected to try to reflect official views or declassified inputs from Western intelligence experts where possible. In some critical cases, such as the data on North Korean missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the data have had to be drawn from the work of NGOs. It is obvious in many cases that such data are not fully reliable, although they are a useful indication of Western, South Korean, and Japanese perceptions. The Resource, Arms Import, and Military Spending Balance Some data are available on the relative weight of military effort in North and South Korea, and in China, Japan, and the US. These data are summarized in this report, but it is unclear that it has great value since no meaningful estimates are available for North Korea. Moreover, meaningful unclassified data are not available on key areas like arms transfers. There is no consensus on levels of military spending or how to assess them. More broadly, efforts to compare data between state-controlled and market economies raise major questions as to the comparability of cost. This not only affects investment, but every aspect of manpower and readiness. North Korea, example, can command any amount of manpower it wants at the price it wants. South Korea cannot. The Conventional Warfare Balance The balance of North and South Korean conventional forces cannot be separated from the role US forces would play in a conflict, from Japan s willingness to support US basing and staging into Korea, and from the role China would play in trying to limit any threat to North Korea as a buffer state. Much would also depend on the conditions that led to a confrontation or actual fighting. North Korea might conduct a major conventional build-up to pressure South Korea, Japan, and/or the United. It might do so to deal with internal unrest by trying to focus the nation on a foreign enemy. It might launch a limited war for the same reasons. It is doubtful that South Korea would initiate such a conflict, but it cannot be sure what level of escalation will follow any response to a limited incident or North Korean of attack of the kind

6 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 6 North Korea initiated by attacking the South Korean ship Cheonan on March 26, 2010, and by artillery fire on densely populated South Korean island of Yeonpyeong that killed four people, on November 23, South Korea might also be confronted with a North Korea succession crisis or massive suppression of the population creating a strong incentive for some form of decisive South Korean military action. North and South Korea both operate in a security environment where the risk of dragging the US and China into a conventional conflict, and the dilemma this would create for Japan, tends to limit the scope of any given conventional war. At the same time, if North and South Korea do go to war with conventional forces the perceptions of risk and capability may be so different on each side and involve such complex mixes of the use and threaten use of asymmetric, conventional, nuclear, and long-range missile forces that each side might make a major miscalculation and a conflict might escalate in predictable ways that neither state could control. Moreover, North Korea s ideological hostility to South Korea and the US could lead North Korea to escalate in ways that are unpredictable and make a rational bargainer approach to scenario planning and predicting escalation highly uncertain. Similarly, a US and Japanese role in support of South Korea coupled to any South Korea success that threatened the existence of North Korea would confront China with the risk of losing a key buffer state. China might, or might not, choose to intervene at any stage in such a conflict either to limit or deter any action against North Korea or to ensure that South Korean and US forces did not occupy part of North Korea. Either side might try to use strategic air and/or missile power in support of its tactical forces, particularly if it appeared to be losing or came under serious pressure. It is possible, that a conflict could escalate to conventional fighting affecting Chinese bases, as well as US bases and carrier task forces, including those as far away as Guam and the outer island chain the US might use to base long-range bombers and stealth aircraft. Moreover, China might put pressure on Taiwan as a means of indirectly pressuring the US. The naval dimension of a new Korean War is also unpredictable. North Korea could use its submarines, smart mines, and longer-range antic-ship missiles in a wide variety of ways, including covert or asymmetric attacks on shipping, and outside Korean waters. It might perceive a naval war including some kind of attack or seizure of a US ship as safer way of exerting pressure. China might or might not become involved. Japan would have to decide on its naval posture. The Asymmetric or Irregular Warfare Balance North Korea has repeatedly challenged South Korea using low level covert operations and asymmetric attacks and used them to put pressure on both Korea and the United States. North Korea has also deployed large amounts of its force structure for the same purpose, keeping South Korea under constant pressure. It has created a special balance in the border area by creating tunnel systems and deploying large amounts of artillery in caves and sheltered positions within range of South Korea s capital, Seoul. The historical record shows that there was nothing new about North Korea s use of such attacks in North Korea s willingness and inventiveness in using the threat and reality of such attacks was so consistent between 1950 and 2007, that it led the Congressional Research Service to prepare a 36 page chronology which covered 164 examples of armed invasion; border

7 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 7 violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism (including assassination and bombing); threats/intimidation against political leaders, media personnel, and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean government; actions undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations; and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. 1 As the CRS report noted, The most intense phase of the provocations was in the latter half of the 1960s, when North Korea (Democratic People s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) staged a series of limited armed actions against South Korean and U.S. security interests. Infiltration of armed agents into South Korea was the most frequently mentioned type of provocation, followed by kidnaping and terrorism (actual and threatened). From 1954 to 1992, North Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of 3,693 armed agents into South Korea, with 1967 and 1968 accounting for 20% of the total. Instances of terrorism were far fewer in number, but they seemed to have had a continuing negative impact on relations between the two Koreas. Not counting North Korea s invasion of South Korea that triggered the Korean War ( ), North Korea s major terrorist involvement includes attempted assassinations of President Park Chung Hee in 1968 and 1974; a 1983 attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan s life in a bombing incident in Rangoon, Burma (Myanmar); and a mid-air sabotage bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707 passenger plane in Reported provocations have continued intermittently in recent years, in the form of armed incursions, kidnappings, and occasional threats to turn the South Korean capital of Seoul into a sea of fire and to silence or tame South Korean critics of North Korea. Then, in July 2006, North Korea launched seven missiles into the Sea of Japan, and in October 2006, it tested a nuclear bomb. North Korea may well have its own list of charges and complaints, but its public statements are largely political in character. An open source analysis of such material does not seem to be available. The Nuclear and CBRN Warfare Balance North Korea has conducted two low yield nuclear tests, and has effectively ended its past agreements to limit the production of nuclear materials and its missile tests. While unclassified estimates are to some extent sophisticated guesswork, North Korea may have obtained enough Plutonium from its power reactors to have 4-13 nuclear weapons even allowing for the material used in its two tests. Moreover, Siegfried Heckler a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory reported on a visit to Yongbyon that he saw a small, sophisticated facility with some 2,000 centrifuges that were P-2 advanced designs. 2 This means that North Korea may have significant stocks of enriched uranium, as well as plutonium. At a minimum, this means North Korea s future production of weapons grade material is impossible to predict, and that both targeting and arms control are far more difficult because of the inability to predict how many dispersed centrifuge facilities North Korea may have. Similar uncertainties arise because of the inability to predict how sophisticated North Korea s weapons and warhead design capabilities are. US experts feel North Korea has obtained some 1 Hannah Fischer, North Korean Provocative Actions, , Congressional Research Service, RL30004, April 20, See Seigfried Heckler, A Return Trip to North Korea s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex, November 20, 2010, David Albright and Paul Brannan, Satellite Image Shows Building Centrifuges in North Korea, ISIS, November 21, 2010, and Taking Stock: North Korea s Uranium Enrichment Program, October 8, 2010; Jonathan Medalia, North Korea s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications, Congressional Research Service, R41160, November 24, 210; Kwang Ho Chun, North Korea s Nuclear Question: Sense of Vunerability, Defensive Motivation, and Peaceful Solution, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, December 2010.

8 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 8 advanced missile warhead design data, and this was confirmed by the sale of some of these data by the A. Q. Khan network. Moreover, North Korea s ambitious missile programs are still largely in development and their capabilities are impossible to predict until the nature of a nuclear warhead is know, and there have been enough tests of North Korea s longer range missiles to provide a clear picture of their performance. Some estimates indicate that North Korea s SRBMs include some regular and extendedrange Scud missiles, and one source indicates it could have deployed up to 100 much longer range. According to that source, North Korea may deploy its missiles in two belts, in bases with in the rear area. The first is kilometers north of the DMZ, and the second kilometer north. A third belt may exist more than 175 kilometers from the border. 3 However, North Korea s longer-range No Dong MRBM missile (700-1,500 kg warhead and 1,000-1,500 km range) is still developmental and would require large numbers of additional, full range, tests to become a mature program. The Japanese Defense White Paper for 2010 reports that Japan believes tests were limited to a possible launch into the Japan Sea in late May 1993, a mix of Scud and No Dong launches on July 5, 2006, and a mix of launches that might have involved some No Dongs from the Kittareryong district of North Korea on July 4, Some experts feel North Korea s larger Taepodong 1 MRBM missile (1,000-1,500 kg warhead and 1,500-2,500 km range) has never been launched, except as an SLV. The Japanese Defense White Paper for 2010 reports one successful launch occurred on August 31, Similarly some experts believe the Taepodong 2 ICBM missile (500-1,500 kg warhead and 4,500-8,000 km range) has never been launched, and it is not clear whether its missile engines have been used as an SLV. The Japanese Defense White Paper for 2010 reports one failed launch occurred in July 1996, and a second launch on April 5, 2009 when North Korea fired a missile that may have been a Taepodong 2 into the sea at a range over 3,000 kilometers. 5 Another system, North Korea s Musudan IRBM (650-1,000 kg warhead and 2,500-3,200 km range) may be a copy or modification of the Russian R-27/BM-25 series. It may have been launched at very short ranges for test purposes, but is not operational. These uncertainties make it impossible to estimate any of these missiles reliability and accuracy, and whether North Korea has anything approaching some form of terminal guidance technology. 6 The focus on North Korean nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs raises important issues for the Korean balance per se, and for the US in deterring or responding to North Korean threat or reality of using nuclear weapons against South Korea. This threat, however, cannot be limited to the Korean peninsula. It already extends to Japan and US bases in Japan. US reaction again raises the issue of what China s response would be and whether a crisis could escalate to 3 Joseph S. Bermudez, Going Ballistic North Korea s advanced missile capabilities, Jane s Intelligence Review, See Joseph S. Bermudez, Going Ballistic North Korea s advanced missile capabilities, Jane s Intelligence Review, 2009; Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February, 2008; and Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, English translation, pp See Joseph S. Bermudez, Going Ballistic North Korea s advanced missile capabilities, Jane s Intelligence Review, 2009; Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February, 2008; and Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, English translation, pp See Joseph S. Bermudez, Going Ballistic North Korea s advanced missile capabilities, Jane s Intelligence Review, 2009; Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February, 2008,

9 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 9 the point where the US-Chinese strategic and nuclear balance became relevant a threat that could force Japan to make hard choices of its own. As is noted in the introduction, however, North Korean nuclear weapons programs are only part of a far wider range of important issues in assessing the Korean balance: The US and China are major nuclear powers, with boosted and thermonuclear weapons. While neither is likely to use nuclear weapons, they have that capability, and at a minimum it plays a major role in the balance of deterrence and in shaping the risks of asymmetric escalation. North Korea has implosion fission weapons. Its numbers, weapons yields, and ability to create reliable bombs and missile warheads are uncertain, but it seems likely it either has them or is rapidly moving towards acquiring them. It almost certainly has programs to develop boosted and thermonuclear weapons, but there status is unknown. South Korea had a covert nuclear weapons program that it halted after quiet negotiations with the US. This gives it a significant nuclear breakout capability if it should reverse its decisions. Japan is unlikely to have nuclear weapons programs, but has all of the technology and material necessary to rapidly acquire them and develop boosted and thermonuclear weapons. The US and China have nuclear-armed aircraft and ICBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs, and SRBMs with boosted and thermonuclear weapons. North Korea may have long-range tactical and theater missiles with implosion nuclear weapons. North Korea is a major chemical weapons state, and probably has advanced chemical warheads and bombs. China may have stocks of chemical weapons. There is no way to estimate the size, type, and lethality/effectiveness of their relative stockpiles, or doctrine and plans for using them. It should be noted, however, that relatively crude mustard gas weapons played a decisive role in area denial and disruption of Iranian forces in the final phase of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, and that stocks of persistent nerve gas and socalled 4 th generation chemical weapons are possible. South Korea is suspected to have a chemical weapons program, and may have covert stocks of chemical weapons. North Korea is strongly suspected to have a biological weapons program and may have stocks of such weapons. These could range from basic weapons types to genetically modified types. China s program is not discussed in unclassified official statements. South Korea may have a program. It should be noted that China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and the US all have advanced civil biological, food processing, chemical processing, and pharmaceutical facilities that can be adapted to both chemical and biological weapons development and production. All have significant capability for genetic engineering of biological weapons. All would have to develop advanced biological weapons for test purposes to conduct an effective biological defense program. No public details are available on the efforts of any power to develop small or specialized chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons for covert delivery or potential transfer to non-state actors and third countries. China and North Korea have large numbers of conventionally armed long-range missiles capable of hitting targets in South Korea. The nature of their conventional warheads is not clear, and this is critical since unity conventional warheads have limited lethality, and terminal guidance is needed to provide the accuracy necessary to strike at high value, rather than broad area targets. China and North Korea may already have, and are certainly developing, ballistic and cruise missiles with some form of terminal guidance. The US has large numbers of precision-guided long range cruise missiles for air and sea launch, and precision-guided long-range multiple rocket launchers. US stealth aircraft can deliver precision-guided weapons at standoff ranges from most Chinese and North Korean surface-to-air missiles with the exception of the S300/S400 series. China is developing long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles that can strike large surface ships like US carriers at long distances. These potentially are weapons of mass effectiveness that can launch devastating strikes against critical facilities and infrastructure without the use of WMD warheads.

10 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 10 The US, Japan, and South Korea have some ballistic missile defense capability and are working together to develop wide area theater ballistic missile defense systems. China has the Russian S300/S400 series of advanced surface-to-air missile defenses, and is almost certainly seeking more advanced missile defense capabilities. North Korea lacks such capabilities, but is almost certainly seeking them. The balance of air and missile defense capabilities plays a critical role in limiting the offensive capabilities of the opposite side and reducing the risk in using one s own missiles. This makes air and missile defenses the equivalent of a major offensive weapon. China, the US, South Korea, and possibly North Korea, all have advanced cyberwarfare capabilities. China has some anti-satellite capability, and possibly some form of EMP weapon. These too are potential weapons of mass effectiveness that can launch devastating strikes against critical facilities and infrastructure without the use of WMD warheads. Current arms control efforts and assessments of the Korean balance may focus on North Korea s nuclear programs, but they are only part of a far more complex and rapidly evolving mix of current and potential capabilities to deliver weapons of mass destruction or mass effectiveness. The threat that such weapons may be used also cannot be limited to the Korean peninsula. It already extends to Japan and US bases in Japan. US reaction again raises the issue of what China s response would be and whether a crisis could escalate to the point where the US-Chinese strategic and nuclear balance became relevant a threat that could force Japan to make hard choices of its own. The range of uncertainties on this list also raises two key issues for arms control. One is the socalled Nth weapon paradox. It may be possible to reduce a nation s nuclear weapons, but it is probably impossible to be certain it does not retain at least a few. The problem for arms control is that the smaller the stockpile, the more it has to be used in ways that threaten absolutely critical targets like major population centers rather than a given military target. Arms reductions can easily escalate targeting. The second is the diversion effect: The risk that nuclear controls can drive states even more towards advanced biological and chemical weapons. Advances in biotechnology have made control regimes virtually impossible, as well as vastly increased the potential lethality of biological weapons to levels beyond that of even boosted and thermonuclear weapons. It is also clear that the nuclear threat already is only part of the equation. North Korea has long been a chemical weapons power. It is believed to have active biological weapons programs, and it clearly has long-range missile programs that can target Japan and any target in South Korea. These can potentially be armed with a range of CBRN warheads but no meaningful unclassified evidence exists of the range of such warheads or their lethality. The same is true of North Korean bombs, and rocket warheads. This means that CBRN escalation could occur at a wide range of unpredictable levels including asymmetric, covert, and terrorist attacks. Moreover, North Korea is already acquiring missile engines and boosters that will give it ICBM capabilities to attack targets in the US. The Balance of Weapons of Mass Effectiveness and Offensive vs. Defensive Weapons It is equally important to stress, however, that conventionally armed missiles can also be used to threaten or attack targets. It is unclear how accurate North Korea s missiles are, and whether North Korea has a real-world terminal guidance capability to use ballistic missiles or can develop such systems for cruise missiles. As long as North Korea does not have such smart

11 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 11 warheads, conventionally armed missiles are largely terror weapons that can produce limited casualties and damage in targets as large as cities or military facilities as large as airfields. Once North Korea does have t a real-world terminal guidance capability, however, such missiles may become weapons of mass effectiveness that can destroy high value and critical infrastructure targets with conventional warheads. This could lead to new patterns of escalation where the US and South Korea used precision guided air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, and cruise missiles to destroy critical North Korean targets, or the threat of such use to deter North Korea. Alternatively, the US and South Korea might threaten or initiate the use of precision guided air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, and cruise missiles to destroy critical North Korean targets in add effort to halt a North Korean conventional attack. Cyberwarfare is becoming steadily more critical, and affects civil operations as well as warfighting. It is important to note that South Korea is probably more dependent on the Internet than any other nation in the world. Any use of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons could also have a massive impact on US battle management and IS&R systems. Moreover, the fact so many missile and precision air strike systems are being deployed has turned defensive weapons such as ballistic missile defense and surface-to-air missile forces into offensive forces as well. The comparative ability to defend also equates to the ability reduce the risk in escalating to offensive missile, air, and stealth attacks. The Balance of Different Perceptions This report examines each of these balances using a range of different sources. The primary statistical data on the military balance are drawn from reporting by the Institute for Strategic Studies, but these are supplemented in each section by a range of data taken from US, Japanese, and South Korean official sources, other NGOs, and defense reporting be sources like Jane s. Similar data are not available in meaningful detail from unclassified North Korean and Chinese sources. It should be noted that major differences exist in the estimates of given sources both in terms of data on given military forces, and as to how the balance should be assessed. It is clear that any model for negotiations and arms control would present at least the same need for research and negotiations over basic data that affected the START, MBFR, and CFE talks. At this point, there is no common base of perceptions to build upon.

12 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 12 Section 1: Korean and Northeast Asia Military Expenditures and Comparative Resources It is not possible to make meaningful comparisons of North and South Korean military expenditures using unclassified data. No government provides such comparisons, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies does not make estimates for North Korea. Estimates of Chinese military expenditures are highly controversial, and raise major question regarding the extent to which definitions of such estimates are comparable in terms of both what is included and prices. Moreover, there is no clear way to relate US military spending to the Korean balance, although US military capabilities play a major role in that balance. East Asian Military Spending In the past, the US State Department issued comparable estimates of military effort and arms transfers based on models that estimated the size of each military effort based on comparable prices. These reports have long been discontinued, however, and think tank or NGO has the resources or access lo intelligence to make credible estimates on its own. North Korean Military Spending It is possible, however, to make some comparisons for Asian countries other than North Korea, and these are shown in Figures 1.1 to 1.5. In broad terms they show that South Korean and Japanese national security expenditures have been relatively static, while China is emerging as major regional military power. Moreover, Jane s has developed some useful material on the size of the North Korean effort, drawn from South Korean sources, and this is report is summarized on in Figure 1.6. It concludes that, North Korea's defense budget reached nearly USD9 billion in 2009, around 15 times more than the official amount declared by Pyongyang, the state-run Korea Institute of Defense Analyses (KIDA) has said in a report. The KIDA report - cited by the state-funded Yonhap news agency on 18 January - said North Korea had previously announced a USD570 million defense budget, although the real expenditure, calculated on an exchange rate based on purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, was USD8.77 billion. Yonhap quoted the report as saying: "In spite of its economy shrinking since the mid-2000s, North Korea has gradually increased its military spending." According to KIDA, official North Korea figures state that the defense budget increased to USD570 million in 2009 from USD540 million in 2008, USD510 million in 2007 and USD470 million in 2006, although these figures do not reflect PPP. Previous estimates have indicated that North Korean defense spending is equal to at least 15 per cent of GDP. In 2008 Pyongyang said it was allocating 15.8 per cent of GDP on defense although it has not released any GDP figures for a number of years. In 2009 the US State Department stated that North Korea's defense spending was more than 22 percent based on its estimate that North Korea's GDP in 2009 was USD40 billion based on PPP.

13 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 13 How much North Korea is allocating towards defense procurement is similarly contested but it is thought to be at least 40 per cent of its expenditure, with most of these finances directed at centrally controlled indigenous programs: a consequence of North Korea's impoverished economy and its international isolation. Some of these figures have an obvious bias, while others are little more than educated guesses. They are almost certainly correct however, in indicating that North Korea is willing to devote far more of its total economy to national security expenditures than South Korea. North and South Korean Military Modernization Figures 1.7 and 1.8 provide a different approach to measure relative military effort. Figure 1.7 compares North and South Korean military modernization. Figure 1.8 summarizes the modernization plans through 2020 that South Korea issued in There are serious limits to the unclassified data available for such comparisons. They do not include many smart munitions, they only cover a limited amount of other weapons, and they do not reflect investments in logistics and transport. They also do not include battle management, IS&R (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), or C4 command, control, communications, and computer) assets. These are becoming steadily more critical aspects of military modernization. Nevertheless, Figure 1.7 shows that South Korea has modernized more rapidly and with more advanced equipment than North Korea, while North Korea has focused on force expansion. South Korea has almost achieved a massive lead in modern aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. Figure 1.8 shows that South Korea has an effective plan for force modernization through 2020 a plan it has upgraded since There is no unclassified North Korean equivalent. North and South Korean Capacity for Military Efforts Finally, there are useful data on each country s capacity to develop and support its forces. The CIA estimates that North Korea had a GDP in 2010 worth roughly $40 billion (ranking 98 th in the world), while South Korea s GDP was worth some $1,467 billion (ranking 13th in the world), or nearly 37 times that of that of North Korea. It also estimated that North Korea had a GDP per capita worth some $1,900 (ranking 196 th in the world), while South Korea s GDP was worth some $30,200 (ranking 45th in the world), or more than 16 times of that of North Korea. 7 The CIA draws a sharp contrast between the economies of North And South Korea: 8 North Korea, one of the world's most centrally directed and least open economies, faces chronic economic problems. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment and shortages of spare parts. Large-scale military spending draws off resources needed for investment and civilian consumption. Industrial and power output have declined in parallel from pre-1990 levels. Severe flooding in the summer of 2007 aggravated chronic food shortages caused by on-going systemic problems, including a lack of arable land, collective farming practices, and persistent shortages of tractors and fuel. Large-scale international food aid deliveries have allowed the people of North Korea to escape widespread starvation since famine threatened in 1995, but the population continues to suffer from prolonged malnutrition and poor living conditions. Since 2002, the government has allowed private "farmers' markets" 7 CIA, World Factbook, North Korea and South Korea, accessed January 27, GDP measured in purchasing power parity terms. 8 CIA, World Factbook, North Korea and South Korea, accessed January 27, 2011.

14 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 14 to begin selling a wider range of goods. It also permitted some private farming - on an experimental basis - in an effort to boost agricultural output. In October 2005, the government tried to reverse some of these policies by forbidding private sales of grains and reinstituting a centralized food rationing system. By December 2005, the government terminated most international humanitarian assistance operations in North Korea (calling instead for developmental assistance only) and restricted the activities of remaining international and non-governmental aid organizations. In mid-2008, North Korea began receiving food aid under a US program to deliver 500,000 metric tons of food via the World Food Program and US nongovernmental organizations; but Pyongyang stopped accepting the aid in March In December 2009, North Korea carried out a redenomination of its currency, capping the amount of North Korean won that could be exchanged for the new notes, and limiting the exchange to a one-week window. A concurrent crackdown on markets and foreign currency use yielded severe shortages and inflation, forcing Pyongyang to ease the restrictions by February Nevertheless, firm political control remains the Communist government's overriding concern, which likely will inhibit changes to North Korea's current economic system. Since the 1960s, South Korea has achieved an incredible record of growth and global integration to become a high-tech industrialized economy. Four decades ago, GDP per capita was comparable with levels in the poorer countries of Africa and Asia. In 2004, South Korea joined the trillion-dollar club of world economies, and currently is among the world's 20 largest economies. Initially, a system of close government and business ties, including directed credit and import restrictions, made this success possible. The government promoted the import of raw materials and technology at the expense of consumer goods, and encouraged savings and investment over consumption. The Asian financial crisis of exposed longstanding weaknesses in South Korea's development model including high debt/equity ratios and massive short-term foreign borrowing. GDP plunged by 6.9% in 1998, and then recovered by 9% in Korea adopted numerous economic reforms following the crisis, including greater openness to foreign investment and imports. Growth moderated to about 4-5% annually between 2003 and With the global economic downturn in late 2008, South Korean GDP growth slowed to 0.2% in In the third quarter of 2009, the economy began to recover, in large part due to export growth, low interest rates, and an expansionary fiscal policy, and growth exceeded 6% in The South Korean economy's long-term challenges include a rapidly aging population, inflexible labor market, and overdependence on manufacturing exports to drive economic growth. The CIA estimates that North Korea had a total population of 22.7 million), while South Korea s population is 48.6 million, or more than 2.1 times that of North Korea. It estimates the median age of North Korea s population at 33.9 years, and that of South Korea at 37.9 years. Finally it estimates that North Korea had 6.1 million males eligible for military service and 885,000 young men entering military age each year), while South Korea had 13.3 million eligible males and 371,000 males entering military age. 9 All of these data show that South Korea has far more resources to use in supporting its national security structure than North Korea, and that the overall trends are likely to remain significantly in South Korea s favor. The World Bank and UN make somewhat different estimates, but all agree that South Korea as a vastly larger economy, with far better income distribution and personal wealth, and far more personnel that can be devoted to military service. South Korea s disadvantages are that its population has much higher expectations; it must pay far more for manpower, must price military investment in market rather than command terms, and finds it harder to command popular sacrifices in the name of enhanced security. 9 CIA, World Factbook, North Korea and South Korea, accessed January 27, 2011.

15 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 15 Figure 1.1: Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP: (SIPRI) 10 Russia South Korea China Japan Japan China South Korea Russia % 1.80% 2.60% 3.70% % 2.00% 2.60% 4.10% % 2.10% 2.40% 4.40% % 2.10% 2.50% 4.30% % 2.00% 2.50% 3.80% % 2.00% 2.60% 3.70% % 2.00% 2.60% 3.60% % 2.00% 2.60% 3.50% % 2.00% 2.80% 3.50% % 1.40% 2.80% 3.40% 10 Based on data provided by SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Data for North Korea is unavailable.

16 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 16 Figure 1.2: Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP (IISS): South Korea North Korea Japan China China Japan North Korea South Korea Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010).

17 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 17 Figure 1.3: Military Expenditures by the Major Asian Powers: (SIPRI) 12 (In $US Billions, 2008) South Korea Russia Japan India China Based on data provided by SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Data for North Korea is unavailable.

18 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 18 Figure 1.4: Northeast Asian Defense Expenditures: (IISS) 13 China Japan North Korea South Korea ,223 41, , ,174 41, , ,187 46, , Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010).

19 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 19 Figure 1.5: Northeast Asian Per Capita Defense Expenditures: (IISS) 14 China Japan North Korea South Korea Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010).

20 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 20 Figure 1.6: North Korean Defense Budget 15 North Korea's defense budget reached nearly USD9 billion in 2009, around 15 times more than the official amount declared by Pyongyang, the state-run Korea Institute of Defense Analyses (KIDA) has said in a report. The KIDA report - cited by the state-funded Yonhap news agency on 18 January - said North Korea had previously announced a USD570 million defense budget, although the real expenditure, calculated on an exchange rate based on purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, was USD8.77 billion. Yonhap quoted the report as saying: "In spite of its economy shrinking since the mid-2000s, North Korea has gradually increased its military spending." According to KIDA, official North Korea figures state that the defense budget increased to USD570 million in 2009 from USD540 million in 2008, USD510 million in 2007 and USD470 million in 2006, although these figures do not reflect PPP. Previous estimates have indicated that North Korean defense spending is equal to at least 15 per cent of GDP. In 2008 Pyongyang said it was allocating 15.8 per cent of GDP on defense although it has not released any GDP figures for a number of years. In 2009 the US State Department stated that North Korea's defense spending was more than 22 percent based on its estimate that North Korea's GDP in 2009 was USD40 billion based on PPP. How much North Korea is allocating towards defense procurement is similarly contested but it is thought to be at least 40 per cent of its expenditure, with most of these finances directed at centrally controlled indigenous programs: a consequence of North Korea's impoverished economy and its international isolation. Despite this, Russia, China and parts of Eastern Europe and the Middle East are thought to have supplied Pyongyang with selected critical equipment, replacement parts and technologies in recent years, most of which have been to support the country's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The West has attempted to curtail North Korea's indigenous military programs most notably through a range of sanctions. The most recent measures to this effect were introduced in 2009 and 2010 following a series of missile tests and a detonation of a nuclear device carried out by Pyongyang in the first half of 2009, and the sinking of the Republic of Korea Navy's corvette Chon An in March last year off the coast of North Korea. Some analysts believe, however, that these increasing restrictions are prompting North Korea to form a closer defense partnership with China. Marcus Noland, a deputy director and senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, DC, wrote in an academic paper in 2009: "An unintended consequence [of the sanctions] has been to dramatically raise the share of North Korea's trade with China, and with Iran, Syria and Egypt - countries with which it shares nuclear and/or missile interests... This geographical shift in trade makes traditional sanctions even less potent." 15 Jon Grevatt, Analysts reveal real North Korea 2009 defense budget, Jane s Defense Weekly, January 19, 2011

21 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 21 Figure 1.7: Military Modernization Trends on Korean Peninsula 16 Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 17 North Korea has deliberately pursued an asymmetric strategy to enhance its long-range strike capability against civilian and military targets to compensate for declining conventional capabilities. Specific attention has been focused on self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and ballistic missiles. More reliance has also been given to the Special Forces, tasked with stealthy infiltration of the ROK rear. According to the 2010 ROK White Paper, DPRK Special Forces have been augmented to a 200,000 end-strength, up from 180,000 in Some key equipment modernization trends in the last decade are outlined below. Army Type Remarks MBTs 3,500 3,500 IISS reported no changes in DPRK MBT holdings but the 2010 ROK White Paper noted the introduction of the Pokpung-Ho (Storm Tiger), believed to be modeled on the T-72 Air Force (and Air Defense) Type Remarks SAMs 45 SA-2 7 SA-3 2 SA SA SA-3 38 SA-5 Major reported increase in DPRK SAM holdings Combat Aircraft 16 MIG-29 Fulcrum 35 MIG-29 Fulcrum Transport Aircraft 300 An An-2 The An-2s are a key component of DPRK asymmetric strategy designed to facilitate the infiltration of Special Forces into the ROK rear UAV Shmel Introduced in Attack Helicopters 20 Mi-24 Hind Navy Type Remarks Submarines 26 SSK PRC Type- 031/FSU Romeo 45 SSI 21 SSK PRC Type- 031/FSU Romeo 20 SSI Aggregate decrease in total North Korean submarines with 5 SSKs either retired or not operational in The bulk of decreases were in SSI submarine holdings. 16 All figures unless otherwise noted are based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). 17 Jonathan Pollack, The Strategic Futures and Military Capabilities of the Two Koreas, in Ashley Tellis, Michael Wills, Strategic Asia : Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, (DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005)

22 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 22 Republic of Korea (ROK) 18 In the last decade South Korea has been confronted with major choices and dilemmas including reductions in manned U.S. units on its territory, a greater desire for autonomy within the U.S.-ROK alliance and a hostile threat environment. These trends have pushed the ROK to increase its capabilities in areas previously overseen by U.S. forces, notably in surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning. In 2005 the South Korean Ministry of Defense released The Defense Reform 2020 Initiative which outlined ROK strategy to create a slimmer and more selfreliant military focused on technological improvements. Some key goals included procuring advanced aircraft and transforming a largely coastal patrol force into a blue-water navy 19 (see Figure 1.8) DPRK hostilities in 2010 have also pushed South Korean leaders to amend their reform plans to pursue a more aggressive strategy to guard against future DPRK hostilities. These have included increased militarization in the Yellow Sea to convert its five islands into fortresses, 20 reducing the magnitude of the proposed troop cut to retain army manpower at 517,000 instead of 500,000, increasing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters in the wake of the sinking of the Cheonan and strategizing means to combat the North s irregular warfare tactics. 21 Major equipment modernization trends are outlined below. Army Type Remarks Battle Tanks 800 Type-88 (K1) 1420 K/K1A1 Armor holdings increased from about 2,130 to 2,750 by2010 with an emphasis on shifting towards thirdgeneration MBTs APCs 300 Bv206 Artillery K-9 Thunder Introduced in 2005, the K-9 selfpropelled howitzer was designed to replace the aging M109A2 and significantly increase the ROK s artillery capacity. SAMs 110 MIM-23B I-HAWK 158 MIM-23B I-HAWK; 48 Patriot (on delivery) Navy Type Remarks Submarines 3 KSS-1 Dolgorae 2 SSK Son Won-ill 2 KSS-1 Dolgorae 8 SSI Dolphins were phased out within this period Destroyers 3 King Kwanggaeto 3 Kwang-Ju Corvettes Naval Aviation 23 combat capable fixedwing aircraft (15 S-2Es, 8 P-3C Orion) 1 Sejong KDX-III 6 Chungmugong Yi Sun- Jhin KDX-II 3 Gwanggaeto Daewang KDX-I 4 Dong Hae 8 combat capable fixedwing aircraft (P-3C Orion) In order to reach their goal to become a blue-water navy by 2020, the decade saw major developments with new lines of indigenous destroyers being deployed and total numbers increasing from 6 to 10 by Older surface ships appear to have been retired. Decrease in total naval aviation. Fixedwing holdings fell from 23 to 8 and armed helicopters from 47 to 24. ASW 18 Jonathan Pollack, The Strategic Futures and Military Capabilities of the Two Koreas, in Ashley Tellis, Michael Wills, Strategic Asia : Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, (DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005) 19 Bruce Bennett, A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea s Defense Reform Plan, RAND, Available at 20 South Korea push to build military fortresses, AP, December 7, Available at 21 Pyongyang threat spurs defense re-think, Oxford Analytica, January 24, Available at South Korea s Defense Reform Initiative 2020 under intense review, Asia Defense (Blog), May 29, Available at

23 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page Lynx (ASW) 24 Lynx MK99/MK99A (ASW) capabilities were however doubled, with further increases anticipated. Air Force Type Remarks Combat Aircraft 88 KF-16C/D Fighting Falcon 130 F-4D/E Phantom 39 F-15K Eagle (20 more on order) 164 KF-16C/D Fighting Aircraft numbers remained stable but the F-4s were phased out in favor of fourth-generation fighters Falcon Recce Aircraft 4 Hawker 800RA; 20 KO-1 EW/ELINT 4 Hawker 800SIG UAVs 3 Searchers 100 Night Intruders In the wake of the November 2010 Yeonpyeong artillery attack, modernization plans appear to have grown in urgency. Some examples are noted below South Korean government sources indicated in January 2011 that they have pushed for expedited purchase of fifth generation stealth fighters by 2015 with a targeted introduction date of Contenders include the Boeing F-15, Lockheed Martin s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and EADS Eurofighters 22 Seoul has been lobbying for revisions to a bilateral accord that limits their ballistic missiles to a 300- kilometer range and 500kg payload. South Korean military officials claim Growing reports that South Korea is interested in substantially increasing defense-related deals with Israel to buy drones, missiles, radars, and possibly missile defense systems. 23 The most recent was a $29 million deal with Israel s Elbit systems in January 2011 to supply Airborne Electric Warfare (EW) Suites and Missile Warning Systems for the ROKAF CN-235 transport aircraft. 24 In end December 2010, the ROK MOD announced it will create a new Joint Forces Command to reform the top military command structure and increase operability between branches South Korea to speed up combat fighter purchase, Reuters, January 29, Available at 23 Amos Harel, South Korea eyes upgrading Israel defense deals in light of tensions with North, Haaretz, January 12, Available at 24 Elbit Systems to supply the Republic of Korea Airborne EW Suites and MWS Valued at Approximately $29 Million, Elbit Systems, January 11, Available at 25 Military overhauls command, JoongAng Daily, December 30, Available at

24 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 24 Figure 1.8: Defense Reform 2020 (2005) Plans for ROK Modernization Bruce Bennett, A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea s Defense Reform Plan, RAND, Available at

25 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 25

26 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 26

27 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 27 Section 2: The Conventional Military Balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia As has been stressed in the introduction, there is no one conventional balance that is most likely to shape any conflict between the Koreas, and asymmetric and nuclear forces are likely to play at least some role in the way any conflict develops. As is noted in the introduction, the balance of North and South Korean conventional forces cannot be separated from the role US forces would play in a conflict, from Japan s willingness to support US basing and staging into Korea, and the role China would play in trying to limit any threat to North Korea as a buffer state. In broad terms, South Korea has the advanced in conventional force quality and North Korea has the advantage in force quantity. James R. Clapper, the US Director of National Intelligence, summarized the conventional balance as follows in his testimony to the U.S. Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on February 10, 2011: North Korea s conventional military capabilities have eroded significantly over the past years due to persistent food shortages, poor economic conditions, inability to replace aging weapons inventories, reduced training, and increased diversion of the military to infrastructure support. Therefore, Pyongyang increasingly relies on its nuclear program to deter external attacks on the state and to its regime. Although there are other reasons for the North to pursue its nuclear program, redressing conventional weaknesses is a major factor and one that Kim and his likely successors will not easily dismiss. Nevertheless, the Korean People s Army remains a large and formidable force capable of defending the North. Also, as demonstrated by North Korean attacks on the South Korean ship Cheonan in March 2010 and Yeongpyong Island in November. North Korea is capable of conducting military operations that could potentially threaten regional stability. These operations provide Pyongyang with what the regime may see as a means to attain political goals through coercion. Uncertain Patterns of Conflict and Escalation There is no reason to assume that any new Korean War would involve the total commitment of the conventional forces on each side, would separate the use of conventional warfare from asymmetric warfare, could be decoupled from the deterrent and war limiting impact of the fact that North Korea has nuclear and chemical weapons, and both the US and China are major regional nuclear powers. A war might escalate into a struggle for control of the Korean peninsula, but it is far from clear that this would be the case. North Korea might conduct a major conventional build-up to pressure South Korea, Japan, and/or the United. It might do so to deal with internal unrest by trying to focus the nation on a foreign enemy. It might launch a limited war for the same reasons. Both North and South Korea would be under at least initial pressure to keep any conflict limited and to find ways to end it, and return to the status before the conflict began. It is possible that North Korea might take the risk of an all out attack, and some experts have postulated that it might do so if its regime either came under severe internal threat in an effort to

28 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 28 unify North Korea s citizens around a foreign threat, or it felt it was isolated politically and the US and/or South Korea might attack. It seems more likely, however, that North Korea would use conventional forces to conduct a limited war for limited objectives. It might try to seize islands or part of the DMZ, or to demonstrate its capability to threaten and intimidate South Korea through a limited attack or by launching a major artillery attack across the border on Seoul or some other critical South Korean strategic objective. It might increase the readiness of conventional forces and/or deploy more forward in a battle of intimidation and never go beyond a minor border incident, raid, or use of asymmetric forces in a limited attack somewhere in South Korea or local waters. It is doubtful that South Korea would initiate a new Korean conventional conflict, but it cannot be sure what level of escalation will follow any response to a limited incident or attack of the kind North Korea made on the South Korean ship Cheonan on March 26, 2010, and by North Korea s artillery fire on densely populated South Korean island of Yeonpyeong near the countries' western border which and killed 20 people on November 22, South Korea might also be confronted with a North Korea succession crisis or massive suppression of the population of North Korea creating a strong incentive for some form of decisive South Korean military action. Outside powers would initially play a major role in deterring both sides from a major escalation of conventional conflict. The risk of dragging the US and China into a conventional conflict, and the dilemma this would create for Japan, would tend to limit the scope of any given conventional war. At the same time, North Korea s ideological hostility to South Korea and the US could lead North Korea to escalate in ways that are unpredictable and make a rational bargainer approach to scenario planning and predicting escalation highly uncertain. Any major North Korean success on the ground, or escalation of a war, would almost certainly lead the US to escalate its forces and to expand its range of targets in North Korea. It is possible that North Korea might ignore this risk or miscalculate, but it seems unlikely. Similarly, any South Korea success that threatened the existence of North Korea would confront China with the risk of losing a key buffer state. China might, or might not, choose to intervene at any stage in such a conflict either to limit or deter any action against North Korea or to ensure that South Korean and US forces did not occupy part of North Korea. It is at least possible, that this escalation could extend to conventional fighting affecting Chinese bases, as well as US bases and carrier task forces, including those as far away as Guam and the outer island chain the US might use to base longrange bombers and stealth aircraft. Moreover, China might put pressure on Taiwan as a means of indirectly pressuring the US. Either side might use strategic air and missile power, and attacks on population centers and critical infrastructure, to support tactical operations. In fact, it seems likely that such escalation would occur the moment either side perceived it was threatened with major losses or some form of defeat. The US also demonstrated during the first and second Gulf Wars in 1991 and 2003, as well as in its attacks on Serbia, that strategic air and missile power can play a critical role in limiting an opponent s tactical capability. They can temporarily cripple civilian targets in ways that produce little collateral damage and allow the civil economy to function. Air-land and airsea operations are now becoming far more complex than in the past, and the directions between

29 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 29 tactical attacks and interdiction, and tactical and strategic operations are much less distinct and easy to predict. The naval dimension of a new Korean War is also unpredictable at virtually every level. North Korea could use its submarines, smart mines, and longer-range antic-ship missiles in a wide variety of ways, including covert or asymmetric attacks on shipping, and outside Korean waters. It might perceive a naval war including some kind of attack or seizure of a US ship as a safer way of exerting pressure. China might or might not become involved. Japan would have to decide on its naval posture. Seen from this perspective, the most important measures in terms of stability may not be arms reductions, or controls on modernization and force change per se, but finding ways to limit the risk of confrontation and escalation. Confidence building measures and transparency might do more to limit risk. Expanding limits on deployment in the border area, risk to critical population centers, allowing neutral or mixed observers at exercises, real time transparency on force movements, and mediation of border, air, coastal, and sea control disputes are examples. Looking at Key Trends That said, the data on the total strength of each side s potential forces, and their comparative rate of modernization, still provides a broad picture of their relative war fighting capability. It should be noted that the sources shown do not agree on many details, and that an examination of other NGO and commercial data from source like Jane s reveals additional differences. This could be a key problem in determining security measures. It took more than five years for NATO to agree on the core elements of the conventional balance in studying its options for MBFR and CFE, and another half-decade for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reach an agreement that was far more a political compromise than a rigid search for analytic validity. As a result, this the Figures in this section of the analysis present three main sets of data and comparisons based current capabilities and trends as seen from a Western, South Korean, and Japanese perspective. The primary source for the Western data is the International Institute of Strategic Studies, which is able to draw on a mix of declassified data, official data, and expert assessment. In addition, data are drawn from South Korean white papers prepared by the South Korean ministry of defense, and similar White Papers from Japan. Western Data from International Institute of Strategic Studies The data from the International Institute of Strategic Studies present the problem as do all unclassified sources they cannot reflect the contingency plans of the countries listed. Accordingly they list the total forces of each China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan. They deliberately omit US forces, which are described in the next section. US naval and air forces would surge from outside the area, and the current total of US forces in Japan and South Korea is largely a symbol of such a surge. US land forces would be much harder to surge, but would also build-up from outside Japan and South Korea. Much would also depend on Japan s willingness to serve as a staging point, and how much pressure China did or did not put in other areas like the Pacific and Taiwan Straits. This is a key problem for arms control. In many ways, the current balance is not the issue. It is the potential balance and role of outside forces in a given contingency. Moreover, limits on

30 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 30 forward deployed land forces in South Korea or the Chinese border area in North Korea would favor escalation to the use of air and missile power, or key elements of specialized land force reinforcement which quality and specialization would be more important than numbers. Figure 2.1 shows the total manpower on each side. It is clear that North Korea and China have much larger manpower totals. The problem, however, is that manpower quality and training -- and associated weapons, sustainability, battle management, IS&R, and C4 capability are likely to be far more important than total active reserve manpower. Mass is still important, but total manpower no longer is a key measure of force strength. Figure 2.2 shows relative balance of army manpower and land force equipment strength. Here too, North Korea and China have a massive lead in force strength. Given the economic disparity between the Koreas, this figure shows that North Korea is one of the most militarized countries in the world. It has extraordinarily large anti-aircraft holdings, nearly twice the artillery strength of South Korea, as well as a major advantage in self-propelled artillery and a massive lead in multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). North Korea has a lead in main battle tanks, which is partially offset by a South Korean lead in tank quality. (2.2b). It is, however less mechanized than South Korea, and m ore limited in total armored maneuver strength. (2.2.c), and South Korea at least has parity in rotary wing attack and transport capability because of superior aircraft capability. It should be noted that operations by the forces of each side would be sharply affected by the air-land, surface-to- surface missile battles areas where the quality of IS&R capability and smart air munitions would have a major impact on the balance. Figure 2.3 shows relative balance of naval manpower and equipment strength. North Korea again as a lead over South Korea in manning, but is inferior in virtually every aspect of major naval surface vessel fleet strength and capability. North Korea, however, has a major lead in amphibious vessels, potential mine layers, and smaller surface vessels of the kind that can be used in asymmetric warfare, and allow it to operate close to shore and outside the normal operating area of major US naval surface vessels. North Korea also has a major lead in conventional submarines, as does China over Japan. It should be noted that operations by the forces of each side would be sharply affected by the air-sea, smart mine, and anti-ship missile battles -- areas where the quality of IS&R capability and smart air munitions would again have a major impact on the balance. Figure 2.4 shows relative balance of air manpower and equipment strength. North Korea again as a lead over South Korea in manning, and has one in total aircraft. North Korea, however, is far inferior in terms of aircraft quality at every level (2.4b and 2.4d), and has a larger and more capable mix of total air, army, and naval attack and combat helicopters (2.4d). North Korea only has 35 MiG-29A/S fighters, and these are the only aircraft approaching a modern type in a force of 620 combat aircraft. South Korea is completing a buildup of 59 F-15K advanced modern fighters and has 164 modern F-16C/Ds. South Korea s 60 AH1F/J attack helicopters are probably superior in individual capability to North Korea s 20 Mi-24s. Figure 2.5 shows relative balance of surface-to-air air and ballistic missile missile strength. The trends in missile defense are discussed later in Section Seven. North Korea has large, but largely obsolete surface to air missile defenses. North Korea also has massive numbers of short-range manportable air defense systems (MANPADs) and anti-aircraft guns. The IISS estimates it has some 10,000 MANPADs and 11,000 guns. South Korea has smaller holdings of surface-to-air missiles, but has far more modern and more capable Hawk and Patriot systems compared to North Korea s aging SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5 systems. South Korea s qualitative advantage in SAMs would more than offset North Korea s advantage in numbers. In is unclear how much North Korea s advantage in AA guns and MANPADs really matters. Most are aging and have limited range and capability. US and South Korean strike aircraft have effective countermeasures against most MANPADs and can use air-to-surface missiles from standoff ranges. It is important to note that these data, and the data on US forces shown in Section 3, can only hint at the qualitative advantages that the South Korean side could have when the total associated weapons, sustainability, battle management, IS&R, and C4 capabilities of US and South Korean forces are considered, and that this would be particularly true in China stood aside from the conflict. The role of external players is critical in any scenario where they become engaged, and relative force quality could easily be far more decisive than force numbers.

31 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 31 Data from Korean Defense White Papers The data in recent South Korea white papers is shown in Figures 2.6a to Figure 2.6p. These data differ strikingly from the IISS data, as well as from the Japanese assessments shown later, and data from sources like Jane s that are not shown in detail in this report. The manpower data in Figure 2.6a, for example, do not agree for any service in either North or South Korea with the data shown earlier in Figure 2.1. The same is true of the data on army equipment (2.6b), where South Korea shows a much larger North Korean superiority in tanks and other armored vehicles, and uses a very different but unstated way of counting artillery. South Korea also presents a very different count of helicopters, and flags a North Korean advantage in river crossing assets ignored in other estimates of the balance. The South Korean data on the naval balance (2.6c) not only show very different numbers for force strength, they make no distinction between the size and capability of naval surface vessels a count that sharply understates the quality of the South Korean fleet. The South Korean data on the air balance are radically less favorable than the IISS for South Korea. The IISS shows a ratio of total South Korean vs. North Korean air force combat aircraft of 620 to 467. The South Korean white paper for 2010 shows a ratio of total South Korean vs. North Korean air force combat aircraft of 820 to 460. These same differences occur when the comparison is expanded to cover China and Japan. (Figures 2.6e to 2.6h), and are further complicated by the fact South Korea changes definition from one type of comparison of the same forces to another. There are no consistent patterns in the differences in the estimates for China and Japan, but it should be noted that official US estimates often count the same forces very differently in given commands, services, and branch of the US intelligence community. Much depends on the reason a given comparison is developed, and the definitions used definitions that often are not explicitly explained in a given source. Figures 2.6i to 2.6p illustrate another difficulty in making force comparisons. They show the estimates of North Korean forces in different South Korean white papers from 2004 to They do not reveal any major trends in terms of a North Korean build-up, but they do show that South Korea has changed the way it counts North Korean forces over time. Again, a similar comparison of IISS and US official estimates would show the same kinds of differences, and there is no one or right way of counting forces. This does, however, make net assessments much harder to make (and evaluate), and presents obvious problems for any arms control effort that is not either zero-based on hard intelligence data or a negotiated political compromise. Data from the Japanese White Paper for 2010 The data in the Japanese white paper for 2010 is shown in Figures 2.7a to Figure 2.7c. These data seem to be similar to the IISS data, although they differ in detail. They also have the same broad differences from the South Korean white papers as the IISS estimates. Figure 2.6b does provide new trend data on the size of Japanese Self Defense Forces. These data are useful in showing that Japan is not increasing the size of its forces, or potential threat to

32 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 32 China or North Korea although Japan has made steady improvements in the quality of its forces, its ability to project them, and the quality of its air and missile defense forces. The Japanese data in Figures 2.6c and 2.6.d provide an estimate of the size of Chinese forces and US forces in South Korea. Figure 2.6.d provides a useful estimate of how small the US forces in South Korea now are, and shows that they been reduced to a size that is largely demonstrative, if not virtually a trigger force.

33 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 33 International Institute of Strategic Studies Conventional Force Estimates Figure 2.1: Northeast Asian Military Manpower in 2010 (In thousands) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Navy Army Air Force

34 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 34 Figure 2.2a: Army Manpower and Equipment in Northeast Asia 27 Army and Army Reserve Manpower (1,000s) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Active Reserve Army Equipment China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Air Defense Air defense, guns Air defense, man portable Air defense, surface-to-air missile Aircraft 10 Aircraft, utility Anti-Tank Anti-tank, guns Anti-tank, missile Anti-tank, ramped craft logistic Anti-tank, rocket launcher Artillery Artillery, multiple rocket launcher Artillery, self-propelled Artillery, towed Artillery, mortar Helicopter Helicopter, attack Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment and personnel figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

35 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 35 Helicopter, search and rescue Helicopter, operations special 7 Helicopter, support Helicopter, training 30 Helicopter, utility Personnel Carrier Armored infantry fighting vehicle Armored personnel carrier Reconnaissance 100 Tank Tank, light Tank, main battle

36 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 36 Figure 2.2b: Northeast Asian Modern Main Battle Tanks versus Total Holdings: (Number in Active Service) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Not Modern Modern Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Data includes both Army and Marine inventories. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

37 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 37 Figure 2.2c: Northeast Asian Armored Fighting Vehicles: (Number of Tanks, OAFVs, APCs, RECCE, in active service) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Armored personnel carrier Armored infantry fighting vehicle Reconnaissance 100 Tank, main battle Tank, light Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Data includes both Army and Marine inventories. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

38 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 38 Figure 2.2d: Northeast Asian Modern AFVs (MBTs, APCs, AIFVs) versus Total Holdings of Other Armored Vehicles: (Number in active service) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan LFV, Not Modern ACV, Not Modern APC, Not Modern APC, Modern 250 AIFV, Not Modern AIFV, Modern MBT, Not Modern MBT, Modern Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Data includes both Army and Marine inventories. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

39 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 39 Figure 2.2e: Northeast Asian Artillery Strength: (Number in active service) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Artillery, mortar Artillery, towed Artillery, self-propelled Artillery, multiple rocket launcher Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Data includes both Army and Marine inventories. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

40 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 40 Figure 2.3a: Navy Manpower and Equipment in Northeast Asia Navy and Navy Reserve Manpower (1,000s; Figures include Naval Aviation and Marines) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Active Reserve Navy Equipment Aircraft, warfare China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Aircraft anti-submarine Aircraft, bomber 50 Aircraft, fighter 84 Aircraft, fighter ground attack Aircraft, maritime patrol 4 80 Aircraft, maritime patrol anti-submarine warfare Aircraft, reconnaissance 13 Aircraft, search and rescue 7 Aircraft, tanker 3 Aircraft, training Aircraft, transport 66 9 Aircraft, utility 5 Amphibious Amphibious assault vehicle Landing platform, dock 1 Landing helicopter platform, Landing ship, dock 2 Landing ship, medium

41 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 41 Landing ship, tank Command Ships 1 Amphibious command ship 1 Corvettes 5 28 Destroyers Destroyer 4 Destroyer, with guided missile Frigates Frigate 3 Frigate, with guided missile Helicopter, warfare Helicopter anti-submarine Helicopter, assault 25 Helicopter, countermeasures mine Helicopter, search and rescue Helicopter, support 8 3 Helicopter, training 8 Helicopter, utility 4 5 Landing Craft Air cushion vehicle Amphibious assault ship Landing craft, heavy Landing craft, medium Landing craft, personnel light Landing craft, tank 6 Landing craft, utility Landing craft, vehicles and personnel

42 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 42 Mine Warfare, Counter Mine support Mine vessel countermeasures, countermeasures, 4 Mine hunter, coastal 24 6 Mine sweeper, coastal Mine sweeper, drone 46 Mine sweeper, ocean Mine Warfare, Layer 1 1 Patrol and Coastal Combatants Fast patrol craft with SSM Fast patrol craft, coastal Fast patrol craft, inshore 75 Guided missile patrol craft 16 4 Patrol craft 6 Patrol craft, coastal 27 Patrol craft, inshore Patrol hydrofoil, with SSM 1 Patrol hydrofoil, with Torpedo Personnel Carrier 180 Armored personnel carrier 180 Submarines, Strategic 3 Submarine, ballistic-missile, nuclear-fuelled 3 Submarines, Tactical Submarine, attack, diesel, non-ballistic missile launchers Submarine, attack, nuclearpowered Submarine, diesel

43 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 43 Submarine, diesel, coastal 21 Submarine, diesel, inshore 2 Submarine, diesel, with ASW capability Tank 100 Tank, light

44 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 44 Figure 2.3b: Northeast Asian Naval Combat Ships: (Number in active service) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Submarines, Tactical Submarines, Strategic 3 Other Patrol Craft Missile Patrol Craft Mine Warfare, Layer 1 1 Frigates Destroyers Corvettes Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Data for patrol crafts includes standard, fast and hydrofoil patrol craft types. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

45 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 45 Figure 2.3c: Northeast Asian Naval Combat Ships by Category: (Number in active service) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Major Surface Combat Ships Submarines Other Patrol Craft Missile Patrol Craft Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010).

46 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 46 Figure 2.3d: Northeast Asian Submarines by Type: (Number in active service) Ballistic-missile, nuclearfuelled Attack, diesel, non-ballistic missile launchers China Attack, nuclear-powered 6 Diesel 1 3 Japan North Korea Diesel, coastal 21 1 South Korea Diesel, inshore 2 Taiwan Diesel, with ASW capability Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

47 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 47 Figure 2.4a: Air Force Manpower and Equipment in Northeast Asia Air Force and Air Force Reserve Manpower (1,000s) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Active Reserve Air Force Equipment China Japan North Korea South Korea Air Defense Air defense, guns Air defense, man portable 3050 Air defense, static 38 Air defense, surface-to-air missile Air defense, surface-to-air missile, self-propelled Air defense, surface-to-airmissile, towed Taiwan Aircraft Aircraft, airborne early warning Aircraft, bomber Aircraft, electronic warfare Aircraft, fighter Aircraft, fighter ground attack Aircraft, reconnaissance Aircraft, search and rescue 20 Aircraft, surveillance 3 Aircraft, tanker 18 4 Aircraft, training Aircraft, transport

48 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 48 Aircraft, utility 10 Helicopter Helicopter, attack 20 Helicopter, reconnaissance 103 Helicopter, search and rescue Helicopter, support Helicopter, utility Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

49 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 49 Figure 2.4b: Northeast Asian Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft by Branch: (Number in active service) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Navy, Fixed Wing, Combat Air Force, Fixed Wing, Combat Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

50 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 50 Figure 2.4c: Northeast Asian Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft by Type: (Number in active service) Aircraft, bomber/fighter ground attack Aircraft, maritime patrol anti-submarine warfare China Japan Aircraft, maritime patrol 4 80 Aircraft, fighter/fighter, ground attack Aircraft, fighter ground attack North Korea South Korea 8 Taiwan Aircraft, fighter Aircraft, bomber Aircraft, anti-submarine warfare Aircraft, anti-submarine Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Data for each aircraft type represent the sum of all active service aircraft in Army, Navy and Air Force inventories. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

51 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 51 Figure 2.4d: Northeast Asian Rotary Wing Combat Aircraft by Branch: (Number in active service) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Air Force, Combat Helicopter 20 Army, Combat Helicopter Navy, Combat Helicopter Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

52 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 52 Figure 2.4e: Northeast Asian Rotary Wing Combat Aircraft by Type: (Number in active service) China Japan North Korea South Korea Helicopter, special operations 6 Helicopter, mine countermeasures Taiwan Helicopter, attack Helicopter, assault 25 Helicopter, anti-submarine warfare Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Data for each aircraft type represent the sum of all active service aircraft in Army, Navy and Air Force inventories. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

53 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 53 Figure 2.4f: Northeast Asian Modern Air Force Combat Aircraft versus Total Combat Aircraft: (Number in active service) China Japan North Korea South Korea Taiwan Fixed Wing, Combat, Modern Fixed Wing, Combat, Not Modern Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Data for each aircraft type represent the sum of all active service aircraft in Army, Navy and Air Force inventories. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

54 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 54 Figure 2.5a: Korean and Northeast Asian Air/Missile Defenses 40 Country Major SAMs Light SAMs DPRK 38 SA-5 Gammon 179+ SA-2 Guideline 133 SA-3 Goa 13,050 SA-16/SA-7/SA-14 ROK China Chun Ma Pegasus 158 MIM-23B I-HAWK 48 Patriot* 200 HQ-7A 60 SA-15 Gauntlet (Tor M1) 30 HQ-6D Red Leader 24 HD-6D 60+ HQ-7 32 HQ-9 24 HQ-12 (KS-1A) 32 S-300PMU (SA-10B) 64 S-300PMU-1 (SA-10C) Grumble 64 S-300PMU-2 (SA-10C) Grumble 300+ HQ-2/HQ-2A/HQ-2B(A) (SA-2) Guideline 60 FIM-43 Redeye 200 FIM-92A Stinger 350 Javelin 170 Mistral SA-16 Gimlet HN-5A/HN-5B Hong Nu FN-6/QW-1/QW-2 Japan 60+ Type-81 Tan-SAM 180 MTM-23B I-HAWK 10 Type-03 Chu-Sam 110 Type-93 Kin SAM 192+ MIM-104 Patriot* 16+ PAC-3 Patriot (system)* 50+ FIM-92A Stinger 330+ Type-91 Kin-SAM/Kei SAM Taiwan 74 FIM-92A Avenger 2 M-48 Chaparral 25 MIM-104 Patriot* 465+ FIM-92A Stinger 40 Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Figures represent equipment in use across service branches. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

55 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page MIM-23 HAWK 6 PAC-3 Patriot (system)* 6 Tien Kung I Sky Bow/Tien Kung II Sky Bow Note: * indicates ABM (anti-ballistic missile) capability

56 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 56 Figure 2.5b: Northeast Asian Air Defense Strength: China Japan DPRK ROK Taiwan Air defense (SAM) Air defense, MANPAD Air defense, guns Total Air Defenses Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Data includes both Army and Marine inventories. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

57 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 57 Figure 2.5c: Northeast Asian Air Force Air Defenses: China Japan DPRK ROK Taiwan Air Defense (MANPAD) 3050 Air Defense (Towed SAM) Air Defense (SP SAM) 300 Air Defense (SAM) 300 Air Defense (Static) Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Data for each aircraft type represent the sum of all active service aircraft in Army, Navy and Air Force inventories. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

58 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 58 Republic of Korea (ROK) Conventional Force Estimates Figure 2.6a: ROK Estimate of Korean Force Balance in 2010: Manpower 43 Army Personnel Navy Personnel Air Force Personnel Special Forces DPRK ROK Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, Defense White Paper Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

59 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 59 Figure 2.6b: ROK Estimate of Korean Force Balance in 2010: Army 44 Tanks Armored Vehicles Artillery/MRL S Guided River Crossing Weapons Equipment Helicopters DPRK 4,100 2,100 13, ,000 0 ROK 2,300 2,500 5, Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, Defense White Paper Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

60 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 60 Figure 2.6c: ROK Estimate of Korean Force Balance in 2010: Navy 45 Surface Combatants Submarines Landing Vessels Mine Sweeping Boats Other Helicopters DPRK ROK Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, Defense White Paper Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

61 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 61 Figure 2.6d: ROK Estimate of Korean Force Balance in 2010: Air Force 46 Combat Aircraft C2-ISR Aircraft Air Mobility Aircraft Training Aircraft Helicopters DPRK ROK Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, Defense White Paper Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

62 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 62 Figure 2.6e: ROK Estimate of Northeast Asian Force Balance in 2010: Manpower 47 DPRK ROK China Japan Air Force Personnel Navy Personnel Army Personnel Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, Defense White Paper Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

63 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 63 Figure 2.6f: ROK Estimate of Northeast Asian Force Balance in 2010: Army Tanks LFVs APCs Armored Vehicles Towed Artillery Self Propelle d Artillery MLRS Helicopt ers ROK DPRK China Aircraft Japan Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, Defense White Paper Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

64 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 64 Figure 2.6g: ROK Estimate of Northeast Asian Force Balance in 2010: Navy Submari nes Strategic Submari nes Aircraft Carriers Surface Combata nts Minesw eepers Amphibi ous Vessels Support Vessels Helicopt Fighters ers ROK DPRK China Japan Note: ROK Naval Helicopters are estimate based on reconciliation of total helicopters in ROK forces versus those in use by ROK-AF and ROK-N Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, Defense White Paper Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

65 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 65 Figure 2.6h: ROK Estimate of Northeast Asian Force Balance in 2010: Air Force Strategic Bombers Bombers C2-ISR Fighters Tankers AWACs Training Aircraft Helicopter s ROK DPRK China Japan Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, Defense White Paper Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

66 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 66 Figure 2.6i: ROK Estimates of DPRK Military Manpower Trends from 2004 to Air Force Personnel Navy Personnel Army Personnel Army Personnel Navy Personnel Air Force Personnel Japan China ROK DPRK Figure 2.6j: ROK Estimates of DPRK Army Equipment Trends from 2004 to River Crossing Equipment MRLS Field Artillery Armored Vehicles Tanks Tanks Armored Vehicles Field Artillery MRLS River Crossing Equipment ,100 2,100 8,500 5,100 3, ,900 2,100 8,500 5,100 3, ,700 2,100 8,500 4,800 2, ,700 2,100 8,500 5,000 2, Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense White Papers (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). Available at Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service. 52 Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense White Papers (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). Available at Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

67 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 67 Figure 2.6k: ROK Estimates of DPRK Navy Equipment Trends from 2004 to Other Mine Sweeping Boats Landing Vessels Submarines Surface Combatants Surface Mine Sweeping Submarines Landing Vessels Combatants Boats Other Figure 2.6l: ROK Estimates of DPRK Air Force Equipment Trends from 2004 to Training Aircraft Helicopters Air Mobility Aircraft (includes AN-2) C2-ISR Aircraft Combat Aircraft Combat Aircraft C2-ISR Aircraft Air Mobility Aircraft Helicopters Training Aircraft (includes AN-2) Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense White Papers (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). Available at Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service. 54 Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense White Papers (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). Available at Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

68 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 68 Figure 2.6m: ROK Estimates of ROK Manpower Trends from 2004 to Air Force Personnel Navy Personnel Army Personnel Army Personnel Navy Personnel Air Force Personnel Japan China ROK DPRK Figure 2.6n: ROK Estimates of ROK Army Equipment Trends from 2004 to Helicopters Guided Weapons Artillery/MRLS Armored Vehicles Tanks Tanks Armored Vehicles Artillery/MRLS Guided Weapons Helicopters ,300 2,500 5, ,300 2,400 5, ,300 2,500 5, ,300 2,400 5, Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense White Papers (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). Available at Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service. 56 Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense White Papers (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). Available at Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

69 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 69 Figure 2.6o: ROK Estimates of ROK Navy Equipment Trends from 2004 to Helicopters Support Vessels Combat Vessels Submarines Submarines Combat Vessels Support Vessels Helicopters Figure 2.6p: ROK Estimates of ROK Air Force Equipment Trends from 2004 to Helicopters Training Aircraft Air Mobility Aircraft C2-ISR Aircraft Combat Aircraft Combat Aircraft C2-ISR Aircraft Air Mobility Training Aircraft Aircraft Helicopters Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense White Papers (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). Available at Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service. 58 Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense White Papers (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). Available at Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

70 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 70 Government of Japan Conventional Force Estimates North Korea s military behavior has increased tension over the Korean peninsula and constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for the entire East Asian region, including Japan. Figure 2.7a: Japanese Summary Estimates of Forces on the Korean Peninsula in North Korean active-service military personnel represent nearly 5% of the country s overall population, with roughly two-thirds deployed close to the DMZ. North Korea continues to abide by the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for soldiers, modernizing all the armed forces, arming the entire population and fortifying the entire country). Key North Korean military capabilities include 240mm multiple launch rockets and 170mm selfpropelled guns that can target Seoul. 60 midget submarines and 140 air-cushioned landing crafts are believed to be used for infiltration or transportation of special operations forces. Among its aging fleet of combat aircraft are fourth-generation MIG-29s and SU-25s. A large number of outdated An-2s are also believed to be used to transport SOF personnel. 59 Graphics and narrative based on material from Defense of Japan 2010, Japanese Ministry of Defense, pp

71 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 71 Figure 2.7b: Japanese Estimates of Japanese Self Defense Forces Graphics and narrative based on material from Defense of Japan 2010, Japanese Ministry of Defense, pp. 161

72 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 72 Figure 2.7c: Japanese Estimates of Chinese Armed Forces in China has begun modernizing its military forces, backed by the high and constant increase in its defense budget. In its military modernization China appears to give particular priority to the Taiwan issue as an issue of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and for the time being it will probably aim for the improvement of military capabilities to prevent Taiwan s independence and others, but in recent years, China has begun acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue. China has been rather intensifying its activities in waters near Japan. The lack of transparency of its national defense policies and the military activities are a matter of concern for the region and the international community, including Japan, which should require prudent analysis The Japanese 2010 White Paper notes that China has focused on the mechanization and informationization of its military power, with fewer formations of marching soldiers noticed in military parades. Instead mobile missile, combat vehicle, aircraft formations and advanced equipment such as early warning radars and UAVs have increased their presence. China has reduced the number of military personnel, notably in the army, and has focused on the modernization of its armed forces, notably its naval, air, nuclear and missile capabilities. China is working to increase joint operability between its services and branches and is seeking to build up its defense industry. 61 Graphics and narrative based on material from Defense of Japan 2010, Japanese Ministry of Defense, pg 53-80

73 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 73 Section 3: US Forces in Korea and the Pacific the Pacific The US sees South Korea as a critical ally, and has legal obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolutions passed in They make the US head of the United Nations Command, and the ROK/US Mutual Security Agreement of 1954, which commits both nations to assist each other in case of attack from outside forces. The US is also part of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) established in The Commander of US forces in Korea serves as Commander in Chief of both the United Nations Command (CINCUNC) and the CFC, and is responsible for maintaining the armistice agreement that suspended the Korean War on July 27, Figure 3.1 show a Japanese estimate of how the forces the US still maintain South Korea compare with those of North and South Korea. As has been noted in the previous section, The Japanese data provides a useful estimate of how small the US forces in South Korea now are, and shows that they have been reduced to a size that is largely demonstrative, if not a virtual trigger force. The US national military strategy for 2011 describes the US strategy for Korea and Northeast Asia, and for shaping the Korean military balance, as follows: 62 Though still underpinned by the U.S. bilateral alliance system, Asia s security architecture is becoming a more complex mix of formal and informal multilateral relationships and expanded bilateral security ties among states. We expect to maintain a strong military presence in Northeast Asia for decades. We will work with the Japan Self-Defense Forces to improve their out-of-area operational capabilities as the nation adjusts its defense posture. The Republic of Korea has proven a steadfast ally supporting U.S. security efforts around the world; our commitment to the Republic of Korea is unwavering as North Korea remains a provocative threat to regional stability. We will retain operational control over combined forces on the Korean peninsula through 2015 and provide assistance to South Korea as it expands its security responsibilities. We will continue to work with Japan and South Korea to help improve security ties between them, enhance military cooperation, and preserve regional stability. US Forces in Korea The major force elements in Korea include the Eighth US Army, US Air Forces Korea (Seventh Air Force) and US Naval Forces Korea. At one point the US occupied some 85 active installations in the Republic of Korea, but it has cut its total military manning from about personnel in 1990, and 36,300 personnel in 2000 to an agreed force level of 28,500: (Army: 19,755, Navy: 274, Air Force: 8,815, Marines: 24. Global Security and the IISS estimate that their equipment now includes some 140 M1A1 tanks, 170 Bradley armored vehicles, mm 62 Source: Admiral M. G. Mullen, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 8, 2011, pp ,

74 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 74 self-propelled howitzers, 30 MRLs as well as a wide range of surface-to-surface and surface-toair missiles, e.g., Patriot, and 70 AH-64 helicopters. 63 Global Security also estimates that US Air Forces Korea possessed approximately 100 aircraft: advanced fighters, e.g., 70 F-16s, 20 A-10 anti-tank attack planes, various types of intelligencecollecting and reconnaissance aircraft including U-2s, and the newest transport aircraft. This number does not seem to reflect recent force cuts, and the Japanese estimate of 60 US combat aircraft (40 modern F-16s) seems more correct, but US air strength could be rapidly reinforced by the Seventh Fleet and the Seventh Air Force Command. 64 Only limited manpower and equipment are allocated to US Naval Forces Korea, US Marine Forces Korea, and Special Operations Command Korea in peacetime. However, the US Pacific Command can rapidly provide rapid reinforcements. 65 General Walter L. Sharp, Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK provided the following overview of the capabilities of North Korean, and US and South Korean forces, in a speech to the East Asia Institute on July 9, 2010 as well as the ongoing US force changes summarized in Figure 3.2: 2010 has proven to be a very fast paced year. I d like to begin our discussion today by sharing with you three things which I think greatly influence and impact our efforts: First, the north Korean threat, second, the north Korean attack on the Cheonan, and third, our combined transformation efforts. 3 First, North Korea poses a serious asymmetric threat to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. While the responsible nations of the world are looking to reduce their weapons of mass destruction, North Korea is continuing its development of these weapons systems and their delivery vehicles. Clearly this is a dangerous situation, not just for the United States, not just for the Republic of Korea, but also for the entire region. Another unconventional threat posed by North Korea is in the size and disposition of their special operations forces. Even in armistice, North Korea has displayed the willingness to use these forces. The threats of the North Korean forces have shown themselves in their attack on the Cheonan, and the assassination team targeting the senior most individual to have defected from North Korea. 4 North Korea also continues to build their conventional capabilities and threaten their use as a means to manipulate the world community. One of North Korea s largest capabilities, in terms of quantity and disposition, exists in the form of artillery and missile forces. This poses an asymmetric threat, one that holds at risk the capital of one of the world s most important economies right here in Seoul. While North Korea remains a potent military threat, they do not have the ability to reunify the peninsula by force. However, as demonstrated by the attack on the Cheonan and the asymmetric aspects of the North Korean threat that I discussed earlier, this merely changes the nature of the threat and how we are prepared to deter and defeat it. Let me be clear, by no means does North Korea s inability to reunify the peninsula by force equate to an absence of a serious military threat. Rather, North Korea maintains a range of capabilities to engage in provocations. However these provocations and north Korea s irresponsible behavior in the international arena to include events such as the continued oppression of its own people, the seizure of ROK assets at the Mt. Kumgang 63 U.S. Forces Order of Battle, Global Security, Available at U.S. Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command Combined Ground Component Command (GCC), Global Security, Available at Briefing by Defense Secretary Gates and ROK Minister Lee, America.gov, October 17, Available at 64 U.S. Forces Order of Battle, Global Security, Available at

75 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 75 Resort, the sinking of the Cheonan, and the development of nuclear capabilities have significantly eroded their ability to effectively use other means to exercise national power in the region. With very few diplomatic, informational, and economic options available, North Korea is forced to rely almost exclusively on military instruments when it decides to engage in provocations and we must therefore be ever vigilant. Sun Tzu once said, Thus the highest form of generalship is to attack the enemy's strategy; the next best is to attack his alliances; the next, in order, is to attack the enemy's army in the field More so than ever before, North Korea knows that they cannot defeat our strong and well prepared armies, air forces, navies, and marines, so they are now attacking us in other ways. However, the ROK-US Alliance needs more from the entire international community and all countries in the region, in particular China, to work with us in responding to North Korean provocations. We strongly desire Chinese cooperation in addressing north Korea s aggressive behavior, and in particular would welcome Chinese action, even if behind the scenes, to assist in convincing north Korea that its path to security and prosperity lies in stopping its provocative behavior, better relations with its neighbors, and complete, irreversible denuclearization. It is important that we be willing to have detailed discussions with the Chinese about interests related to the Korean peninsula. I believe it is safe to say that the U.S. and ROK are willing and eager to engage in discussions about each of our interests. We hope that China will do the same. The more we can talk and reach a common understanding about regional security challenges, the better we are able to maintain stability and prosperity in this region. America s five bilateral treaty alliances in Asia have long underpinned regional stability and prosperity. In Northeast Asia, our relationships with Korea and Japan serve as a foundation for American efforts to provide regional stability and prosperity. We look forward to the continued strengthening of these Alliances and the contributions that they make to the region. I would now like to spend a little bit of time discussing where the ROK-U.S. Alliance is heading in the next few years. From what I mentioned earlier, it is clear that North Korea has increased their efforts to attack our Alliance and our strategic objectives. In addition, the security environment requires that we continue to prepare for any possible threats. To do this, we are continuing to strengthen the Alliance through our ongoing transformation initiatives. We will first demonstrate to the North Koreans that our Alliance and our collective Armed Forces remain strong and cannot be broken. Secondly, we will continue to modify our strategy to create adaptive, agile plans and combat forces that can anticipate and defeat our enemy s provocations, deter aggression, and if deterrence fails, to fight and win. The decision to delay the transition of wartime operational control until late 2015, as announced by President Lee and President Obama at last weekend s G-20 meeting in Toronto, Canada, demonstrates the strength and agility of this Alliance. Although the ROK and U.S. militaries were on track for OPCON transition in 2012, this adjustment will provide us with additional time to look at OPCON in a broader construct and to further synchronize the various Alliance initiatives and focus on meeting the established timelines for these initiatives. It also allows us to ensure each of the initiatives are mutually supportive and that they collectively support the Joint Vision Statement signed by President Lee and President Obama in We will proceed very rapidly to develop a new OPCON Transition plan. This new plan, a plan for the Alliance of 2015, will help align all of our transformation initiatives we have worked on. It will truly be an overarching plan for the Alliance of Detailed discussion will start at this month s 2+2 talks here in Seoul and be approved at the autumn Security Consultative Meeting between the Secretary of Defense and the Minister of Defense. The goal of all of our ROK and U.S. transformation efforts is to build adaptive capabilities to deter and defeat any future provocations and to fight and win on the peninsula if this deterrence fails. Transformation efforts consist of the preparation for the transfer of Wartime Operational Control; refining and improving our combined plans; the definition and development of new organizational structures and command and control relationships; the procurement, and integration of Republic of

76 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 76 Korea capabilities to lead the warfight; more realistic training based on the north Korean threat of today and the future, as well as continued support for exercises and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations in the region; the consolidation of U.S. military units into two enduring hubs; and lastly, tour normalization for U.S. forces here in Korea. Let me talk briefly about each of these elements, because these are the elements we will synchronize between now and To move to the Alliance of 2015, we will seek to better align in our planning efforts. We are taking the opportunity to review our plans and ensure they are realistic based upon the full scale of possible scenarios. This includes North Korean provocations, instability, or full-scale war on the peninsula. We will also ensure that our plans properly address the KORCOM to ROK JCS supporting to supported command and control structures. By doing so, we will ensure that we have the correct and most up-to-date plans in place to guarantee security and stability in the region. Next, we will be continuing our transformation efforts in the areas of organizational structure and command and control. U.S. Forces Korea will become the United States Korea Command or U.S. KORCOM, providing the necessary manpower for our supporting relationship with the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result of the OPCON transition, the KORCOM staff will be dual-hatted as Combined Forces Command, much the same way the U.S. Forces Korea staff is dual hated in CFC At the same time the United States is transforming our organizational structures, the ROK will also continue to strengthen and build on the JCS centric operational execution system which will ensure and reinforce its intelligence, operations planning and execution and joint battlefield management capabilities. The Republic of Korea JCS is developing the command and control systems capable of real time battlefield management and enhanced warning and target acquisition. In turn, the ROK Army is transforming its forces and creating a Ground Forces Operations Command. This command will be stood up a certified by 2015 before OPCON transition takes place. In support of their planned defense reform, the ROK is already undergoing a process of procuring equipment, and training and organizing forces to lead the warfight. Until these capabilities exist, the United States will provide the agreed upon bridging and enduring capabilities. If OPCON transition had occurred in 2012, ROK forces would have had to rely on some U.S. bridging capabilities, but by adjusting OPCON transition to 2015, the Republic of Korea will have time to field many of the critical organic systems in their Defense Reform plan that will enable them to lead the warfight. The new Alliance 2015 plan improves our overall readiness by allowing time for these key warfighting headquarters to be established and the Republic of Korea to acquire critical Command and Control systems and capabilities. The final hand off of wartime Operational Control will be smoother and the end result will be better command and control of Alliance forces. The Strategic Alliance plan for 2015 also gives us the ability to better synchronize and improve our exercises more robust and realistic exercises that will be based on the North Korean threat of today and the future. The decision to adjust OPCON transition also allows us to synchronize the movement of U.S. forces on the peninsula. Currently, U.S. forces are undergoing two major infrastructure moves as part of this transformation. The major southward moves to U.S. Army Garrison-Humphreys will begin in 2012 and will accomplish several goals. First, the relocation allows the United States to give back land, including the Yongsan Garrison here in Seoul, back to the Republic of Korea. Second, it allows for a consolidation of U.S. forces into two hubs and will reduce the KORCOM footprint from 110 installations down to 48. The KORCOM headquarters will remain at in Seoul until after the OPCON transition is complete. These two milestones are synchronized with the rest of the strategic Alliance plan for 2015, and will greatly increase KORCOM s ability to command and control US forces and support Korean forces. The U.S. is committed to ensuring all elements of the new Alliance plan are in place to facilitate its completion by late We are also reaffirming our commitment through the Tour Normalization program, which directly affects our ability to be able to fight across the full spectrum of conflict that I spoke about earlier. Since the beginning of the summer of 2008, the number of families in Korea has increased from 1,700 to over 4,200 with a goal of almost 5,000 families here by the summer of Moving forward, we will begin to assign families to Korea for three years, while unaccompanied and

77 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 77 I am absolutely confident that our new bilateral plan to get us to 2015 the strategic alliance of 2015 will better synchronize our ongoing transformation efforts, it will reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the ROK and the region; ensure both nations are even better prepared to swiftly counter, deter, and defeat any north Korean provocations and aggression; and will ultimately result in a much stronger Alliance. It is important to note that the US provided South Korea with immediate support after the sinking of the Cheonan on March 26, 2010, which South Korea and the US state was caused by a torpedo fired from a North Korean submarine. It did the same when North Korea fired dozens of rounds of artillery onto the densely populated South Korean island of Yeonpyeong near the countries' western border, and killed four people, on November 22, The US also held joint exercises with South Korea in May, July, and late November 2010 to show its support for South Korea in spite of pressure from China. US Forces in Japan and USPACOM Figure 3.3 shows a similar Japanese estimate of the US forces in Japan. As this estimate shows, US forces in Japan are much larger now than in South Korea. More importantly, Japan provides the US with critical basing and staging facilities for any serious Korean conflict. Figure 3.4 and 3.5 shows that US forces in Japan are only part of the resources the US could bring to bear assuming it relied on the total forces in its Pacific Command (USPACOM). A USPACOM estimate as of January 2011, summarized USPACOM force strength as follows: 66 U.S. military and civilian personnel assigned to USPACOM number approximately 325,000, or about onefifth of total U.S. military strength. U.S. Pacific Fleet includes five aircraft carrier strike groups, approximately 180 ships, 1,500 aircraft and 100,000 personnel. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific possesses about two-thirds of U.S. Marine Corps combat strength, includes two Marine Expeditionary Forces and about 85,000 personnel assigned. U.S. Pacific Air Forces is comprised of approximately 40,000 airmen and more than 300 aircraft, with about 100 additional aircraft deployed to Guam. U.S. Army Pacific has more than 60,000 personnel assigned, including five Stryker brigades. Of note, component command personnel numbers include more than 1,200 Special Operations personnel. Department of Defense Civilians and Contractors in the Pacific Command AOR number about 40,000. Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard, which frequently supports U.S. military forces in the region, has approximately 27,000 personnel in its Pacific Area. It is important to note that while these force levels are impressive, they again represent a major cut in US forces and presence during a period in which both China and North Korea have made major increases in their conventional and WMD capabilities. There has been a steady downward trend in the total personnel, combat aircraft, and major combat ships from the end of the Cold War in 1990 onwards. Admiral Willard, the US Commander of USPACOM summarized the US role in the Pacific as follows in the following portions of his annual testimony to the Senate Armed Service Committee on March 24, 2010: Five of our nation s seven mutual defense treaties are with nations in the Asia- Pacific region. We continue 66 USPACOM Facts: Headquarters U.S. Pacific Command, USPACOM, Available at

78 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 78 to work closely with these regional treaty allies Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines and Thailand to strengthen and leverage our relationships to enhance security within the region. The U.S. ROK alliance remains strong and critical to our regional strategy in Northeast Asia. General Sharp and I are aligned in our efforts to do what is right for the United States and the ROK as this alliance undergoes a major transformation. I will defer to General Sharp s testimony to provide the details of our relationship on the Peninsula, but note that General Sharp s progress in handling the transition of wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK military has been exceptional as has his leadership of U.S. Forces Korea. The transformation of the U.S. ROK alliance will ultimately assist the ROK to better meet security challenges both on and off the peninsula. The ROK currently maintains a warship in the Gulf of Aden in support of counter-piracy and maritime security operations, and has provided direct assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom, including demonstrating strong leadership in its decision to deploy a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan this year. Of particular note is the evolving trilateral security cooperation between the U.S., ROK, and Japan. Although there are still policy issues to be addressed in realizing its full potential, the shared values, financial resources, logistical capability, and the planning ability to address complex contingencies throughout the region make this trilateral partnership a goal worth pursuing.. Our alliance with Japan is the cornerstone of our security strategy in Northeast Asia. Despite some recent challenges related to U.S. basing in Japan, the military relationship, as well as the overall alliance, remain strong That being said, we must make every effort particularly as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the alliance to remind the citizens of both the U.S. and Japan of the importance of our alliance to enduring regional security and prosperity. U.S. Pacific Command remains committed to the implementation of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). Initiated by the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense with their Japanese counterparts in 2002, progress on Alliance Transformation and Realignment through the execution of the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment are critical next steps. Major elements of the Realignment Roadmap with Japan include: relocating a Marine Corps Air Station and a portion of a carrier air wing from urbanized to rural areas; colocating U.S. and Japanese command and control capabilities; deploying U.S. missile defense capabilities to Japan in conjunction with their own deployments; improving operational coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces; and adjusting the burdensharing arrangement through the relocation of ground forces. The rebasing of 8,000 Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam remains a key element of the Realignment Roadmap. Guam-based Marines, in addition to those Marine Forces that remain in Okinawa, will sustain the advantages of having forward-based ground forces in the Pacific Command AOR. Currently the Government of Japan (GOJ) is reviewing one of the realignment elements that addresses the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and related movement of Marines Corps aviation assets in Okinawa; an action which is directly linked to the relocation of Marines to Guam and a plan to return significant land area to Japan. The GOJ has indicated it expects to complete its review by May of this year. The U.S. remains committed to the 2006 DPRI Roadmap as agreed to by both countries. The Japan Self Defense Force is advancing its regional and global influence. In the spring and early summer of 2009, Japan deployed two JMSDF ships and two patrol aircraft to the Gulf of Aden region for counter-piracy operations. Although their Indian Ocean-based refueling mission recently ended, Japan remains engaged in the region by providing civil and financial support for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the foreseeable future. Although the Japanese defense budget has decreased each year since 2002, the Japan Self Defense Forces continue their regular bilateral interactions with the U.S., and in some multi-lateral engagements with the U.S. and our other allies, such as the Republic of Korea and Australia. Last year witnessed the completion of several successful milestones in our bilateral relationship, including the completion of a yearlong study of contingency command and control relationships and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) testing of a third

79 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 79 Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Aegis destroyer. Japan continues to maintain over $4 billion in annual Host Nation Support (HNS) to our Japan-based force. Japan HNS contribution remains a vital strategic pillar of respective U.S. and Japanese alliance commitments.

80 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 80 Figure 3.1: Japanese Estimates of US, South Korean and North Korean Forces in the Korean Peninsula Graphics and narrative based on material from Defense of Japan 2010, Japanese Ministry of Defense, pg 53-80

81 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 81 Figure 3.2: Relocation of U.S. Forces in Korea from Based primarily on material from Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, 2006 Defense White Paper, pg. 99

82 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 82 Figure 3.3: Japanese Estimates of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) in The security environment around Japan remains challenging. Given that environment, in order for the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements to continue, it is necessary that U.S. military presence in Japan is secured which functions adequately as a deterrent that contributes to Japan s defense as well as regional peace and security marks the 50 th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the 2010 Japanese White Paper outlines its intention to implement deepening military cooperation in the coming years. Areas of cooperation will include extended deterrence information security, missile defense and space as well as individual security areas including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and cyber issues. U.S. forces stationed in Japan serve as a deterrent as well as functioning as an offensive spear in the event of armed aggression against Japan. 69 Graphics and narrative based on material from Defense of Japan 2010, Japanese Ministry of Defense, pg Ibid, pg. 272

83 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 83 Figure 3.4: US Forces in the Pacific in 2010: Equipment by Type and Location 71 Pacific Command (PACOM) Headquartered in Hawaii Guam Abbreviation Definition Quantity SSN Submarine, nuclear powered 3 Japan Abbreviation Definition Quantity CVN Carrier, nuclear powered 1 CG Cruiser, with guided missiles 2 DDG Destroyer, with guided missiles 8 LCC Amphibious command ship 1 MCM Mine countermeasures 2 LHD Amphibious assault ship 1 LSD Landing ship, dock 2 South Korea Abbreviation Definition Model MBT Main battle tank M-1 Abrams MBT Main battle tank M-2/M-3 Bradley MBT Main battle tank M-109 HEL, ATK Helicopter, attack AH-64 Apache HEL, TPT Helicopter, transport CH-47 Chinook HEL, UTL Helicopter, utility UH-60 Black Hawk ARTY, MLR Artillery, multiple rocket launcher MLRS AD, SAM Air defense, surface-to-air missile MIM-104 Patriot AD, SAM Air defense, surface-to-air missile FIM-92A 71 Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

84 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 84 Avenger Pacific Abbreviation Definition Quantity SSBN Submarine, nuclear powered, with ballistic missiles SSGN SSN, with dedicated, non-ballistic missiles 2 SSN Submarine, nuclear powered 26 CVN Carrier, nuclear powered 3 CG Cruiser, with guided missiles 9 DDG Destroyer, with guided missiles 18 FFG Frigate, with guided missiles 10 MCM Mine countermeasures 2 LHD Amphibious assault ship 4 LHA Landing ship, assault 1 LPD Landing platform, dock 4 LSD Landing ship, dock 4 8

85 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 85 Japan Figure 3.5: US Forces in the Pacific in 2010: Forces by Role and Location Quantity Role Army 1 HQ (9th Theater Army Area Command) 7th Fleet 1 HQ (7th Fleet) 1 HQ (5th Air Force) 1 FTR WING with Navy Air Force 2 FTR SQN with a total of 18 F-16 Fighting Falcon 1 FTR WING with 1 AEW SQN with 2 E-3B Sentry 1 SAR SQN with 8 HH-60G Pave Hawk 2 FTR SQN with a total of 24 F-15C/D Eagle 1 LIFT WING with 10 C-130H Hercules 2 C-12J 1 DIV (3rd) Marines 1 FTR SQN with 12 F/A-18D Hornet 1 TKR SQN with 12 KC-130J Hercules 2 SPT HEL SQN with 12 CH-46E Sea Knight 1 SPT HEL SQN with 12 MV-22B Osprey 3 SPT HEL SQN with 10 CH-53E Sea Stallion 1 SPEC OPS GRP South Korea Quantity Role Army

86 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 86 1 HQ (8th Army) 1 HQ (2nd In Div) 1 HBCT 1 CBT AVN BDE 1 ARTY BDE 1 AD BDE 1 HQ (7th Air Force) 1 FTR Wing, with Air Force 1 FTR SQN with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 FTR SQN with 12 A-10 Thunderbolt II 12 OA-10 Thunderbolt II 1 FTR Wing, with 1 FTR SQN with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 SPEC OPS SQN

87 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 87 Section 4: Special, Asymmetric, and Paramilitary Forces North Korean and South Korea have long competed in creating effective special and paramilitary forces, and North Korea has developed a major capability for unconventional warfare in the border/dmz area and to attack deep into South Korea. North Korea also has mixed attacks by covert and special forces with limited naval and artillery strikes, while using missile and nuclear tests to obtain asymmetric leverage. There are many chronologies of this kind of low-level political-military conflict. The British newspaper, the Guardian, published the following summary on major incidents on November 23, 2010: July 1953: The Korean war ends in a truce is signed by a representative of the US-backed UN forces, and a representative of North Korea and allied Chinese forces. South Korea was not a signatory. There is no formal peace treaty, meaning the two countries remain technically at war. The Korean war cost 2 million lives. January 1968: North Korean commandos launch a failed assassination attempt on then president of South Korea, Park Chung-hee. 15 August 1974: Another assassination attempt on Park Chung-hee, by a North Korean agent in Seoul. Park survives, but his wife is killed. 9 October 1983: North Korean agents strike at the area of a visit by South Korean president Chun Doohwan to Burma, killing more than 20 people including four South Korean cabinet ministers. The president escapes. 29 November 1987: North Korea blows up a South Korean civilian airliner, killing 115 people. The US decides to include the North on its list of countries that support terrorism. 1991: North and South Korea become members of the UN. September 1996: A North Korean submarine lands commandos on the South Korean coast. June 2000: North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and South Korean president Kim Dae-jung meet in Pyongyang. January 2002: The then US president, George Bush, makes his "axis of evil" speech, which includes North Korea and links it to Iran and Iraq. February 2005: North Korea claims to have built nuclear weapons. July 2006: North Korea test-fires medium- and long-range missiles. 9 October 2006: An international outcry North Korea's first nuclear test. The UN sets up a series of sanctions. November 2007: The prime ministers of the two Koreas meet for the first time in 15 years. March-May 2008: North Korea test-fires short-range missiles. July 2008: A North Korean soldier shoots and kills a South Korean tourist in the Mount Kumgang resort. 72 Timeline: North Korea Key Events since the end of the Korean War, The Guardian, November 23, Available at

88 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 April 2009: North Korea launches a long-range rocket capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Criticism from the UN security council prompts Kim Jong-il to walk out of talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear program. May 2009: North Korea announces it has successfully conducted a second nuclear test, sparking an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. It also withdraws from the 1953 armistice that ended the war between the two Koreas. November 2009: Shots are exchanged near the Yellow Sea border for the first time in seven years. January 2010: North Korea fires artillery near its disputed maritime border with South Korea. South Korea returns fire, but no one is injured. March 2010: The South Korean warship Cheonan sinks after an unexplained explosion; 46 sailors die. A later investigation suggests the boat was sunk by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. September 2010 : Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il's youngest son, gains high-powered political and military posts, fuelling speculation that he will be his father's successor. October 2010: North and South Korea exchange shots across the border. November 2010: North Korea gives a US scientist a tour of a uranium plant, sparking alarm at the sophistication of its nuclear technology. 23 November 2010: The North fires rounds of artillery on to an inhabited South Korean border island. South Korea scrambles its fighter jets and returns fire, saying two of its marines have been killed. James R. Clapper, the US Director of National Intelligence, provided an official American perspective on this aspect of the balance in his testimony to the U.S. Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on February 10, 2011: We assess that North Korea s artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November was meant in part to continue burnishing successor-designate Kim Jong Un s leadership and military credibility among regime elites, although other strategic goals were also factors in the attack. Kim Jong Il may feel the need to conduct further provocations to achieve strategic goals and portray Jong Un as a strong, bold leader, especially if he judges elite loyalty and support are in question. Kim Jong Il has advanced preparations for his third son to succeed him, by anointing him with senior party and military positions, promoting probable key supporting characters, and having the younger Kim make his first public appearances. These steps strengthened the prospects for the 27- year old Jong Un to develop as a credible successor, but the succession process is still subject to potential vulnerabilities, especially if Kim Jong Il dies before Jong Un consolidates his authority. the Korean People s Army remains a large and formidable force capable of defending the North. Also, as demonstrated by North Korean attacks on the South Korean ship Cheonan in March 2010 and Yeongpyong Island in November. North Korea is capable of conducting military operations that could potentially threaten regional stability. These operations provide Pyongyang with what the regime may see as a means to attain political goals through coercion. Special and Asymmetric Forces An unclassified estimate of the Special and Unconventional Forces on each side is shown in Figure 4.1. The forces in Figure 4.1 would be supplemented by similar US forces, but no detailed estimate is available. They create a major wild card in assessing the region. Not only do they make it difficult to assess probable scenarios, but any limits on more conventional forces expands their relative capability, and it would be difficult at best to assess any meaningful arms control options affecting special forces.. The North and South Korean balances is also sharply affected by two unique aspects of North Korean forces that are summarized in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Page 88

89 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 89 Figure 4.2 provides an unclassified estimate of a tunnel system that North Korea has built up to allow it to make rapid, surprise attacks and the bulk of its forces are concentrated near the DMZ. Figure 4.3 provides a similar description of the massive artillery attack system that could deliver massive fire to both aid in an invasion and attack South Korea s capital at Seoul. These capabilities are highly destabilizing and could lead to rapid escalation in war. They are also present major problems for arms control, unless they can be largely eliminated, since they give North Korea a major advantage in threatening and attacking South Korea that would be enhanced by general reduction in conventional forces. Paramilitary, Police, and Internal Security Forces Paramilitary, police, and internal security forces also play a role in the balance. The size of each country s paramilitary forces is summarized in Figure 4.4. It is harder to estimate the size and role of internal security forces, although these can play a major role in securing year areas, and forcing soldiers to fight. The US State Department annual country reports on human rights do, however, provide a Western assessment of some aspects of such capabilities: Figure 4.5 summarizes the role of such forces in North Korea. Figure 4.6 summarizes the role of such forces in South Korea. These assessments reflect a Western viewpoint, but it was not possible to find comparable assessments that reflect a North Korean view. Once again, it is also important to note that North Korea may see its choices as forced upon it by outside threats and pressures. At the same time, these differences between North and South Korea act as a warning that the internal security structures of each state reflect differences that reflects their ability and willingness to use force and to escalate.

90 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 90 Figure 4.1: Northeast Asian Special Forces 73 Democratic People s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) 74 [NOTE] The 2010 South Korean Defense White Paper notes an increase in DPRK Special Forces to 200,000 in 2010 from 180,000 in According to ROK intelligence sources, the KPA's formidable special operations force (SOF), one of the largest in the world, includes approximately 180,000 personnel. US sources credit the KPA with only 80,000 SOF troops. The discrepancy arises from the fact that ROK estimates include light infantry units organic to divisions and corps, as well as infantry units converted to light infantry, while the US figures do not. This force is organized into seven light infantry divisions, approximately 25 special forces brigades (12 light infantry/mechanized light infantry, three reconnaissance brigades, three airborne brigades, two air force sniper brigades, two navy sniper brigades and three sniper brigades) and between five and seven reconnaissance battalions. Additionally, infantry divisions have an organic light infantry battalion or regiment. Sniper units are alternately identified as 'sharpshooter'. The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau is the primary organization within the KPA tasked with the training and conducting of unconventional and special warfare operations. During peacetime it is believed to exercise administrative control over all special operations units, including those of the KPAF, KPN and Reconnaissance General Bureau. During wartime it will function as the primary headquarters co-coordinating all special operations. Beginning in 2000 but more significantly from 2003 to the present, the KPA has undertaken a number of significant organizational changes within its ground forces units. Among the more significant changes was the expansion of existing division level light infantry battalions within the DMZ corps to regiments and the reorganization of seven infantry or mechanized infantry divisions (approximately 50,000 troops) into light infantry divisions. These later organizational developments were apparently achieved by stripping these divisions of the majority of their combat and combat support units (for example artillery, armor, air defense and so on). Accompanying these organizational developments was the expansion of urban, nighttime and mountaineering training for all special operations units. It is believed that the KPA undertook these changes to organization and training following a strategic review of a future conflict on the Korean Peninsula, combined with lessons learned from the recent conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, which convinced the KPA of the need for a greater number of "light" units. This is possibly one of the most interesting developments in KPA conventional forces in the past 20 years. Additionally, some light infantry battalions within divisions deployed along the DMZ were expanded to regiment size. On paper the KPA has the capability to transport approximately 19,000 troops (4,000 by air and 15,000 by sea) at once. With the economic troubles during the past 15 years, and the resulting decline in KPAF and KPN operational readiness, this lift capability may have declined by per cent. The primary missions of these special forces are: reconnaissance, establishing a 'second front' within the ROK strategic rear, destruction and disruption of the ROK/US C4ISR structure, neutralization of ROK and US air bases, and neutralization of ROK and US missiles and weapons of mass destruction. These missions include operations against US bases in Japan. Elements of both the Reconnaissance General Bureau and Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau make use of specialized high-speed semi-submersible infiltration landing craft (SILC), Hugo and Yen-class SSM and Sang-o SSC. The KPA takes great pride in its special operations forces, which are frequently identified as the "invincibles" (in the air force), "human bombs protecting the center of the revolution" (in the army) and "human torpedoes" (in the navy) 73 Note: Due to secrecy and limited open source information, all available personnel figures are rough estimates. 74 IHS Jane s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis. Jane s World Armies: North Korea. IHS Jane s, Jan. 20, Jan. 21, Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper

91 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 91 Japan 76 The Special Operations Group (SOG), consisting of 300 personnel, was established in early 2004 at Narashino Camp, 30 km west of Tokyo. Its main mission is to capture or destroy enemy special forces after an initial force of regular infantry is deployed to establish a perimeter around the intruding force. Mobility for the SOG is provided by the 1st Helicopter Brigade stationed near Narashino. Its troops could also be deployed by parachute drops from C- 130 transport aircraft. Personnel are trained at specialized facilities for military operations in urban terrain, together with close-combat techniques in mountainous areas. The 640-strong Western Army Infantry Regiment, established at Ainoura Camp in Nagasaki prefecture in March 2002, was created to deal with an increasing number of offshore penetrations of Japanese territorial waters. The unit conducts reconnaissance activities around the roughly 180 isolated isles within the Western Army's jurisdiction and makes provision against armed guerrilla attacks. The regiment consists of four companies, and each now includes one ranger platoon. This is the first time that the GSDF has integrated units with specialized capabilities within its regular forces, and it has so far shied away from forming fully-fledged ranger formations after the US model. GSDF Special Forces units consist of the Central Readiness Force (Chuo Sokuo Shudan), the Special Operations Group (Tokushu Sakusen Gun), the 1st Airborne Brigade, the Tsushima Guardian Unit, the Western Army Infantry Regiment (Seibu Homen Futsu-ka Rentai) and one Ranger Platoon. China 77 Army Special Forces are receiving a substantial investment, with at least one dedicated unit assigned to each MR. Airborne and Marine forces also appear to have their own Special Forces contingents. Special Forces will be used extensively in the early stages of a conflict to attack key personnel and infrastructure targets, and to secure air and naval facilities to allow for follow-on forces. Chosen for their stamina, Special Forces troops are trained in many skills, and are able to operate a wide range of Chinese and foreign weapons. Some specialized weapons for Special Force include a range of crossbows for silent attack. The PLA has also revealed a new rifle-size laser device, which can be used to cue laser-guided bombs or for non-lethal anti-personnel purposes. Republic of Korea (ROK) 78 The ROK s special operations forces number no more than 20,000 individuals. However, they amount to a formidable, well-trained set of units that are largely modeled on their U.S. equivalents and use primarily U.S. equipment. The ROK s Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps all employ special operations units. The largest unit is the Army Special Warfare Command (SWC). About 10,000 SWC troops are tasked with infiltrating deep behind enemy lines for reconnaissance and surveillance, destruction of key military facilities, sabotage, and kidnapping enemy VIPs. Additionally, they combat terrorism, protect VIPs, and carry out top-secret operations. Furthermore, the SWC also has brigades whose specific duty is to engage and eliminate the DPRK s light infantry troops if they infiltrate the ROK. The SWC must also contend with a number of potential wild-card scenarios, including DPRK terrorist actions, threats of the use of WMD, missile launches, and other forms of provocation to gain political and economic concessions. It must also be prepared to deal with other potential crises that include a massive refugee flow, natural 76 IHS Jane s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis. Jane s World Armies: Japan. IHS Jane s, Nov. 12, Jan. 21, IHS Jane s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis. Jane s World Armies: China. IHS Jane s, Oct. 15, Jan. 21, The Chosun Ilbo (English Edition). Spotlight on S. Korea s Special Forces. The Chosun Ilbo (English Edition): Daily News from Korea, Jan. 24, Jan. 25, The Chosun Ilbo (English Edition). S. Korea s Special Forces Vastly Outnumbered by N. Korea s. The Chosun Ilbo (English Edition): Daily News from Korea, Jan. 06, Jan. 25, History of Special Operations Command Korea United States Eight Army Website, Jan. 27,

92 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 92 or manmade disasters, the transfer or loss of control of WMD, an outbreak of civil war within the DPRK, and the collapse of the DPRK itself. If open hostilities between the ROK and the DPRK resume, the SWC will combine with the U.S. Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR) located at Camp Kim in Yongsan forming the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force (CUWTF). The CUWTF will plan and conduct combined special operations throughout the Korean Theater of Operations. The ROK Navy s UDT/SEAL unit is modeled after the U.S. UDT. Like its counterpart in the U.S., the unit is famous for its intensive training. As evidenced in its flawless raid which led to the rescue of 21 crewmembers of the Samho Jewelry after the ship was hijacked by Somali pirates on January 15, 2010, the force is extremely well trained and competent. The operation ultimately resulted in all of the crewmembers of the ship being rescued, while eight pirates were killed and five were taken prisoner The ROK Air Force s Combat controllers are another elite troop of the military. During wartime, they too infiltrate behind enemy lines ahead of airborne troops or airlift operations to guide planes so they can accurately drop troops and equipment to positions on the ground.

93 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 93 Figure 4.2 DPRK Infiltration Routes: Tunnels 79 One of the more unusual aspects of the KPA's offensive strategy is the construction of infiltration tunnels under the DMZ. In November 1974, a KPA engineer defected and revealed the existence of these tunnels. One tunnel, discovered in 1975, had a total length of 3,300 m (1,100 m of this extended into South Korean territory), was dug at a depth of between 50 and 150 m, and was measured 2 m by 2 m wide; it has been calculated that as many as 8,000 troops could pass through per hour. Surveillance of the suspected tunnel entrances, and possible exits, continues, but their exact locations and the extent of construction remains unknown. Whether these tunnels will be countertunneled if positively located is questionable due to the enormous costs involved. It is estimated that there are approximately such tunnels, four of which have been identified and neutralized by ROK/US forces. The threat posed by the remaining tunnels and their potential to insert combat forces behind the forward defenses is substantial. There is an extensive nationwide system in excess of 11,000 fortified underground facilities. Tunnel No 1 Tunnel No 2 Tunnel No 3 Tunnel No 4 Location: 8 km northeast of Korang'po 13 km north of Ch'orwan 4 km south of P'anmunjon 26 kilometers northeast of Yanggu Invasion route: Korang'po- Uijongbu-Seoul Ch'orwon- P'och'on-Seoul Munsan-Seoul Sohwa- Wontong-Seoul Troop capacity: 4,000/h 1 8,000/h 8,000/h 8,000/h Total length: 3.5 km 3.5 km 1.64 km 2.05 km Length south of Military Demarcation Line: 1,000 m 1,100 m 435 m 1,030 Depth below surface: 45 m m 73 m 145 m Discovery Date: November 1974 March 1975 October 1978 March 1990 Note: This tunnel has concrete lining. 79 IHS Jane s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis. Jane s World Armies: North Korea. IHS Jane s, Jan. 20, Jan. 21, 2011

94 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 94 Figure 4.3: DPRK Artillery While the vast majority of North Korea s military equipment is outdated in comparison with that used by South Korean and U.S. forces south of the DMZ, North Korea often substitute numbers and mass for modernization and quality, and has created thousands of artillery emplacements near the DMZ that are capable of inflicting significant damage and civilian casualties on Seoul in minutes. In addition to its ballistic missiles, the KPA has approximately 8,500 artillery pieces (and 5,100 MRLs) 80, the vast majority of which are located along the DMZ in natural caves, manmade tunnels, and bunkers (known as Hardened Artillery Sites, or HARTS). The state of North Korea s artillery forces and their competence is questionable. Despite North Korea s use of radar in its November 23, 2010 artillery bombardment of Yonp yong-do island, the accuracy of the attack was poor. South Korean MND (Ministry of National Defense) sources state that the KPA (Korean People s Army) fired approximately 170 rounds at Yonp yong-do. Of these, 90, or 53%, impacted the waters surrounding the island, while 80, or 47%, impacted on the island. 81 Although inconclusive, the poor accuracy suggests that despite their pre-attack planning and exercises, KPA artillery troops at least those in the IV Corps are in need of greater training. Additionally, MND sources claim that approximately 25% of the 80 rounds that impacted the island were duds and failed to detonate on impact (12% if the total of 170 is taken into consideration). 82 This high failure rate suggests that some DPRK-manufactured artillery munitions especially MRL rounds suffer from either poor quality control during manufacture or that storage conditions and standards are poor. Hypothetical Range of 170mm and 240mm DPRK Artillery South Korea Ministry of Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper. 81 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., The Yonp yong-do Attack, November 23, 2010, Pt II, KPA Journal, Vol. 1, No Ibid 83 North Korea deploys more multiple-launch rockets, Yonhap News Agency, December 3, Available at

95 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 95 List of North Korean Artillery 84 Type Manufacturer Role Original Total In Service First Delivery 122 mm M1977 (D- 30) n/a Self-Propelled Howitzer n/a n/a n/a 152 mm M1974 n/a Self-Propelled Howitzer n/a n/a n/a 122 mm M1991 n/a Self-Propelled Howitzer n/a n/a n/a 170 mm M1978 Koksan n/a Self-Propelled Howitzer n/a n/a n/a 170 mm M1989 Koksan n/a Self-Propelled Howitzer n/a n/a 1 n/a 122 mm M1985 n/a Self-Propelled Gun n/a n/a n/a 122 mm M1981 n/a Self-Propelled Gun n/a n/a n/a 130 mm M1975 n/a Self-Propelled Gun n/a n/a n/a 130 mm M1981 D- 74 n/a Self-Propelled Gun n/a n/a n/a 130 mm M1991 n/a Self-Propelled Gun n/a n/a n/a 130 mm M1992 SM- 4-1 n/a Self-Propelled Gun n/a n/a n/a SU-100 n/a Self-Propelled Gun n/a 60 2 n/a 122 mm D-30 n/a Howitzer n/a n/a n/a 122 mm D-74 n/a Howitzer n/a n/a n/a 122 mm M1931 n/a Howitzer n/a n/a n/a 122 mm M1937 (A- 19) n/a Howitzer n/a n/a n/a 122 mm M1938 (M- 30) n/a Howitzer n/a n/a n/a 130 mm M-46 n/a Howitzer n/a n/a n/a 84 Jane s World Armies: North Korea. IHS Jane s Defense & Security Intelligence Analysis, Jan. 20, Available through

96 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page mm M1937 n/a Howitzer n/a n/a n/a 107 mm VTT 323 M1992 MRL n/a Self-Propelled Multiple Rocket Launcher n/a n/a n/a 107 mm Type 63 n/a Multiple Rocket Launcher n/a n/a n/a 122 mm BM-11 n/a Multiple Rocket Launcher n/a n/a n/a 122 mm BM-21 n/a Multiple Rocket Launcher n/a n/a n/a 122 mm M1977 n/a Multiple Rocket Launcher n/a n/a n/a 122 mm M1985 n/a Multiple Rocket Launcher n/a n/a n/a 122 mm M1992 n/a Multiple Rocket Launcher n/a n/a n/a 200 mm BMD-20 n/a Multiple Rocket Launcher n/a n/a n/a 220 mm 3 n/a Multiple Rocket Launcher n/a n/a n/a 240 mm M1991 n/a Multiple Rocket Launcher n/a n/a n/a FROG-5 Former Soviet state factories Artillery Rocket System n/a n/a n/a FROG-7 Former Soviet state factories Artillery Rocket System n/a n/a n/a 120 mm M1992 n/a Self-Propelled Mortar n/a n/a n/a 60 mm Type-31 n/a Mortar n/a n/a n/a 82 mm M37 n/a Mortar n/a n/a n/a 120 mm M43 n/a Mortar n/a n/a n/a 160 mm M43 n/a Mortar n/a n/a n/a Notes: Estimates only. No accurate information is available on the status or numbers of the DPRK's weapons systems. The estimated total inventory of KPA artillery, 76 mm or greater-including anti-tank weapons, is at least 8,500, plus 5,100 multiple rocket launchers of all types. The self-propelled coastal defense missile launcher transports and fires HY-1, HY-2 and AG-1 ASCMs.

97 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 97 If still in service, the SU-100 is likely to be found only within rear area and paramilitary training units. Some may be deployed in rear area coastal defense zones while others have been supplied to client nations in Africa. Utilizes the Russian 9K57 16 round 220 mm Uragan MRL on a modified civilian chassis.

98 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 98 Figure 4.4: Reserve and Paramilitary Forces 85 South Korea North Korea Series1 3,040,000 7,700,000 DPRK Reserve and Paramilitary Units 86 RMTU 620,000 Subject to combat mobilization (men and single women between ages of 17 and 30) Worker and Peasant Red Guard Red Youth Guards 5,720,000 Equivalent to ROK s Homeland Reserve Forces 940,000 Military organization of high/middle school students Paramilitary Units 420,000 Includes Security Guard Command, Ministry of People s Security (includes 115,000 Border Guards), Logistics Mobilization Guidance Bureau, Speed Battle Youth Shock Troops 85 Based primarily on material in Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, 2008 Defense White Paper. Available at Personnel figures are estimates. 86 Based primarily on material in Jane s World Armies, North Korea, January 20, 2011; Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, 2008 Defense White Paper. Personnel figures are estimates.

99 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 99 Figure 4.5: Internal Security Portions of US State Department Human Rights Report: Democratic People's Republic of Korea 87 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is a dictatorship under the absolute rule of Kim Jong-il, general secretary of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) and chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC), the "highest office of state." The country has an estimated population of 23.5 million. Kim's father, the late Kim Il-sung, remains "eternal president." National elections held in March were not free or fair. There was no civilian control of the security forces, and members of the security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses. Citizens did not have the right to change their government. The government subjected citizens to rigid controls over many aspects of their lives. There continued to be reports of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, arbitrary detention, arrests of political prisoners, harsh and life threatening prison conditions, and torture. There were reports that pregnant female prisoners underwent forced abortions in some cases, and in other cases babies were killed upon birth in prisons. The judiciary was not independent and did not provide fair trials. Citizens were denied freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association, and the government attempted to control all information. The government restricted freedom of religion, citizens' movement, and worker rights. There continued to be reports of severe punishment of some repatriated refugees. There were widespread reports of trafficking in women and girls among refugees and workers crossing the border into China. There were numerous reports that the government committed arbitrary and unlawful killings. Defector and refugee reports indicated that in some instances the government executed political prisoners, opponents of the regime, repatriated defectors, and others accused of crimes with no judicial process. The law prescribes the death penalty for the most "serious" or "grave" cases of "antistate" or "antination" crimes, including: participation in a coup or plotting to overthrow the state; acts of terrorism for an antistate purpose; treason, which includes defection or handing over state secrets; suppressing the people's movement for national liberation; cutting electric power lines or communication lines; and illegal drug transactions. An 2007 addendum to the penal code extended executions to include less serious crimes such as theft or destruction of military facilities or national assets, fraud, kidnapping, smuggling, and trafficking, Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) NGOs and think tanks reported. In the past border guards reportedly had orders to shoot to kill potential defectors, and prison guards were under orders to shoot to kill those attempting to escape from political prison camps, but it was not possible to determine if this practice continued during the year. During the year the security forces announced that attempting to cross the border or aiding others in such an attempt was punishable by execution. Religious and human rights groups outside the country alleged that some North Koreans who had contact with foreigners across the Chinese border were imprisoned or killed. Press and South Korean NGOs reported that public executions were on the rise, but no statistics were available to document the reported trend. In February two officials from the Ministry of Electric Industry were reportedly executed for "shutting down the electricity supply" to the Sunjin Steel Mill in Kimchaek, North Hamkyung Province (see section 4). In June the navy allegedly killed three persons fleeing to South Korea on a small boat (see section 2.d.). Also in June an NGO reported four inmates and a guard at Yodok prison camp were killed following a gas explosion. The incident reportedly occurred while five workers were unloading drums of gasoline. Two of the prisoners reportedly died in the explosion, and guards shot and killed two others. The guard on night duty who survived the accident reportedly was sentenced to death. An NGO reported that in June four soldiers beat and killed a security guard after he refused to give them the potatoes he was guarding. Security agents reportedly arrested the soldiers. There was no additional information available regarding the soldiers' status at year's end. It was unknown whether the government prosecuted or otherwise disciplined members of the security forces for killings that occurred in 2008, including the July 2008 shooting by security forces that killed a visiting South Korean tourist who strayed outside the boundary of the Mt. Kumgang Tourism Park. 87

100 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 100 During the year the brother of Son Jong-nam reported he believed that in December 2008 officials executed Son Jong-nam, who was sentenced to death in 2006 for maintaining contacts with organizations outside the country. Role of the Police and Security Apparatus.The internal security apparatus includes the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the State Security Department (SSD). Corruption in the security forces was endemic. The security forces do not have adequate mechanisms to investigate possible security force abuses. The country has an estimated 1.1 million active duty military personnel, in addition to a reserve force of approximately three million. The military conscripts citizens into military service at age 17, and they serve for four to 10 years. The formal public security structure was augmented by a pervasive system of informers throughout the society. Surveillance of citizens, both physical and electronic, also was routine. The MPS, responsible for internal security, social control, and basic police functions, is one of the most powerful organizations in the country and controlled an estimated 144,000 public security personnel. It maintains law and order; investigates common criminal cases; manages the prison system and traffic control; monitors citizens' political attitudes; conducts background investigations, census, and civil registrations; controls individual travel; manages the government's classified documents; protects government and party officials; and patrols government buildings and some government and party construction activities. Border Guards are the paramilitary force of the MPS and are primarily concerned with monitoring the border and with internal security. In 2008 one South Korean NGO reported that the role of the police increased significantly. The increased responsibility reportedly caused tension between the police and the military. Disappearance Reports indicated the government was responsible for disappearances. In recent years defectors claimed that state security officers often apprehended individuals suspected of political crimes and sent them, without trial, to political prison camps. There are no restrictions on the ability of the government to detain and imprison persons at will and to hold them incommunicado. The penal code states that a prosecutor's approval is required to detain a suspect; however, the government ignored this law in practice. There were no new developments in the 2008 report of disappearance of 22 North Koreans who were repatriated after floating into South Korean waters. Japan continued to seek further information about the cases of 12 Japanese nationals whom the Japanese government designated as having been abducted by DPRK government entities. The DPRK did not announce any progress or results of an investigation it agreed to reopen after discussions with the Japanese government in Japan also hoped to gain answers regarding other cases of suspected abductions of Japanese nationals. ROK government and media reports indicated that the DPRK government also kidnapped other nationals from locations abroad in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the DPRK government continued to deny its involvement in the kidnappings. The ROK government estimated that approximately 480 of its civilians, abducted or detained by DPRK authorities since the end of the Korean War, remained in the DPRK. The ROK government estimated 560 South Korean prisoners of war and soldiers missing in action also remained alive in North Korea. In 2008 the media reported South Korean missionary Kim Dong-shik had most likely died within a year of his 2000 disappearance near the China-DPRK border. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The penal code prohibits torture or inhuman treatment; however, many sources continued to report these practices. Methods of torture and other abuse reportedly included severe beatings, electric shock, prolonged periods of exposure to the elements, humiliations such as public nakedness, confinement for up to several weeks in small "punishment cells" in which prisoners were unable to stand upright or lie down, being forced to kneel or sit immobilized for long periods, being hung by the wrists or forced to stand up and sit down to the point of collapse, and forcing mothers recently repatriated from China to watch the infanticide of their newborn infants. Defectors

101 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 101 continued to report that many prisoners died from torture, disease, starvation, exposure to the elements, or a combination of these causes. The North Korean Human Rights Database Center's 2009 White Paper on North Korean Human Rights indicated that officials have in some cases prohibited live births in prison and ordered forced abortions, particularly in detention centers holding women repatriated from China, according to first-hand refugee testimony. In some cases of live birth, the white paper reported that prison guards killed the infant or left it for dead. Guards also sexually abused female prisoners according to the white paper. Defectors reported that reeducation through labor, primarily through sentences at forced labor camps, was a common punishment and consisted of tasks such as logging, mining, or tending crops under harsh conditions. Reeducation involved memorizing speeches by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Prison and Detention Center Conditions NGO, refugee, and press reports indicated that there were several types of prisons, detention centers, and camps, including forced labor camps and separate camps for political prisoners. Defectors claimed the camps covered areas as large as 200 square miles and contained mass graves, barracks, worksites, and other prison facilities. The Washington Post reported in July that numerous prison camps can be seen in satellite images and that the camps have been consolidated from 14 locations to five. An NGO reported six major prison camp complexes across the country. Reports indicated that those sentenced to prison for nonpolitical crimes were typically sent to reeducation prisons where prisoners were subjected to intense forced labor. They stated that those who were considered hostile to the regime or who committed political crimes, such as defection, were sent to political prison camps indefinitely. Many prisoners in political prison camps were not expected to survive. The government continued to deny the existence of political prison camps. Reports indicated that conditions in the political prison camps were harsh and that systematic and severe human rights abuses occurred throughout the prison and detention system. Detainees and prisoners consistently reported violence and torture. According to refugees, in some places of detention, prisoners received little or no food and were denied medical care. Sanitation was poor, and former labor camp inmates reported they had no changes of clothing during their incarceration and were rarely able to bathe or wash their clothing. An NGO reported that one reeducation center was so crowded that prisoners were forced to sleep on top of each other or sitting up. The same NGO reported that guards at a labor camp stole food brought for inmates by their family members. The government did not permit inspection of prisons or detention camps by human rights monitors. Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention Members of the security forces arrested and reportedly transported citizens suspected of committing political crimes to prison camps without trial. According to one South Korean NGO, beginning in 2008 the People's Safety Agency was authorized to handle directly criminal cases without approval of prosecutors. Previously, once police officers arrested suspects, the preadjudication department examined facts and evidence of the case and passed the case to prosecutors. It was not until the completion of prosecutors' investigation that the court made an official decision on the case. The change was made reportedly because of corruption among prosecutors. There were no restrictions on the government's ability to detain and imprison persons at will or to hold them incommunicado. Family members and other concerned persons found it virtually impossible to obtain information on charges against detained persons or the lengths of their sentences. Judicial review of detentions did not exist in law or in practice. In January the Sooseong Reeducation Center reportedly doubled the sentences of inmates near the end of their threeand four-year terms. In March a ROK national was apprehended at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and detained for four months without being allowed to speak with ROK government officials. Political Prisoners and Detainees While the total number of political prisoners and detainees remained unknown, a 2003 report by the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, The Hidden Gulag, reported an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 persons

102 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 102 were believed to be held in a type of political prison camps known as kwan li so. The government considered critics of the regime to be political criminals. Reports from past years described political offenses as including sitting on newspapers bearing Kim Il-sung's or Kim Jong-il's picture, mentioning Kim Il-sung's limited formal education, or defacing photographs of the Kims. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons The law provides for the "freedom to reside in or travel to any place"; however, the government did not respect this right in practice. During the year the government continued to attempt to control internal travel. The government did not cooperate with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons. The government continued to restrict the freedom to move within the country. Only members of a very small elite class and those with access to remittances from overseas had access to personal vehicles, and movement was hampered by the absence of an effective transport network and by military and police checkpoints on main roads at the entry to and exit from every town. Use of personal vehicles at night and on Sundays was restricted. An NGO reported that in the provinces along the Chinese border, persons traveling without authorization papers were arrested and fined 100,000 won (approximately $700). (Note: the government revalued its currency on November 30. Approximations in this report are based on the prerevalued rates.) The government strictly controlled permission to reside in, or even to enter, Pyongyang, where food supplies, housing, health, and general living conditions were much better than in the rest of the country. Foreign officials visiting the country observed checkpoints on the highway leading into Pyongyang from the countryside. The government also restricted foreign travel. The regime limited issuance of exit visas for foreign travel to officials and trusted businessmen, artists, athletes, academics, and religious figures. Short-term exit papers were available for some residents on the Chinese border to enable visits with relatives or to engage in small-scale trade. It was not known whether the laws prohibit forced exile; the government reportedly forced the internal exile of some citizens. In the past the government engaged in forced internal resettlement of tens of thousands of persons from Pyongyang to the countryside. Sometimes this occurred as punishment for offenses, although there were reports that social engineering was also involved. For example, although disabled veterans were treated well, other persons with physical and mental disabilities, as well as those judged to be politically unreliable, were sent out of Pyongyang into internal exile. The government did not allow emigration, and beginning in 2008 it tightened security on both sides of the border, which dramatically reduced the flow of persons crossing into China without required permits. NGOs reported strict patrols and surveillance of residents of border areas and a crackdown on border guards who may have been aiding border crossers. According to an NGO, on February 10, a navy patrol boat captured a fishing boat that crossed into international waters; they arrested the captain and crew for attempting to flee to South Korea. Authorities reportedly beat one crewmember to death during a preliminary hearing. Six crewmembers were released, but five, including the captain, remained in custody. Substantial numbers of citizens have crossed the border into China over the years, and NGO estimates of those who lived there during the year ranged from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. Some settled semipermanently in northeastern China, others traveled back and forth across the border, and others sought asylum and permanent resettlement in third countries. A few thousand citizens gained asylum in third countries during the year. The law criminalizes defection and attempted defection, including the attempt to gain entry to a foreign diplomatic facility for the purpose of seeking political asylum. Individuals who cross the border with the purpose of defecting or seeking asylum in a third country are subject to a minimum of five years of "labor correction." An NGO reported that minors over age 14 found crossing the border were tried as adults. In "serious" cases defectors or asylum seekers are subject to indefinite terms of imprisonment and forced labor, confiscation of property, or death. Many would-be refugees who were returned involuntarily were imprisoned under harsh conditions. Some sources indicated that the harshest treatment was reserved for those who had extensive contact with foreigners. In the past, reports from defectors indicated that the regime differentiated between persons who crossed the border in search of food (who might be sentenced only to a few months of forced labor or in some cases merely issued a warning) and persons who crossed repeatedly or for political purposes (who were sometimes sentenced to heavy

103 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 103 punishments). The law stipulates a sentence of up to two years of "labor correction" for the crime of illegally crossing the border. During the year the government reportedly continued to enforce the policy that all border crossers be sent to prison or reeducation centers.

104 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 104 Figure 4.6: Internal Security Portions of US State Department Human Rights Report: Republic of Korea 88 The Republic of Korea (Korea or ROK) is a constitutional democracy governed by President Lee Myung-bak and a unicameral legislature. The country has a population of approximately 48 million. In April 2008 the Grand National Party obtained a majority of National Assembly seats in a free and fair election. Civilian authorities maintained effective control of the security forces. The government generally respected the human rights of its citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Women, persons with disabilities, and minorities continued to face societal discrimination. Rape, domestic violence, and child abuse remained serious problems. There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Official figures indicated that hazing was a factor in many of the 356 suicides by military personnel since There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Prison and detention center conditions generally met international standards. The government permitted monitoring visits by independent human rights observers, and such visits occurred during the year. In December 2008 the government passed the Act on Sentence Execution and Treatment of Detainees, a new petition system that better accommodates detainees who want to formally accuse prison officials of abuse. The system provides detainees easier access to petition procedures and assists with the petition process, whereas before, petitioners had to submit their grievances directly to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) with limited support mechanisms. As of October, 449 such petitions were submitted to the MOJ's Human Rights Violations Center. Of those petitions, 166 were dismissed, 226 were referred to other government offices, 31 were rejected, 23 had no action taken, and 53 were pending a decision. As of October there were 297 petitions alleging human rights violations by detention facility officials. Of those cases, 107 were withdrawn, 115 were rejected, and the remaining 75 were under investigation. The MOJ reported the total of number of prisoners as of December was 48,228. Of that total, 2,603 were female and 472 were juveniles. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the government generally observed these prohibitions. However, the National Security Law (NSL) grants the authorities powers to detain, arrest, and imprison persons who commit acts the government views as intended to endanger the "security of the state." Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continued to call for reform or abolishment of the law, contending that its provisions did not define prohibited activity clearly. The MOJ maintained that the courts had established legal precedents for strict interpretation of the law that preclude arbitrary application. The number of NSL investigations and arrests has dropped significantly in recent years. During the year 34 persons were prosecuted for violating the NSL; of those, 14 were convicted and 20 were awaiting trial. In 2008, 27 persons were prosecuted for alleged NSL violations. Of those, seven were found guilty-- two were serving prison sentences, and five received suspended sentences and were on probation. The remaining 20 cases were pending at year's end. The secondary school teacher indicted in August 2008 for violating the NSL by distributing banned material remained free on bail while awaiting trial. During the year the MOJ reported dropping the portion of the case related to the 1980 Kwangju uprising. Four members of an NGO detained and charged in September 2008 with illegal contact with Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) agents and distribution of North Korean press material for the purpose of exalting DPRK leader Kim Jong-il were convicted during the year. Two of the members were serving prison sentences, and two members were given suspended sentences and probation. The NGO members appealed the sentences and filed a defamation claim against the government. 88

105 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 105 A university professor found guilty of violating the NSL in 2007 and sentenced to two years in jail had his sentence reduced to three years of probation. He appealed the conviction; the case was pending before the Supreme Court. Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention The law requires warrants in cases of arrest, detention, seizure, or search, except if a person is apprehended while committing a criminal act or if a judge is not available and the authorities believe that a suspect may destroy evidence or escape capture if not arrested quickly. In such cases a public prosecutor or police officer must prepare an affidavit of emergency arrest immediately upon apprehension of the suspect. Police may not interrogate for more than six hours persons who voluntarily submit to questioning at police stations. Authorities must release an arrested suspect within 20 days unless an indictment is issued. An additional 10 days of detention is allowed in exceptional circumstances. There is a bail system, but human rights lawyers stated that bail generally was not granted for detainees who were charged with committing serious offenses, might attempt to flee or harm a victim, or had no fixed address. The law provides for the right to representation by an attorney, including during police interrogation. There are no restrictions on access to a lawyer, but authorities can limit a lawyer's participation in an interrogation if the lawyer obstructs the interrogation or divulges information that impedes an investigation. The courts generally observed a defendant's right to a lawyer. During both detention and arrest periods, an indigent detainee may request that the government provide a lawyer. Access to family members during detention varied according to the severity of the crime being investigated. There were no reports of access to legal counsel being denied. Political Prisoners and Detainees The MOJ stated that no persons were incarcerated solely because of their political beliefs. The NGO Mingahyup claimed that as of August, the government had imprisoned 129 persons for their political beliefs. In April a riot police conscript was sentenced to two years in prison for refusing to return to duty. He had ignored orders from his superiors to use violence against protesters during the 2008 beef protests. The country requires military service for all men, although mandatory service periods vary: 24 months for the army, 26 months for the navy, and 27 months for the air force. The law does not protect conscientious objectors, who can receive a maximum three-year prison sentence. The MOJ has noted that the law does not distinguish conscientious objectors from others who do not report for mandatory military service. The MOJ reported that there were 5,136 cases of Military Service Act violations, with 750 cases referred for trial and 2,123 cases settled out of court. During the year the Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that it would not pursue the introduction of alternative service for conscientious objectors. The ministry cited a lack of public support as the primary reason for its decision; an MND-sponsored poll found that 68 percent of the respondents opposed instituting alternative service, but an independent poll taken about the same time found that only 39 percent were opposed. Meanwhile, the Jehovah's Witnesses reported that courts increasingly were sympathetic to conscientious objectors. In September 2008 a district court asked the Constitutional Court to review again the constitutionality of the Conscription Law. The request remained pending approval. The court ruled in 2002 and 2004 that the law is constitutional. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons Most citizens could move freely throughout the country; however, government officials restricted the movement of certain DPRK defectors by denying them passports. In many cases travelers going to the DPRK must receive a briefing from the Ministry of Unification prior to departure. They must also demonstrate that their trip does not have a political purpose and is not undertaken to praise the DPRK or criticize the ROK government. The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern. In September NGO leaders reported that Dolksun Isa, secretary general of the World Uighur Congress, was detained at Incheon airport for 42 hours, allegedly at China's request. Although he was later released and safely returned home, the government prohibited Isa from entering the country and attending an NGO conference in Seoul, as he had initially planned. MOJ officials emphasized that Isa was denied entry under the immigration law, not for political reasons.

106 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 106 The law does not include provisions for forced exile of its citizens, and the government did not employ it. Official Corruption and Government Transparency.The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, and the government generally implemented these laws effectively. The Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption stated that the overall "cleanliness level" of the government for 2008 was 8.17 out of 10 points, a slight decrease from 8.89 in There were reports of officials receiving bribes and violating election laws. According to the MOJ, 4,067 government officials were prosecuted for abuse of authority, bribery, embezzlement or misappropriation, and falsification of official documents. The National Assembly reported that out of the 250 lawmakers facing indictment, 15 lawmakers were prosecuted for corruption and 12 were awaiting trial. By law public servants above a certain rank must register their assets, including how they were accumulated, thereby making their holdings public. Among the anticorruption agencies are the Board of Audit and Inspection and the Public Servants Ethics Committee. In February 2008 the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption, Ombudsman of Korea, and Administrative Appeals Commission were integrated to form the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission. The country has a Freedom of Information Act; in practice the government granted access for citizens and noncitizens alike, including foreign media. The Republic of Korea (Korea or ROK) is a constitutional democracy governed by President Lee Myung-bak and a unicameral legislature. The country has a population of approximately 48 million. In April 2008 the Grand National Party obtained a majority of National Assembly seats in a free and fair election. Civilian authorities maintained effective control of the security forces. There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Official figures indicated that hazing was a factor in many of the 356 suicides by military personnel since There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Prison and detention center conditions generally met international standards. The government permitted monitoring visits by independent human rights observers, and such visits occurred during the year. In December 2008 the government passed the Act on Sentence Execution and Treatment of Detainees, a new petition system that better accommodates detainees who want to formally accuse prison officials of abuse. The system provides detainees easier access to petition procedures and assists with the petition process, whereas before, petitioners had to submit their grievances directly to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) with limited support mechanisms. As of October, 449 such petitions were submitted to the MOJ's Human Rights Violations Center. Of those petitions, 166 were dismissed, 226 were referred to other government offices, 31 were rejected, 23 had no action taken, and 53 were pending a decision. As of October there were 297 petitions alleging human rights violations by detention facility officials. Of those cases, 107 were withdrawn, 115 were rejected, and the remaining 75 were under investigation. The MOJ reported the total of number of prisoners as of December was 48,228. Of that total, 2,603 were female and 472 were juveniles. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the government generally observed these prohibitions. However, the National Security Law (NSL) grants the authorities powers to detain, arrest, and imprison persons who commit acts the government views as intended to endanger the "security of the state." Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continued to call for reform or abolishment of the law, contending that its provisions did not define prohibited activity clearly. The MOJ maintained that the courts had established legal precedents for strict interpretation of the law that preclude arbitrary application. The number of NSL investigations and arrests has dropped significantly in recent years. During the year 34 persons were prosecuted for violating the NSL; of those, 14 were convicted and 20 were awaiting trial. In 2008, 27 persons were prosecuted for alleged NSL violations. Of those, seven were found guilty--

107 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 107 two were serving prison sentences, and five received suspended sentences and were on probation. The remaining 20 cases were pending at year's end. The secondary school teacher indicted in August 2008 for violating the NSL by distributing banned material remained free on bail while awaiting trial. During the year the MOJ reported dropping the portion of the case related to the 1980 Kwangju uprising. Four members of an NGO detained and charged in September 2008 with illegal contact with Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) agents and distribution of North Korean press material for the purpose of exalting DPRK leader Kim Jong-il were convicted during the year. Two of the members were serving prison sentences, and two members were given suspended sentences and probation. The NGO members appealed the sentences and filed a defamation claim against the government. A university professor found guilty of violating the NSL in 2007 and sentenced to two years in jail had his sentence reduced to three years of probation. He appealed the conviction; the case was pending before the Supreme Court. Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention The law requires warrants in cases of arrest, detention, seizure, or search, except if a person is apprehended while committing a criminal act or if a judge is not available and the authorities believe that a suspect may destroy evidence or escape capture if not arrested quickly. In such cases a public prosecutor or police officer must prepare an affidavit of emergency arrest immediately upon apprehension of the suspect. Police may not interrogate for more than six hours persons who voluntarily submit to questioning at police stations. Authorities must release an arrested suspect within 20 days unless an indictment is issued. An additional 10 days of detention is allowed in exceptional circumstances. There is a bail system, but human rights lawyers stated that bail generally was not granted for detainees who were charged with committing serious offenses, might attempt to flee or harm a victim, or had no fixed address. The law provides for the right to representation by an attorney, including during police interrogation. There are no restrictions on access to a lawyer, but authorities can limit a lawyer's participation in an interrogation if the lawyer obstructs the interrogation or divulges information that impedes an investigation. The courts generally observed a defendant's right to a lawyer. During both detention and arrest periods, an indigent detainee may request that the government provide a lawyer. Access to family members during detention varied according to the severity of the crime being investigated. There were no reports of access to legal counsel being denied. Political Prisoners and Detainees The MOJ stated that no persons were incarcerated solely because of their political beliefs. The NGO Mingahyup claimed that as of August, the government had imprisoned 129 persons for their political beliefs. In April a riot police conscript was sentenced to two years in prison for refusing to return to duty. He had ignored orders from his superiors to use violence against protesters during the 2008 beef protests. The country requires military service for all men, although mandatory service periods vary: 24 months for the army, 26 months for the navy, and 27 months for the air force. The law does not protect conscientious objectors, who can receive a maximum three-year prison sentence. The MOJ has noted that the law does not distinguish conscientious objectors from others who do not report for mandatory military service. The MOJ reported that there were 5,136 cases of Military Service Act violations, with 750 cases referred for trial and 2,123 cases settled out of court. Watchtower International, a Jehovah's Witness organization that is actively engaged in lobbying the government on this issue, reported that as of April 1, there were 465 Jehovah's Witnesses and a handful of others serving an average of 14 months in prison for conscientious objection to military service. During the year the Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that it would not pursue the introduction of alternative service for conscientious objectors. The ministry cited a lack of public support as the primary reason for its decision; an MND-sponsored poll found that 68 percent of the respondents opposed instituting alternative service, but an independent poll taken about the same time found that only 39 percent were opposed. Meanwhile, the Jehovah's Witnesses reported that courts increasingly were sympathetic to conscientious objectors. In September 2008 a district court asked the Constitutional Court to review again the constitutionality of the Conscription Law. The request remained pending approval. The court ruled in 2002 and 2004 that the law is constitutional.

108 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 108 Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons Most citizens could move freely throughout the country; however, government officials restricted the movement of certain DPRK defectors by denying them passports. In many cases travelers going to the DPRK must receive a briefing from the Ministry of Unification prior to departure. They must also demonstrate that their trip does not have a political purpose and is not undertaken to praise the DPRK or criticize the ROK government. The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern. In September NGO leaders reported that Dolksun Isa, secretary general of the World Uighur Congress, was detained at Incheon airport for 42 hours, allegedly at China's request. Although he was later released and safely returned home, the government prohibited Isa from entering the country and attending an NGO conference in Seoul, as he had initially planned. MOJ officials emphasized that Isa was denied entry under the immigration law, not for political reasons. The law does not include provisions for forced exile of its citizens, and the government did not employ it.

109 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 109 Section 5: Counterterrorism, Terrorism and Low-Level Asymmetric Warfare From a military point of view, there is no clear line between terrorism and asymmetric warfare. It is also a historical fact that the side with the stronger regular military forces is either less likely to use such tactics, or conceal them in the form of state terrorism. As is noted in the introduction, North Korea has repeatedly challenged South Korea using low level covert operations and asymmetric attacks and used them to put pressure on both Korea and the United States. North Korea has also deployed large amounts of its force structure for the same purpose, keeping South Korea under constant pressure. It has created a special balance in the border area by creating tunnel systems and deploying large amounts of artillery in caves and sheltered positions within range of South Korea s capital, Seoul. US and South Korea feel that the historical record shows that there was nothing new about North Korea s use of limited or asymmetric attacks some of which the US and South Korea label as terrorism -- in North Korea s willingness and inventiveness in using the threat and reality of such attacks was so consistent between 1950 and 2007, that it led the Congressional Research Service to prepare a 36 page chronology which covered 164 examples of armed invasion; border violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnaping; terrorism (including assassination and bombing); threats/intimidation against political leaders, media personnel, and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean government; actions undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations; and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. 89 The CRS report summarizes these trends as follows, The most intense phase of the provocations was in the latter half of the 1960s, when North Korea (Democratic People s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) staged a series of limited armed actions against South Korean and U.S. security interests. Infiltration of armed agents into South Korea was the most frequently mentioned type of provocation, followed by kidnaping and terrorism (actual and threatened). From 1954 to 1992, North Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of 3,693 armed agents into South Korea, with 1967 and 1968 accounting for 20% of the total. Instances of terrorism were far fewer in number, but they seemed to have had a continuing negative impact on relations between the two Koreas. Not counting North Korea s invasion of South Korea that triggered the Korean War ( ), North Korea s major terrorist involvement includes attempted assassinations of President Park Chung Hee in 1968 and 1974; a 1983 attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan s life in a bombing incident in Rangoon, Burma (Myanmar); and a mid-air sabotage bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707 passenger plane in Reported provocations have continued intermittently in recent years, in the form of armed incursions, kidnappings, and occasional threats to turn the South Korean capital of Seoul into a sea of fire and to silence or tame South Korean critics of North Korea. Then, in July 2006, North Korea launched seven missiles into the Sea of Japan, and in October 2006, it tested a nuclear bomb. The US State Department annual assessment of North Korea and South Koreas role in terrorism and counter terrorism provides a current assessment of each countries role in such activities, and of how they might affect the military balance, although these assessments again reflect a Western perspective: Figure 5.1 provides the reporting on North Korea. 89 Hannah Fischer, North Korean Provocative Actions, , Congressional Research Service, RL30004, April 20, 2007.

110 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 110 Figure 5.2 provides the reporting on South Korea. Once again, it was not possible to find comparable assessments from a North Korean viewpoint. It is important to note, however, that North Korea may see the use of unconventional or asymmetric warfare as the only way it can exert safely exert military pressure on South Korea and the US, and force the pace of negotiation. In realpolitik, the difference between terrorism and asymmetric warfare is often a matter of perspective and semantics.

111 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 111 Figure 5.1 Counterterrorism and Terrorism in North Korea (DPRK) The Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in On October 11, 2008, the United States removed the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that the government of the DPRK had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding sixmonth period and the provision by the DPRK of assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. In May, the United States re-certified North Korea as not cooperating fully with U.S. counterterrorism efforts under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. Pursuant to this certification, defense articles and services may not be sold or licensed for export to North Korea from October 1, 2009 to September 30, This certification will lapse unless it is renewed by the Secretary of State by May 15, Four Japanese Red Army (JRA) members who participated in a jet hijacking in 1970 continued to live in the DPRK. On June 13, 2008, the government of Japan announced that the DPRK had agreed to cooperate in handing over the remaining members of the JRA involved in the hijacking. However, the DPRK has not yet fulfilled this commitment. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities in the 1970s and 1980s. The DPRK admitted to abducting eight of these individuals, but claimed that they have since died; the DPRK has denied having abducted the other four individuals. On August 12, 2008, Japan and the DPRK agreed on steps towards the eventual resolution to this issue. However, the DPRK has not yet fulfilled its commitment to reopen its investigations into the abductions. Since 2002, five other abductees have been repatriated to Japan.

112 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 112 Figure 5.2 Counterterrorism and Terrorism in the Republic of Korea (ROK) 90 The Republic of Korea (South Korea) demonstrated excellent law enforcement and intelligence capabilities to combat terrorism. South Korean immigration and law enforcement agencies had a strong record of tracking suspicious individuals entering their territory and reacting quickly to thwart potential terrorist acts. Seoul also reviewed and strengthened its emergency response plan and, in accordance with UNSCR 1267 and 1373, further tightened its legislative framework and administrative procedures to combat terrorist financing. For example, the Prohibition of Financing for Offenses of Public Intimidation Act took effect in December 2008 and was intended to implement the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, to which the South Korea has been a party since Under the Act, funds for public intimidation offenses are identified as any funds or assets collected, provided, delivered, or kept for use in any of the following acts committed with the intention to intimidate the public or to interfere with the exercise of rights of a national, local, or foreign government. An amendment expanding the government s ability to confiscate funds related to terrorism was enacted in March, enabling the government to confiscate not only the direct proceeds of terrorism, but also funds and assets derived from those proceeds. In October, South Korea became a full member of FATF. The accession to FATF will allow Korea, an observer since 2006, to actively participate in the process of setting and revising global Anti-Money Laundering and Counterterrorismm Financing Terrorism (AML/CTF) standards and increase international cooperation. South Korea supported U.S. counterterrorism goals in Afghanistan by announcing the establishment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team. In addition, South Korea worked closely with other foreign partners and played a constructive role in improving regional counterterrorism capabilities. South Korea continued to participate in the counterterrorism activities of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Asia-Europe Meeting. The Korea Overseas International Cooperation Agency hosted counterterrorism training and capacity-building programs for regional partners in forensic science, prevention of money laundering, and cyber security. In March, the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate of the United Nations visited South Korea to monitor its efforts to combat terrorism in accordance with UNSCR The team found that Korea had made good progress with respect to AML/CFT laws and mechanisms to criminalize terrorist financing and freeze funds and assets. In October, the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses hosted the ninth Biannual Symposium of the Council for Asian Terrorism Research, with the theme Korean Peninsula WMD Threats: Regional and Global Implications. In November, South Korea hosted the second APEC Cybersecurity Seminar on Protection of Cyberspace from Terrorist Attacks and Use, which brought 13 countries together to discuss recent cyber attacks and ways to deal with the challenges of cyber terrorism. In December, the Ambassador for International Counterterrorism Cooperation hosted the second round of South Korea-U.S. bilateral counterterrorism consultations, attended on the U.S. side by the Deputy Coordinator for Regional Affairs of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Korea also held bilateral counterterrorism meetings with Indonesia, Japan, France, and Germany during the year. The South Korean government has recently been concerned over the growing number of South Korean citizens abroad who have been victims of terrorist attacks. In March, four South Korean tourists were killed and five were wounded in a suicide bombing in Yemen, for which al-qa ida later claimed responsibility. In June, another South Korean civilian working for a medical NGO in Yemen was kidnapped and killed. Although the Yemeni government did not find a conclusive connection to an established terrorist group in that incident, the South Korean government was put on alert and is now exploring various possibilities to prevent future attacks on its citizens. 90 See Office of the Coordinator, US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 2. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview, August 5, 2010,

113 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 113 Section 6: Korean Missile and WMD Forces North Korea s nuclear programs, and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range missiles have been the source of concern and arms control efforts for more than a decade. These are very real concerns, but it is important to note that they are only part of this aspect of the balance of power. Weapons of mass destruction include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The balance includes the CBRN weapons of outside actors like the United State and China. It is tied to delivery systems, and includes a growing capability to deploy new weapons of mass effectiveness. North Korean Nuclear Developments North Korea s nuclear programs are having a major impact on the balance. Dennis C. Blair, then U.S. Director of National Intelligence summarized Western and South Korean perceptions of such North Korean activities as follows in the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community that he provide to the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 2, 2010: Pyongyang s nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the security environment in East Asia. North Korea s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries including Iran and Pakistan, and its assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor, exposed in 2007, illustrate the reach of the North s proliferation activities. Despite the Six-Party October 3, 2007 Second Phase Actions agreement in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how we remain alert to the possibility North Korea could again export nuclear technology. The North s October 2006 nuclear test was consistent with our longstanding assessment that it had produced a nuclear device, although we judge the test itself to have been a partial failure based on its less-than-one-kiloton TNT equivalent yield. The North s probable nuclear test in May 2009 supports its claim that it has been seeking to develop weapons, and with a yield of roughly a few kilotons TNT equivalent, was apparently more successful than the 2006 test. We judge North Korea has tested two nuclear devices, and while we do not know whether the North has produced nuclear weapons, we assess it has the capability to do so. It remains our policy that we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, and we assess that other countries in the region remain committed to the denuclearization of North Korea as has been reflected in the Six Party Talks. After denying a highly enriched uranium program since 2003, North Korea announced in April 2009 that it was developing uranium enrichment capability to produce fuel for a planned light water reactor (such reactors use low enriched uranium); in September it claimed its enrichment research had entered into the completion phase. The exact intent of these announcements is unclear, and they do not speak definitively to the technical status of the uranium enrichment program. The Intelligence Community continues to assess with high confidence North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past, which we assess was for weapons In addition to the TD-2 missile launch of April 2009 and the probable nuclear test of May 2009, Pyongyang s reprocessing of fuel rods removed from its reactor as part of the disablement process appears designed to enhance its nuclear deterrent and reset the terms of any return to the negotiating table. Moreover, Pyongyang knows that its pursuit of a uranium enrichment capability has returned that issue to the agenda for any nuclear negotiations. The North has long been aware of US suspicions of a highly enriched uranium program. We judge Kim Jong-Il seeks recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapons power by the US and the international community. Pyongyang s intent in pursuing dialogue at this time is to take advantage of what it perceives as an enhanced negotiating position, having demonstrated its nuclear and missile capabilities.

114 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 114 James R. Clapper, Blair s replacement as DNI, updated this analysis in his testimony to the U.S. Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on February 10, 2011: Pyongyang s nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the security environment in East Asia, a region characterized by several great power rivalries and some of the world s largest economies. North Korea s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of the North s proliferation activities. Despite the October 2007 Six-Party agreement in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, we remain alert to the possibility North Korea could again export nuclear technology. We judge North Korea has tested two nuclear devices. The North s October 2006 nuclear test is consistent with our longstanding assessment that it had produced a nuclear device, although we judge the test itself to have been a partial failure. The North s probable nuclear test in May 2009 is consistent with our assessment that the North continued to develop nuclear weapons, and with a yield of roughly two kilotons TNT equivalent, was apparently more successful than the 2006 test. Although we judge North Korea has tested two nuclear devices, we do not know whether the North has produced nuclear weapons, but we assess it has the capability to do so. In November 2010, North Korean officials told US visitors that North Korea is building its own light water reactor (LWR) for electricity production. The claimed prototype LWR has a planned power of 100 megawattthermal and a target completion date of North Korean officials also told the US visitors in November that it had constructed and started operating a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon that they claimed was designed to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) and support fabrication of reactor fuel for the LWR. The US visitors were shown a facility at the existing fuel fabrication complex in Yongbyon, which North Korea described as a uranium enrichment plant. North Korea further claimed the facility contained 2,000 centrifuges and was operating and producing LEU that would be used to fuel the small LWR. The North s disclosure supports the United States longstanding assessment that the DPRK has pursued a uranium-enrichment capability. We judge it is not possible the DPRK could have constructed the Yongbyon enrichment facility and begun its operation, as North Korean officials claim, in such a short period of time less than 20 months without having previously conducted extensive research, development, testing, fabrication, and assembly or without receiving outside assistance. Based on the scale of the facility and the progress the DPRK has made in construction, it is likely that North Korea has been pursuing enrichment for an extended period of time. If so, there is clear prospect that DPRK has built other uranium enrichment related facilities in its territory, including likely R&D and centrifuge fabrication facilities, and other enrichment facilities. Analysts differ on the likelihood that other production-scale facilities may exist elsewhere in North Korea. Following the Taepo Dong 1 launch in 1998, North Korea conducted launches of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) in 2006 and more recently in April Despite the most recent launch s failure in its stated mission of orbiting a small communications satellite, it successfully tested many technologies associated with an ICBM. Although both TD-2 launches ended in failure, the 2009 flight demonstrated a more complete performance than the July 2006 launch. North Korea s progress in developing the TD-2 shows its determination to achieve long-range ballistic missile and space launch capabilities. If configured as an ICBM, the TD-2 could reach at least portions of the United States; the TD-2 or associated technologies also could be exported. Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, the North s leaders are focused on deterrence and defense. The Intelligence Community assesses Pyongyang views its nuclear capabilities as intended for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy. We judge that North Korea would consider using nuclear weapons only under certain narrow circumstances. We also assess, albeit with low confidence, Pyongyang probably would not attempt to use nuclear weapons against US forces or territory

115 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 115 unless it perceived its regime to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable loss of control. The North has signaled it wants to return to a nuclear dialogue. The North probably wants to resume nuclear discussions to mitigate international sanctions, regain international economic aid, bolster its ties with China, restart bilateral negotiations with South Korea and the United States, and try to gain tacit international acceptance for its status as a nuclear weapons power. Since 2009, Pyongyang has made a series of announcements about producing enriched uranium fuel for an indigenous light water reactor that it is building at its Yongbyon nuclear complex. In mid- November, 2010, the North showed an unofficial US delegation what it claims is an operating uranium enrichment facility located in the Yongbyon rod core production building. Key Nuclear Weapons Developments North Korea has conducted two low yield nuclear tests one on October 9, 2006 with a yield of less than one kiloton, and one on May 25, 2009, with a yield of a few kilotons. North Korea has effectively ended its past agreements to limit the production of nuclear materials and its missile tests. While unclassified estimates are to some extent sophisticated guesswork, North Korea may have obtained enough plutonium from its power reactors to have 4-13 nuclear weapons even allowing for the material used in its two tests. Moreover, Siegfried Heckler a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory reported on a visit to Yongbyon that he saw a small, sophisticated facility with some 2,000 centrifuges that were P-2 advanced designs. 91 These reports were followed by press reports that the IAEA suspected Korea had at least one additional covert centrifuge site, and might have significant nuclear of additional sites. 92 These reports mean that North Korea may have significant stocks of enriched uranium, as well as plutonium. At a minimum, this means North Korea s future production of weapons grade material is impossible to predict, and that both targeting and arms control are far more difficult because of the inability to predict how man disperse centrifuge facilities North Korea may have. In addition, respected sources like Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) have indicated that North Korea may be sharing at least some aspects of its nuclear weapons technology with Iran and Syria. 93 Mike Green of the CSIS also notes, the danger of horizontal escalation by the DPRK namely, transferring weapons to third parties in the event of tensions or conflict. The DPRK directly threatened us with this in March Arms Control Chronology See Seigfried Heckler, A Return Trip to North Korea s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex, November 20, 2010, David Albright and Paul Brannan, Satellite Image Shows Building Centrifuges in North Korea, ISIS, November 21, 2010, and Taking Stock: North Korea s Uranium Enrichment Program, October 8, 2010; Jonathan Medalia, North Korea s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications, Congressional Research Service, R41160, November 24, 210; Kwang Ho Chun, North Korea s Nuclear Question: Sense of Vunerability, Defensive Motivation, and Peaceful Solution, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, December Chico Harlan, UN report suggests N. Korea has secret nuclear sites, Washington Post, February 1, 2011, p. A7. 93 See and other material in the Korea section ( of the ISIS web page. Additional material can be found in the Global Security, Federation of American Scientists, and Nuclear Threat Initiative web pages. 94 from Mike Green, February 07, :57 PM 95 Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, IAEA, May Available at

116 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 116 These developments do not make efforts to roll back North Korea s nuclear weapons programs impossible, but the track record of such efforts has not been reassuring. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the following chronology of UN related efforts. The separate efforts of China, Japan, the US, and Russia have followed similar patterns: 1980s: Origins of Nuclear Safeguards. On 12 December 1985 the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK) became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On 10 April 1992 the NPT Safeguards Agreement entered into force (INFCIRC/403). Before that, in 1977, the country had concluded an INFCIRC/66 type Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/252) for two nuclear research facilities (the IRT research reactor and a critical assembly). Two-Phased Program. Two phases are to be distinguished in the DPRK s nuclear program. The first started at the end of the fifties and was set up with Soviet assistance. In that period a nuclear complex was constructed at Nyongbyong, where in the 1960s a number of facilities were built. The second - indigenous - phase started in 1979 with the construction of a 5 MW(e) natural uranium, graphite moderated reactor in Nyongbyong. In the same period an ore processing plant and a fuel rod fabrication plant were built. By the time the 5 MW(e) reactor became operational in 1986, construction of the first of two larger gas-graphite reactors began and around 1987, also in Nyongbyong, the construction of a Radiochemical Laboratory with a sizeable reprocessing capacity started. 1990s: IAEA Safeguards Inspections. After the DPRK had submitted its initial report to the IAEA under its Safeguards Agreement in May 1992, inspections began. Shortly thereafter inconsistencies emerged between the DPRK's initial declaration and the Agency s findings, centering on a mismatch between declared plutonium product and nuclear waste solutions and the results of the Agency s analysis. The latter suggested that there existed in the DPRK undeclared plutonium. In order to find answers to the inconsistencies detected and to determine the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration provided, the IAEA requested access to additional information and to two sites that seemed to be related to the storage of nuclear waste. The DPRK, however, refused access to the sites. Special Inspection. Thereupon, the Director General invoked in February 1993 the special inspection procedure provided for in the Safeguards Agreement. The request for a special inspection was refused by the DPRK and the Board of Governors on 1 April 1993 concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement and, in line with Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, referred this noncompliance to the UN Security Council. On 11 May 1993, the Council called upon the DPRK to comply with the Agreement. In parallel with these developments, on 12 March 1993, the DPRK announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT, but in June 1993 "suspended the effectuation" of that withdrawal. Prelude to Security Council Action. During 1993 and 1994 the IAEA was permitted by the DPRK to conduct safeguards activities with a limited scope only (containment, surveillance and maintenance) with the sole purpose of ensuring, as the DPRK phrased it, the "continuity of safeguards" versus "full implementation" demanded by the Agency. The Director General reported as early as December 1993 to the Board that the kind of limited safeguards permitted by the DPRK could no longer be said to provide any meaningful assurance of the peaceful use of the DPRK s declared nuclear installations. Based on the Director General s report, the UN Security Council, on 31 March 1994, again called upon the DPRK to enable the inspectors to complete their required activities. June 1994 IAEA Board Resolution. In the context of the special inspection request it was vital for the Agency to ascertain whether the core of the DPRK s 5 MW(e) Experimental Nuclear Power reactor was the first core as claimed by the DPRK. However, in May 1994, the DPRK hastily discharged the fuel from the 5 MW(e) reactor in such a way that the IAEA was not able to conduct the verification activities that could have clarified the history of the core. On 30 May 1994, in his statement, the President of the Security Council called for immediate consultations between the DPRK and the Agency in connection with the further discharge of the core, and, on 10 June 1994, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution which concluded that "the DPRK is continuing to widen its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement by taking actions which prevent the Agency from verifying the history of the reactor core and from ascertaining whether nuclear material from the reactor had been diverted in past years". The Board also decided to suspend all non-medical technical assistance to the DPRK.

117 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 117 DPRK Withdraws IAEA Membership. On 13 June 1994, the DPRK, which had been an IAEA Member State since 1974, withdrew from its membership in the Agency. Although the withdrawal did not affect the DPRK obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, which in the Agency s view remains binding and in force, the DPRK took the position that it was in a special position with regard to the Safeguards Agreement and that it was no longer obliged to allow the inspectors to carry out their work under the Safeguards Agreement. US-DPRK Agreed Framework. The mid-1994 crisis was defused by the visit of former President Carter in June 1994 and in the subsequent negotiations that led to the Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK on 21 October Under the Agreed Framework the US commits itself to make arrangements for the provision of a LWR generating capacity of approximately 2000 MW(e) in exchange for a DPRK "freeze" and ultimately the dismantlement of its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities. The arrangements for the LWR project led to the creation, in 1995, of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). IAEA Monitoring of the Freeze. The Agreed Framework stipulates that the IAEA will be allowed to monitor the freeze. At the request of the Security Council (in a statement by the President of the Council of 4 November 1994), and as authorized by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1994, the IAEA has maintained a continuous presence in Nyongbyong to verify the freeze. In the Agency s view, the activities under the Agreed Framework are a subset of activities to be performed under the Safeguards Agreement. The facilities subject to the freeze are the 5MW(e) reactor, the Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing), the fuel fabrication plant and the partially built 50 and 200MW(e) nuclear power plants. 2000s: IAEA-DPRK Technical Talks. Notwithstanding the continuing difference between the Agency and the DPRK as to the status of the Safeguards Agreement, regular technical meetings, about twice a year, have taken place since 1994 in Vienna and the DPRK to resolve outstanding issues. Initially the discussions focused on preserving the relevant information. However, despite 17 rounds of technical consultations, no progress has been achieved on key issues. After the Secretariat had determined, in September 2000, that it would need 3 to 4 years to carry out all the activities required to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial report, the focus has shifted to obtaining full DPRK cooperation to carry out these activities. So far the DPRK has not agreed to even discuss such a program of work. The last technical meeting was held in November Repeated efforts in the course of 2002 to convene a technical meeting with "verification of the correctness and completeness of the initial report" on the agenda have not yet been successful. KEDO Nuclear Plant Project. Factors relevant to the DPRK position are its relations with the US and the progress in the KEDO Project. The conclusion of an internal US review in June 2001 was that improved implementation of the Agreed Framework should be sought. The Agreed Framework aimed at the completion of the first reactor in 2003, but the project has suffered delays for a number of reasons. However, since the start of the construction phase in February 2000, the project has been on schedule. The concrete for the first reactor was poured on 7 August According to the Delivery Protocol to the 1995 KEDO-DPRK Supply Agreement, which was handed over to the DPRK (and brought to the attention of the Agency) at the end of April 2002, the first key nuclear components will be delivered in mid This is relevant to the Agency because the Agreed Framework specifies that the DPRK has to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement before key nuclear components can be delivered. October Disclosures. A new phase started on 16 October 2002 with the announcement by the US that the DPRK side had acknowledged, in talks with Assistant Secretary Kelly in early October that it had a "program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons". Subsequently in a number of statements, by the US, by the US together with Japan and the Republic of Korea (28 October 2002), and by KEDO (14 November 2002), the conclusion was drawn that the DPRK's program was a violation of the Agreed Framework, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the DPRK-IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In light of those violations the KEDO Board decided to suspend heavy oil deliveries as of the December shipment. November IAEA Seeks Clarification, Talks. The IAEA, in faxes of 17 and 18 October, requested information about the alleged program and offered "to dispatch a senior team to the DPRK or to receive a DPRK team in Vienna, to discuss recent information and the general question of the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DPRK". No reply to these faxes was received. On 29 November the Board of

118 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 118 Governors adopted a resolution without a vote in which the Board insisted that the DPRK should reply and cooperate with the Agency. The Board recognized that the program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons "or any other covert nuclear activities, would constitute a violation of the DPRK s international commitments, including the DPRK s safeguards agreement with the Agency pursuant to the NPT". December Exchanges of Letters. In his reply to the IAEA Director General (dated 2 December, received 4 December) the DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun expressed his disappointment about the Agency s unilateral and unfair approach. The DPRK Government could not accept the resolution, he said. On 12 December the Director General received a further letter, from Mr. Ri Je Son, Director General of the General Department of Atomic Energy in the DPRK, conveying the DPRK decision on that day to lift the freeze on its nuclear facilities as of 13 December in light of the US suspension of the heavy fuel oil supply pursuant to the Agreed Framework. The Director General replied the same day urging the DPRK not to take unilateral steps related to seals or cameras and to agree to an urgent meeting of technical experts to discuss practical arrangements involved in moving from the freeze to normal safeguards operations. However, on 22 December the DPRK started to cut seals and disable surveillance cameras. On 27 December it ordered the IAEA inspectors to leave the country. January New Resolution, North Korea NPT Withdrawal. In light of developments, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution 6 January 2003 that called upon North Korea to cooperate fully and urgently with the Agency. The Board affirmed that unless the DPRK takes all required safeguards measures, it would be in further non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT effective as of 11 January No agreed statement on the matter has been issued by the NPT States Parties, or by the NPT depositary States (Russia, UK and USA), or by the UN Security Council. (Article X.1 of the NPT says that a State Party in exercising its national sovereignty has the right to withdraw from the Treaty... it shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance... [and] shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.) The IAEA is not a party to the NPT and hence it is not in the position to determine the status of any State Party's membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. NPT States Parties comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA provide that such agreements would remain in force as long as the State is party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. February IAEA Refers Issue to Security Council. Expressing "deep concern" over North Korea s actions, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution 12 February declaring North Korea in further noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations, and referring the matter to the UN Security Council, as the IAEA is required to do in such circumstances under its Statute. The Board called upon North Korea to remedy urgently its non-compliance, and fully cooperate with the Agency. It also stressed its desire for a peaceful resolution. April Security Council Expresses Concern. Following consultations 9 April, the UN Security Council expressed its "concern" over the situation in North Korea and said it will keep following developments there. UN Secretary-General Annan additionally has appointed a Special Advisor on the North Korea issue. No Complete Picture. The Agency has never been able to verify the completeness and correctness of the initial report of the DPRK under the NPT Safeguards Agreement. Since 1993 it has drawn the conclusion that the DPRK is in non-compliance with its obligations under the Agreement. In other words, the Agency has never had the complete picture regarding DPRK nuclear activities and has never been able to provide assurances regarding the peaceful character of the DPRK nuclear program. Between 1994 and 2002, the Agreed Framework has been a tool that was aimed at bringing the DPRK into compliance with its safeguards obligations. However, the reports about a clandestine uranium enrichment program, the end of the freeze pursuant to the Agreed Framework, and the expulsion of the IAEA inspectors have brought this phase to an end. March Recommitment to Solution. The IAEA remains committed to securing full safeguards compliance by the DPRK through peaceful means. In March 2005, the IAEA Board emphasized the importance of continued dialogue to achieve a peaceful and comprehensive resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue, and attached great importance to the crucial role played by the six party talks in this regard. The 35-

119 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 119 member policymaking body expressed the hope that such a resolution would ensure the return of the DPRK to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and provide the IAEA with the authority necessary for it to provide credible assurances regarding the nature of the DPRK nuclear program. September 2005: Six Party Talks Issue Joint Statement. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed a Joint Statement from the latest round of Six Party Talks that said the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK) would abandon its nuclear program in exchange for economic aid and security guarantees. The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing, and included representatives from the DPRK, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States from 26 July to 7 August and September July UN Security Council Resolution Condemns DPRK Missile Launches, Urges Return to Six- Party Talks. In a resolution condemning ballistic missile launches by the DPRK, the Security Council strongly urged the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition, to work towards the expeditious implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement. October DRPK Reports Nuclear Test. North Korea is reported to have carried out a nuclear test on 9 October IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei expressed deep regret and serious concern about the reported carrying-out of the test. On 14 October, the UN Security Council adopts a resolution imposing sanctions against the DPRK, and demanding that Pyongyang cease its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. It further demanded that the DPRK return to the NPT and accept safeguards through the IAEA. February Six Party Talks in Beijing Report Progress. Parties to the Six Party Talks announced agreed actions following their latest round of discussions in Beijing. Among the agreed actions is that "the DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility" and that the DPRK "will invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK." Dr. ElBaradei welcomed the outcome as "a step in the right direction." On 23 February 2007, IAEA Chief Dr Mohamed ElBaradei accepted an invitation from the DPRK to visit for talks. He expressed hope that discussions would further progress toward improving relations and resolving issues of mutual concern. The DPRK letter of invitation came from Mr. Ri Je Son, Director General of the DPRK General Department of Atomic Energy March Dr. ElBaradei, IAEA Delegation Visit. In March 2007, a high-level IAEA delegation headed by Dr. ElBaradei visited the DPRK for two days of talks on issues of "mutual concern". Dr. ElBaradei welcomed the visit as a "the first step in a long process" toward the normalization of the relationship between DPRK and the Agency. The visit preceded the visit of an IAEA delegation to the DPRK in June 2007 for talks on verification and monitoring the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. In July, Dr. ElBaradei submitted a report on Monitoring and Verification in the Democratic People s Republic of Korea to the IAEA Board of Governors. The report outlines agreed arrangements for monitoring and verification by the IAEA of the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and the reactor under construction in Taechon July Shutdown of Nuclear Facilities. IAEA inspectors arrived and confirmed the shutdown of five nuclear facilities in Yongbyon: the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant No. 1, the Radiochemical Laboratory, the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant, the Yongbyon Nuclear Power Plant No. 2, and the Nuclear Power Plant at Taechon. The team applied the necessary seals and other surveillance and monitoring measures as appropriate. June Director General Briefs Board. In June 2008, IAEA Director General ElBaradei briefed the Board of Governors on the Agency s verification activities in North Korea, and raised some matters that require guidance from States Parties to the NPT. As he had done in March 2008, he further noted that the additional funds are needed for the IAEA to carry out its monitoring and verification activities in North Korea for the rest of September IAEA Removes Seals from Plant in Yongbyon. In September 2008, IAEA Director General ElBaradei reported to the Board that DPRK had asked the IAEA to remove seals and surveillance from the reprocessing plant in Yongbyon. The work was subsequently done, after which no more IAEA

120 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 120 seals and surveillance equipment were in place at the reprocessing facility. The DPRK stated that IAEA inspectors would have no further access to the reprocessing plant. April IAEA Inspectors Depart. IAEA inspectors at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities removed safeguards equipment and left the country on 16 April 2009, following the DPRK decision to cease all cooperation with the IAEA. June 2009: Friday. UN Security Council Adopts Resolution on DPRK. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution that imposes tougher sanctions on the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK), including a tighter arms embargo and new financial restrictions, following the nuclear test that the DPRK conducted in May North Korean Missile Programs North Korea s long-range missile programs are also having a major impact on the military balance. An extract from the Japanese defense white paper for 2010 provides both an overview of North Korean long-range missile efforts and an indication of how Japanese views compare to the US views quoted earlier: Details about the current status of North Korea s nuclear weapons program still remain largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of the series of North Korean announcements and actions as well as the fact that the status of North Korea s nuclear development so far is not yet elucidated, the possibility that North Korea has already made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program cannot be dismissed. In addition, the fact that North Korea announced in May 2009 that it had conducted a nuclear test following the one in 2006 suggests that there is a high possibility that North Korea has further advanced its nuclear weapons program. When taken together with North Korea s enhancement of its ballistic missile capability, which could serve as a means of delivering WMD, nuclear tests by North Korea are totally unacceptable as they are a significant threat to Japan s security and seriously undermine the peace and security of Northeast Asia and the international community. In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon enough to be loaded on a ballistic missile requires an extremely high degree of technological capacity. However, considering the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, it is difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea, in a relatively short time, will achieve miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquire nuclear warheads. It is necessary to remain watchful of all related developments. (2) Biological and Chemical Weapons Because North Korea is an extremely closed regime and most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian use, facilitating camouflage, details of North Korea s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are not clear. However, it is believed that North Korea has a certain level of production base for biological weapons although it ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in As for chemical weapons, North Korea has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and it is estimated that North Korea has several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and has a substantial amount of stock of such agents. (3) Ballistic Missiles North Korea is an extremely closed regime, and details of its ballistic missiles are unknown. It appears however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of earning foreign currency, in addition to enhancing its military capabilities. b. Nodong

121 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 121 North Korea is also thought to have started its development of longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong. It appears that Nodong, the deployment of which is believed to be ongoing, is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300km, and may reach almost all parts of Japan. It is highly probable that Nodong was used in the launch into the Sea of Japan in A total of six ballistic missiles fired from the Kittaeryong district in the southeastern part of North Korea in July 2006 are believed to be Scud and Nodong. In July 2009, North Korea is believed to have launched a total of seven ballistic missiles from the same district, and it is possible that they were either Scud or Nodong. Though details about Nodong s capability have not been confirmed, as the ballistic missile is believed to be based on the Scud technology, it seems that it does not have the accuracy to carry out strikes on specific target installations. Due to the fact that it is extremely difficult to verify the intentions of North Korea s military activities because of its closed regime, that it is believed that underground military facilities have been constructed across the country, and that Nodong, as is the case with Scud, is thought to be loaded onto a transportererector-launcher (TEL) and operated with mobility, it is thought to be difficult to detect individual and concrete signs of a Nodong launch in advance, such as its specific launch site and timing. c. Taepodong-1 North Korea has also been developing Taepodong-1, which has an estimated range of at least approximately 1,500km. Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and a Scud used as its second stage. The ballistic missile launched in 1998 is assessed to be based on Taepodong-1. North Korea is believed to have shifted its focus to the development of Taepodong-2, which has longer range, and the Taepodong-1 may have been a transitory product for the development of Taepodong-2. d. Taepodong-2 Taepodong-2 is believed to be a two-stage missile with a new booster as its first stage and a Nodong as its second stage, with a range of approximately 6,000km. A Taepodong-2 is believed to have been launched from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area in July 2006, and was damaged during the flight at an altitude of several kilometers, several tens of seconds after the launch without separating the first stage, and have fallen near the launch site. In the launch of April 2009, it is thought that North Korea used a Taepodong-2 or a variant of it from the same district again. Since it is estimated that the missile crossed over Japan, and flew more than 3,000km before falling into the Pacific Ocean, it is believed that North Korea had been able to extend the range of its ballistic missiles since its failed launch of Taepodong- 2 in Through the April 2009 launch, it is believed that North Korea may have tested the required technologies, such as increasing the size of propulsion, separation of the multi-staged propulsion devices, and attitude control. Thus, it is highly possible that North Korea will advance the development of ballistic missiles, including longer-range missiles. Moreover, a test launch of a long-range ballistic missile would contribute to extending the range of the other shorter-range missiles, increasing the warhead weight and improving the circular error probability (CEP). The April 2009 launch may lead to the improvement of the performance of Nodong and other ballistic missiles possessed by North Korea. (See Fig. I-2-2-2/3) At present, North Korea appears to be developing not only ballistic missiles, but also an intermediate-range ballistic missile and a solid fuel propellant short-range missile. It is also necessary to pay attention to the possibility of North Korea s efforts to improve existing ballistic missiles such as Scud and Nodong, including an attempt to extend their ranges. As the background of North Korea s rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches, it is assumed that the country imported various materials and technologies from outside. It is pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missiles or related technologies including the transfer of Nodong airframes and related technologies to Iran and Pakistan, and that North Korea promotes further development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation. In light of this, it is necessary to remain alert to North Korea s ballistic missiles, particularly in terms of transfer and proliferation, in addition to their development and deployment.

122 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 122 It is interesting to note that there are as many uncertainties in predicting the nature of North Korea s missile programs as there are in predicting its nuclear program. North Korea s ambitious missile programs are still largely in development and their capabilities are impossible to predict until the nature of a nuclear warhead is known, and there have been enough tests of North Korea s longer range missiles to provide a clear picture of their performance. Some estimates indicate that North Korea s SRBMs include some regular and extendedrange Scud missiles, and one source indicates it could have deployed up to 100 much longer range missiles. According to that source, North Korea may deploy its missiles in two belts, in bases with in the rear area. The first is kilometers north of the DMZ, and the second kilometer north. A third belt may exist more than 175 kilometers from the border. 96 North Korea s longer-range No Dong MRBM missile (700-1,500 kg warhead and 1,000-1,500 km range) is still developmental and requires large numbers of additional, full range, tests to become a mature program. The Japanese Defense White Paper just cited shows that that Japan believes tests are limited to a possible launch into the Japan Sea in late May 1993, a mix of Scud and No Dong launches on July 5, 2006, and a mix of launches that might have involved some No Dongs from the Kittareryong district of North Korea on July 4, No unclassified source, however, provides a clear picture of exactly what happened during these tests or how far North Korea has progressed in bringing the system to the final development stage. Some experts feel North Korea s larger Taepodong 1 MRBM missile (1,000-1,500 kg warhead and 1,500-2,500 km range) has never been launched, except as an SLV. The Japanese Defense White Paper for 2010 reports one successful launch occurred on August 31, Similarly some experts believe the Taepodong 2 ICBM missile (500-1,500 kg warhead and 4,500-8,000 km range) has also never been launched, and it is not clear whether its missile engines have been used as an SLV. However, the Japanese Defense White Paper for 2010 reports one failed launch occurred in July 1996, and a second launch on April 5, 2009 where North Korea fired a missile that may have been a Tapeodong 2 into the sea at a range over 3,000 kilometers. 98 The Japanese paper does not mention the Musudan IRBM (650-1,000 kg warhead and 2, km range) that other experts feel is a North Korean copy or modification of the Russian R- 27/BM-25 series. The Musudan may have been launched at very short ranges for test purposes, but is not operational. These uncertainties also make it impossible to estimate any of these missiles reliability and accuracy, and whether North Korea has anything approaching some form of terminal guidance technology Joseph S. Bermudez, Going Ballistic North Korea s advanced missile capabilities, Jane s Intelligence Review, See Joseph S. Bermudez, Going Ballistic North Korea s advanced missile capabilities, Jane s Intelligence Review, 2009; Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February, 2008; and Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, English translation, pp See Joseph S. Bermudez, Going Ballistic North Korea s advanced missile capabilities, Jane s Intelligence Review, 2009; Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February, 2008; and Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, English translation, pp See Joseph S. Bermudez, Going Ballistic North Korea s advanced missile capabilities, Jane s Intelligence Review, 2009; Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February, 2008,

123 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 123 Understanding North and South Korean Capabilities in More Detail There is no quantifiable balance of North and South Korean capabilities in these areas to draw upon, aside from some basic data on the missile strength of each country and these figures are uncertain and in a constant process of change. It is, however, critical that anyone attempting to understand the Korean balance have a clear idea of the broad trends in the CBRN and missile force of each side. There are a number of NGOs that provide useful insights into these developments, but the most comprehensive and comparable analysis seems to come from the work of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Accordingly, the material on its web page has been organized to provide the following comparative survey of the forces on each side. 100 Some aspects of the following material are dated, but this is inevitable, given the uncertainties and debates over these forces and the constant changes and evolution in the capabilities of North and South Korea. NTI Overview of South Korea 101 South Korea has maintained a bilateral security alliance with the United States since the Korean War ( ). Seoul abandoned its nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, but has the latent technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons. [1] South Korea is a signatory to several nonproliferation treaties and has adopted a policy aimed at maintaining a "nuclear-free Korean peninsula." [2] Seoul is a party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Although Seoul has never admitted to this in a public forum, South Korea is understood based on various media reports and comments by relevant experts to have declared its possession of chemical weapons as part of its obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); this stockpile was fully destroyed as of 2008 under the supervision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). [3] South Korean Nuclear South Korea first became interested in nuclear technology in the 1950s, but did not begin construction of its first power reactor until [4] Seoul currently has 20 civilian nuclear power reactors in use, for an estimated net electricity capacity of just over 17,000 MW(e) providing for about 40 percent of the country's electricity. [5] Changes in the international security environment influenced South Korea's decision to begin a nuclear weapons program in the early 1970s. Under significant pressure from the United States, however, Seoul abandoned this program and signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in April 1975 before it had produced any fissile material. [6] Seoul is a state party to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. [7] In November 1991, President Roh Tae Woo declared that South Korea would not "manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons." [8] Two months later, North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In this agreement, Seoul and Pyongyang agreed not "to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons," and not to "possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." However, both sides failed to implement the agreement's provisions relating to a bilateral inspection regime. Although North Korea has clearly violated the Joint Declaration, particularly in light of its two nuclear weapons tests (in 2006 and 2009), South Korea has never officially renounced its obligations under the declaration, and has called on the North to abide by the agreement. Seoul has been a participant in the Six-Party Talks since their inception in 2003, which are aimed at ending the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. 100 For full details on the NTI, see its home web page at Taken from the Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site at

124 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 124 South Korea first became interested in nuclear technology in the 1950s but did not begin construction of its first power reactor until [1] Changes in the international security environment influenced South Korea's decision to begin a nuclear weapons program in the early 1970s. Under significant pressure from the United States, Seoul abandoned the program and signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in April In 1981, South Korean engineers produced five test fuel rods using depleted uranium. The fuel rods were placed in a research reactor and irradiated between July and December The spent fuel rods were removed and scientists conducted experiments in hot-cells to extract 0.3 grams of plutonium. [2] The South Korean Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) claimed that this experiment was conducted by "a small group of scientists to analyze the chemical characteristics of plutonium."[3] These experiments were not revealed to the public until the summer of 2004, after South Korea had ratified the Additional Protocol. Under this modified safeguards agreement with the IAEA, South Korean nuclear facilities were subject to more detailed inspections.[4] In the summer of 2004, South Korea also reported that its scientists had conducted laser isotope separation experiments to enrich about 0.2 grams of uranium. Both the plutonium extraction and uranium enrichment experiments were in violation of Seoul's safeguards commitments, but the government cooperated with the IAEA to account for these violations and to ensure there were no future violations.[5] During the June 2008 IAEA Board of Governors meeting, a "broader conclusion" was drawn that all nuclear material in South Korea had been placed under safeguards and remained in peaceful nuclear activities. [6] In November 1991, President Roh Tae Woo declared that South Korea would not "manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons."[7] Two months later, North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In this agreement, Seoul and Pyongyang agreed not "to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons," and not to "possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." However, both sides failed to implement the agreement's provisions relating to a bilateral inspection regime. Although North Korea has clearly violated the Joint Declaration, particularly in light of its two nuclear weapons tests (in 2006 and 2009), South Korea has never officially renounced its obligations under the declaration and has called on the North to abide by the agreement. Seoul has been a participant in the Six-Party Talks, aimed at ending the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, since their inception in South Korea has a total of 20 nuclear power reactors in operation ranking fifth in the world in number of reactors. Nuclear energy currently provides almost 40 percent of its total electricity. [8] Furthermore, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) has six reactors under construction and six more ordered or planned by [9] South Korea has also recently become a major player as a nuclear exporter, with Korean companies winning a number of lucrative contracts in These include a US$20 billion contract to construct four reactors in the UAE, and a $173 million contract to construct a nuclear research reactor in Jordan. [10] Despite South Korea's extensive nuclear energy infrastructure and technological base, South Korea does not possess any independent means of enrichment or reprocessing. While its legal validity remains ambiguous, South Korea is politically constrained by the 1992 Joint Declaration with North Korea. However, South Korean officials have expressed a keen interest in establishing a closed nuclear fuel cycle. In light of the projected expansion of nuclear power in South Korea and the problem of mounting spent fuel, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been conducting research on dry pyroprocessing technology.[11] While South Korean officials argue that pyroprocessing is different from reprocessing, outside experts, including many in the U.S. government disagree. Since much of South Korea's nuclear fuel is U.S.-origin, South Korea cannot undertake any reprocessing (or pyroprocessing) without the consent of the U.S. government. Sources: [1] Ha Yŏng Sŏn, Hanbandoŭi Haengmugiwa Segyejilsŏ (Seoul: Nanam, 1991). [2] Daniel A. Pinkston, "South Korea's Nuclear Experiments," CNS Research Story, 9 November 2004, [3] Anthony Faiola and Dafna Linzer, "S. Korea Admits Extracting Plutonium," Washington Post, 10 September 2004, [4] Anthony Faiola and Dafna Linzer, "S. Korea Admits Extracting Plutonium," Washington Post, 10 September 2004, [5] Mohamed El-Baradei, "Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors," IAEA Website, 13 September 2004,

125 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 125 [6] "IAEA Confirms S. Korea's Nuclear Activity Peaceful," Yonhap, 3 June 2008, in [7] Roh Tae Woo, "President Roh Tae Woo's Declaration of Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula Peace Initiatives," 8 November 1991, available at [8] "Nuclear Power in South Korea," World Nuclear Association, 23 April 2010, [9] "Nuclear Power in South Korea," World Nuclear Association, 23 April 2010, [10] "Korean consortium for Jordan's first reactor," World Nuclear News, 7 December 2009, and "UAE picks Korea as nuclear partner," World Nuclear News, 29 December 2009, both at [11] "Fuel Cycle Process Development Division," KAERI, South Korean Biological While South Korea possesses a well-developed pharmaceutical and biotech infrastructure, there is no evidence that Seoul has an offensive biological weapons (BW) program. Citing a biological threat from North Korea, South Korea conducts defensive BW research and development, including the development of vaccines against anthrax and smallpox. [9] South Korea ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in June 1987 and joined the Australia Group in October [10] South Korean Chemical South Korea ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in April Upon its ratification of the treaty, South Korea according to many reliable sources declared possession of several thousand metric tons of chemical warfare agents and one chemical weapons production facility to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Despite the fact that Seoul is widely understood to have declared its CW stockpile and facilities, neither the OPCW nor Seoul has publicly acknowledged this declaration. The South Korean government has maintained a high level of secrecy regarding its previous chemical weapons activities, making no public announcements and requiring the OPCW to refer to it in all documents as "another state party" or "an unnamed state party." However, media reports indicate that pursuant to its CWC obligations, the South Korean military built and operated a CW destruction facility to eliminate all CW munitions at a site in Yongdong-kun, North Ch ungch ong Province. [11] Under the CWC, South Korea was obligated to eliminate its CW stockpile by April South Korea requested an extension on that deadline from the OPCW, reportedly citing a number of technical difficulties in the operation of its destruction facility. South Korea completed the destruction of its entire chemical weapons stockpile in July 2008, becoming the second CWC member to do. [12] South Korean Missile In December 1971, South Korean President Park Chung Hee issued a directive to reverse-engineer the U.S. Nike Hercules air defense missile, a system that can also be used as a surface-to-surface system. Following several failures, South Korea's first successful test of its own version, the Paekkom system, was conducted in September In 1979, South Korea entered into a bilateral agreement with the United States that limited South Korean ballistic missiles to a range of 180km with a 500kg payload. [13] The Paekkom program was slashed in December 1982, but was restored in late South Korea subsequently developed an improved version of the Paekkom, called the Hyonmu. South Korea joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in March 2001; membership in the organization supersedes the missile-range agreement concluded earlier with Washington. [14] In January 2002, South Korea announced procurement of the 300km-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) from the United States, purchasing 110 ATACMS by [15] In the 1990s, Seoul began development of its own space program, including the development of a space-launch vehicle (SLV). After numerous delays, South Korea launched the two-stage KSLV-1 rocket on 25 August The launch was intended to place an earth and atmospheric monitoring satellite the Science and Technology Satellite-2 (STSTAT-2) into orbit. The satellite reached an altitude of about 390km, but could not maintain an orbit; it was destroyed during re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere. [16] The partial success of this launch raised concerns that South Korea had sufficient technology for a long-range ballistic missile system that could deliver WMD payloads.

126 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 126 Sources: [1] Daniel A. Pinkston, "South Korea's Nuclear Experiments," CNS Research Story, 9 November 2004, [2] "Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements," UNODA, [3] Chris Schneidmiller, "South Korea Completes Chemical Weapons Disposal," Global Security Newswire, 17 October 2008, [4] Ha Yong Son, Hanbandoui Haengmugiwa Segyejilso (Seoul: Nanam, 1991). [5] "Nuclear Power in South Korea," World Nuclear Association, 23 April 2010, [6] Daniel A. Pinkston, "South Korea's Nuclear Experiments," CNS Research Story, 9 November 2004, [7] "Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements," UNODA, "Who are the Current NSG Participants?," Nuclear Suppliers Group, and "Members," Zangger Committee, 13 January 2010, [8] Roh Tae Woo, "President Roh Tae Woo's Declaration of Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula Peace Initiatives," 8 November [9] "2006 Defense White Paper," Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, May 2007, p. 26, [10] "Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements," UNODA, and "Australia Group Participants," [11] "Report: Korean army built factory to destroy chemical weapons," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9 May [12] Chris Schneidmiller, "South Korea Completes Chemical Weapons Disposal," Global Security Newswire, 17 October 2008, [13] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," CNS Occasional Paper, 9 February 2000, [14] "MTCR Partners," [15] "South Korea: Seoul Contracts for U.S.-Made Missiles," Global Security Newswire, 4 January 2002, [16] Kim Tong-hyung, "Satellite Fails to Enter Orbit," Korea Times, 25 August 2009.

127 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 127 Figure 6.1 South Korean Missile Forces: 2010 Under the amended terms of the 1979 memorandum of understanding between South Korea and the United States, South Korean ballistic missiles are restricted to a range of 300km and a payload of 500kg. The only known South Korean ballistic missile is the NHK-1/2. Its relevant details are provided below. Details 102 Alternate Name Hyon Mu, Nikes-Hercules Variant Class SRBM Length 12.20m Diameter 0.54m Launch Weight 5400kg Payload Single Warhead Warhead HE, 500kg Propulsion Single-stage solid Range 180km The NHK-1 was developed by South Korea in 1975 as a short-range ballistic missile aimed at countering the ballistic missile threat from North Korea. It was based off of the US Nike-Hercules Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) and had a range limited to 150 km (93 miles). The NHK-2 was developed as a variant of the NHK-1 in 1983, incorporating improved technology. The NHK-2 has an extended range of 180 km (112 miles), though this can be easily extended to 250 km (155 miles) at the cost of breaking a US-South Korea 1979 agreement. An unconfirmed report states that the NHK-A was designed to achieve this increased range, but was never developed. It is reported that in 1999 a modified NHK-2 or NHK-A was test launched a distance of 40 km (25 miles) but had the capability to reach 300 km (186 miles). This fits an agreement made in 1999 to extend South Korea s maximum missile range to 300 km (186 miles), a range sufficient to strike key North Korean cities, including Pyongyang. This provides South Korea with the ability to launch strikes against the capital of North Korea, providing deterrence against a North Korean attack at Seoul. The existence of a powerful South Korean deterrent could be valuable to prevent North Korean communist aggression. The NHK-2 has a range of 180 km (112 miles), the maximum range for ballistic missiles by the 1979 US-South Korean agreement, with a warhead of 500 kg. It has a launch weight of 5,400 kg. In 2006 it was reported that North Korea will keep the missile in service until Based primarily on information from in turn derived from Wyn Bowen, Tim McCarthy, and Holly Porteous, Ballistic Missile Shadow Lengthens, Jane s International Defence Review, 1 January 1997; Duncan Lennox, Jane s Strategic Weapons Systems 46 (Surrey: Jane s Information Group, January 2007),

128 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 128 NTI Overview of North Korea 103 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has an active nuclear weapons program and tested nuclear explosive devices in both 2006 and It is also capable of enriching uranium and producing weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea deploys short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and is developing a long-range threestage missile. Pyongyang withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in January 2003 and is not a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) or a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The DPRK is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and is believed to possess an extensive chemical weapons program. North Korea is a party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), but is suspected of maintaining an offensive biological weapons program in defiance of that treaty. North Korean Nuclear North Korea's interest in a nuclear weapons program reaches as far back in time as the end of World War II. Since then, Pyongyang has mastered the nuclear fuel cycle and has both plutonium and enriched uranium programs capable of producing fissile material. North Korea declared that it had roughly 38.5kg of weapons-grade plutonium extracted from spent fuel rods in May 2008, however external estimates have varied. [1] In November 2010, North Korea unveiled a uranium enrichment program ostensibly intended to produce low enriched uranium for power reactors, though it would be possible for Pyongyang to produce more highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes if it decided to do so. [2] North Korea has conducted two nuclear weapons tests, in 2006 and [3] The Six-Party Talks between North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States began in 2003 with the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. However, these talks have been suspended since April North Korea has conducted two nuclear weapon tests, and is believed to have enough fissile material for approximately 10 weapons. The first test came on 9 October 2006, at 10:35AM (local time) at Mount Mant'ap near P'unggye-ri, Kilchu-kun, North Hamgyong Province. The Korean Central News Agency announced that the test was conducted at a "stirring time when all the people of the country are making a great leap forward in the building of a great prosperous powerful socialist nation." The North Korean nuclear test did not, however, produce a significant yield. The yield from this test appeared to be less than 1 kiloton; North Korea was reportedly expecting at least a 4 kiloton yield, possibly indicating that the North Korean plutonium program still had a number of technical hurdles to overcome before it had a usable warhead. In reaction to the test, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1718 placing sanctions on North Korea. After the October 2006 test, North Korea became reengaged in the Six-Party Talks process aimed at ending Pyongyang's nuclear program. In 2007, North Korea agreed to disable its nuclear facilities and give a complete accounting of all its nuclear programs. In June 2008 North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear activities and destroyed the cooling tower in its Yongbyon reactor; in response Washington moved toward lifting some sanctions on Pyongyang and removing the regime from the list of states sponsor of terrorism on 11 October The Obama administration announced 3 February 2010 its intention to keep North Korea off the list. However, the six parties stalemated over U.S. and North Korean disagreement on a verification plan for the DPRK disablement, and have yet to resume. On 25 May 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test. North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that Pyongyang had carried out the nuclear test, and that it "was safely conducted on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its control." Initial estimates from the U.S. government showed the test causing seismic activity equivalent to a magnitude of 4.7 on the Richter Scale and located close to the site of the first nuclear test in Early estimates pointed to a possible yield for the test of between 2 and 8 kilotons, with about 4 being most likely. While this yield is stronger than the first test, some 103 Taken from the Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site at

129 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 129 analysts still questions the viability of Pyongyang's nuclear warhead design, although, others see it as evidence that the North has been working toward a low-yield weapon all along. Background North Korea first became embroiled with nuclear politics during the Korean War. Although nuclear weapons were never used, U.S. political leaders and military commanders threatened their use to end the Korean War on terms favorable to the United States. In 1958, the United States deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea for the first time, and the weapons remained there until North Korean government statements and media reports often cite a "nuclear threat from the United States," and continue to claim that the United States has about 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. There are different schools of thought on the motivations behind Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. Those who believe North Korea is a revisionist state that is dissatisfied with its place in the current international structure argue that Pyongyang's nuclear aspirations are motivated by a need to create a serious external threat. This school of thought has ample evidence to support its claims: North Korea's initiation of the Korean War, acts of terrorism, forward-deployed military forces, a constitution that states that the DPRK is the sole legitimate government for all of Korea, and Korean Workers' Party bylaws calling for a "completion of the revolution in the south." On the other hand, some analysts believe North Korea is a state satisfied with the status quo and that it seeks peaceful coexistence with South Korea and the international community. Proponents of this school of thought often argue that Pyongyang's nuclear motivations are defensive in nature and designed to deter external threats to North Korea. Evidence to support this argument includes the 1972 North-South Joint Communiqué; the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea (the so-called "Basic Agreement"); the 1991 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; the 2000 summit meeting between the leaders of North and South Korea; the Agreed Framework with the United States; and reunification proposals that would recognize "two systems" for the North and South. Regardless of North Korean motivations, Pyongyang's record of exporting ballistic missiles and missile production technology have raised concerns that North Korea may also be willing to sell nuclear materials, technology, or even complete nuclear weapons to state or non-state actors. Early Program In the early 1950s, North Korea began establishing the institutional base to train personnel for its nuclear development program. The Atomic Energy Research Institute was established along with the Academy of Sciences in December 1952, but the nuclear program did not begin to take-off until North Korea established cooperative agreements with the Soviet Union. Pyongyang signed the founding charter of the Soviet Union's Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in February 1956, and began to send scientists and technicians to the USSR for training shortly thereafter. In 1959, North Korea and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy that included a provision for Soviet help to establish a nuclear research complex in Yongbyon-kun, North Pyongan Province. In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union provided extensive technical assistance while North Korea constructed the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, which included the installation of a Soviet IRT-2000 Nuclear Research Reactor and other facilities. The small research reactor has been used to produce radioisotopes and to train personnel. The cabinet and the Academy of Sciences were given operational and administrative oversight of the nuclear facilities, but ultimate control of the program and decisions over weapons development belonged to then-north Korean leader Kim Il Sung. The program appeared to begin as a peaceful one, but the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis may have prompted North Korea to initiate a dedicated nuclear weapons program. Indigenous Development

130 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 130 Although the beginnings of the development of North Korea's nuclear weapons program were bolstered by relevant assistance from Moscow, and to some extent Beijing, North Korea's program developed largely without significant foreign assistance. This was in part due to suspicions that the North Korean leadership had about the long-term reliability of the Soviet Union and China. While Kim Il Sung appreciated Soviet and Chinese support during the Korean War ( ), he had expected more help, particularly from the Soviets, and he was dissatisfied that the war ended in a stalemate. In 1961, Pyongyang signed "treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance" with both Moscow and Beijing, but Kim ultimately questioned the credibility of these alliances. Kim was particularly doubtful of Moscow's alliance commitment after Khrushchev backed down during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Soon after the missile crisis was over, the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee adopted policies to strengthen the military and to implement import-substitution programs to reduce dependency on arms imports. There are also reports that Kim Il Sung asked Beijing to share its nuclear weapons technology following China's first nuclear test in October 1964, but Chinese leader Mao Zedong refused. Shortly thereafter, North Korean relations with China began to deteriorate. In the late 1960s, North Korea expanded its educational and research institutions to support a nuclear program for both civilian and military applications. By the early 1970s, North Korean engineers were using indigenous technology to expand the IRT-2000 research reactor and Pyongyang began to acquire plutonium reprocessing technology from the Soviet Union. In July 1977, North Korea signed a trilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the USSR that brought the IRT-2000 research reactor and a critical assembly in Yongbyon-kun under IAEA safeguards. The Soviets were included in the agreement since they supplied the reactor fuel. The early 1980s was a period of significant indigenous expansion, which included uranium milling facilities, a fuel rod fabrication complex, and a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor, as well as research and development institutions. The early 1980s also marked the beginning of high explosives tests that are required for the triggering mechanism in a nuclear bomb. By the mid-1980s, Pyongyang began construction on a 50MW(e) nuclear power reactor in Yongbyon-kun, while expanding its uranium processing facilities. Some of the technology and equipment acquired during this period had dual-use applications for a uranium enrichment program that was suspected, though not revealed until North Korea's energy concerns make nuclear energy a legitimate rationale for nuclear power, and Pyongyang explored the acquisition of light water reactor (LWR) technology in the early to mid-1980s. This period coincided with the expansion of North Korea's indigenously designed reactor program, which was based on gas-graphite moderated reactors similar in design to the Calder Hall reactors first built in the United Kingdom in the 1950s. In the early 1980s, Pyongyang was also exploring the acquisition of light water power reactors, and agreed to sign the NPT in December 1985 in exchange for Soviet assistance in the construction of four LWRs. In September 1991, President George Bush announced that the United States would withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea, and on 18 December 1991, President Roh Tae Woo declared that South Korea was free of nuclear weapons. North and South Korea then signed the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," whereby both sides promised to "not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons." The agreement also bound the two sides to forgo the possession of "nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." The agreement also provided for a bilateral inspections regime, but the two sides failed to agree on its implementation. North Korea finally signed an IAEA safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992, and the Supreme People's Assembly ratified the agreement on 9 April. Under the terms of the agreement, North Korea provided an "initial declaration" of its nuclear facilities and materials, provided access for IAEA inspectors to verify the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration. Six rounds of inspections began in May 1992 and concluded in February Pyongyang's initial declaration included a small plutonium sample (less than 100 grams), which North Korean officials said was reprocessed from damaged spent fuel rods that were removed from the 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun. However, IAEA analysis indicated that Korean technicians reprocessed plutonium on three occasions , 1990, and When the Agency requested access to two suspect nuclear waste sites, North Korea declared them to be military sites and therefore off-limits.

131 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page Crisis and the Agreed Framework After the IAEA was denied access to North Korea's suspect waste sites in early 1993, the Agency asked the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to authorize special ad hoc inspections. In reaction, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March Under the terms of the treaty, withdrawal is not effective until 90 days after giving notice. Following intense bilateral negotiations with the United States, North Korea announced it was "suspending" its withdrawal from the NPT one day before the withdrawal was to become effective. Pyongyang agreed to "suspend" its withdrawal while talks continued with Washington, but claimed to have a special status in regard to its nuclear safeguards commitments. Under this "special status," North Korea agreed to allow the "continuity of safeguards" on its present activities, but refused to allow inspections that could verify past nuclear activities. As talks with the United States over North Korea's return to the NPT dragged on, North Korea continued to operate its 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun. By the spring of 1994, the reactor core was burned up, and the spent fuel rods had to be discharged. On 14 May 1994, Korean technicians began removing the spent fuel rods without the supervision of IAEA inspectors. This action worsened the emerging crisis because the random placement of the spent fuel rods in a temporary storage pond compromised the IAEA's capacity to reconstruct the operational history of the reactor, which could have been used in efforts to account for the discrepancies in Pyongyang's reported plutonium reprocessing. The administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton announced that it would ask the UNSC to impose economic sanctions; Pyongyang declared that it would consider economic sanctions "an act of war." The crisis was defused in June 1994 when former U.S. President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Il Sung. Carter announced from Pyongyang that Kim had accepted the broad outline of a deal that was later finalized as the "Agreed Framework" in October Under the agreement, North Korea agreed to freeze its gasgraphite moderated reactors and related facilities, and allow the IAEA to monitor that freeze. Pyongyang was also required to "consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," and remain a party to the NPT. In exchange, the United States agreed to lead an international consortium to construct two light water power reactors, and provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the first reactor came online with a target date of Furthermore, the United States was to provide "formal assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S." Collapse of the Agreed Framework While the Agreed Framework froze North Korea's plutonium program for almost a decade, neither party was completely satisfied with either the compromise reached or its implementation. The United States was dissatisfied with the postponement of safeguards inspections to verify Pyongyang's past activities, and North Korea was dissatisfied with the delayed construction of the light water power reactors. After coming to office in 2001, the new Bush administration initiated a North Korea policy review that was completed in early June. The review concluded that the United States should seek "improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile program, a ban on missile exports, and a less threatening North Korean conventional military posture." From Washington's perspective, "improved implementation of the Agreed Framework" meant an acceleration of safeguards inspections, even though the agreement did not require Pyongyang to submit to full safeguards inspections to verify its past activities until a significant portion of the reactor construction was completed but before the delivery of critical reactor components. There were also concerns about North Korea's suspected highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, which is a different path to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In the summer of 2002, U.S. intelligence reportedly discovered evidence of transfers of HEU technology and/or materials from Pakistan in exchange for ballistic missiles. Later, in early 2004, it was revealed that Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan had sold gas-centrifuge technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran. Compared to plutonium-production facilities, the HEU production facilities that North Korea was suspected of developing are difficult to detect.

132 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 132 In October 2002, bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea finally resumed when U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly visited Pyongyang. During the visit, Kelly informed First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Chu and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan that Washington was aware of a secret North Korean program to produce highly-enriched uranium (HEU). The U.S. State Department claimed that North Korean officials admitted to having such a program during a second day of meetings with Kelly, but North Korea later argued that it only admitted to having a "plan to produce nuclear weapons," which Pyongyang claimed was part of its right to self-defense. The United States responded in December 2002 by suspending heavy oil shipments, and North Korea then retaliated by lifting the freeze on its nuclear facilities, expelling IAEA inspectors monitoring that freeze, and announcing its withdrawal from the NPT on 10 January Initially, North Korea claimed it had no intention of producing nuclear weapons, and that the lifting of the nuclear freeze was necessary to generate needed electricity. New Crisis and the Beginning of the Six-Party Process In the spring of 2003, U.S. intelligence detected activities around the Radiochemisty Laboratory, a reprocessing facility in Yongbyon-kun, that indicate North Korea was probably reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods that had been in a temporary storage pond. In September 2003, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said that North Korea had completed the reprocessing of this spent fuel, which would give North Korea enough plutonium for about four to six nuclear devices. In January 2004, a delegation of invited U.S. experts confirmed that the canisters in the temporary storage pond were empty. In April 2003, a multilateral dialogue began in Beijing with the aim of ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Initially trilateral in format (China, North Korea and the United States), the process expanded to a sixparty format with the inclusion of Japan, Russia and South Korea. The first round of the six-party talks began in August According to reports, North Korean diplomats stated at the talks that Pyongyang had "no choice but to declare its possession of nuclear weapons" and "conduct a nuclear weapons test." The North Korean delegation, however, reiterated that Pyongyang would be willing to dismantle its nuclear programs if the United States "changed its hostile policies, stopped obstructing North Korea's economic growth, and aided the energy needs of North Korea." Six months later, in February 2004, the second round of talks were held and a third round were held June However, tensions between the parties - particularly the United States and North Korea - meant the talks stalled for over a year, restarting in July While the six-party process stagnated, North Korea shut down its 5MW(e) reactor in April 2005 and removed the spent fuel. The reactor had been operating since February 2003, so it could have produced enough plutonium for 1 to 3 devices. However, it would take a few months for North Korean engineers to extract the plutonium from the spent fuel rods. In September 2005, satellite imagery indicated that the reactor had begun operations once again. "Statement of Principles" and Breakdown in Talks On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of six-party talks concluded and the six parties signed a "Statement of Principles" whereby North Korea would abandon its nuclear programs and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards at "an early date." The United States agreed that it has no intention of attacking North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons, and Washington affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. The parties also agreed that the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which prohibits uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, should be observed and implemented. Although hailed as a breakthrough by some participants, the viability of the "Statement of Principles" were immediately brought into questions by North Korean and U.S. actions. One particularly sticking point was the extent to which different parties interpreted the agreement's provision of light water reactors to North Korea. While Pyongyang argued that the six-party statement had allowed for LWRs, Washington countered that this was not guaranteed under the statement and would only come after North Korea had dismantled its current nuclear program. Shortly after the agreement was signed in Beijing, the U.S. government announced that it was sanctioning Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a Macao based bank, for assisting North Korea with illegal activities including counterfeiting

133 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 133 U.S. currency. North Korea demanded that the sanctions be lifted or Pyongyang would not carry-out its part of the September 2005 agreement. Due to these, and other disagreements, the Six-Party Talks stalemated and the "Statement of Principles" remained dormant for over 18 months. Nuclear Tests and Resumption of Talks The nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula continued to deteriorate throughout 2006, reaching a low point in October when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. Immediately following the test, the UNSC imposed sanctions on North Korea. After intense diplomatic activities by the Chinese government and others involved in the six-party process, the parties met again in December 2006 after a hiatus of more than a year. However, these talks ended without any sign of progress. In what appeared to be a breakthrough in the negotiations, the six parties in February 2007 agreed on the "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" whereby North Korea agreed to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards, in exchange for a package of incentives that included the provision of energy assistance to North Korea by the other parties. The agreement also established a 60-day deadline during which North Korea was to shut down and seal its main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon-kun under IAEA supervision. In addition, the United States agreed to release the approximately $25 million in North Korean assets held at the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia. However, the BDA part of the February deal again became a sticking point; much of the international financial community, concerned about possible legal ramification of dealing with a bank that was technically still under U.S. sanctions, refused to take part in the transfer of the funds. The issue was eventually resolved when a Russian bank agreed to transfer the funds in June After the February 2007 agreement, the North Koreans extended invitations to IAEA officials opening the door to re-establishing its relationship with the agency since expelling IAEA inspectors in December In March 2007, an IAEA delegation headed by Mohamed ElBaradei visited Pyongyang and met with North Korean officials to discuss the denuclearization process. In July 2007, North Korea began shutting down and sealing it main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon-kun under IAEA supervision. Further progress was made in the Six-Party Talks when the parties adopted the second "action plan" that called on North Korea to disable its main nuclear facilities and submit a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs by 31 December While disablement activities on North Korea's three key plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon-kun-the 5MW(e) experimental reactor, the Radiochemical Laboratory and the Fuel Fabrication Plant-progressed, North Korea failed to meet the 31 December deadline to submit its declaration. Sharp disagreements over North Korea's past procurement efforts that support the development of a uranium enrichment capability and controversies surrounding suspected North Korean nuclear cooperation with Syria proved to be the key sticking points. Almost six months past the deadline, on 26 June 2008, North Korea submitted its much-awaited declaration. While the contents of North Korea's declaration have not been disclosed to the public, various media reports claimed that the declaration failed to address its alleged uranium enrichment program or suspicions of its nuclear proliferation to other countries, such as Syria. Despite problems with the declarations, the Bush administration notified U.S. Congress that it was removing North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and also issued a proclamation lifting some sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Following the U.S. government's action, North Korea demolished the cooling tower at the Yongbyon reactor which was broadcasted by the international media. However, North Korea announced in late August 2008 that they restored the nuclear facilities in Yongbyonkun and barred international inspectors from accessing the site. Pyongyang also criticizing the United States for delaying the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terror. On 11 October 2008, the United States dropped North Korea from the terrorism list after reaching a deal in which North Korea agreed to resume the disabling of its nuclear facilities and allow inspectors access to the nuclear sites. The six parties then resumed negotiations to map out a verification plan in Beijing in December These negotiations focused on ways to verify the disabling of North Korea's nuclear program, including taking nuclear

134 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 134 samples. However, the negotiations failed to reach an agreement on a verification protocol and the issue remains stalled. After a dispute over rocket launches in March 2009, North Korea kicked out IAEA and U.S. inspectors and began to rebuild the Yongbyon reactor for the purpose of reprocessing plutonium from the spent fuel rods, going back on its previous promises at the Six-Party Talks. Yongbyon-kun's reactor has yet to achieve completion despite some media report to the contrary. According to satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe taken on 23 August 2009, no attempts had been made to reconstruct the cooling tower or of other ventilation. After the North's 25 May 2009 nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council released Resolution 1874; in response Pyongyang announces that "the processing of uranium enrichment will be commenced." After the UN sanctions that followed the 2009 "satellite" launch, the DPRK indicated that they did not plan to return to the Six-Party Talks and that they were not bound by agreements made earlier through this forum. By the fall of 2009, international pressure was being increasingly placed on Pyongyang-particularly by China and the United States-for resumption of the Six Party Talks process. In December 2009, U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth visited North Korea to explore the renewal of the Six-Party Talks. Pyongyang called for the lifting of UN-imposed sanctions before returning to the Six-Party Talks, a request that was refused by the United States and the other Six- Party Talk participants. In January and February 2010, diplomatic activities increased significantly, and hopes were raised that North Korea could rejoin the process in the near future.

135 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 135 Figure 6.2: North Korean Plutonium Production and Separation, as of Mid Figure 6.3 Known North Korean Nuclear Tests 105 The 2006 Test North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, It was clearly nuclear because it released radioactive materials. The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released this statement: Analysis of air samples collected on October 11, 2006 detected radioactive debris which confirms that North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P unggye on October 9, The explosion yield was less than a kiloton. The 2009 Test North Korea announced on May 25, 2009, that it had conducted a second nuclear test. ODNI stated: The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that North Korea probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P'unggye on May 25, The explosion yield was approximately a few kilotons. 104 Kwang Ho Chun, North Korea s Nuclear Question: Sense of Vulnerability, Defensive Motivation, and Peaceful Solution, Strategic Studies Institute, December 2010, pg U.S. Congressional Research Service. North Korea s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications Nov. 24, 2010, Jonathan Medalia.

136 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 136 Figure 6.4: Timeline of North Korea s Nuclear Program : North Korea starts to build a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon 1986: Yongbyon begins operation 1993: Pyongyang pulls out of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The first North Korean nuclear crisis develops 1994: The US and North Korea make first nuclear deal. Pyongyang freezes its nuclear program in return for western help and cash to build light-water reactors 1998: Pyongyang fires a long-range ballistic missile that overflies Japan before splashing down in the Pacific 2002: Second crisis develops. The then US president, George Bush, names North Korea as a part a threestrong "axis of evil" 2005: North Korea says it has a nuclear weapon and demands a civilian light-water reactor in exchange for ending its nuclear program something the US and Japan dismiss as unacceptable 2006: North carries out first nuclear test 2007: North Korea agrees to shut down its Yongbyon reactor in return for 50,000 tons of fuel oil or economic aid of equal value April 2009: North Korea launches a multi-stage rocket and says Yongbyon will restart. UN inspectors ordered to leave May 2009: North Korea says it has successfully conducted a second nuclear test, raising the explosive power of the device 106 James Sturcke. North Korea and Nuclear Testing: Timeline. The Guardian, May25, 2009, Jan. 26,

137 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 137 North Korean Biological Although the DPRK acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1987, it is suspected of maintaining an ongoing biological weapons program. Defectors from the DPRK and the defense agencies of the United States and South Korea generally agree that the country began to acquire a biological weapons capability in the early 1980s. [4] However, open source information on the DPRK's biological weapons program varies considerably. The 2006 Defense White Paper by South Korea's Ministry of National Defense, estimates that the DPRK possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of biological agents, including the causative agents of anthrax, smallpox, and cholera. [5] Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1987, it is suspected of maintaining an ongoing biological weapons program. Defectors from the DPRK and the defense agencies of the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) generally agree that the country began to acquire a biological weapons capability in the early 1980s. However, open-source information on the DPRK's biological weapons program varies considerably, so it is difficult to know of its true state. Perhaps the most authoritative analysis was made in 2006 by the ROK's Ministry of National Defense (MND), which estimates that the DPRK possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of biological agents including the causative agents of anthrax, smallpox, and cholera.[1] However, heightened concerns regarding DPRK 's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, as well as its ongoing program to export weapons and related dual-use equipment, have overshadowed international considerations of whether the DPRK adheres to the BWC.[2] Sources: [1] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2006 Defense White Paper (English translation), May 2007, Pak Tongsam, "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, in OSC document FTS [2] "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments," prepared by the U.S. Department of State," 1 January 2001, "Actual Problems of Chemical Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Convention after the First Review Conference," Masaryk University (Brno), 12 April 2005, in OSC document GRY Weapons Overview Open-sources provide varying assessments of DPRK's purported capabilities in biological weapons. These estimates range from its possession of a rudimentary biological warfare (BW) program to having deployed biological weapons. However, most official estimates appear to conclude that the DPRK possesses a range of pathogens that can be weaponized and the technical capabilities to do so rather than ready-to-use weapons. The United States government believes that the DPRK possesses a substantial biological weapons capability. General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK), stated in a testimony before the U.S. Senate in March 2002 that "...North Korea has the capability to develop, produce and weaponize biological warfare agents."[1] In May 2002, John R. Bolton, then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, described DPRK's biological weapons program as "a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW capability" and claimed that it "has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the [Biological and Toxin Weapons] Convention." Bolton further noted that the "leadership in Pyongyang has spent large sums of money to acquire the resources, including a biotechnology infrastructure, capable of producing infectious agents, toxins, and other crude biological weapons. It likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of deciding to do so, and has a variety of means at its disposal for delivering these deadly weapons."[2] Further, in 2006, the MND stated that "It is assessed that Pyongyang has been producing poison gas and biological weapons since the 1980s. It is believed that... North Korea is able to produce biological weapons such as the bacteria of anthrax, smallpox, and cholera." Some assessments of DPRK's BW program have described the country's biotechnology infrastructure as sorely deficient in advanced equipment and expertise. However, achievements in biological research by North Korean scientists suggest that in some areas of biomedical research they possess considerable capabilities. For example, published research carried out by North Korean scientists from 1990 to 1997 demonstrates a high level of expertise working with vaccinia virus. The research most likely contributed to the development of vaccines or pharmaceutical products, but such work could also prove useful to a BW program since the vaccinia virus' genome is closely related to that of variola virus, which causes smallpox. An Open Source Center analysis published in January 2009

138 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 138 supported the conclusion that experiments, including genetic modifications of vaccinia virus, were done for peacefully-directed medical research. Nevertheless, it is likely that similar experiments could be used to produce toxins, enhance the virulence of viruses, transform the vaccinia virus into a pathogen, and provide a cover for a smallpox R&D program.[4] Also indicative of a substantial biotechnology capability is that the country's scientists received an award for the development of a Hepatitis-B vaccine in 1999.[5] Less clear than its research capabilities are the DPRK 's capabilities in weaponization and delivery of BW agents. Although efforts to strengthen international and national export controls and the implementation of sanctions on Pyongyang have limited the DPRK 's ability to import dual-use equipment and supplies, the country has proven resourceful in securing materials from abroad. In 2006, for example, Japanese authorities discovered that DPRK had obtained a freeze dryer which could be used to freeze-dry pathogens of possible biological weapons applications from a Tokyo-based trading company in 2002.[6] DPRK also has sufficient stocks of the growth media such as agar, peptone, and yeast extract from breweries to support a BW program.[7] Several unconfirmed reports state that DPRK engaged in human testing as recently as 2002 as part of the chemical and biological weapons development effort. As noted by the U.S. Department of State in its International Religious Freedom Report 2007, these allegations are extremely difficult to verify due to the DPRK being a closed society.[8] History Asserting that poisonous gas and bacteria had been used against DPRK and Chinese forces during the Korean War, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung (d. 1994) in the early 1960s ordered the establishment of a biological weapons program. The country subsequently established such a program within the Academy of National Defense. However, results from this program were unremarkable. An estimated different types of pathogens were investigated during the early development process, including the etiological agents of anthrax, cholera, plague, smallpox, and yellow fever. According to reports, the DPRK imported via entities in Japan and elsewhere cultures of anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), plague (Yersinia pestis) and cholera (Vibrio cholerae)bacteria. Typhoid (which is caused by Salmonella typhi) has also been mentioned in reports on the DPRK BW development program. Actual production of BW agents, including the causative bacteria of cholera, typhus (rickettsia), tuberculosis, and anthrax is believed to have begun in the early 1980s. Unlike DPRK's development of chemical weapons, its biological weapons development has been mostly indigenous.[9] List of Suspected BW Agents in North Korea BW agents are reportedly cultured in both civilian and military-related research institutes in the DPRK. According to various accounts, pathogens having possible utility for BW that are allegedly being researched and developed by the DPRK include: Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) Clostridium botulinum (produces botulinum toxin that causes botulism) Mycobacterium tuberculosis (tuberculosis) Rickettsia prowazekii (typhus) Salmonella typhi (typhoid) Vibrio cholerae 01 (cholera) Yersinia pestis (plague) Korean hemorrhagic fever virus (hemorrhagic fever) Variola major (smallpox) Yellow fever virus (yellow fever) A report from Jane's Intelligence Group noted that North Korea scientists had used microencapsulation to protect Bacillus anthracis cells from UV light. It also reiterated the allegation that DPRK possesses cultures of variola major.[10]

139 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 139 DPRK'S Biological Warfare Delivery Systems Little is known about the organization of the DPRK's BW program, although one author suggests that it is likely organized in a similar way to the DPRK CW program. If this is the case, then the Second Economic Committee and its subsidiary Fifth Machine Industry Bureau would fulfill requirements for biological weapons set by the North Korean military. The latter organizations are directed by the National Defense Commission and the Ministry of People's Armed Forces.[12] In contrast to the DPRK's considerable capabilities to deliver CW agents, it is much less clear whether comparable munitions are available to the DPRK to deliver BW agents. Although DPRK has advanced missile technology, the fragile nature of biological agents complicates the task of using missiles as a means of delivery and dispersal. While the ROK government has estimated that half of DPRK 's long-range missiles and 30 percent of its artillery pieces are capable of delivering chemical or biological warheads,[11] it is not known whether biological payloads would survive and be effectively dispersed by these missiles. Facilities Estimates in open sources of the number of biological weapons facilities that the DPRK possess vary widely and therefore the real number is unknown. One report from Jane's states that there appear to be at least ten of them, some of which are reported to function under the guise of electrical engineering facilities.[16] A handbook on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) published in 2001 by the South Korean MND contains a map listing suspect BW facilities in DPRK, including three production and research facilities. While the locations of the research facilities were not published, the three production sites were reported to be located at Chongju, Munchon, and the Sohae coast.[17] The facility in Munch'on, Kangwon Province, manufactures an estimated 200 metric tons of growth media per year.[18] According to defector Choi Ju Hwal, a former sergeant in the DPRK People's Army (KPA), there is a Joint Research Institute responsible for biological weapons development. This institute is placed within the military-medical department, which reports to the General Logistics Bureau of the Armed Forces Ministry.[19] North Korea and the 1972 Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BWC) The DPRK is a state party to the Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BWC), having acceded to it on March 13, Although the U.S. and other governments have asserted that the DPRK has, or is, violating the BWC, no official attempt has been made to apply provisions spelled out in the BWC for having these allegations investigated or verified. Map by the ROK Ministry of National Defense (2001); green markers indicate biological weapons-related facilities. Sources: [1] Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed Forces Committee, 05 March 2002, [2] John R. Bolton, "Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction," Heritage Lectures, No. 743, 06 May 2002, [3] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2006 Defense White Paper (English translation), May 2007, p. 26, [4] OSC Analysis, "Researchers Likely Genetically Modified Vaccinia Virus for Production of Vaccines, Pharmaceuticals from ," 23 January 2009, in OSC document KPF [5] Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan (Seoul), January 1999, in OSC document FTS [6] "DPRK Probably Produced Centrifuge To Produce Biological Agents," U.S. Army Asian Studies Detachment, 22 November 2006, in OSC document JPP [7] Andy Oppenheimer, ed., "Jane's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense ," August 2008, pp , [8] U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2007, 2007, [9] Pak Tong-sam, "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan (Seoul), January 1999, translated in OSC document FTS [10] Andy Oppenheimer, ed., "Jane's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense ," August 2008, pp , [11] Ibid.

140 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 140 [12] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), p. 227; Daniel A. Pinkston, "The South Korean Ballistic Missile Program," Strategic Studies Institute, February 2008, [13] Trefor Moss, "Launch preparations are for communications satellites, says Pyongyang," 02 March 2009, "North Korea sparks fears of strike on U.S. with 'rocket' launch," Mail Foreign Service, 24 February 2009, [14] "U.N. Chief Voices Concern over N. Korean Rocket Launch," Yonhap (Seoul), 29 March 2009, in OSC document KPP [15] "N. Korea's Missile Capability Improves," Korea Times Online, 06 April 2009, in OSC document KPP [16] Oppenheimer, "Jane's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense " [17] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Hwasaengbang Misail Olmana Algo Hyesimnikka, in Korean, p. 32, 01 December 2001; ROK MND Book on DPRK Chemical, Biological Warfare Capabilities, 01 December 2001, in OSC document KPP [18] "South Korea: Monthly on DPRK Weapons of Mass Destruction," 21 Nov 1998, in OSC document FBIS-EAS , cited at [19] Hearing of the International Security Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on Weapons proliferation in North Korea, Chaired by Senator Thad Cochran (R-Mi), Federal News Service, 21 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,

141 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 141 North Korean Chemical The DPRK's chemical weapons agent production capability is estimated to be up to 5,000 metric tons per year. Pyongyang has concentrated on acquiring mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-type chemical agents. [6] Reports indicate that the DPRK has approximately 12 facilities where raw chemicals, precursors, and actual agents are produced and/or stored, as well as six major storage depots for chemical weapons. [7] Pyongyang also has placed thousands of artillery systems including multiple launch rocket systems that would be particularly effective for chemical weapons delivery within reach of the Demilitarized Zone and Seoul. [8] North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The DPRK ranks among the world's largest possessors of chemical weapons. If official reports and testimonies from North Korean defectors are to be believed, the DPRK military possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of chemical weapons (it is unclear if this amount includes only CW agents or agents and munitions). The DPRK's chemical arsenal allegedly include four of the five major classes of CW agents, including phosgene (choking), hydrogen cyanide (blood), mustard (blister), and sarin (nerve agent) (it does not appear to possess nervous system incapacitants such as BZ). However, a 2002 report by the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, General Thomas A. Schwartz, suggests that DPRK is self-sufficient only in World War I era CW agents such as phosgene, lewisite, and mustard blister agents, but not the modern nerve agents.[1] Reports and documentary evidence from North Korean defectors suggest that the regime tested chemical agents on humans, especially prisoners, as recently as One witness describes how he stole transfer authorizations for prisoners, stating: "Each document gives sparse biographical details of an individual and authorizes his or her transfer from a prison specifically for the purpose of 'human experimentation of liquid gas for chemical weapons testing in live experiments.' Forms are dated as late as July 2002."[2] Since the DPRK's establishment in 1947, its CW program had uneven success in obtaining and weaponizing CW agents. However, in the last two decades DPRK appears to have increased its CW agent production capacity and been able to develop and deploy a variety of delivery systems. According to defector accounts, DPRK 's long-range missiles such as the Nodong, and other ballistic rockets and artillery pieces with calibers larger than 80 mm, are capable of delivering CW agents. North Korea appears to be continuing to improve its CW delivery capability, as evidenced by development of the KN-2 short-range missile in 2007.[3] Despite DPRK's moribund economy, the quantity and quality of new artillery placed near the DMZ have increased over the last several years, to include platforms such as multiple launch rocket systems of up to 320 mm. These systems pose threats to heavily populated Seoul and the entire Korean peninsula.[4] Background As early as 1947, a Korean People's Army (KPA) manual addressed at least the theory of CW operational doctrine. By 1954, the KPA had established nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense units. It appears that these were developed according to the Soviet model, and that the chemical weapons program relied heavily on Chinese assistance. Kim Il Sung's 1961 "Declaration for Chemicalization" called for the further development of a chemical industry to support chemical weapons production. It was during this time that DPRK established the basic organization of the current Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau.[5] In 1966, for reasons that are unclear, DPRK turned to the Soviets for assistance in its CW development, which was provided mostly in the form of training manuals and small quantities of nerve and mustard agents. Following this period of Soviet-led assistance, DPRK made substantive gains in the CW area.[6] Still, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated in May 1979 that DPRK had only a defensive capability in CW. It assumed, however, that the development of an offensive program would follow. By the late 1980s, sources reported that the DPRK was capable of producing CW agents in large quantities, and had deployed large numbers of chemical weapons munitions. In January 1987, the South Korean MND reported that the DPRK possessed up to 250 metric tons of chemical weapons, including blister (mustard) and some nerve agents. (This estimate is varies somewhat from that made above by General Schwartz, but we have no way to determine which is correct.) Since then, MND estimates of DPRK chemical ordnance have increased to the thousands of tons, probably based on information provided by North

142 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 142 Korean defectors, including former members of DPRK military and NBC defense organizations.[7] In 2006, the MND estimated that DPRK possessed 2,500 to 5,000 metric tons of chemical agents, including nerve agents.[8] The Suspected DPRK Chemical Weapons Arsenal The DPRK is believed to possess mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-series nerve agents. Dr. Cho'ng Yo'ng-sik from the Korea Research Institute of Chemical Technology has estimated that DPRK is capable of producing an annual 5,000 metric tons of CW agents in times of peace. According to him, the DPRK could increase this production to 12,000 metric tons should the country be placed on war footing.[9] While an unknown quantity of CW agents is stored in bulk, reportedly a significant portion of the DPRK stock of BW agents is loaded into artillery shells and rocket warheads. Due to the DPRK having limited indigenous sources for precursors of CW agents, it is believed to be concentrating on producing as much as it can of phosgene, mustard, sarin, and V-agents.[10] Allegations of Chemical Agent Experimentation on Humans In 2004, the BBC produced a documentary, entitled "Access to Evil," which alleged that the DPRK had used political prisoners as test subjects for its chemical weapons. The documentary featured the testimony of a former North Korean prison officer who witnessed entire families being gassed. In addition, documentary evidence in the form of prisoner "letter of transfer" forms that had been smuggled out of DPRK by an engineer at the February 8 Vinalon Complex in Hamhung, was presented to corroborate the officer's story. Other defectors have made similar claims previously (and since), but trustworthy documentary evidence to support these claims has not been available. Of course, Pyongyang denies charges made by defectors and it must be noted that the ROK government generally expresses skepticism of defector claims.[11] As observed by the U.S. Department of State in 2007, defector allegations are extremely difficult to verify rigorously due to the DPRK being a closed society.[12] Delivery Systems Over half of DPRK's 1.2 million-man army, supported by thousands of artillery systems, is deployed within 90 miles of the DMZ. Possibly because chemical agents are best delivered by larger caliber artillery shells and rockets, beginning in 2002 the DPRK has acted to substantially increase the number of long-range multiple rocket 280 mm and 320 mm launching systems near the DMZ. The country's arsenal includes thousands of artillery of various calibers, hundreds of forward deployed Scud-B, Frog-5, and Frog-7 missiles, as well as Scud-C missiles capable of being fitted with chemical warheads. The ROK government has asserted that half of the DPRK's long-range missiles and almost one-third of its other artillery weapons are capable of delivering either biological or chemical agents,[13] although the effectiveness of these weapons are not known. In October 2007, a South Korean lawmaker, citing intelligence data, claimed that the DPRK had developed a new short range missile, the KN-2, which reportedly is a modified version of the Russian SS-21. The solid fuel-propelled KN-2 reportedly has a 120 km range, is capable of delivering a 500 kg payload, and can carry a chemical warhead.[14] According to the MND 2008 Defense White Paper, DPRK deployed a new intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) in The white paper also states that the DPRK is believed to be continuing to develop its Taepodong-2 long-range ballistic missile which is estimated to have a range of 6,700 kilometers. The MND notes further that the missile's maximum range could be extended if the DPRK reduces the missile's weight or adds a third propulsion rocket.[17] The implications of these developments for CW are not yet known, but it is wise to assume that these new missiles are designed to carry a variety of warheads, including a chemical one. Source: the Republic of Korea 2000 Defense White Paper (Ministry of National Defense) Facilities In 2001, an estimated 12 facilities in DPRK produce and/or store raw chemicals, precursors, and CW agents. ROK government officials, relying partly on aerial photographs, determined that the DPRK has eight chemical weapons production facilities, which are located in Hamhung and Hungnam, South Hamgyong Province; Ch'ongjin and Aoji,

143 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 143 North Hamgyong Province; Sinuiju, North P'yongan Province; Manp'o, Chaggang Province; and Anju and Sunch'on, South P'yongan Province. In addition, reportedly there are four research and seven storage facilities.[19] Two facilities located proximal to the cities of Kanggye and Sakchu are reportedly equipped to undertake the final preparation and the filling of CW agents into artillery shells. The testing of agents reportedly is also performed at these two locations, possibly in very large underground facilities.[20] The Hamhung Chemical Engineering College appears to be responsible for much of the training of the KPA personnel in CW defense. Status During the 1990s, a scarcity of precursors required for the manufacture of nerve agents forced the DPRK to look for foreign sources. In 1996, an ethnic Korean possessing Japanese citizenship and residing in Japan was caught exporting 50 kg of sodium fluoride to North Korea by way of cargo vessels bringing food aid. Supposedly, this chemical was intended for use by a North Korean enterprise for electroplating purposes. But because sodium fluoride is also a precursor for sarin and soman nerve agents, Japanese authorities arrested the individual and charged him for the crime of illegally trading in a controlled substance. The relatively small amount of this chemical involved in this case would have allowed the DPRK to produce militarily insignificant amounts of nerve agent, but the act might have been a test run for subsequent large smuggling or precursors.[21] A more serious incident occurred in September 2003, when DPRK purchased more than 100 metric tons of sodium cyanide from a South Korean man and then successfully imported it via China. Although the DPRK government claimed that the chemical would be used for only peaceful purposes, it is well recognized that sodium cyanide is a dual-use chemical that could be used to manufacture both blood (hydrogen cyanide) and nerve (tabun) agents. The incident underscores the challenge associated with controlling the international trade of dual-use equipment and materials that could be applied to acquire chemical weapons. But these incidents also point to a serious problem faced by DPRK, namely having a low capability to domestically manufacture chemical weapon agents precursors, even relatively simple ones such as sodium cyanide.[22] While it would appear as if the ready availability of oil-derived intermediates makes the large-scale manufacture of CW agents such as the ones listed above well within the capabilities of the DPRK, it is not clear to what extent it is able to manufacture large quantities of CW agents and associated munitions given its limited financial resources.[23] It would appear as if having to choose between acquiring nuclear weapons, short and long-range missiles, and/or chemical weapons, the last would probably have the lowest value to the DPRK government. North Korea and the Chemical Weapons Convention In the early 1990s according to reports from North Korean defectors the DPRK Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces debated over whether the country should join the CWC. Although the Foreign Ministry apparently was in favor of doing so, the military was opposed. Kim Jong-Il apparently sided with the latter. Beginning in 1997, the ROK government tried to convince the DPRK to join the CWC, but to no avail. The DPRK has also rebuffed similar efforts on the part of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Japanese government. North Korea's accession to the CWC could have long-term economic advantages by giving the DPRK access to trade in treaty-controlled chemicals and technology. In the short term, however, North Korea is not likely to reap immediate benefits by joining the CWC regime. [24] It bears noting that DPRK has refused to acknowledge having chemical weapons as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which was passed in October 2006 following North Korea's test of a nuclear device.[25] Sources: [1] Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed Forces Committee, 05 March 2002, [2] Jasper Becker, "North Koreans Take Revenge on Chemical Tests Whistleblowers," The Independent (London), 08 February 2004, [3] Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?"

144 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 144 Pukhan, January 1999, pp , translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS ; Kim Min-seok, JoongAng Ilbo / Brian Lee, "North Korea Develops New Missile," JoongAng Ilbo (Internet version) 10 October 07, OSC document KPP [4] Andy Oppenheimer, ed., "Jane's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense ," August 2008, pp , "The CBRN Threat: Assessing Asian Capabilities," Asian Military Review, September 2008, [5] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Programmes," in "North Korea's Weapons Programmes: a Net Assessment," 21 January 2004, p. 56, [6] Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, pp , translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS [7] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons (BCW) Programmes" in North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment, 21 January 2004, [8] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2006 Defense White Paper (English translation), May 2007, p. 74, "South Estimates DPRK Has 5,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons, Mostly Sarin," Sinmun (Seoul), 15 April 1995, p. 1, in BBC Summary of World Broadcast. [9] "Sankei Shimbun: DPRK Manufactures Chemical Weapons," Sankei Shimbun, 10 June 2000, in OSC document JPP ; "North Korea's Military Science and Technology (Part 2)," Kunsa Nontan, 26 Aug Aug [10] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program," The Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College, February 2008, p. 49, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Programmes," in North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment, 21 January 2004, p. 56, [11] Bertil Lintner, "North Korea and the Poor Man's Bombs," Asia Times Online, 9 May 2007, Antony Bartnett, "Revealed: the gas chamber horror of North Korea's gulag," The Guardian, 01 February 2004, [12] U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "International Religious Freedom Report 2007," [13] Andy Oppenheimer, ed., "Jane's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense ," August 2008, pp.30-31, janes-store.ihs.com; "The CBRN Threat: Assessing Asian Capabilities," Asian Military Review, September 2008, [14] Kim Min-seok, JoongAng Ilbo / Brian Lee, "North Korea Develops New Missile," JoongAng Ilbo (Seoul), 10 October 2007, in OSC document KPP [15] Trefor Moss, "Launch preparations are for communications satellites, says Pyongyang," 02 March 2009, Mail Foreign Service, "North Korea sparks fears of strike on U.S. with 'rocket' launch," 24 February 2009, [16] "U.N. Chief Voices Concern over N. Korean Rocket Launch," Yonhap (Seoul), 29 March 2009, OSC document KPP [17] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, "Korea Publishes Defense White Paper 2008," 11 March 2009; (An English version of the full 2008 White Paper has not been released as of the time of this writing.) [18] "N. Korea's Missile Capability Improves," Korea Times Online, 06 April 2009, OSC document KPP [19] Yi Kyo-kwan, "NK Report - North Korea Finishes Deploying Chemical Weapons in Forward Units," Choson Ilbo, 05 November 2002, in OSC document KPP ; "Defector Describes Various DPRK Arms Factories," Kin Seinichi no Himitsu Heiki Kojo (Tokyo), 25 November 2001, in OSC document KPP ; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Program," in North Korea's Weapons Programs: a Net Assessment, 21 January 2004, p. 56, [20] "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," Joseph Bermudez, Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1994, pp , cited at Hungnam information page at "DPRK Chemical Warfare Facilities," in Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), p [21] "Trader Nabbed for Illegal Chemical Exports," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 8 April 1996, [22] Park Chan-kyong, "ROK Says Sodium Cyanide Shipped to North Korea via China Sep 2003," Agence France Presse, 24 September 2004, in OSC Document JPP [23] "DPRK Manufactures Chemical Weapons," Sankei Shimbun, 10 June 2000, in OSC document JPP ; "North Korea's Military Science and Technology (Part 2)," Kunsa Nontan, 26 Aug Aug [24] "Why the Discrepancy Between ROK, DPRK Joint Communiqué Regarding Military Authorities Talks," Yonhap, 08 April 2002, in OSC document KPP ; "Actual Problems of Chemical Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Convention after the First Review Conference," Masaryk University (Brno), 12 April 2005, in OSC document GRY [25] "Security Council condemns nuclear test by Democratic People's Republic of Korea, unanimously adopting Resolution 1718 (2006)," SC/8853, Security Council 5551st Meeting (PM), 14 October 2006,

145 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 145 North Korean Missile Forces North Korea began its missile development program in the 1970s and tested a Scud-B ballistic missile by April North Korea is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In its short-range arsenal, Pyongyang has produced the 500km-range Scud-C, the 700km-range Scud-D, and the KN-02, which is an upgraded version of the Russian SS-21 "Scarab" with a slightly longer range of about 120km. In its medium and intermediate-range arsenal, North Korea has the 1,300km-range missile known as the Nodong (Rodong), which it initially tested in 1993 (500km), and again in North Korea has deployed between 175 and 200 Nodong missiles. [9] Pyongyang has also displayed its Musudan IRBM, with an estimated range of 2,500-4,000km, in parades, although it has never been flight tested. [7] A yet-unnamed Nodong-variant was also displayed in October 2010, which possesses visible similarities to Iran's Ghadr-1.[10] North Korea's Taepodong-1 (Paektusan- 1), an 1800km-range missile/space launch vehicle has also been flight-tested. North Korea's three-stage Taepodong- 2 is potentially an intercontinental range missile; however it has yet to be tested successfully. [11] Pyongyang has also tested anti-ship cruise missiles numerous times since The North Korean missile identified as the AG-1 is based on the Chinese CSSC-3 'Seersucker'. Anti-ship cruise missile tests on 25 May and 7 June 2007 are believed to have been either the KN-01 or the Chinese-made CSSC-3 'Seersucker'. North Korea is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Sources: [1] "North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs," International Crisis Group Asia Report N 168, 18 June 2009, U.S. analysts have been skeptical of North Korea's claim, citing its history of past deception. Some U.S. estimates have cited 50-60kg of Pu-239. "Jane's CBRN Assessments, Production Capability: Nuclear, Korea, North," Jane's Information Group, 7 January [2] Siegfried S. Hecker, "A Return Trip to North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex," Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 20 November 2010, [3] "Jane's CBRN Assessments, Key Facts: Nuclear, Korea, North," Jane's Information Group, 7 January [4] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, "2006 Defense White Paper [English translation]," May 2007, [5] [Namgung Min], [Ministry of National Defense: North Korea posses maximum 5000 tons of biochemical weapon]," Daily NK, 5 October 2010, [6] "Strategic Weapon System, Korea, North," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 5 July 2010; [Oh Ju-hwan], [Conducting medical experiments on living bodies to develop bio-chemical weapons]," FNK Radio, 23 October 2009, [7] "Strategic Weapon System, Korea, North," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 5 July [8] "Strategic Weapon System, Korea, North," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 5 July [9] Daniel A. Pinkston, "North Korea Displays Ballistic Missiles During Military Parade, Some for First Time," WMD Insights, June 2007, [10] Joshua Pollack, "Another North Korean Missile First," Arms Control Wonk Blog, 10 October 2010, Doug Richardson, "Iran test-flies solid-propellant ballistic missile," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 2 December [11] "Strategic Weapon System, Korea, North," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 5 July Considering North Korea's long-standing interest in advancing its missile capabilities, its missile program is notable in that there have been relatively few flight tests. North Korea has deployed about Scud missile variants, about Nodong missiles, and perhaps 10 Paektusan-1 missiles, which are more commonly referred to as Taepodong-1 missiles. On April 5, 2009, at 11:20 am local time, North Korea launched an Unha-2 space launch vehicle which is a modified version of the Taepodong-2 (Paektusan-2). Although North Korean media immediately claimed that the satellite had been placed into orbit, no orbit was detected by outside observers. Launch of the three-stage rocket was seen as a technical failure with the first stage splashing down in the water between the Korean peninsula and Japan and the remaining stages, along with payload, falling into the Pacific Ocean. In early February 2009, media reports had indicated that North Korea was planning a test of its long-range missile system. U.S. satellites had observed movement of equipment indicative of preparations for a Taepodong-2 (Paektusan-2) missile launch. The Taepodong-2 (Paektusan-2) had not been successfully tested but was suspected of having a range of 6,700 km.

146 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 146 According to Jane's Information Group reporting of 11 September 2008, North Korea has been building a new longrange missile launch site for the past eight years.[1] In contrast to the older Musudan-ri facility which has limited capabilities, this new installation, located on the west coast of North Korea, includes a movable launch pad and a 10- story tall tower capable of supporting North Korea's largest ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. South Korean Defense Minister, Lee Sang Hee confirmed the reports and stated that "about 80 percent of the work has been completed and we're watching it closely."[2] On July 5, 2006, North Korea flight tested seven ballistic missiles, including the long-range Taepodong-2 [Paektusan-2]. The Taepodong-2, failed about seconds. The missile exercise included the launch of four shortrange ( kilometers) Hwasŏng (Scud) variants and two medium-range (approximately 1,300 kilometers) Nodong missiles, launched from Kitaeryŏng, Anbyŏn-kun, Kangwŏn Province, about 40 kilometers south of Wŏnsan, a port city on North Korea's east coast. The North Koreans also tested a Scud-ER ("extended range") with a range of about 850 kilometers. The North Korean Foreign Ministry referred to the 5 July launches as part of the "Korean People's Army's routine military exercises to increase the nation's capacity for self-defense." The Ministry emphasized that North Korea is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and is not bound by any international laws or agreements restricting its missile tests. However, on 15 July, 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1695, which demands that North Korea suspend all missile-related activities and requires all UN member states to prevent the transfer of missile-related materials and technologies to North Korea. In 2003, U.S. satellite imagery detected a new ballistic missile under development that appears to be based upon the Soviet R-27 (SS-N-6), which is a liquid-fueled submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of at least 2,500km. The land-based version is 12 meters long and 1.5 meters in diameter with a range of 2,500-4,000km. North Korea reportedly considered displaying 10 of the missiles and five mobile launchers on 9 September 2003, which is the anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, the display was apparently cancelled for political reasons. In May 2004, a report indicated that North Korea was building two underground bases for the new missile, and that construction of the bases was about percent complete. On 24 February and 10 March 2003, North Korea tested surface-to-ship cruise missiles on the east coast. The missile test on 24 February was considered provocative because it was only one day before the inauguration of South Korean President Roh Mu Hyun, and the same day that U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell arrived in Seoul to attend the inauguration. Both missiles landed in the Sea of Japan (East Sea), but the flight tests were not considered a violation of North Korea's ballistic missile flight test moratorium. North Korea's missile exports are a significant source of hard currency for Pyongyang. On 10 December 2002, Spanish and U.S. naval ships intercepted the North Korean ship Sŏsan en route to Yemen. The Sŏsan cargo included 15 Scud missiles, conventional warheads, and 85 drums of "inhibited red fuming nitric acid," which is used as an oxidizer for Scud missile fuel. North Korea declared the interception of the Sŏsan an "act of piracy" and demanded "compensation for the losses and personal trauma experienced by the crew members." History North Korea first entered the field of rockets and missiles in the early 1960s with the production of multiple rocket launchers.[3] By 1965, Kim Il Sung had is suspected to have made the political decision to seek an indigenous ballistic missile production capability. That year marked the establishment of the Hamhŭng Military Academy, where North Korean personnel began to receive training in missile development.[4] In general, the 1960s marked the procurement of rockets, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), anti-ship missiles, and the initial development of human resources to support a missile program. There were a number of factors that likely motivated the North Korean leadership to acquire and develop ballistic missile capabilities. First, U.S. intervention at the outbreak of the Korean War thwarted Kim Il Sung's attempt to unify Korea by force. Kim might have viewed ballistic missiles as weapons to deter or defeat U.S. military forces in a subsequent conflict. Second, rocky alliance relationships with both the Soviet Union and China caused Kim to

147 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 147 question the credibility of Moscow's and Beijing's commitments to aid Pyongyang in the event of another war. Kim Il Sung had been disappointed with Moscow's limited support during the Korean War, and he was appalled by Khrushchev's "collapse or cowardice" during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October In a probable response to perceived alliance uncertainty, and to the military coup d'état in South Korea in 1961, the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) Central Committee adopted a policy in December 1962 to "modernize" the military, and ballistic missiles were likely on the list of desired weapons systems. The KWP also held a party leader conference in October 1966, at which Kim Il Sung declared the need to develop military and economic capabilities in tandem.[5] However, this policy actually began to split the military economy, or "second economy," from its civilian counterpart. The Second Economic Committee was established in the early 1970s to oversee the promotion of domestic defense industries, and this institutional arrangement enabled the state to increasingly divert more resources to the missile development program. Early Ballistic Missile Development During the late 1960s, Pyongyang acquired surface-to-ship missiles and FROG-5/7 rockets from Moscow,[6] and by 1970, Beijing was delivering surface-to-ship missiles, SAMs, and technical assistance.[7] Although North Korea sought to acquire Soviet ballistic missiles as early as the mid-1960s, Moscow declined, at least initially, so Pyongyang turned to Beijing for help to produce ballistic missiles. In September 1971, North Korea signed an agreement with China to acquire, develop, and produce ballistic missiles and other weapon systems; however, substantial cooperation did not begin until about 1977 when Korean engineers were able to participate in a joint program to develop the DF-61.[8] The development of North Korean human resources was necessary, but not sufficient for the relatively rapid progress in Pyongyang's missile development program. North Korea, as practically every national missile program since the introduction of the German V-2, has relied upon the transfer of hardware and technology from more advanced producers. North Korea obtained Soviet-made Scud-B missiles to begin a reverse-engineering program, but the timing and conditions of the procurement are still unclear. The earliest reported possibility of North Korea acquiring Scud-Bs is from the Soviet Union in 1972.[9] However, the general view is that Egypt provided the first Scud-Bs to North Korea in 1976, or at some time between 1979 and 1981.[10] Sources: Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999); Federation of American Scientists, personal interview data; SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000 Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000). Reports generally cite the number of missiles received as "a few." The ambiguity in the number and timing of the delivery makes it difficult to extrapolate or estimate the development path of what is generally considered an indigenous reverse-engineering program. However, the later the delivery and the smaller the number of missiles received, the more likely that North Korea was dependent upon foreign technical assistance. This assistance could range from licensed production to covert assistance from firms or individuals. Many questions about foreign assistance may only be of historical interest for the Hwasŏng-5/6 (Scud-B/C) programs because Pyongyang's production of these short-range missiles is probably sustainable without foreign assistance. However, foreign materials and technical assistance could be critical for the production and development of North Korea's intermediate-range and long-range missile programs. By 1984, North Korea had produced and flight-tested an indigenous version of the Scud-B, and in 1985 Pyongyang reached an agreement with Tehran to obtain financial assistance for missile development and production in exchange for Iran's option to purchase North Korean missiles in the future.[11] Iran's ballistic missile "war of the cities" with Iraq created an opportunity for North Korea to earn foreign exchange and increase scale economies in production. Furthermore, Tehran's use of the Hwasŏng-5 provided Pyongyang with performance data that would have required extensive flight testing in Korea. Although North Korea avoided the political costs of conducting flight tests at home, Pyongyang's missile exports had destabilizing effects in the Middle East.

148 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 148 During , North Korea had begun to construct missile bases for the Hwasŏng-5, which entered serial production by As soon as, or shortly after, mass production of the Hwasŏng-5 began, North Korea began development of the Hwasŏng-6 (Scud-C), before rapidly starting the Nodong development program. The deployment of the Hwasŏng-5, production of the Hwasŏng-6, and the beginning of the Nodong program all coincide around This prompt sequence of development is remarkable, and historically unprecedented for a small developing country. Late-industrializing countries can reduce the time required for industrialization, and the same is true in the area of missiles. However, accelerated development is a function of foreign technology transfers, so Pyongyang's extremely rapid progress in missile development suggests a high level of foreign technical assistance. By the late 1980s, North Korea had begun construction for intermediate-range missiles that were still under development. Around , serial production of the Hwasŏng-6 began, or at about the same time the first Nodong prototypes were built. Meanwhile, Pyongyang began to provide technology transfers, and even turnkey Scud factories, to countries in the Middle East. Intermediate-Range Missile Development In the late 1980s, North Korea's Second Natural Science Institute began development of the so-called "Nodong" intermediate-range ballistic missile. U.S. reconnaissance satellites detected a Nodong on the launch pad at the Musudan-ri missile test site in May 1990, but subsequent imagery revealed burn marks on the pad, which indicated a probable test failure. Nevertheless, North Korea reportedly was able to obtain Nodong sales contracts with Libya, Iran, and possibly with Syria and Pakistan before the Nodong was successfully flight tested in late May Although the Nodong was later flight tested in Iran and Pakistan, the 1993 flight test is still Pyongyang's only test. It is worth noting that North Korea was unable to test the Nodong to full range for geographic reasons. Nevertheless, Pyongyang began to deploy the Nodong shortly after the 1993 flight test, and about 100 have now been deployed to North Korean missile bases. As North Korea was nearing completion of the Nodong's development, engineers were also working on the Paektusan-1, which is more commonly known as the "Taepodong-1." The Paektusan-1 does not have a new airframe or engine design, but it is a two-stage missile with a Nodong as the first stage and Hwasŏng (Scud) variant as the second stage. The Paektusan-1 was flight tested in a space launch configuration on 31 August 1998, but it failed to place a small satellite named "Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1" into earth orbit. The space launch vehicle (SLV) version of the Paektusan-1 included a solid-fueled third stage that failed during the 1998 launch. In the mid-1990s, North Korea had begun design and development of the Paektusan-2, more commonly known as the "Taepodong-2," which has a new airframe for the first stage, and reportedly has a Nodong for its second stage. In July 1998, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, headed by Donald Rumsfeld, reported that North Korea "was hard at work on the Taepodong-2 ballistic missile and could deploy the missile within five years." Although Pyongyang agreed to a missile flight test moratorium in September 1999, North Korean engineers continued design work and static testing of the Paektusan-2. On July 5, 2006, North Korea lifted the moratorium and tested seven ballistic missiles during an exercise. The Paektusan-2 failed after seconds of flight, but U.S. intelligence estimates that it could deliver a small payload to the western part of the continental United States. Sources: [1] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Tim Brown, "Ready For Launch? North Korea's New Missile Facility," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 September [2] "N Korea Builds New Missile Launch Pad: S Korean Minister," Agence France Presse, 11 September 2008, [3] Christopher F. Foss, editor, Jane's Armour and Artillery (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p [4] Yun Dŏk Min, "Mi-Puk Missile Hyŏpsang'ŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Chŏnmang," ROK IFANS policy paper, 22 November 2000, p. 2; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 2; Testimony of Ko Yŏng Hwan, former North Korean Foreign Ministry official, before the US Senate, 21 October [5] The Second Machine Industry Ministry, under the party secretary in charge of military industries, was established shortly after Kim's declaration. The Second Machine Industry Ministry was renamed the "Second Economic Committee" in The Second Economic Committee is responsible for the production of all armaments. See Joseph S. Bermudez, The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), pp ; "Minsaeng Hŭisaengwi Kunsusanŏp Pŏnch'ang," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 31 March 1997, p. 6, in KINDS, Kim Kwang In, "'Twaejigongjang' Sŏn Missile Saengsan," Chosun Ilbo, 11 February 2001, "'Pyongyang Pig Factory' Produces Missiles," Chosun Ilbo, 12 February 2001,

149 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 149 [6] Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp ; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 4-5; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The North Korean 'Scud B' Program," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp ; Christopher F. Foss, editor, Jane's Armour and Artillery (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p [7] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The North Korean 'Scud B' Program," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp ; Christopher F. Foss, editor, Jane's Armour and Artillery (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 749; Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p [8] The DF-61 was designed to be a liquid-propelled ballistic missile with a range of about 600km while delivering a 1,000kg warhead. The program was cancelled because of Chinese domestic political reasons in See Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 3; Hua Di, "One Superpower Worse that Two," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1991, pp ; John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms Export Enigma," International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 5-40; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp [9] A high-level North Korean defector claims that Pyongyang leveraged its capture of the USS Pueblo and the hardware on board to bargain with Moscow and get a contract for the delivery of 20 Scud-B missiles. This report and any details about an agreement for subsequent deliveries or technology transfers have not been substantiated. Interview with North Korean defector by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 1 November 2000, Seoul. [10] Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry Says Nodong-1 Test in May Successful," JPRS-TND , 28 June 1993, p. 1; ROK Ministry of Unification, Information Analysis Bureau, "Pukhan Missile Munjae Kwallyŏn Ch'amgojaryo," press release, 3 November 2000, p. 1; "Pukhan, Sajong 1 Ch'ŏn Kilometer Isang Missile Kaebalchung," Joongang Ilbo, 8 November 1991, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 249, 266; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp , 257, 266; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202; Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000: Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000), p. 95; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, [11] For reports of North Korea's initial production of an "indigenous Scud-B," see Yun Dŏk Min, "Mi-Puk Missile Hyŏpsangŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Chŏnmang" IFANS policy paper, 22 November 2000, p. 1; interview with Kim Kil Sŏn by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 10 April 2001, Seoul; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10; for information on bilateral North Korean-Iranian missile cooperation during this period, see Korean Central News Agency, 25 October and 26 October 1983, in "Iranian Prime Minister's Visit to North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 October 1983, in Lexis-Nexis, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missile Development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 1992, pp ; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202.

150 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 150 Figure 6.5: North Korean Missile Forces: Name Type Range (km) KN-02 SRBM SCUD-B/-C SRBM Nodong MRB M 1,000-1,500 Remarks Operational kg payload KPA version of the SS-21 Scarab Introduced to replace aging FROG-7 Frontline deployment ranges South Korean targets Operational kg payload Korean reporting name is Hwasong-5/-6 Single-stage liquid fuelled Conservative IISS estimates suggest 5-7 launch battalions with 4-6 mobile launchers per battalion plus support vehicles. Deployment ranges all of South Korea Operational kg payload Scaled-up SCUD using identical liquid propellants but with larger engine IISS estimates ten Nodong launchers, organized into 2-3 battalions, implying about 40 deployed missiles Deployment ranges all of South Korea and most of Japan, but low accuracy is expected 107 Based primarily on material in Joseph S Bermudez Jr, Going Ballistic: North Korea s advanced missile capabilities, Jane s Intelligence Review, March 12, 2009; Steven A Hildreth, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Congressional Research Service, January 24, 2008; North Korea s Ballistic Missile Program, IISS, Available at ; Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, Strategic Studies Institute, February Available at Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, 2008 Defense White Paper. Available at

151 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 151 Likely Operational 650 1,000 kg payload Musadan IRBM 2,500 3,500 Based on Soviet R-27 (SS-N-6) Occasionally referred to as SCUD-D, Nodong-B Unveiled in parade in October 2010, NTI assesses 12 fielded missiles 108 Deployment ranges South Korea, Japan and U.S. military installations in Guam and Okinawa Test Firing Taepodong 1 MRB M 1,500 2, kg payload Two or three-stage system utilizing Nodong and SCUD-C designs Could range U.S. military installations in East Asia and potentially Alaska Unknown Operational/Development Status Taepodong 2 ICBM 4,000 8, kg payload Two or three-stage system Could potentially range continental U.S. 108 North Korea rolls out ballistic missiles, Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 13, Available at

152 Cordesman: The Korean Military Balance 2/15/11 Page 152 Figure 6.6: Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles Defense of Japan 2010, Japan Ministry of Defense, pg. 43