A FUTURE MARITIME CONFLICT

Save this PDF as:
 WORD  PNG  TXT  JPG

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "A FUTURE MARITIME CONFLICT"

Transcription

1 Chapter Two A FUTURE MARITIME CONFLICT The conflict hypothesized involves a small island country facing a large hostile neighboring nation determined to annex the island. The fact that the primary attack routes are over water, along with the small island country s dependence on sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and air lines of communications (ALOCs), implies a significant naval component. Setting the conflict 10 years into the future provides time to implement emerging NCW concepts as well as some new Navy systems. THE ENEMY S PLAN The scenario begins early in 2009, as the hostile nation prepares to attack the nearby island nation. By May 2010, planning is complete and the enemy is ready to initiate operations against the island. From the enemy s perspective, the most favorable outcome would be for the island to capitulate before the United States intervenes as the United States has promised to do in the event serious hostile acts are initiated. An intense initial attack will further the enemy s goal. Attacking before the island s main supporter (the United States) can assist in its defense will maximize the effectiveness of the strike. Simultaneity A primary effect of the attack is to degrade the island s airfields and command and control facilities. The operational objective is to overrun island air defenses early. The goal is to maintain constant pressure, thus preventing the island from reconstituting air superiority. 7

2 8 Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Navy Simultaneously, an attempt is made to cut the island s SLOCs. This is seen to be useful in weakening the island as the conflict continues, even if the tactic were unsuccessful in forcing capitulation. The island is particularly dependent on its SLOCs for fuel. The aggressor plans to declare an interdiction and launch an effort to destroy several merchant vessels before the United States can intervene. In the (likely) event capitulation does not occur early, the interdiction will be extended as part of a war of attrition. Capitalizing on Asymmetries Although the aggressor s air force is numerically superior to the island s air force in 2010, the aggressor cannot bring all of its aircraft to bear in any reasonable period of time. The problem is that the aircraft are widely dispersed and the command and control capability is undeveloped. The aggressor s only leverage is that, unlike the island, it can replace losses from out-of-theater. The island s qualitative advantages in aircraft and crew training offset the numeric disadvantage. The aggressor plans to employ asymmetric warfare techniques developed in the last decade of the twentieth century. Key to its strategy is its relatively large and capable submarine force, its missile force (especially ballistic missile), and a limited electronic warfare (EW) capability. The Aggressor s Asymmetric Advantages Submarine Warfare: Beginning in the 1990s, partly as a result of the high-tech Iraq war, the enemy recognized the value of modern, capable forces, including submarines, and has since devoted considerable resources to modernize its forces. The submarine force, however, has been optimized for attacks against surface ships and not for antisubmarine warfare (ASW). In 2010, the island still cannot counter the enemy submarines with other submarines, surface ships, or aircraft. As a result, the enemy nation can apply pressure to the island nation s SLOCs for long periods without significant risk to its own submarine forces.

3 A Future Maritime Conflict 9 Missiles: The enemy nation has developed a daunting missile challenge in 2010 built on conventional theater ballistic missiles and land-attack cruise missiles. They offer a means to attack early those assets most directly relating to the island nation s ability to sustain defensive operations. Defense of more than a small fraction of the island nation against this threat is infeasible. Used in large numbers at the outset of a conflict, these missiles could gain the enemy country early air superiority over the island nation. Electronic Warfare: The enemy nation has developed a significant EW capability against the island nation s warning radars, without which it cannot intercept attacking aircraft efficiently. Along with the aforementioned missile advantage, this capability could help the enemy nation achieve air superiority early in a conflict. The Enemy View A key problem for the aggressor in 2010 is the dispersion of its air forces and the lack of a modern command and control structure that can effectively mass airpower in a timely manner. It must also anticipate U.S. involvement in any conflict with the island. Once in the fight, U.S. forces can threaten much of the aggressor s navy. The aggressor, therefore, plans to move its navy into a defensive bastion to protect all of its high-value ships. We assume U.S. forces are located just a few hundred miles from the enemy nation, and less than a thousand miles from the threatened island. U.S. Navy forces can be on the scene in about a day after getting under way. The fact that the United States can become involved this quickly influences the enemy s strategy. RESISTANCE TO ANNEXATION The island s strategic objective is to hold on against an anticipated massive enemy application of force early in any conflict. The aggressor hopes that its massive application of force will result in an early capitulation. This would be the worst possible outcome for the island as a nation, and therefore it must be prepared to weather such an attack. At a minimum, the island nation must plan to hold out until the United States intervenes.

4 10 Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Navy Although the island cannot hope to defeat its enemy militarily, it can strive to fight to a draw, with the aggressor tiring of the conflict and seeking peace. At best, the aggressor will decide that the cost of continuing the conflict (a war of attrition) would outweigh any possible gain, thus ending the conflict under favorable terms for the island nation. Operational Objectives The island nation s primary objective is to maintain air superiority over its contiguous waters at least up to the limits of the enemy s surface-to-air missile (SAM) envelope. This is paramount. It is vital to protecting SLOCs and ALOCs and deterring or defeating enemy assaults by sea or air. An important weapon for maintaining air superiority in the island nation s arsenal is the F-16 fighter aircraft. Their pilots have been trained in the United States, and they get considerably more flight hours than their enemy counterparts. Consequently, the island has superior air force operational proficiency. This strength is enhanced by command and control capabilities considerably superior to the enemy s uncoordinated air force. Geographically, the island s air superiority will cover all of the island and much of the waters between itself and the enemy, but it will not extend to the enemy coast. Aircraft attacking the island must emerge from overlapping SAM coverage areas before they can be engaged. However, the ALOCs on the island and lesser combatants can be protected against enemy surface attacks on shipping near the island. Figure 2.1 illustrates the situation facing the island as it prepares to defend against an anticipated attack. THE U.S. ROLE U.S. naval forces are positioned to help the island improve its defensive posture against enemy missile attacks by intercepting missiles in flight. There is no desire for the United States to attack the enemy s territory. U.S. aircraft will position themselves to fill the gaps in the island s defense and thereby help ensure that the island

5 A Future Maritime Conflict 11 RANDMR Aggressor Nation SAM coverage Island Nation ALOCs SLOCs Figure 2.1 Theater of Operations nation achieves its primary objective of maintaining air superiority over the island and much of the waters between itself and the enemy. A consequence of the U.S. involvement will likely be to force the aggressor into a defensive posture, thus limiting its offensive options. U.S. Air and Sea Operations Initially the carrier battle group (CVBG) operating nearby will be positioned east of the island with MODLOC position placing it out of enemy reach. 1 It is joined by a second CVBG before the outbreak of hostilities. Aegis cruisers will be assigned to ballistic missile defense duty off the island s two major ports, and SSNs will be assigned to attack enemy interdiction submarines. Figure 2.2 illustrates the disposition of a portion of U.S. naval forces in the theater at D-day. 1 MODLOC stands for Miscellaneous Operational Details, Local Operations: fixed, geographically defined operating areas.

6 12 Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Navy Air Superiority: U.S. forces will help defeat raids across the waters between the island and the aggressor and kill leakers over the island either directly using its fighter aircraft or indirectly by providing command and control support. Missile Defense: Early on, the Aegis cruisers will provide Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) over critical ports and airfields. Later in the conflict, U.S. forces will attack surface combatants who are equipped with Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs). The aggressor s intent to use its missiles early lends urgency to the latter mission. Breaking the Blockade: Enemy surface ships operating outside ports and bastions can be eliminated quickly. Nevertheless, these ships collectively threaten U.S. Navy forces in the area. A large, saturation ASCM attack would be particularly attractive to the aggressor. It would be difficult to coordinate such an attack, but it could succeed through force of numbers. The aggressor s interdiction effort will give its submarines freedom of operation. RANDMR Aggressor Nation SSN CG CG SSN Island Nation CG CG CV CVN Figure 2.2 Disposition of U.S. Naval Force

7 A Future Maritime Conflict 13 Conditions around the island are expected to be poor for ASW, so relatively advanced threats like the improved Kilo will be hard to find. Placing the Enemy on the Defensive: U.S. presence in the conflict will force the enemy navy into a defensive posture. In 2010, the aggressor will have no counter for U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), for example. At sea, the best destroyers available to the aggressor will be easy targets for a Los Angeles-class SSN. Consequently we would expect that enemy surface combatants would retreat to ports or bastions, thus preventing their certain destruction in open waters. The aggressor s surface, subsurface, and air platforms will be largely ineffective against modern U.S. SSNs. Consequently, defense in depth is the enemy s only option. It could interpose minefields, ships with active sonar, and submarines to try to stop a U.S. SSN. With surface combatants forced to retreat for self-protection and with forces committed to the defense of high-value units and systems, fewer capable combatants will be available to the aggressor for use against the island. THE BASIS FOR ANALYSIS Central to the analysis of vignettes derived from this and other scenarios is the effect of changed command and control systems and procedures on the outcome of the battle. Network-centric operations purport to improve combat operations. However, this is merely an assertion and therefore must be regarded as a hypothesis. However plausible it may sound, it requires rigorous assessment, and, to do that, a credible link between command and control systems and procedures and combat outcomes needs to be established. In the next two chapters we attempt to do just that. We focus on the development of mathematical relationships that link network-centric operations, command and control, combat operations, and combat outcomes in the context of the scenario just described. In assessing network-centric operations and command and control procedures, we develop measures of performance. Assessing combat operations and combat outcomes is generally accomplished through the development of measures of combat effectiveness. In this work we have

8 14 Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Navy linked the two so that the effects on combat outcomes of variations in C4ISR procedures and processes can be assessed. In developing the combined metrics, we rely on graph theory to assess the value of connectivity, information theory to assess the value of collaboration and the effects of knowledge, and traditional measures of combat to assess the value of combat power. It is important, however, that we emphasize that no claims are made concerning the correctness of these formulations. They must be treated as hypotheses subject to testing, validation, and calibration.

INTRODUCTION. Chapter One

INTRODUCTION. Chapter One Chapter One INTRODUCTION Traditional measures of effectiveness (MOEs) usually ignore the effects of information and decisionmaking on combat outcomes. In the past, command, control, communications, computers,

More information

Follow this and additional works at:

Follow this and additional works at: Naval War College Review Volume 55 Number 4 Autumn Article 2 2002 President s Forum Rodney P. Rempt Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation

More information

UNCLASSIFIED FY 2009 RDT&E,N BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET DATE: February 2008 Exhibit R-2

UNCLASSIFIED FY 2009 RDT&E,N BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET DATE: February 2008 Exhibit R-2 Exhibit R-2 PROGRAM ELEMENT: 0605155N PROGRAM ELEMENT TITLE: FLEET TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION COST: (Dollars in Thousands) Project Number & Title FY 2007 Actual FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011

More information

UNCLASSIFIED FY 2008/2009 RDT&E,N BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET DATE: February 2007 Exhibit R-2

UNCLASSIFIED FY 2008/2009 RDT&E,N BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET DATE: February 2007 Exhibit R-2 Exhibit R-2 PROGRAM ELEMENT: 0605155N PROGRAM ELEMENT TITLE: FLEET TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION COST: (Dollars in Thousands) Project Number & Title FY 2006 Actual FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010

More information

The Air Force View of IAMD in a Joint Environment

The Air Force View of IAMD in a Joint Environment Headquarters U.S. Air Force The Air Force View of IAMD in a Joint Environment This Briefing is Unclassified Maj Gen Timothy M. Ray Director, Operational Planning, Policy & Strategy 11 Jul 2013 INTRO /

More information

The primary goal of the NAE s total force strategy is to provide combat-ready Naval Aviation

The primary goal of the NAE s total force strategy is to provide combat-ready Naval Aviation People War is force - force to the utmost - force to make the enemy yield to our own will - to yield because they see their comrades killed or wounded - to yield because their own will is broke. War is

More information

ASSIGNMENT An element that enables a seadependent nation to project its political, economic, and military strengths seaward is known as 1-5.

ASSIGNMENT An element that enables a seadependent nation to project its political, economic, and military strengths seaward is known as 1-5. ASSIGNMENT 1 Textbook Assignment: Chapter 1, U.S. Naval Tradition, pages 1-1 through 1-22 and Chapter 2, Leadership and Administrative Responsibilities, pages 2-1 through 2-8. 1-n element that enables

More information

CURRICULUM OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER DEPARTMENT HEAD COURSE CIN: A-4H-0107 CDP: 9545 VER: 2.0 CHANGE: 9

CURRICULUM OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER DEPARTMENT HEAD COURSE CIN: A-4H-0107 CDP: 9545 VER: 2.0 CHANGE: 9 1-3-1 Air and Missile TO 1-3-1.1 EXPLAIN the following in relation to the Air and Missile (AMD) mission: Fundamentals Battlespace areas and sectors Command and Control procedures and reporting US Navy

More information

CURRICULUM OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER DEPARTMENT HEAD COURSE CIN: A-4H-0107 CDP: 9545 VER: 2.0 CHANGE: 8

CURRICULUM OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER DEPARTMENT HEAD COURSE CIN: A-4H-0107 CDP: 9545 VER: 2.0 CHANGE: 8 1-3-1 Air and Missile TO 1-3-1.1 EXPLAIN the following in relation to the Air and Missile (AMD) mission: Fundamentals Battlespace areas and sectors Command and Control procedures and reporting US Navy

More information

Sufficiency Analysis in Surface Combatant Force Structure Studies

Sufficiency Analysis in Surface Combatant Force Structure Studies Sufficiency Analysis in Surface Combatant Force Structure Studies Michael S. Morris The Surface Warfare Division of Chief of Naval Operations has conducted a series of major studies to determine the required

More information

The Cruise Missile Threat: Prospects for Homeland Defense

The Cruise Missile Threat: Prospects for Homeland Defense 1 June 2006 NSW 06-3 This series is designed to provide news and analysis on pertinent national security issues to the members and leaders of the Association of the United States Army and to the larger

More information

Challenges and opportunities Trends to address New concepts for: Capability and program implications Text

Challenges and opportunities Trends to address New concepts for: Capability and program implications Text Challenges and opportunities Trends to address New concepts for: Offensive sea control Sea based AAW Weapons development Increasing offensive sea control capacity Addressing defensive and constabulary

More information

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FM US ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FM US ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FM 44-100 US ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited FM 44-100 Field Manual No. 44-100

More information

HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-4. Subject: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-4. Subject: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction [National Security Presidential Directives -17] HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-4 Unclassified version December 2002 Subject: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction "The gravest

More information

Su S rface Force Strategy Return to Sea Control

Su S rface Force Strategy Return to Sea Control S Surface urface F orce SReturn trategy to Sea Control Surface Force Strategy Return to Sea Control Preface WWII SHIPS GO HERE We are entering a new age of Seapower. A quarter-century of global maritime

More information

3. Subsequently at its 12th Session on 9 December 1955 the Military Committee approved M.C. 48/1, subject to one amendment.

3. Subsequently at its 12th Session on 9 December 1955 the Military Committee approved M.C. 48/1, subject to one amendment. (FINAL) 9 December 1955 NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE DECISION ON ` A report by the Military Committee on THE MOST EFFECTIVE PATTERN OF NATO MILITARY STRENGTH FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS - REPORT No. 2

More information

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY THE NATION S COMBAT LOGISTICS SUPPORT AGENCY. Maritime Future Requirements 2018 Suppliers Conference

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY THE NATION S COMBAT LOGISTICS SUPPORT AGENCY. Maritime Future Requirements 2018 Suppliers Conference DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY THE NATION S COMBAT LOGISTICS SUPPORT AGENCY Maritime Future Requirements 2018 Suppliers Conference DLA Land and Maritime June 19, 2018 WARFIGHTER FIRST Welcome Future Requirement

More information

CRS Report for Congress

CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS20851 Updated February 10, 2005 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Naval Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress Summary Ronald O Rourke Specialist in National

More information

Salvo Model for Anti-Surface Warfare Study

Salvo Model for Anti-Surface Warfare Study Salvo Model for Anti-Surface Warfare Study Ed Hlywa Weapons Analysis LLC In the late 1980 s Hughes brought combat modeling into the missile age by developing an attrition model inspired by the exchange

More information

FINAL DECISION ON MC 48/2. A Report by the Military Committee MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

FINAL DECISION ON MC 48/2. A Report by the Military Committee MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT MC 48/2 (Final Decision) 23 May 1957 FINAL DECISION ON MC 48/2 A Report by the Military Committee on MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT 1. On 9 May 1957 the North Atlantic Council approved MC

More information

Challenges of a New Capability-Based Defense Strategy: Transforming US Strategic Forces. J.D. Crouch II March 5, 2003

Challenges of a New Capability-Based Defense Strategy: Transforming US Strategic Forces. J.D. Crouch II March 5, 2003 Challenges of a New Capability-Based Defense Strategy: Transforming US Strategic Forces J.D. Crouch II March 5, 2003 Current and Future Security Environment Weapons of Mass Destruction Missile Proliferation?

More information

Conventional Strategic Arms: Implications For Strategic Stability And Proliferation

Conventional Strategic Arms: Implications For Strategic Stability And Proliferation Conventional Strategic Arms: Implications For Strategic Stability And Proliferation Alexei Arbatov, Carnegie Moscow Center Center for International Security Institute of World Economy and International

More information

includes a greater use of Special Forces and Joint Forces across a wide range of ongoing activities. I would note that shifting our focus does not

includes a greater use of Special Forces and Joint Forces across a wide range of ongoing activities. I would note that shifting our focus does not Remarks by Dr. Donald C. Winter Secretary of Navy National Defense Industry Association 2006 Expeditionary Warfare Conference Marriott Bay Point Resort Panama City, Florida Wednesday, 25 October 2006 Admiral

More information

Methodology The assessment portion of the Index of U.S.

Methodology The assessment portion of the Index of U.S. Methodology The assessment portion of the Index of U.S. Military Strength is composed of three major sections that address America s military power, the operating environments within or through which it

More information

NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES, FY 2005-

NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES, FY 2005- (Provisional Translation) NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES, FY 2005- Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004 I. Purpose II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan III.

More information

2017 Outlook for Navy Shipbuilding

2017 Outlook for Navy Shipbuilding Congressional Budget Office January 4, 2017 2017 Outlook for Navy Shipbuilding Presentation at the 2017 Defense Outlook Forum Eric J. Labs Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons This presentation

More information

UNCLASSIFIED. Unclassified

UNCLASSIFIED. Unclassified Clinton Administration 1993 - National security space activities shall contribute to US national security by: - supporting right of self-defense of US, allies and friends - deterring, warning, and defending

More information

Trusted Partner in guided weapons

Trusted Partner in guided weapons Trusted Partner in guided weapons Raytheon Missile Systems Naval and Area Mission Defense (NAMD) product line offers a complete suite of mission solutions for customers around the world. With proven products,

More information

Aerospace Power. The projection of military force by or from aircraft operating above the earth s surface.

Aerospace Power. The projection of military force by or from aircraft operating above the earth s surface. CHAPTER 9 GLOSSARY CHAPTER 9 GLOSSARY Above Ground Level (AGL). The altitude expressed in feet measured above the ground s surface. Aerial Refueling (AR). The act of receiving fuel efficiently and safely

More information

Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

Airspace Control in the Combat Zone Airspace Control in the Combat Zone Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.7 4 June 1998 BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2 1.7 4 JUNE 1998 OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Maj Chris Larson,

More information

CHAPTER 7 ADAPTING U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES

CHAPTER 7 ADAPTING U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES CHAPTER 7 ADAPTING U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES The Department of Defense has completed a comprehensive review of the U.S. nuclear posture. This chapter summarizes the conclusions of that review. Nuclear forces

More information

Concentration and Asymmetry in Air Power Lessons for the defensive employment of small air forces. Ian Horwood, Niall MacKay & Christopher Price

Concentration and Asymmetry in Air Power Lessons for the defensive employment of small air forces. Ian Horwood, Niall MacKay & Christopher Price Concentration and Asymmetry in Air Power Lessons for the defensive employment of small air forces Ian Horwood, Niall MacKay & Christopher Price Technical limitations of interwar air defence Chain Home

More information

Rebuilding Capabilities of Russian Navy to Be Long Process

Rebuilding Capabilities of Russian Navy to Be Long Process Rebuilding Capabilities of Russian Navy to Be Long Process Defense-aerospace Russian shipyards have undertaken a substantial shipbuilding program to renew the Russian Navy s fleet, which had slowly grown

More information

Russia s Naval Renewal. Dr. Michael B. Petersen Director, Russia Maritime Studies Institute United States Naval War College

Russia s Naval Renewal. Dr. Michael B. Petersen Director, Russia Maritime Studies Institute United States Naval War College Russia s Naval Renewal Dr. Michael B. Petersen Director, Russia Maritime Studies Institute United States Naval War College 1 Russian Federation Navy Missions Missions: 1. Ensure nuclear deterrence (provide

More information

ALLIANCE MARITIME STRATEGY

ALLIANCE MARITIME STRATEGY ALLIANCE MARITIME STRATEGY I. INTRODUCTION 1. The evolving international situation of the 21 st century heralds new levels of interdependence between states, international organisations and non-governmental

More information

US Navy s Display Considerations

US Navy s Display Considerations US Navy s Display Considerations Sea Power to the Hands of Our Sailors Nilo Maniquis PEO IWS D1 Senior Ship Systems and Integration Engineer October 03, 2017 Discussion Warfighter s Workload Today s Display

More information

SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES. for FY 2011 and beyond

SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES. for FY 2011 and beyond (Provisional Translation) SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2011 and beyond Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010 I. NDPG s Objective II. Basic Principles

More information

CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web

CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Order Code RS21133 January 31, 2002 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web The Nuclear Posture Review: Overview and Emerging Issues Summary Amy F. Woolf Specialist in National Defense Foreign

More information

Chapter 13 Air and Missile Defense THE AIR THREAT AND JOINT SYNERGY

Chapter 13 Air and Missile Defense THE AIR THREAT AND JOINT SYNERGY Chapter 13 Air and Missile Defense This chapter addresses air and missile defense support at the operational level of war. It includes a brief look at the air threat to CSS complexes and addresses CSS

More information

OF THE DEFENSE FUNDAMENTALS CHAPTER 9

OF THE DEFENSE FUNDAMENTALS CHAPTER 9 CHAPTER 9 FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE The immediate purpose of defensive operations is to defeat an enemy attack. Army forces conduct defensive operations as part of major operations and campaigns, in

More information

Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for America

Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for America Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for America The World s Greatest Air Force Powered by Airmen, Fueled by Innovation Gen Mark A. Welsh III, USAF The Air Force has been certainly among the most

More information

Assessing Technologies using Campaign Analysis and War Gaming: The Warfare Innovation Continuum at NPS

Assessing Technologies using Campaign Analysis and War Gaming: The Warfare Innovation Continuum at NPS Assessing Technologies using Campaign Analysis and War Gaming: The Warfare Innovation Continuum at NPS Professor of Practice Jeff Kline, Operations Research Captain, USN (ret) Naval Postgraduate School

More information

STATEMENT OF GORDON R. ENGLAND SECRETARY OF THE NAVY BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 10 JULY 2001

STATEMENT OF GORDON R. ENGLAND SECRETARY OF THE NAVY BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 10 JULY 2001 NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE STATEMENT OF GORDON R. ENGLAND SECRETARY OF THE NAVY BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 10 JULY 2001 NOT FOR PUBLICATION

More information

F-16 Fighting Falcon The Most Technologically Advanced 4th Generation Fighter in the World

F-16 Fighting Falcon The Most Technologically Advanced 4th Generation Fighter in the World F-16 Fighting Falcon The Most Technologically Advanced 4th Generation Fighter in the World Any Mission, Any Time... the F-16 Defines Multirole The enemies of world peace are changing. The threats are smaller,

More information

Background Briefing: Vietnam: Evaluating its Fleet of Six Kilo-class Submarines Carlyle A. Thayer February 25, 2017

Background Briefing: Vietnam: Evaluating its Fleet of Six Kilo-class Submarines Carlyle A. Thayer February 25, 2017 Thayer Consultancy ABN # 65 648 097 123 Background Briefing: Vietnam: Evaluating its Fleet of Six Kilo-class Submarines Carlyle A. Thayer February 25, 2017 [client name deleted] Next week the Vietnam People

More information

SHARPENING THE SPEAR

SHARPENING THE SPEAR SHARPENING THE SPEAR The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict Seth Cropsey, Bryan G. McGrath, and Timothy A. Walton Hudson Institute Center for American Seapower 8 October 2015 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

More information

A New Gap in the High North and Forward Defense Against Russian Naval Power

A New Gap in the High North and Forward Defense Against Russian Naval Power Capability Analysis, Europe A New Gap in the High North and Forward Defense Against Russian Naval Power July 17, 2018 Steven Wills 1 Comment By Steve Wills, CNA Analyst The stand-up of a new NATO Maritime

More information

Axis & Allies Anniversary Edition Rules Changes

Axis & Allies Anniversary Edition Rules Changes The following chart contains a list of rules changes between Axis & Allies Anniversary Edition and Axis & Allies Revised. The Larry Harris Tournament Rules (LHTR) are also referenced, both to allow comparison

More information

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 2000 NAVY PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 2000 NAVY PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 2000 NAVY PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000 OPNAVINST 3380.5A N314 OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3380.5A From: Chief of Naval Operations Subj: HIGH-VALUE

More information

CHINA S WHITE PAPER ON MILITARY STRATEGY

CHINA S WHITE PAPER ON MILITARY STRATEGY CHINA S WHITE PAPER ON MILITARY STRATEGY Capt.HPS Sodhi, Senior Fellow, CAPS Introduction On 26 May 15, Chinese Ministry of National Defense released a White paper on China s Military Strategy i. The paper

More information

mm*. «Stag GAO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE Information on Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Other Theater Missile Defense Systems 1150%

mm*. «Stag GAO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE Information on Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Other Theater Missile Defense Systems 1150% GAO United States General Accounting Office Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m.,edt Tuesday May 3,1994 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

More information

FISCAL YEAR 2019 DEFENSE SPENDING REQUEST BRIEFING BOOK

FISCAL YEAR 2019 DEFENSE SPENDING REQUEST BRIEFING BOOK FISCAL YEAR 2019 DEFENSE SPENDING REQUEST BRIEFING BOOK February 2018 Table of Contents The Fiscal Year 2019 Budget in Context 2 The President's Request 3 Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation 6 State

More information

Lieutenant Commander, thank you so much. And thank you all for being here today. I

Lieutenant Commander, thank you so much. And thank you all for being here today. I Remarks by the Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus USS Washington (SSN 787) Shipnaming Ceremony Pier 69, Port of Seattle Headquarters Thursday, 07 February 2013 Lieutenant Commander, thank you so much. And

More information

Should the Achievement of the Air Supremacy Be Awaited for the Ground Operation During A Struggle Between Two Equally Equipped Forces

Should the Achievement of the Air Supremacy Be Awaited for the Ground Operation During A Struggle Between Two Equally Equipped Forces Should the Achievement of the Air Supremacy Be Awaited for the Ground Operation During A Struggle Between Two Equally Equipped Forces Author : Aykut COŞKUN If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war,

More information

Arms Control Today. U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance

Arms Control Today. U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance Arms Control Today For the past five decades, the United States has debated, researched, and worked on the development of defenses to protect U.S. territory against

More information

Force 2025 Maneuvers White Paper. 23 January DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release.

Force 2025 Maneuvers White Paper. 23 January DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release. White Paper 23 January 2014 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release. Enclosure 2 Introduction Force 2025 Maneuvers provides the means to evaluate and validate expeditionary capabilities for

More information

In Sweden, an Ethical Dilemma of Nuclear Proportions

In Sweden, an Ethical Dilemma of Nuclear Proportions In Sweden, an Ethical Dilemma of Nuclear Proportions Sept. 8, 2017 By signing a new nuclear weapons ban, Stockholm would be giving up U.S. and NATO security cooperation. Editor s note: An earlier version

More information

Why Japan Should Support No First Use

Why Japan Should Support No First Use Why Japan Should Support No First Use Last year, the New York Times and the Washington Post reported that President Obama was considering ruling out the first-use of nuclear weapons, as one of several

More information

April 25, Dear Mr. Chairman:

April 25, Dear Mr. Chairman: CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE U.S. Congress Washington, DC 20515 Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director April 25, 2005 Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett Chairman Subcommittee on Projection Forces Committee on Armed Services

More information

US Navy Ships. Surface Warfare Officer First Tours

US Navy Ships. Surface Warfare Officer First Tours US Navy Ships Surface Warfare Officer First Tours CVN Carriers Nimitz Class: Class Size 10 ships Built 1975-2009 Cost - $8.5 Billion Crew Size 200 officers, 3,000 enlisted Air Wing - 500 officers, 2,300

More information

AUSA BACKGROUND BRIEF

AUSA BACKGROUND BRIEF AUSA BACKGROUND BRIEF No. 54 April1993 Army Issue: PROTECT THE FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY dominance. Protecting the force is an essential element of the Army's requirement for land force In an era in which

More information

The assessment portion of the Index of U.S.

The assessment portion of the Index of U.S. Methodology The assessment portion of the Index of U.S. Military Strength is composed of three major sections that address America s military power, the operating environments within or through which it

More information

STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN YOUNGER DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN YOUNGER DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNTIL RELEASED BY THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN YOUNGER DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE EMERGING

More information

Standard Missile: Snapshots in Time Captured by Previous Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest Articles

Standard Missile: Snapshots in Time Captured by Previous Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest Articles Standard Missile: Snapshots in Time Captured by Previous Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest Articles Neil F. Palumbo Standard Missile (SM) is the cornerstone of ship-based weapons designed to defend the

More information

The Honorable J.D. Crouch II Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) United States Missile Defense Policy

The Honorable J.D. Crouch II Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) United States Missile Defense Policy The Honorable J.D. Crouch II Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) United States Missile Defense Policy Before the Senate Armed Services Committee March 18, 2003 Mr. Chairman,

More information

LESSON 2 INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD OVERVIEW

LESSON 2 INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD OVERVIEW LESSON DESCRIPTION: LESSON 2 INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD OVERVIEW In this lesson you will learn the requirements and procedures surrounding intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

More information

CONSIDERING THREAT CAMPAIGNS

CONSIDERING THREAT CAMPAIGNS Appendix A CONSIDERING THREAT CAMPAIGNS A thread that has run through most of the preceding chapters is the possibility of prolonged threat campaigns. This appendix provides a detailed summary of our thinking

More information

Reconnaissance and Security Helicopter Fundamentals

Reconnaissance and Security Helicopter Fundamentals Reconnaissance and Security Helicopter Fundamentals SECTION I PRIMARY ROLES AND MISSIONS ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ARMY OPERATIONS 1-1. Army aviation's rapid, terrain-independent air mobility helps

More information

Coastal Zone Management Act, Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Alaska Coastal Management Program

Coastal Zone Management Act, Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Alaska Coastal Management Program Coastal Zone Management Act, Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Alaska Coastal Management Program GULF OF ALASKA NAVY TRAINING ACTIVITIES EIS/OEIS FINAL (MARCH 2011) This page intentionally left blank

More information

Great Decisions Paying for U.S. global engagement and the military. Aaron Karp, 13 January 2018

Great Decisions Paying for U.S. global engagement and the military. Aaron Karp, 13 January 2018 Great Decisions 2018 Paying for U.S. global engagement and the military Aaron Karp, 13 January 2018 I. Funding America s four militaries not as equal as they look Times Square Strategy wears a dollar sign*

More information

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NWC 1159 THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT A Guide for Deriving Operational Lessons Learned By Dr. Milan Vego, JMO Faculty 2006 A GUIDE FOR DERIVING OPERATIONAL LESSONS

More information

Presentation to OPTECH West. Jeff Kline, CAPT USN (ret) Professor of Practice Operations Research Naval Postgraduate School

Presentation to OPTECH West. Jeff Kline, CAPT USN (ret) Professor of Practice Operations Research Naval Postgraduate School Presentation to OPTECH West Jeff Kline, CAPT USN (ret) Professor of Practice Operations Research Naval Postgraduate School Current NPS Littoral Operations Studies Warfare Innovation Continuum Warfighting

More information

9 th Annual Disruptive Technologies Conference

9 th Annual Disruptive Technologies Conference 9 th Annual Disruptive Conference Navy IAMD Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. (12/05/2012). This Brief is provided for Information Only and does not constitute

More information

Theater Air Defense Cornerstones

Theater Air Defense Cornerstones THEATER AIR DEFENSE CORNERSTONES Theater Air Defense Cornerstones Thomas R. Foard The Navy, taking a page from previous work on the Aegis Weapon System, undertook an effort in late 1997 to formulate a

More information

KEY NOTE ADRESS AT ASSOCIATION OF OLD CROWS

KEY NOTE ADRESS AT ASSOCIATION OF OLD CROWS KEY NOTE ADRESS AT ASSOCIATION OF OLD CROWS Over the past few months a group of dedicated and passionate electronic warfare professionals have been coming together to discuss and plan the revival of the

More information

Military Radar Applications

Military Radar Applications Military Radar Applications The Concept of the Operational Military Radar The need arises during the times of the hostilities on the tactical, operational and strategic levels. General importance defensive

More information

New Normalcy and the Way Ahead

New Normalcy and the Way Ahead Maritime, Multi-Mission, Military New Normalcy and the Way Ahead Understanding the Coast Guard s Maritime Homeland Security and National Defense Missions 1 Unique Characteristics of the Coast Guard Military

More information

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD)

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) Executive Summary The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) conducted five Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) intercept flight tests in FY/CY17. Aegis BMD successfully

More information

TESTIMONY STATEMENT BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON FUTURE FLEET ARCHITECTURE STUDIES. March 8, 2017

TESTIMONY STATEMENT BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON FUTURE FLEET ARCHITECTURE STUDIES. March 8, 2017 TESTIMONY STATEMENT BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON FUTURE FLEET ARCHITECTURE STUDIES March 8, 2017 Statement by Bryan Clark Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Chairman

More information

European Parliament Nov 30, 2010

European Parliament Nov 30, 2010 European Parliament Nov 30, 2010 1. Introduction Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen! I will very shortly remind you what MBDA is: a world leading missile system company, with facilities in France, Germany,

More information

AUSA BACKGROUND BRIEF

AUSA BACKGROUND BRIEF AUSA BACKGROUND BRIEF No. 72 February 1997 THE MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW ACT OF 1996: THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW AND NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL The purpose of this Background Brief is to provide

More information

Timeline: Battles of the Second World War. SO WHAT? (Canadian Involvement / Significance) BATTLE: THE INVASION OF POLAND

Timeline: Battles of the Second World War. SO WHAT? (Canadian Involvement / Significance) BATTLE: THE INVASION OF POLAND Refer to the Student Workbook p.96-106 Complete the tables for each battle of the Second World War. You will need to consult several sections of the Student Workbook in order to find all of the information.

More information

ISSUE BRIEF. Pursuing asymmetric ways and means to counter the US conventional capabilities;

ISSUE BRIEF. Pursuing asymmetric ways and means to counter the US conventional capabilities; ISSUE BRIEF INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES ISLAMABAD Web: www.issi.org.pk Phone: +92-920-4423, 24 Fax: +92-920-4658 US NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 2018: AN OVERVIEW By Malik Qasim Mustafa Senior Research Fellow/Editor

More information

Statistical Thinking in DoD Test & Evaluation: F-35 Case Study. Dr. Laura Freeman

Statistical Thinking in DoD Test & Evaluation: F-35 Case Study. Dr. Laura Freeman Statistical Thinking in DoD Test & Evaluation: F-35 Case Study Dr. Laura Freeman Improving Operational Testing: A case study from my past 8 years Goal of Operational Test: Evaluate Operational Effectiveness,

More information

Department of Defense Report to the Congress NAVY THEATER WIDE DEFENSE SYSTEM (FORMERLY NAVY UPPER TIER)

Department of Defense Report to the Congress NAVY THEATER WIDE DEFENSE SYSTEM (FORMERLY NAVY UPPER TIER) Department of Defense Report to the Congress On NAVY THEATER WIDE DEFENSE SYSTEM (FORMERLY NAVY UPPER TIER) Office of the Secretary of Defense 25 March 1996 The conference report accompanying the National

More information

Employing Merchant Vessels for Offshore Presence and Launch of US Military Operations

Employing Merchant Vessels for Offshore Presence and Launch of US Military Operations Employing Merchant Vessels for Offshore Presence and Launch of US Military Operations LCDR Chavius G. Lewis Duke University Federal Executive Fellowship Program April 17, 2015 Agenda Purpose Historical

More information

Theater ballistic missile (TBM) defense. Joint. Theater Missile Defense Strategy. ballistic missile threats are of foremost concern ROBERT M.

Theater ballistic missile (TBM) defense. Joint. Theater Missile Defense Strategy. ballistic missile threats are of foremost concern ROBERT M. Joint Theater Missile Defense Strategy By ROBERT M. SOOFER Patriot in Kuwaiti. U.S. Army (Moses M. Mlasko) Theater ballistic missile (TBM) defense was first used operationally during Desert Storm in response

More information

The First Years of World War II

The First Years of World War II The First Years of World War II ON THE GROUND IN THE AIR ON THE SEA We know that Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and that both Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939.

More information

Executing our Maritime Strategy

Executing our Maritime Strategy 25 October 2007 CNO Guidance for 2007-2008 Executing our Maritime Strategy The purpose of this CNO Guidance (CNOG) is to provide each of you my vision, intentions, and expectations for implementing our

More information

CATO HANDBOOK CONGRESS FOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 108TH CONGRESS. Washington, D.C.

CATO HANDBOOK CONGRESS FOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 108TH CONGRESS. Washington, D.C. CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 108TH CONGRESS Washington, D.C. 48. The Defense Budget Congress should reduce the budget for national defense from the current sum of about $400

More information

Air-Sea Battle & Technology Development

Air-Sea Battle & Technology Development Headquarters U.S. Air Force Air-Sea Battle & Technology Development Col Gantt AF/A5XS 20 Mar 12 1 Agenda Background & Scope Definitions ASB Concept Overview ASB Central Idea: Networked, Integrated, Attack-in-Depth

More information

Part l. Security Environment Surrounding Japan. Chapter 2. National Defense Policies of Countries

Part l. Security Environment Surrounding Japan. Chapter 2. National Defense Policies of Countries Part l Security Environment Surrounding Japan Chapter 2 National Defense Policies of Countries Section 1. The United States Section 2. Korean Peninsula Section 3. China Section 4. Russia Section 5. Southeast

More information

Part III. Measures for Defense of Japan. Chapter 2. Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Part III. Measures for Defense of Japan. Chapter 2. Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements Part III Measures for Defense of Japan Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements Section 1. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements Section 2. Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the

More information

SSUSH19: The student will identify the origins, major developments, and the domestic impact of World War ll, especially the growth of the federal

SSUSH19: The student will identify the origins, major developments, and the domestic impact of World War ll, especially the growth of the federal SSUSH19: The student will identify the origins, major developments, and the domestic impact of World War ll, especially the growth of the federal government. c. Explain major events; include the lend-lease

More information

CHAPTER 1 WEATHER SUPPORT FOR THE AIRLAND BATTLE

CHAPTER 1 WEATHER SUPPORT FOR THE AIRLAND BATTLE FM 34-81/AFM 105-4 CHAPTER 1 WEATHER SUPPORT FOR THE AIRLAND BATTLE Weather is critical to Army tactical operations and operational level planning. History is filled with examples of the weather s effects

More information

The Necessity of Human Intelligence in Modern Warfare Bruce Scott Bollinger United States Army Sergeants Major Academy Class # 35 SGM Foreman 31 July

The Necessity of Human Intelligence in Modern Warfare Bruce Scott Bollinger United States Army Sergeants Major Academy Class # 35 SGM Foreman 31 July The Necessity of Human Intelligence in Modern Warfare Bruce Scott Bollinger United States Army Sergeants Major Academy Class # 35 SGM Foreman 31 July 2009 Since the early days of the Revolutionary War,

More information

AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND STRATEGIC VISION

AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND STRATEGIC VISION AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND STRATEGIC VISION Cyberspace is a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated

More information