de structive capability different from other weapons. The overwhelming cities some hours or even days

Transcription

1 JAN M. LODAL Deterrence nd Nucler Strtegy From beginning nucler ge, United Sttes hs treted nucler wepons s inherently different from or wepons. The overwhelming de structive cpbility nucler wepons, combined with ner-impossibility n mounting dequte defense ginst m, hve left deterrence ttck s primry mission se wepons. Bernrd Brodie rticulted this in 1946: "If [ ntion tht proposes lunch n ttck] must fer retlition, fct tht it destroys its opponent's cities some hours or even dys before its own re destroyed my vil it little. Thus fr, chief purpose our militry estb lishment hs been win wrs. From now on its chief purpose must be vert m."1 The role deterrence in militry strtegy did not emerge with dvent nucler wepons. It hs lwys been undersod tht by mintining strong wr-fighting cpbility, ntion deters potentil ggressors. But deterrent effect nucler wepons is bsed only prtilly on ir wr-fighting cpbili ty. Nucler wepons deter ttck lso through ir unique cpbility destroy ttcker's entire society in retlition. Since no conceivble objective is worth such loss, risk nucler response is powerful deterrent use se wepons. Through\he 1950s "mssive retlition" ws U.S. strtegy for deling with Soviet militry thret. Given nucler superiority United Sttes t time, thret nucler retlition ws credible enough deter not only ny Soviet ttck on U.S. minlnd, but in Europe s well. In Europe it ws not necessry strike Soviet cities nd risk loss our own cities counter n invsion itself. invsion; we could retlite with nucler wepons ginst It is notble tht during se yers, when United Sttes possessed cler nucler superiority over Soviet Union, Americ never pursued option striking first in preventive wr. To use nucler wepons crry out n fensive militry opertion, even with cler superiority, ws lrgely un thinkble. In Kore, despite politicl nd militry setbcks our strtegy limited conventionl wr bought bout, United Sttes still chose not use nucler wepons. By beginning 1960s, U.S. bility sp Soviet invsion Eu rope by trgeting Soviet forces ws no longer cler-cut. The Soviets hd devel oped enough nucler cpbility mtch thretened use nucler wepons 155 All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

2 156 JAN M. LODAL ginst ir forces in Europen wr. The United Sttes could still threten sp Soviet ttck with nucler wepons, but Soviets could now respond in kind. A U.S. thret esclte immeditely n ll-out ttck on Soviet Union hd lost much its credibility, since ny such ttck would result in destruction Americn cities. This sitution led doctrine "flex ible response" nd consequent buildup in our deployment smller "bttle field" nucler wepons. The doctrine flexible response pushed nucler strtegy closer trdi tionl militry thinking?tht mintining superior overll militry cpbility provides best possible deterrent. Through flexible response, deterrence ws now tied wr-fighting cpbility. Flexible response dded nor importnt spect U.S. strtegy: requirement tht West mintin n dequte conventionl defense cpbility ginst Soviet conventionl ttcks. Soviet nu cler cpbility hd mde our thret respond conventionl ttcks with nucler wepons less credible. The 1960s lso sw dvent "dmge limiting" s prt u. S. nucler strtegy. The emerging technicl fesibility n ntibllistic missile defense (ABM), combined with n incresed cpbility destroy Soviet forces before y could be lunched, led doctrine tht we ought mintin cpbili ty limit gretest extent possible dmge United Sttes tht would follow if nucler wr did occur. Unfortuntely, dmge limiting proved be lrgely impossible tech nologiclly, nd doctrine quickly gve wy "mutul ssured destruction." By mid-1960s, Soviets hd obtined ir own ssured destruction cp bility: y could destroy U.S. society even fter bsorbing n ll-out counter force ttck on ir forces nd our penetrting defenses. A counter force ttck might destroy mny Soviet wepons, but it could not reduce signif icntly Soviet cpbility destroy U.S. forces or cities. This ws prtic ulrly true if Soviets struck first. Counterforce cpbilities, s well s ctive nd pssive defense, cme be seen by mny s not only ineffective, but even possibly hrmful. In crisis Soviets might believe tht ir ssured destruction cpbility ws thretened by U.S. counterforce; this might led m lunch n ttck preemptively rr thn risk losing ir forces s consequence n Americn first strike. Thus, counterforce nd defenses, it ws rgued, might ctully increse risk nucler wr rr thn help deter it. This view, however, did not predominte. Although counterforce cesed be pursued ctively in its own right, tl counterforce cpbility U.S. forces incresed stedily, principlly through improved missile ccurcy. Coun terforce strikes remined n essentil element in wr opertions plns, nd hve s lwys figured use only plnned Americ's numerous "tcti cl" nucler wepons. In his most recent nnul report Congress, Secretry Defense Hr old Brown described current u.s. nucler strtegy. He clled his policy "Deter rence?the Counterviling Strtegy," nd sid: "We need first ll, survivble nd enduring retliry cpbility devstte industry nd cities Soviet Union.... Wht hs come be known s ssured destruction is bedrock nucler deterrence, nd we will retin such cpbility in future." All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

3 DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY 157 But ssured destruction is not "sufficient in itself s doctrine.... If deterrence is be fully effective, United Sttes must be ble respond t level pproprite type nd scle Soviet ttck."2 Secretry Brown's sttement confirmed tht flexible response cpbility remined key element U.S. strtegy. Insisting tht his sttement did not indicte chnge, he sid: In certin respects, nme is newer thn strtegy. The need for in flexibility U.S. retlition is clibrting provoction not, course, new discovery, whtever interprettion my hve been on sttements plced generl prior doc trines. It hs never been U.S. policy limit ourselves mssive counter-city options in retlition, nor hve our plns been so circumscribed. For 20 nerly yers, we hve included explicitly rnge mili employment options?ginst s try well s our nonmilitry trgets?in employment plnning.3 The Need for Strtegic Revision The nucler strtegy United Sttes remins this dy essentilly sme s one worked out during Kennedy Administrtion, nd, indeed, is not very different from tht dopted t very beginning nucler ge. Its bsic postulte is simple: thret retlition must be on scle dequte deter potentil Soviet ttck. One might imgine tht strtegy tht hs so chnged little fter so mny yers would need little revision. Yet, clls for revision re in fct growing ll time nd becoming incresingly insistent. Only recently Henry Kissinger wrote: more "Achieving discriminting nucler strtegy, preserving t lest some hope for civilized life, remins this dy one most difficult tsks implement, requiring substntil recsting our militry estblishment. If unsolved, problem will sooner or lter prlyze our strtegy nd our foreign policy."4 Tht Kissinger could hve mde such sttement?given positions he held for eight yers, nd influence he exercised during tht time?sug gests how difficult nd frustrting problem it is. Mr. Kissinger is rguing me tht is becoming incresingly common in numerous current criticisms U.S. policy; he is sying quite boldly tht doctrine ssured destruction, which Hrold Brown sys "is bedrock nucler deterrence," lcks credibility. These criticisms re being herd becuse re hve been two fundmentl chnges in environment in which U.S. nucler strtegy is required operte. First, invulnerbility U.S. forces Soviet ttck is being seriously chllenged precisely be cuse Soviet bility ttck our Minutemn missile forces is growing. This new vulnerbility thretens Americn bility lunch n effective retli ry strike nd, hence, deter direct ttck on United Sttes. Second, "extended deterrence" ( existence nucler umbrell deterring Soviet ttck on Western or Europe or res interest United Sttes) hs lost much its strength. The Soviet chievement nucler prity hs reduced credibility Western threts use nucler wepons first, while buildup in Soviet conventionl cpbilities hs led greter demnd on extended deterrence thn ever before. The Soviets now hve conventionl forces in Europe dequte mount n effective conventionl ttck, nd ir All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

4 158 JAN M. LODAL expnded force projection cpbilities give m conventionl ttck options in or ters s well. The growing vulnerbility U.S. lnd-bsed missile forces hs been most directly visible cuse clls ressess our strtegy. Four yers go, Pul Nitze set frmework for this debte.5 Nitze's rgument ws not tht lnd bsed missile vulnerbility eliminted Americ's cpbility retlite ginst Soviet cities; rr, tht this vulnerbility presented trget opportunity Soviets in crisis. They could destroy U.S. lnd-bsed missiles, eliminting significnt portion our force while retining mssive force ir own, nd us leving with little option or thn ttcking ir cities? step we were not likely tke if it simply ment tht our own cities were destroyed in return. Those who hve rgued importnce this militry sitution hve gener one lly proposed two responses. The first would be eliminte vulner bility our lnd-bsed missiles by deploying m in mobile mode (or, lterntively, moving m out se). The or would be deploy lrge lnd bsed missiles tht would be ble threten Soviet lnd-bsed force in much sme wy y threten ours. The merits ech pproch is proper subject debte; neir, however, responds fully combintion politi cl, militry, nd diplomtic problems tht confront this country dy. Fur rmore, for time being, rgument over which pproch is best is moot. The MX system being deployed chieves both mo objectives?survivl through bility, ger with mjor increse in U.S. ntisilo counterforce cpbility. The erosion "extended deterrence" hs out brought eqully strong clls for revision. The United Sttes nd its NATO llies hve mintined significnt conventionl defense cpbility for twenty yers, so need for extended deterrence hs never been cute. Yet, becuse Western conventionl defenses hve mjor weknesses, importntly nucler prity, Western security. bility for West use nucler threten nucler wr contributes But critics sy tht in fce Soviet wepons retlite ginst Soviet conventionl invsion would simply led its own destruction by Soviet nucle r forces. This being sitution, rgument continues, it is cler tht n Americn president would be unwilling tke risk; deterrent vlue thret retlition is reby gretly reduced. As with lnd-bsejd missile vulnerbility, critics hve suggested lterntive pproches for coping with problems eroding extended deterrence. The first would involve mjor chnge in strtegy, with West improving its conventionl forces so s substntilly no longer be on dependent nucler deterrence. The second would be continue significnt relince on nucler deterrence, improving nucler wr-fighting cpbility our forces in order enhnce credibility our thret use m. Some critics who hve clled for revision strtegy hve fered politicl rr thn militry rguments. Their concern hs been overwhelmingly with wy in which Americn power is perceived in world. In ftermth Wtergte nd Vietnm, nd in context continuous nd growing Soviet force deployments with flling Western deployments, Americn gurntees defend its llies nd its vitl interests seem hve lost much ir credibility throughout world. All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

5 DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY 159 Certin rguments bout importnce perceptions reltive strength focus on principlly numericl indicrs. They suggest tht Soviets will gin geopoliticl dvntges with ir numericlly superior forces, irrespective wher United Sttes retins its bility withstnd Soviet ttck nd retlite, nd irrespective wher Americn people re pre pred fight nucler wr forced upon m. These critics insist tht our strtegy ought chnge one tht involves mintining forces equl in overll size nd militry cpbility those Soviets. In my view, much more telling critique West's inttention politicl spects nucler strtegy is given by Michel Howrd in his brillint rticle "The Forgotten Dimensions Strtegy." In this rticle, Howrd rgues tht West hs treted nucler wr lmost exclusively s technologicl phe nomenon, lrgely ignoring societl dimension strtegy. Any effective strtegy must incorporte four key spects?opertionl, logisticl, tech nologicl, nd socil? ltter being ttitude, socil cohesion, nd populr pssions people whose commitment nd rediness scrifice ten deter mine successful outcome wr. "The mintennce dequte forces in pecetime, nd will deploy nd support m opertionlly in wr, is in fct symbol tht socil unity nd politicl resolve which is s essentil n element in nucler deterrence s ny invulnerble second-strike cpbility."6 The West hs pid little ttention opertionl nd logisticl dimen sions nucler wr, in shrp contrst Soviets, whose interest in se mtters, Howrd sys, rmed is "no more thn common sense. If such wr does occur, opertionl nd logisticl problems it will pose will need hve been... thoroughly thought through. The belief tht technology hs somehow eliminted need for opertionl effectiveness is, in short, no more likely be vlid in nucler ge thn it ws in second world wr."7 In end, Howrd rgues tht no nucler strtegy lone cn be fully ef fective; it must be supplemented by commitment strong conventionl cpbility. If we do tke ccount socil dimension strtegy in nucler we ge, re likely conclude tht Western leders find it might much more difficult initite nucler wr thn would ir Soviet counterprts nd, more importnt, would be perceived by ir dversries s finding it more difficult. If this is cse, nd if on ir side conventionl strength Soviet rmed forces mkes it unnec essry for ir leders tke such n inititive, opertionl effectiveness rmed forces West once more becomes mtter mjor impor tnce, both in deterrence nd in defense.8 Howrd, in rguing tht perceptions power mtter in deterrence, insists tht se perceptions re bsed on more something thn comprison mili try estblishments. Such not credibility on depends simply perceived blnce, or imblnce, wepons systems, but on perceptions nture society whose leders re such retlition. thretening Peoples who re not prepred mke effort nec essry for opertionl defense re even less likely support decision initite nucler exchnge from which y will mselves suffer lmost inconceivble de All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

6 struction, even if tht decision is tken t lowest escltion.9 possible level nucler Is it instructive contrst Howrd's criticisms with those Henry Kissin ger. Both rgue strongly tht our present inttention opertionl spects wrfre reduce significntly effectiveness our deterrent force. Kissin ger, however, leves himself with n lmost impossible dilemm. He insists tht it is essentil develop nucler strtegy nd doctrine tht will permit our nucler forces ply mjor role in deterring Soviet conventionl ttck, be cuse " politicl impossibility rising dequte conventionl forces." He sttes tht while he ws in fice "it ws counsel defet bjure both nd tcticl nucler forces, for no NATO country?including ours? ws prepred undertke mssive buildup in conventionl forces tht ws sole lterntive."10 But he suggests no wy in which thret use nucler wepons first, ginst n who cn in dversry respond kind, cn be mde cred ible enough reduce need for conventionl defense he sys is politiclly impossible. This is especilly true in Europe where civilin ftlities would be mssive. Kissinger nd Howrd perform considerble service in us reminding ultimte Clusewitzin truth tht ll militry ctivities re driven by politicl objectives. It is well remember tht principl thret Soviet foreign policy? frgment Western llince, our reby thretening liberties?is much more plusible thret thn tht direct Soviet militry ttck. Much our nucler strtegy ought be focused on mintining politicl unity West. This is not suggest tht militry considertions should be ignored. The rtionl nswer question how resre deterrence is cler: West fces serious if it cnnot summon resolve mount n dnger dequte conventionl defense. No mount nucler wr wher it be preprtion, restructuring limited nucler options, plnning for survivl troops on nu cler bttlefield, or more developing precise tcticl nucler commnd nd con trol, cn chnge fundmentl fct tht nucler wr, especilly in Europe, would be ctstrophe for societies involved. It would be difficult for ny president initite such wr, no mtter how well "prepred" West p pered be. Becuse Soviet leders know this, it remins exceedingly on dngerous rely thret nucler retlition deter ttcks or thn most one? unlikely lrge direct Soviet nucler ttck. But Kissinger points true dilemm by sserting, correctly, in my view, tht fully dequte conventionl defense is simply not fesible politicl ly. The West dy hs lrge nd cpble conventionl forces nd will undoubt edly seek improve m. Nucler wepons, however, will hve continue crry significnt shre burden deterring Soviet ttck. If we re mintin credibility our nucler deterrent, we must devise strtegy tht provides mtter for worst how grim scenrio? nd survive nucler possible fight wr, no prospects. The Alterntive Arms Control One solution shortcomings our present strtegy would be negoti te n ccommodtion between Soviet Union nd West tht would re All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

7 DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY 161 duce dnger nucler wr n cceptble level. It ought be in interest both sides rech such n greement. Arms control hs plyed mjor role in U.S. thinking since inception nucler ge. A yer before Hiroshim, Vnnevr Bush nd Jmes Connt, scientists ssocited with Mnhttn Project, suggested Secretry Wr Henry Stimson tht fter wr's end mic wepons should be plced in hnds n interntionl gency.11 Two yers lter Bruch Pln, clling for plcement ll mic wepon production cpbil ity in hnds United Ntions gency, becme ficil U.S. policy. Both efforts filed, but ttempt control rms continued. The focus in 1950s nd erly 1960s ws on nucler testing?efforts tht culminted in first truly successful rms control greement, Limited Test Bn Trety Serious rms control efforts resumed in 1968 t Glssboro Summit be tween President Johnson nd Prime Minister Kosygin. hd considerble nucler rsenls; elimintion nucler By this time ech side wepons becme best distnt objective. Even prospect eliminting ll nucler wepons testing seemed less importnt; two sides seemed comfortble with limit ed test bn trety, restricting testing underground dentions. The objective rms control hd once chnged gin, becoming principlly n effort nego tite stble mutul deterrence between two superpowers. At Glssboro, United Sttes introduced ide mutul bn on ntibllistic missile defense; defenses were seen s gretest potentil thret mutul ssured destruction. The invsion Czechoslovki intervened, however, nd forml tlks did not get underwy gin until Richrd Nixon ok fice. In November 1969 se negotitions begn in Helsinki. The objective re mined essentilly wht it hd been in Glssboro: negotite permnent mutul ssured destruction regime with Soviet Union. Ech side ws be permitted dequte fensive forces cpble destroying or's society in retlition, even n ll-out ttck on its own nucler rsenl. Anti following bllistic missile defenses were be limited or severely tht prohibited, ensuring re would be no effective defense ginst retliry blow. Mny in United Sttes believed tht if this objective could be chieved through negotition, nucler rms rce could be hlted. With two sides holding ech or hostge, stbility would be chieved, nd risk nucler wr would become miniml. U.S. rms control efforts hve lwys been intertwined with ory deterrence. The cretion stble mutul ssured destruction regime remins this dy mjor U.S. rms control objective. The only SALT greement re mining ficilly in force dy is ABM trety, which effectively prohibits ABMs on both sides. The unrtified SALT II trety represents furr Americn ttempt codify mutul ssured destruction by putting ceiling on Soviet cpbility threten U.S. retliry forces. While codifiction mutul ssured destruction hs been most visible objective SALT process, SALT hs hd broder objective s well?" crete conditions for politicl restrint without which esclting crises were inevitble."12 SALT, inherently politicl exercise, ws inextricbly woven in lrger policy reching d?tente with Soviet Union. Thus, successful SALT greement ws expected ply n importnt role in enhncing t All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

8 162 JAN M. LODAL extended deterrence s well s in controlling thret ssured destruction. A SALT trety tht fcilitted detente reltionship, leding Soviet restrint in building up its conventionl force cpbilities, ws intended reduce need on rely nucler wepons deter conventionl Soviet ttcks. It is precisely in re conventionl forces tht d?tente hs been most obviously filure. The ABM trety went long wy wrd codifying mutul ssured destruction reltionship between two sides. Wht ws not chieved, however, ws restrint in buildup Soviet conventionl forces or ny meningful control Soviet geopoliticl dventurism. In wke Soviets' Afghnistn invsion, rtifiction SALT II now seems remote; erly completion mjor new greements would pper be lmost inconceivble. We must begin look beyond rms control for solutions problems ensuring credible deterrence during 1980s. The filure slt stbilize militry blnce between West nd Soviet Union is indictive lrger brekdown in politicl structure tht hs our supported security posture. Some this brekdown hs been inevitble s rest world recovered from World Wr II, nd some hs certinly resulted from mistkes mde by successive U.S. leders. Regrd less who is blme, fct is tht U.S. ssurnces its llies re no longer enough secure politicl solidrity. We must devise new doctrines nd pro grms round which Western ntions cn rlly. These doctrines nd pro grms must be new becuse existing pproches, while not necessrily flwed, re indequte. They hve not succeeded in generting eir internl socil cohesion or llince solidrity required ensure our security. Enhncing Role Nucler Wr-fighting One lterntive is rely more hevily on trditionl deterrence ssocit ed with mintining superior wr-fighting force. The precise role wr fighting cpbilities in our doctrine could rnge from use bttle field wepons, through plnned lunching limited ttck with forces, n extreme mintining "escltion dominnce"? spond in kind ny enemy escltion nd mintin superior position fter response. To dte, United Sttes hs never rticulted detiled policy with respect wr-fighting cpbilities.13 Wht it hs done is insist tht it retins cpbility respond with less thn ll-out ttcks, while no mking cler effort develop full-fledged "escltion dominnce" posture. In my view, re is little reson bndon inherent mbiguity this policy. Moving eir extreme? doctrine tht excludes ll limited wr op tions or one complete escltion dominnce?mkes little sense. The bsence limited option would leve us only strtegy mssive retli tion?rejected in 1961 for resons tht if correct n, re ten times more con vincing dy. At or extreme, it is difficult see dvntge escltion dominnce. To begin with, Soviets would certinly not permit this occur. But even if y filed respond, it is not cler wht such cpbility would dd deterrent effect our forces. Our present doctrine permits us respond in kind ny Soviet ttck up very high level bility re All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

9 DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY 163 violence.14 The revised doctrine would be relevnt only for mssive ttcks, which would undoubtedly involve such lrge scle dmge, tht n ll-out nucler exchnge would be inevitble. Smll wrs my not be credibly deterred by ssured destruction. But it is difficult find ny rtionle for fine dis tinctions bout doctrine ssocited with lrge-scle nucler exchnges; in ll cses, dmge would be immense nd deterrent credible. Forces designed for escltion dominnce re unlikely differ gretly from forces designed for counterforce ttcks. But two opertionl cpbilities differ noneless. Thus, role counterforce in our doctrine de serves seprte considertion. U.S. forces contin significnt counterforce even cpbility dy, prticu lrly if we consider U.S. cpbility ginst Soviet submrines nd bombers in ddition more frequently discussed ttcks ginst lnd-bsed missiles. But much our counterforce cpbility is essentilly incidentl or objec tives. Bomber nd submrine bses re st nd esy trget, nd nti submrine wrfre (sw) ginst bllistic missile submrines is not different from ASW ginst ttck submrines. The only U.S. wepon designed explicitly for counterforce is Mrk 12-A wrhed on Minutemn III, nd new wrhed on n existing missile cn hrdly be seen s mjor commitment counterforce. Neverless, given counterforce cpbility inherent in our present force, only serious question is wher we should obtin n bility destroy Soviets' lnd-bsed missile force, since it is only here tht we could mterilly increse our cpbilities. There re severl rguments in fvor n developing ll-out counterforce cpbility ginst lnd-bsed missile silos. First, such cpbility would elimi nte ny no potentil dvntge, mtter how smll, Soviets might obtin from unilterl ntisilo cpbility y re now deploying. Second, U.S. ntisilo cpbility might well induce Soviets negotite mutul reductions in counterforce wepons, since Soviets re much more hevily dependent upon lnd-bsed ICBMs thn is United Sttes: if United Sttes hd mjor counterforce cpbility ginst se ICBMs, perhps Soviets would see dvntge voiding ll-out counterforce on cpbilities both sides. Third, U.S. counterforce cpbility comprble tht Soviets would ensure ginst possible dverse politicl perceptions or ntions might hve if we llow Soviets hve unilterl counterforce cpbility. No mtter how cogent rgument tht Soviet counterforce wepons confer no rel mili try dvntge, politicl leders throughout world re unlikely gree. Rr, y will rect in more trditionl militry terms, concluding tht Soviet prepondernce rw militry force would eventully previl. A U.S. move new deploy counterforce wepons would eliminte this rection. It would be seen s n indiction improved socil cohesion nd ntionl will, demonstrting helthy nd growing ttention se spects strtegy. Of few technologicl obstcles U.S. development n ntisilo coun terforce cpbility, mjor one is not ten discussed: inbility fully test ntisilo ttcks in opertionl conditions. There is gret uncertinty concerning ctul opertionl relibility counterforce systems owing lrge number interfces mong systems nd mny physicl effects tht All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

10 164 JAN M. LODAL might ffect opertions systems. But it is possible deploy wepons with necessry combintion ccurcy nd yield permit destruction ICBM silos, t lest on pper. It is importnt tht ny U.S. wepons system intended provide n ntisilo cpbility be ble survive Soviet ttck. Nonsurvivble counterforce wepons would increse incentive for Soviets strike preemptively. This "crisis stbility" problem is heightened by Soviet on dependence lnd-bsed mis siles; y might be fced with thret losing mjority ir forces unless y opted preempt. bility, While it does creful not nlysis require requires chnge n increse in survivble counterforce in U.S. progrms. Current doctrine is not explicit concerning ntisilo counterforce cpbilities, but our force structure decision is cler: we intend deploy survivble counterforce cpbility in form MX missile bsed in multiple-impoint mobile mode. The sme conclusion holds with respect or spects nucler fighting, such s development wr plns for limited use nucler forces. Brown's sttement (quoted erlier) tht such re options lredy prt U.S. wr plns could not be clerer.15 Furrmore, it is ten forgotten tht mjority Americ's nucler wepons, tcticl bttlefield wepons, hve s ir only mission "wr-fighting." Nucler wr-fighting thus is not likely be fruitful re find mjor inititives tht would enhnce deterrence. A much more importnt prcticl lterntive present nucler doctrine nd deployments is pursuit strte gic defense, both ctive (bm nd ir defense) nd pssive (civil defense). cp U.S. wr The Absence Defense in U.S. Nucler Strtegy Strtegic defense is completely bsent from U.S. nucler strtegy. There is no reference defense in published sttements strtegy, nd United Sttes mintins no effective defense ginst Soviet ttck. Our ir defenses re limited, nd single Sfegurd site permitted by ABM trety is moth blled. Nor do we hve significnt civil defense progrm. More thn ny or reson, technicl difficulty constructing tight defense hs led bsence defenses in U.S. strtegy. The overwhelmingly destructive cpcity nucler wepons mkes it lmost impos sible defend ginst m. No defense in hisry wrfre hs been impenetrble. A few men or few wepons could lwys get through, but defender could usully survive such infiltrtion. Nucler wepons chnge this. Any penetrting wepons t ll, if imed t cities, would led uncceptble dmge. To must be fully effective in defending Americn cities, U.S. be ble : n ir defense Prevent penetrtion six thousnd Soviet missile wrheds Sp mssed ttcks ginst defense components mselves Sp could Sp supersonic ttcks from lmost ny ximuth, since Soviet ttck from ny ocen Soviet bombers, wher SLBMs long-rnge high-ltitude, low-flying, subsonic, or All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

11 Work ginst vriety countermesures, including penetrtion ids, mneuvering reentry vehicles, ir--surfce missiles, nd so forth. The difficulty n mounting irtight defense is excerbted by fct tht penetrtion only few wepons imed t defenses mselves would destroy defense, llowing remining Soviet wepons penetrte freely. Furrmore, impossibility testing defense in n opertionl sitution mens tht high degree confidence in its relibility is unlikely, even if ll technology ppered be perfect. Thus United Sttes hs rejected deployment full-scle city-protection defense cpbility. The technologicl difficulties will not be overcome in this century. This fundmentl technologicl fct led Secretry Defense Robert McN mr resist pressures deploy full-scle NIKE x defense throughout 1960s. But McNmr hd second reson: he believed strongly tht de ployment ABMs by two countries would led n ction-rection rms rce s ech side incresed its fensive forces ensure penetrtion oth er's defense. Even though mny technicl problems mde construction n irtight defense impossible, neir side would ccept ny significnt risk tht defense might work. McNmr felt this ction-rection effect ws so nerly inevitble tht it ws crucil for two sides gree through negotition forgo lrge ABM systems. An impenetrble shield ws impossible, but limited defense ws clerly seen hve some utility, even by McNmr. It would provide hedge ginst ccidentl ttcks, nd it could be used effectively ginst reltively smll nucler cpbility n emerging in Chin. At sme time, light defense would not effectively threten deterrent cpbility eir side, since existing lrge forces could penetrte esily. Of course, sitution wsn't quite this simple, becuse limited defense could be expnded firly rpidly. Given long led times wepons deployment, one worry ws tht deployment light defense would led n excessive buildup in or side's fensive wepons, becuse de fender could not be relied on sp his deployments t low levels. By 1967 this phenomenon hd lredy begun, with United Sttes developing MlRVs s response very smll Soviet Glosh ABM nd slight chnce tht SA-5 Tllin system might hve some ABM cpbility. Mr. McNmr nd President Johnson resolved dilemm by nnouncing in 1967 deployment Sentinel ABM system, using rtionle defend ing ginst Chinese ttck. Upon entering fice President Nixon ordered thorough review this decision, but rtified it with few chnges. The nme ws chnged Sfegurd, nd mission ws eventully restted focus not on defense ginst Chinese ttck, since no rel Chinese thret ws pprent, but rr wrd defense U.S. forces?prticulrly our Minutemn missiles, which were beginning be thretened by Soviet SS-9 missile: Sfegurd rdrs were lso reoriented wrd se permit some protection U.S. bomber bses ginst Soviet SLBM ttcks. In nti-pentgon tmosphere 1969 Sfegurd system ws lmost defeted by Congress; it survived by one vote. But two nd one-hlf yers lter effort ws effectively bndoned fter ll, s result SALT I ABM trety with Soviet Union. All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

12 166 JAN M. LODAL In end, U.S. greement limit ABMs reflected belief tht by insti tutionlizing ssured destruction through SALT process, deterrence would be stbilized nd world mde reltively sfe from nucler wr. Before MlRVs, ABM defenses were gretest potentil thret ssured destruction. However, it is importnt remember tht U.S. government did not believe tht Sfegurd, nd before it Sentinel, were destbilizing threts mutul s sured destruction, some lthough nongovernment critics certinly did. The low ABM limits greed in SALT I reflected not so much belief tht lrger deploy ments would upset superpower blnce, but rr ssumption tht with successful be unnecessry. negotition mutul deterrence would be ssured nd defenses would The Alterntive Limited Active Defense n Although effective ntibllistic missile defense Americn cities ginst lrge-scle Soviet ttck will not be techniclly fesible in foreseeble fu ture, this does not men tht more limited ctive defense would be ineffective. In thirteen yers since Sentinel decision ws mde, gret del hs chnged in ABM technology. The technology on which Sentinel ws bsed hs been improved considerbly; new technologies nd pproches hve lso emerged. Thus, ny defense tht United Sttes might deploy dy would differ substntilly in its design from both Sentinel nd Sfegurd. In discussing limited defense, it is importnt distinguish between two mjor ctegories ctive defenses: hrdpoint nd re. Hrdpoint defenses re designed exclusively defend hrdened militry sites, such s missile silos; re defenses re intended defend unprotected lrge res, such s cities. Hrd point defenses re esier construct technologiclly becuse it is not necessry intercept n incoming wrhed t ny gret distnce from trget. Since wrhed must dente within few thousnd feet missile silo destroy it, hrdpoint defense hs option ignoring wrheds flling outside le thl rdius, witing until tmosphere hs burned f deceptive penetrtion ids before ttcking remining wrheds. A on city, or hnd, will be destroyed if wrhed lnds nywhere ner it. An re defense, by defini tion, must intercept ttcking wrheds some distnce wy. Also, few wr heds leking through hrdpoint defense will destroy only smll prt dispersed militry trget such s n ICBM field. A smll number wrheds hitting cities nd or st trgets (such s bomber bses) will destroy m completely. It is becuse this ltter phenomenon tht re irtight defenses cities remin unfesible. But hrdpoint defense could be prticulrly effective. Even light hrdpoint defense would be effective if combined with mul tiple impoint icbm-bsing scheme such s tht envisioned for MX. The defen sive cpbility in such circumstnces is multiplied through technique preferentil defense?defending only shelters ctully contining missiles. For exmple, if ech missile is ssocited with ten shelters, single ABM inter cepr requires ten incoming wrheds overcome it. The Soviets must im t ech ten shelters, since intercepr will be used only ginst wr hed heding wrd shelter tht ctully contins missile. All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

13 DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY 167 While n re irtight hevy defense cities could not be deployed, limit ed re defense could still be considerble militry use. It would dd effectiveness hrdpoint defense lnd-bsed missiles, help protect or forces by providing dded wrning time for bombers on ground nd submrines in port some disperse, give defense ginst ccidentl or "third country" ttck, nd protect ntionl commnd uthorities for t lest initil few minutes wr. Thus, both hrdpoint nd limited re defenses could hve cler nd immedite militry usefulness. Such defenses would increse deterrence both by improving wr-fighting cpbility our force nd its ssured destruction cpbility. Americn deployment limited ctive defense could lso resre mesure credibility for extended deterrence. Such n ction would serve well reinforce both socil nd opertionl dimensions Western strtegy discussed erlier. A society must demonstrte willingness crry out thret it relies on for its security; deployment n ctive defense would indicte gretly incresed level preprtion for unlikely event nucler wr. More importnt, perhps, deployment defenses might pper con siderbly more sensible mny Americns thn resring drft or contin uing build yet more fensive nucler systems. The dvntges even limited defenses would be obvious Americn citizens. Finding militry pro grms tht ttrct brod politicl support is vitlly importnt in demonstrting nd creting socil cohesion; se results, quite s much s militry nd diplomtic consequences such policies, need be tken in ccount. In n opertionl sense, n ctive defense would eliminte ny Soviet in centive crry out "limited" nucler ttcks ginst U.S. terriry, United Sttes hd used tcticl nucler wepons sp Soviet invsion. The defense would be cpble intercepting smll-scle ttck; Soviet leder would hve lunch lrge ttck (severl thousnd wrheds) penetrte se defenses. A rtionl Soviet leder ought be deterred from lunching such n ttck, relizing tht n ssured destruction response is much more credible rection n ttck severl thousnd wrheds thn n ttck few wrheds. By eliminting usefulness limited fensive ttcks, U.S. defense would effectively estblish second "firebrek" in ldder escltion. The United Sttes hs, for some time now, emphsized firebrek between con ventionl nd nucler forces, pointing out tht crossing firebrek would in ll likelihood eventute in n ll-out nucler exchnge. This "firebrek effect" helps deter Soviet first use nucler wepons, but it is directly contrdicry NATO's thretened first use nucler wepons sp Soviet conventionl invsion. The firebrek estblished by limited nucler defense would be different chrcter. It would mke West's first use tcticl nucler wep ons more credible, since possibility limited Soviet ttck on United Sttes would be virtully eliminted. Before turning mjor difficulties likely rise out U.S. deploy ment ABMs ( effect on SALT nd possible Soviet response), I will uch briefly on role civil defense nd composition limited ABM system. Any ttempt defend civilin popultions ginst nucler ttck requires t lest some civil defense effort protect ginst fllout. Furrmore, up even if All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

14 168 JAN M. LODAL point, civil defense is much less expensive wy thn ctive defense sve lives. Thus it mkes sense increse our civil defense progrm. But re my well be intense public opposition civil defense, s re hs been in pst. Should it in end prove desirble proceed with limited ABM defense, politicl difficulty mounting n incresed civil defense effort should not be llowed hinder its deployment. I hve left rchitecture this defense system intentionlly vgue, speci fying only tht it hve some cpbility defend lnd-bsed missiles nd limit ed cpbility defend U.S. cities nd "st" militry instlltions. Such defense could be similr in design nd size originl twelve-site Sfegurd system, with perhps n expnsion number interceprs up two three thousnd. But it is not t ll cler tht, given dy's technology, Sfegurd rchitecture remins most effective one. In in next section, detiled rchitecture defense results negotitions with Soviets. ny cse, s I suggest ought wit Soviet Response nd Effect on SAL T When Sentinel ws Progrm nnounced in 1967, it generted gret con cern tht Soviets see might deployment U.S. ABM defense s thret ir ssured destruction cpbility. Such thret, it ws rgued, could be highly destbilizing blnce, even leding perhps Soviet preemptive strike or, t very lest, n ccelerted rms rce. In 1967 Soviets were severl yers from cpbility deploy multiple wepons (MlRVs) on ir missiles; thus even reltively smll Sentinel de fense would require using ir entire ICBM force exhust its interceprs. In se circumstnces, strong Soviet rection U.S. deployment unexpected.16 The Soviets hve now deployed severl thousnd lnd-bsed MlRVs nd re in process deploying MlRVs on ir SLBMs s well. Even should Soviets hve exhust fully limited defense mount n effective ssured destruction ttck, so doing would use only frction ir tl force. In no sense would limited ABM deployed in 1980s threten Soviet ssured de struction cpbility. A closely relted issue is concern tht Soviets might respond U.S. ABM with deployment "hevy" defense tht would threten U.S. ssured destruction cpbility. As s recently 1972, in debte over SALT I ABM trety, mjor debte rged concerning ABM possible cpbili ties rudimentry Tllin ir defense system. Current Soviet ABM tech nology hs been over improved drmticlly tht deployed in Tllin. Thus Soviet deployment even limited defense (sy three thousnd interceprs) could led mjor demnd for incresed U.S. fensive forces. The worry is not so much tht se interceprs could not be penetrted?existing could MlRVs, even without dditionl penetrtion ids, could do so. Rr, concern would be tht rdrs nd commnd nd control systems ssocited with limited defense might permit rpid deployment dditionl "brekout" in hevy defense interceprs. through be All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

15 I find such scenrio DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY 169 implusible. First, ny brekout would tke mtter mny months nd possibly even yers ccomplish. During this time vriety short-term ctions could be tken increse gretly our retliry cpbili ty, such s more putting bombers on lert or keeping more SLBMs t se. Additionl penetrtion ids could be deployed on rpidly existing missiles, nd some missiles re cpble ccepting dditionl wrheds without modifi ction. The Soviets know tht se responses re vilble nd would negte ir efforts. In longer term, cost Soviets deploying dditionl interceprs counter hevy U.S. retliry ttck would be much greter thn cost United Sttes responding with dditionl wrheds nd penetrtion ids. The Soviets simply could not sustin economic burden required for such n effort. But, even if y could, defense would not be effective. It is simply outside relm present technology crete defense tht is irtight ginst simultneous ttck from bombers, cruise missiles, forwrd-bsed systems, SLBMs, nd lnd-bsed ICBMs. The Soviets would be more likely respond by deploying only limited defense tht did not threten Americ's ssured destruction cpbility. One might still worry tht such deployment would effectively negte Americn defense by providing Soviets with symmetric cpbility, mking it esier for m lso cross firebrek nd use nucler wepons first in Europe. But effect is not symmetric. U.S. strtegy is bsed on defending Europe ginst Soviet invsion, while Soviets fce no comprble thret invsion from West. Their ttck would be fensive, nd Soviets would be foolish use nucler wepons first in n fensive opertion. To do so would devstte terriry y were ttempting conquer nd eliminte ny possible politi cl gin from hving gone wr. Even if invsion were spped by Western conventionl forces, Soviets lwys hve option withdrwl, n op tion y would lmost certinly tke before resorting nucler wepons nd ll risk such move would entil. If Soviet ttck begn succeed, options for West would be more strk: eir surrender or use nucler wepons. Wher or not Soviets responded with new ABM ir own, U.S. deployment ctive defenses would hve pround effect on future rms control. Any significnt ABM defense would require eir renegotition 1972 bm trety or its brogtion under "Supreme Ntionl Interest" cluse. In eir cse, Soviet Union would protest tht United Sttes is once gin violting estblished greements nd demonstrting n inbility pursue consistent policy. But hisry this issue should not be forgotten. During SALT I negotitions nd in subsequent rtifiction debte, United Sttes stted strongly tht filure obtin permnent trety limiting fensive wepons would be considered dequte grounds for brogting ABM trety. Not even temporry SALT II trety is likely survive, nd no permnent trety is in prospect. Thus United Sttes would be on firm procedurl ground re open ABM question. This is not minimize effect?brogtion most rms significnt control trety ever concluded could well chnge entire chrcter future rms control negotitions. All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

16 170 JAN M. LODAL No immedite chnge in ABM trety is necessry begin reserch nd development efforts necessry prepre for U.S. ABM deployment. Clerly, it serves no purpose tmper with trety while re remins ny possibility n resring effective SALT process. But should deployment decision prove necessry, it would not be unresonble expect Soviets eventully negotite seriously on modifiction ABM trety, greeing terms tht would permit crrying out type deployment suggested here. The Soviets would hve strong incentives retin certin limits on ABM deployment levels. While ir ABM technology hs dvnced drmticlly in lst decde, y lmost certinly relize tht United Sttes is likely sty hed m in this technology. One ought not ssume tht deci sion by United Sttes deploy limited ABM umticlly spells end SALT, or even end ABM trety. A second rms control considertion reltes verifiction renego tited trety. Once reltively lrge rdr networks re in plce for even smll ntionwide ABM, verifying tht system is in fct limited becomes more difficult. This ws n issue even with Tllin in Our verifiction cpbili ties hve improved somewht in interim, but ny new Soviet ABM progrm would include more cpble nd lrger rdr network thn those in existence in Any future ttempts limit defenses severely would clerly be hm pered by verifiction problems. An indirect rms control effect n developing ctive defense cpbility would be incresed difficulty in negotiting lower limits on sizes both sides' missile forces. If ABMs were in plce, reltively lrge MiRVed missile forces would be required ensure penetrtion defense system. Since re re no foreseeble circumstnces in which eir side will feel secure with out mintining n ssured destruction cpbility, bm would mke it un likely tht eir side would be interested in negotiting reductions low levels. If we re ccept n incresed role for ctive defense in our nucler strte gy, we must be prepred live with probbility no more thn modest rms control mesures throughout 1980s. But such result is likely no mtter wht ctions we tke. The gretest potentil short-term loss would be existing SALT process itself. But SALT process, t lest s it hs been pursued since its inception in 1969, is now effectively ended in ny cse. There is very little left SALT process lose?even if SALT II is rtified. The effect U.S. ABMs on longer-run possibilities for successful rms control is not so clerly negtive. No rms control process will be effective unless stble politicl reltionship exists between United Sttes nd Soviet Union. No such reltionship exists dy, nd it cnnot exist unless United Sttes resserts its strength through development credible doctrine, strong defense progrm, nd consistent foreign policy. To tke no furr ctions with respect our forces would demonstrte Soviets nd rest world our lck will mintin sound defense n ginst expnsionry Soviet regime. We could, course, respond by dding fensive forces. Yet continued development more fensive nu cler wepons serves little demonstrble militry or purpose. The chnge in strtegy I hve suggested?returning development ctive defenses?would not suffer this defect. It might set bck rms control in All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

17 DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY 171 short run; but United Sttes would find itself ultimtely in stronger posi tion negotite effective limits on nucler deployment. Europen Rection Americn Defenses our Initilly, Europen llies would understnd benefit deploying defenses for U.S. retliry forces, since this would increse strength Americ's ssured destruction cpbility nd increse credibility our thret use our forces in defense Europe. They would lso prob see some bly dvntge in incresing credibility our thret use bttle field nucler forces in Europe defend ginst Soviet ttck. But eventully y would be likely object strongly move. First, U.S. move would be seen s furr step wy from slt, rms control, nd d?tente. Even President Crter's limited moves in response invsion Afghnistn hve met mixed response in Europe. To Euro pens, nd prticulrly West Germns who live next door Soviet troops nd Soviet-dominted regime, benefits d?tente seem consid erbly more concrete thn y do most Americns. Second, y would object "decoupling" Americn nucler gurntee tht would probbly result. Wht Europens hve lwys truly desired from United Sttes is willingness respond immeditely Soviet ttck with U.S. nucler ttck on Soviet Union, leding n exchnge between United Sttes nd Soviet Union fought outside Europe. Tht such n exchnge would leve Europe intct while United Sttes nd Soviet Union devstted ech or, despite fct tht wr begn in Europe, is incomprehensible. But in Europen eyes, U.S. defense would mke it more reltively likely tht wr could be fought in Europe lone, without involving U.S. terriry? result tht would be decried s decoupling. Third, n objection tht would come certinly from French, nd quite possibly from British s well, is tht reopening issue ntibllistic missile defenses would eventully led Soviet deployment such defenses. Such move would significntly reduce effectiveness British nd French independent nucler forces. British deployment MIRVed Trident I missile would llevite this considerble extent, nd French technology is dvnced enough ensure tht t lest some ir missiles would pene trte Soviet defense. Noneless, effect would be rel, nd it would be significnt. Despite se inevitble Europen objections, deployment limited Americn defense would be helthy for llince. No possible strtegy cn fully stisfy Europen countries. Even more thn United Sttes, our Europen llies continue look for n esy solution where none exists. An dequte conventionl defense is not cceptble becuse its cost. Thus ll gree tht nucler deterrence must remin bckbone Europen defense. But credible nucler thret requires wr undertking preprtions tht Euro pen governments do not wish sustin politiclly, since se would be seen s plcing dditionl stress on d?tente nd on incresing chnce wr. Our Europen llies will lso complin tht y would be un completely protected should wr ctully occur, while even limited U.S. defense would All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions

18 172 JAN M. LODAL some provide protection for Americns. This is course true, but once gin, it is unfortuntely fct life tht cnnot be overcome. No defense cn protect Western Europe from Soviet nucler ttck. Soviet tcticl forces crry with m bttlefield nucler wepons tht could not be spped by defense. The only wy keep Soviet nucler wepons out Western Europe is sp invsion itself without resorting nucler wepons do so. Of course, Europens' refusl mke scrifices necessry ensure this is why re is need for U.S. defense in first plce. The Soviet Union hs chosen not exercise restrint in its militry build up, eir nucler or conventionl, nd y hve chosen push expnsion ir geopoliticl influence nd control limit. Western society, nd our Europen llies most must specificlly, choose mong difficult lterntives. Americn fensive nucler forces cn be incresed, nd if present progrms re implemented, this will occur. But such n increse provides little militry gin. The sme is true with respect n increse in fensive ter nucler forces, wher or long-rnge bttlefield. An Americn defense is more efficient wy ensure survivl U.S. retliry cpbility, nd it would significntly enhnce credibility our thret use nucler wepons defend Europe. The best lterntive would be field n dequte nonnucler defense, which could be done for modest 4 5 percent NATO's GNP. But in bsence tht, some ction must be tken. The worst possible lterntive would be do t nothing ll. Conclusions nd Policy Implictions The bsic chrcteristics nucler wrfre tht set se wepons prt from ll ors t beginning nucler ge?ir overwhelming de structive cpbility nd impossibility n mounting effective defense ginst m?remin unchnged. Any nucler wr between United Sttes nd Soviet Union would inevitbly led levels deth nd destruction tht would hve be seen, in McGeorge Bundy's words, "s n unexmpled filure This is not even consider effects such sttesmnship."17 secondry s nd environmentl use nucler genetic dmge. Deterring wepons must remin our own nucler predominnt objective force, even s we ttempt fshion ntionl strtegy ensure our economic nd politicl strength nd contin Soviet expnsion. The continued Soviet buildup fensive nucler forces, prticulrly when combined with ir buildup conventionl forces, hs mde mintennce stble deterrence more difficult. The Soviet cpbility respond in kind ny use possible nucler wepons by United Sttes, nd perhps even chieve momentry militry dvntges, mkes U.S. thret use nucler wepons in defense less credible. Since World Wr II we hve relied on credibility this thret deter Soviet nucler ggression. We hve lso relied on "extended deterrence" nucler wepons supplement deterrent effect our conventionl forces. To keep ech se spects deterrence credible will require incresed ttention opertionl nd socil spects nucler strtegy. We must ccept fct tht socil spects n effective deterrence re no policy less importnt thn its technologicl spects. Progrms All use subject JSTOR Terms nd Conditions