A North American Perspective on Multinational and Interagency Maritime Security Collaboration

Transcription

1 This Briefing is A North American Perspective on Multinational and Interagency Maritime Security Collaboration CJOS COE and COE CSW Maritime Security Workshop Istanbul, Turkey 9-11 October 2013 Kurt Salchert kurtrcn@gmail.com

2 Overview Maritime Environment Diverse Stakeholders The Call to Action Defining the Problem From Problems to Solutions A vision without a map is just a wish 2

3 Maritime Environment Source: 3

4 Diverse North American Stakeholders Bi-National Forums Federal, Provincial & Local Government NSS Interagency Policy Committees Canadian IMSWG Committees US MDA Executive Steering Committee Academia & Think Tanks ANR D-17 JTF(N) CSA CANR EC CSEC Health CIC CFICC NSA PSC GOC CDI Justice DFO CSIS ITAC RCMP CBSA TC DFAIT EUCOM AFRICOM CENTCOM NATO Other Allies Private Sector Stakeholders PACOM PACFLT D-14 MCC-P MSOC D-13 CG PAC MIFC 3rd FLT D-11 CBP AMOC ADF C NORAD USNORTHCOM NCTC EPIC D-8 NTC TSA FBI CONR Canadian Joint Ops Command STRATCOM JIATF-S NVMC ONI CBP NMIO IRVMC D-9 NGA ICC ICE D-7 Embassy GMCC NRO MSOC Embassy NSA DOT DHS NOC Federal, State, Local & Tribal Government NJOIC NMCC D-1 MCC-A D-5 MSOC USFF CJOS COE DOE PM-ISE CG LANT MIFC DNDO DOS JIATF-W SOUTHCOM 4

5 Diverse Global Stakeholders MSCHOA, Northwood JIOCEUR Analytic Center (JAC), Huntingdonshire NATO Allied Maritime Command (MCC) & NATO Shipping Centre (NSC), Northwood National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC), Northwood Joint Narcotics Analysis Centre (JNAC), London 4 SUCBAS, Finland Marine Security Operations 1 Centre (MSOC) West, East and Great Lakes National Maritime & Rescue Center (Joint RCC), Den Helder FRONTEX European Union Agency, Warsaw JIOC TRANS CGFMC, Paris Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center (V RMTC), Rome ADF C N2C2 USAFRICOM (NAVAF) NATO Allied Maritime Command (CCMAR), Naples USFJ MIFCPAC AMOC EPIC JIOC CENT MIFCLANT USSOUTHCOM (JIOC SOUTH) USFF MOC National Maritime Safety Agency, Madrid MARLO Maritime Operation Center, Bahrain Maritime Safety Agency, Barcelona NAVCENT UKMTO, Dubai JIOC K IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, Kuala Lumpur PACOM JIOC JIATF WEST Changi (C2) Information Fusion Centre JIATF SOUTH Panama LRIT Surveillance Center RAPPICC Regional Anti Piracy Prosecution Intelligence Coordination Centre ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre MRCC Chile COMCONTRAM Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre (AMSOC), Canberra Fusion Centers Non-Military Military Maritime Organization of West & Central Africa (MOWCA), Abidjan Maritime Analysis & Operations Centre Narcotics (MAOC N) EU Long Range Identification & Tracking Data Centre (EU LRIT DC) Counter Narcotics & Maritime Security Interagency Fusion Center (CMIC), Cape Verde Australian Maritime Information Fusion Centre (AMIFC), Canberra National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC), Trentham 5

6 The Call to Action USS COLE, terrorism, Aden (Oct 2000) M/V COSTA CONCORDIA, grounding (Jan 2012) M/V WARM SEAS VOYAGER, suspicious activity (Apr 2005) Japanese Tsunami debris, West Coast (Mar 2012) R/V FARLEY MOWAT, Seal Hunt Obstruction, (Apr 2008) S/V TABASCO II, illegal migrants, Nova Scotia (Mar 2012) Mumbai, terrorism from the sea (Dec 2008) Shell Oil drilling, Arctic (Summer 2012) M/V STARTRAMP, VOI rediscovery (Feb 2009) M/V SNOW DRAGON, 1 st PRC Arctic crossing (Sep 2012) USNS IMPECCABLE, Chinese harassment (Mar 2009) Record Arctic sea ice melt (Sep 2012) M/V ATLANTIC CONCERT, stowaways, Halifax (Apr 2009) 7.7 magnitude earthquake, Cdn West Coast (Oct 2012) M/V MAERSK ALABAMA, piracy, Somali Coast (Apr 2009) Superstorm SANDY, global supply chain (Nov 2012) M/V KANG NAM I, proliferation, North Korea (Jun 2009) LALB labour dispute, global supply chain (Dec 2012) M/V ARCTIC SEA, hijacking, Atlantic (Aug 2009) USS GUARDIAN, grounding, Philippines (Jan 2013) M/V OCEAN LADY, illegal migrants, Victoria (Oct 2009) Barge-bridge collision & oil spill, Mississippi (Jan 2013) Whale Wars - Sea Shepherds versus Japan (Jan 2010) M/V CARNIVAL TRIUMPH, high seas SAR (Feb 2013) ROKS CHEONAN, torpedoed/sunk by North Korea (Mar 2010) M/T YUAN YANG HU, Iran sanction violations (Mar 2013) Deepwater Horizon, oil-rig explosion, Gulf Coast (Apr 2010) Sabotage internet submarine cables, Egypt (Mar 2013) Gaza Relief Convoy, Israeli commando raid, Gaza (Jun 2010) M/V LYUBOV ORLOVA, adrift in Atlantic (Feb 2013) NP37 Russian research site evacuation, High Arctic (Jun 2010) Terror Threat to bridge/rail network, Canada (Apr 2013) M/V SUN SEA, illegal migrants, Victoria (Aug 2010) M/V CHON CHON GANG, Weapons, N Korea (Aug 2013) M/Vs MOKAMI & NANNY, Arctic groundings (Aug & Sep 2010) MV YONG SHENG, China NSR transit (Aug/Sep 2013) M/V CLIPPER ADVENTURER, Arctic grounding (Aug 2010) Mass SAR, African migrants bound for Europe (Oct 2013) M/V CARNIVAL SPLENDOR, high seas SAR (Nov 2010) Fukushima Radioactive Leak/Debris (Mar Ongoing) Japanese earthquake/tsunami/radioactive release (Mar 2011) Piracy, Transnational Crime, Espionage, Cyber (Daily) Disposal of Osama Bin Laden, somewhere at sea (May 2011) M/V THOR LIBERTY, missiles en route China (Dec 2011) M/V RENDA - C HEALY, Nome resupply (Jan 2012) Key Annual CANUS Maritime Stakeholder Meeting Annual CANUS Maritime Executive Forum 6

7 Scoping the Problem Threat Assessment Warning Plan Respond Recover Detect Analyze Share/Collaborate What level of awareness is required to ensure timely warning of threats and achieve an effective response? Can we detect, issue warning and mitigate the threat before it assembles and departs point of origin? When and where does surveillance and analysis need to be conducted and with whom is information shared in order to preserve decision-advantage? What are the 2 nd and 3 rd order effects of decisions and actions (or inaction)? 7

8 Understanding the Problem When and where does warning have to be issued to alert decision makers? Who gets warned (interagency, multinational, private sector)? Through early warning, can we deter/disrupt/defeat the threat at its point of origin? What threshold and/or level of confidence is acceptable to warn? Threat Assessment Warning Plan Respond Recover Detect Share/Collaborate Analyze What is the desired Agency/National/Allied end state What capability is required to neutralize the threat? What response forces are available (readiness/capability)? Who has the jurisdiction/mandate/authority to respond? What are the lead agencies and who else is involved? When is the latest point the threat must be neutralized? What are 2 nd order effects on Consequence Management/Resiliency? Is the right information being shared at the right time with the right people in the right organizations? Are we considering all connections (People, Cargo, Vessels, Financial Transactions, Critical Infrastructure)? Are we considering all data sources (interagency, multinational, private sector)? What threshold and/or level of confidence is required to share? Have time, space, risk, threat, capabilities of friendly forces, and 2 nd order effects been considered? 8

9 Key Components of the Problem Absence of a daily habitual, persistent and consistent whole-ofgovernment relationship between the Canadian and U.S. agencies and departments related to maritime domain awareness Agreed Problem Statement from 13 September November 2012 (Approved by CAN and US Maritime Security Executive Body) Lack of clearly defined and shared Critical Information Requirements to support decision-making by key stakeholders and mission partners. Inadequate (or lack of awareness of) plans and policy guidelines to define the threshold to share information (whole-of-government, cross-border, private sector). Lack of standardized and integrated intelligence to warning to response processes among key CAN and U.S. stakeholders and mission partners. Inability for key stakeholders/partners to readily access multi-domain, multiagency and multi-classification-level information due to numerous, complicated and often ad hoc network architectures. Lack of awareness of authorities, mandates and jurisdictions of the numerous CAN and U.S. organizations involved in maritime security. 9

10 Draw on our common interests to provide the impetus for collaboration (values, history, culture, integrated economies, networked multi-modal transportation systems and shared critical infrastructure) Share best practices to develop organizational structures and integrated maritime operations and intelligence fusion centers where possible Utilize common data standards (ie. NIEM/CISE) and interagency Vessel of Interest lexicon and develop shared Watch Lists (ie. SILO) Expand network of existing liaison/exchange personnel Incorporate best practices such as write for release or tear lines to enable rapid dissemination across multiple releasability levels Solution Enablers Capitalize on emerging technologies in Information Management and Knowledge Discovery through joint tests and experimentation (ie. CWID etc) Leverage formal, informal and ad hoc governance structures 10

11 From Problems to Solutions April rd CANUS Maritime Stakeholder Conference Absence of a chart that visually links together the numerous CAN and US whole-of-government initiatives, gap analysis, strategies and roadmaps November rd CANUS Maritime Executive Forum Develop a CANUS Gap Map - prioritize areas of positive correlation, make recommendations and develop decision support visualization framework June th CANUS Maritime Stakeholder Conference Present CANUS Gap Map and decision support visualization framework based on NORAD (Salchert) and Johns Hopkins University (Egli) research and collaboration 11

12 CANUS Gap Map and Visualization Identify gaps and overlaps in order to synchronize, harmonize and, where appropriate, integrate efforts to address areas of mutual interest Literature Review + Case Studies + Collective Action Theory Authoritative gaps were used as a baseline from which other documented gaps were aligned to identify areas of strong, weak or no positive correlation 12

13 Building Irreversible Momentum Reconcile Gap Areas Consolidate major gap areas based on degree of positive correlation Decision Support Template Evaluate/rank gap areas based on qualitative and quantitative assessment criteria Visualization Framework Assist Agency and National Planners to develop POA&M to implement priority areas Implementation Performance measurement and feedback to guide future activities and maintain momentum 13

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15 A North American Perspective on Multinational and Interagency Maritime Security Collaboration Kurt Salchert