Face to Face With Armageddon
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1 History Today: Volume: 49 Issue: 3 March 1999 pp34-40 Face to Face With Armageddon John Garnett assesses the pros and cons of mutual deterrence, the nuclear defence strategy that both escalated and controlled tensions between the superpowers during the Cold War. Two developments, one technical, the other political, have shaped East-West relations for most of the second half of the twentieth century. The first was the development of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons together with delivery systems with intercontinental ranges. The second was the onset and evolution of the Cold War, which, though fluctuating in intensity, provided the political context in which the new weapons of mass destruction had to be evaluated. These twin developments led to the strategy of nuclear deterrence which came to dominate the military policies of both superpowers from the mid-1960s, and reflected and exacerbated the Cold War. Gradually, deterrence evolved into a highly sophisticated body of related ideas about the role of nuclear weapons. But in the late 1940s, when the Cold War was just beginning, the complicated theology of deterrence did not exist, and strategists and policymakers were still struggling with the implications of the newly invented atomic bomb. Everyone felt that a new era in destructive warfare had arrived, but even those who thought about it were not sure what this meant. Among some fairly wild speculation about push button warfare, suitcase bombs and the imminence of Armageddon, some basic military realities were emerging. It became clear that there was no defence against these new weapons, that population centres were particularly vulnerable and that a surprise attack could give an aggressor a decisive advantage. It was this gloomy analysis which focused minds on nuclear deterrence and the belief that since states could no longer protect themselves by traditional measures, then enemies could, henceforth, only be deterred from aggression by the threat of devastating retaliation. This view provided the basic rationale for the most expensive military strategy the world has ever seen. Of course, deterrence was not a new idea. Whenever states have acquired military power part of their aim has been to deter potential enemies from aggression by convincing them that they could not win. The idea of deterring an enemy by denying him the fruits of victory had particular validity in the nuclear age when the concept of winning seemed to have lost much of its meaning; but during the Cold War it was overtaken in importance by the idea of deterrence by the threat of punishment. The Soviets, it was argued, would not be deterred from attacking Western Europe by the prospect of failing to win; they would be deterred by the threat of the devastation of Mother Russia. Until the Soviet Union acquired a stockpile of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and a force of long-range bombers and missiles capable of striking the United States, the relationship between the superpowers is best described as one of unilateral deterrence ; that is to say, a highly satisfactory state of affairs (from a Western perspective) in which the United States was able to deter the Soviet Union from aggression by threatening nuclear retaliation, but the latter country was not able to reciprocate the threat. Inevitably, the American monopoly did not last long. By the mid-1960s unilateral deterrence gave way to mutual deterrence, a situation of strategic stalemate in which each side was capable of deterring the other by the threat of nuclear retaliation. By the late 1950s the Soviet Union, having successfully tested a nuclear weapon in 1949 and a hydrogen bomb in 1953, had built up a convincing arsenal of free falling bombs which, with squadrons of Bison and Bear aircraft, it was capable of delivering on the territory of the United States and Western Europe. The position, as Robert Oppenheimer pointed out, could be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life. Mutual deterrence was not a relationship that either side actively sought. It simply came about as a consequence of each developing a powerful nuclear arsenal. But once it existed, strategists and statesmen began to appreciate some of its virtues. As Churchill put it: It may well be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation. Both superpowers accepted that their mutual vulnerability might not be such a bad thing. When that happened mutual deterrence became a policy objective as well as a de facto situation, and from the mid-1960s onwards an enormous amount of effort was directed towards perpetuating it. In particular, East-West arms control negotiations enshrined mutual deterrence by eschewing any arms reductions which might threaten it and discouraging any military policies or technological developments likely to undermine it.
2 Despite the rhetoric of disarmament, the management of mutual vulnerability rather than arms reduction became the keystone of the arms control policies of both sides. The bargaining was tough, but SALT I and II and the START process all reflected attempts by the superpowers to manage strategic nuclear developments in such a way as to stabilise mutual deterrence. Ballistic missile defences were outlawed; first strike weapons were decommissioned; civil defence was discouraged. In this curious adverse partnership, the two superpowers manipulated the arms race in the interests of mutual deterrence. Despite its critical role, there was much confusion, particularly in the early years of the Cold War, about what constituted mutual deterrence. Some confused it with the possession of nuclear capability by both sides. Others believed it arose when both sides had roughly the same number of nuclear weapons. However, strategists were quick to point out that there is a big difference between a balance of terror in which each side has the capacity to obliterate the other, and one in which both sides have that capacity no matter who strikes first. In other words, it is not the balance of an arms race that constitutes mutual deterrence; it is the stability of the balance. A stable balance only exists when neither side in striking first can destroy the other s ability to strike back. Merely equalling or matching the weapons systems of the enemy misconstrues the nature of the problem. To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it. It means being able to strike second with assured destruction capability. But even this is not quite true. Deterrence does not mean that both sides must have efficient retaliatory systems; it only means that each side must think the other has. This is so because deterrence is primarily a psychological phenomenon. If both sides have invulnerable deterrent forces, but neither side believes that the other has, then the situation is one of extreme instability, because each side will believe it could launch a successful attack. And if neither side has deterrent capacity, but both sides believe that the other has it, then the situation is one of mutual deterrence even if all the objective requirements are missing. In other words, whether or not a situation of mutual deterrence exists depends on the state of mind or the mental image which one side has of the other, and it is not automatically connected with real-world objective military capabilities. The best way of seeming to have efficient deterrent capacity is to actually have it. Hence, if both sides are pursuing a policy of preventing war by mutual deterrence, they must seek invulnerable retaliatory weapons which, by definition, are capable of striking back after an attack by the enemy. Unfortunately, the ability to strike back after being attacked is by no means an automatic result of an arms race. By the late 1950s the difficulties were beginning to be appreciated. Both superpowers recognised that the first requirement of an effective deterrent was that it should survive or ride out a surprise counterforce targeted attack without being decimated a task made difficult by the ever-increasing numbers of accurate delivery systems, penetration aids, and multiple warheads which entered service during the next thirty years. Technological innovation forced both sides to spend a fortune on protecting their retaliatory forces via early warning radars, diverse delivery vehicles, hardened missile sites and submarine launched systems. The Americans, anticipating a Soviet attack across the Arctic circle and Canada, built a series of elaborate radar networks of which the DEW (Distant Early Warning) line and the BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System) line were the most effective. The hope was that the warning of impending attack provided by these radar networks would give decisionmakers time to scramble SAC (Strategic Air Command) bombers and launch missiles before airfields and missile sites were destroyed. Some B52 bombers were even kept on round the clock airborne alert status. In addition, land-based missiles like Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman were buried in protective concrete shelters capable of absorbing the shock from anything but a direct hit. Constant worries about the vulnerability of these land-based systems pushed both superpowers into deploying missiles on nuclear-powered submarines whose location could not be determined. From 1959, when the first Polaris boat was commissioned, to 1989 when a second generation of submarines equipped with even bigger and more accurate MIRVed Trident II missiles entered service, the Americans relied increasingly heavily on sea-launched retaliatory systems. However, fearful that a technological breakthrough might undermine particular weapons even on submarines, both superpowers spread the risk by maintaining a triad of forces, bombers, land-based missiles and submarine-launched missiles. Even if one leg of the triad became vulnerable the others would suffice to deter. Assuming that the problem of guaranteeing the survivability of retaliatory forces could be solved, the Americans realised that at least two other hurdles had to be overcome. First, it had to be possible to take the decision to launch a retaliatory strike and communicate that decision to the SAC bases and submarines which would carry it out. Easy enough, perhaps, in peacetime, but after a decapitating nuclear strike on Washington, not so easy. Throughout the Cold War, billions of dollars were spent on command and control arrangements to ensure effective decision-making and communication in the chaos of a post-nuclear war environment. And despite the effort which went into creating hardened and
3 mobile command posts, delegating nuclear release authority, and developing very complex communication facilities, no one was ever completely confident that the problems were satisfactorily solved. The second hurdle related to the power of the retaliatory force to penetrate the enemy s air space and punish him for his aggression. US bombers and missiles had to be able to reach their targets despite whatever anti-aircraft and anti-missile defences the Soviets had created to limit damage, and, having penetrated, they had to be able to deliver unacceptable punishment despite any civil defence measures which the Soviets might have taken to minimise casualties. One of the problems here was the difficulty of knowing what level of destruction the Soviets regarded as unacceptable. Robert McNamara, Secretary for Defence during the Kennedy administration, had a rough rule of thumb. If the United States could kill or maim between 20 and 33 per cent of the Soviet population and destroy between 50 and 75 per cent of its industrial base, then it could feel confident of its power to cause unacceptable damage. The era of mutual assured destruction (MAD) had arrived. Not everyone, though, was reassured by the stalemate that now existed. Though both sides recognised mutual deterrence as a de facto situation, neither was entirely convinced that the other had abandoned ideas of nuclear superiority and first strike capability. There was particular unease in the US. The Soviets never seemed enthusiastic about mutual deterrence and were always reluctant to abandon ideas of ultimate victory in war. Technological improvements in missile guidance and multiple warheads did nothing to diminish suspicions on both sides. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the Americans became almost paranoic about the emergence of bomber and missile gaps which they believed would give the Soviets the ability to launch a successful surprise attack against their territory. The fears proved groundless, but unease continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s as the Soviets stormed ahead with missile building and modernisation programmes. The fact that the arms race showed no signs of slowing was a permanent source of tension and proved that the stability of the nuclear balance could not be taken for granted. Another reason for nervousness about relying too heavily on the strategy of deterrence was an appreciation by strategists on both sides of the Iron Curtain that it might fail. In much the same way that murderers are not deterred by the threat of life imprisonment or capital punishment, so, it was argued, aggressive states might not be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation. The question of what to do if deterrence failed was one with which both superpowers wrestled. In the event of an aggression the strategy of deterrence, with its emphasis on massive nuclear retaliation, left statesmen on the horns of a dilemma. They could retaliate and risk Armageddon, or they could do nothing and suffer defeat. Neither option had much to recommend it, and both sides sought alternatives which would give their statesmen better choices than suicide or surrender. This logic led the Americans to develop ideas of flexible response and limited war even limited nuclear war. In the event of deterrence failure what Robert McNamara and his successors wanted was a spectrum of military options which would allow the United States to respond to an attack in a measured way which would neither provoke all-out war, nor invite defeat. Slowly a sophisticated warfighting strategy evolved alongside deterrence. The trouble with warfighting, especially nuclear warfighting involving surgical nuclear strikes, was that few people believed it could be kept limited, and the weapons required to conduct it were the sort of accurate missiles which an enemy could easily mistake as first-strike offensive capability. Designed as an insurance policy against deterrence failure, warfighting actually undermined the policy it was intended to bolster. The stability of mutual deterrence was threatened most dramatically in the 1980s by developments in anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology. ABMs were dangerous because by destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), they reduced retaliatory capability and therefore undermined the vulnerability on which the entire edifice of deterrence was built. Worries about this technology had surfaced in the late 1960s, but at that time the genie was put back in the bottle by the 1972 ABM treaty which, with minor exceptions, prohibited the deployment of these missiles by either side. In 1983, when President Reagan outlined his Strategic Defense Initiative it looked as if the bottle was about to be uncorked once more. American scientists began to explore the possibility of building a very complicated Star Wars defence system, which if deployed in its most comprehensive form, would not so much have undermined mutual deterrence, as actually replaced it with a strategy of mutual defence. It was a revolutionary idea and, theoretically at least, not without merit. If it had been implemented it would have revolutionised nuclear strategy and ended the era of mutual deterrence. However, for a variety of reasons, not least the difficulties associated with the new exotic space-based surveillance and interceptor systems, research was put on the back burner. Evidence mounted that the new systems were bound to be horrendously expensive and might ultimately be technically flawed. And so mutual deterrence survived. However, the concerns which had prompted President Reagan to seek some other path to security were shared by many people outside the defence community. It
4 seemed preposterous that a superpower should base its security on the vulnerability of its own people and a threat which, if implemented, would probably destroy life as we know it. The flaws in mutual deterrence were widely appreciated. It assumed an unjustifiable level of rationality on the part of statesmen; it failed to address the problems of war caused by human error, mechanical failures in weapons systems, false alarms, miscalculations, accidents, etc. Clearly, mutual deterrence did not make war between the superpowers impossible only less likely. Reducing the incidence of war is an important achievement, but the failure to reduce it to zero meant that sooner or later deterrence would fail, and when it failed the ensuing war would be much more destructive than if the belligerents had not acquired the massive arsenals necessary for mutual deterrence. Some of the most serious criticisms of the strategy focused on the question of credibility. Few doubted that the US had the physical capability to devastate the USSR, but did she have the will to retaliate? Two reasons were advanced for thinking there was some doubt about the matter. First, because the United States would be faced with the decision to retaliate only when the strategy of mutual deterrence had failed. What, said the critics, is the point of executing a threat when the whole point of making it in the first place was to avoid being put in the position of having to carry it out? Second, what is the point of a retaliatory strike which, if implemented, would provoke a further round of attacks and leave the US in an even worse mess than it was already in? In some circumstances retaliation would be tantamount to suicide, and for that reason the threat to engage in it is not very plausible. At the end of the day, as Robert McNamara once pointed out, You cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of an incredible act. The credibility gap was particularly wide in the context of European defence. For years American policy had been to extend the nuclear umbrella to cover European allies by threatening the Soviet Union with massive retaliation in the event of an aggression against NATO territory. But if threatening to commit suicide in defence of oneself is peculiar, doing so in defence of someone else is even odder. No Soviet leader believed that the United States was prepared to risk Armageddon for the sake of Berlin, Paris or London. It was not just the military weaknesses of the strategy which critics latched on to. They pointed out that deterrence fostered a biased, conflict-orientated view of the world, and brainwashed society with the language and imagery of violence. Over the years the deterrent strategists promoted a climate in which war even nuclear war became psychologically acceptable. It deadened the sensibilities of millions of people by accustoming them to thinking about the unthinkable. Furthermore, deterrence belittled the possibilities of disarmament and underplayed the importance of politics and diplomacy in resolving the problems of East-West relations. Instead of trying to remove the causes of tension, deterrent strategists tackled the problem of peace and security by trying to make the consequences of war so bad that nobody would dare fight. Instead of devising imaginative policies to end the Cold War, Western leaders were anaesthetised by a strategy which seemed to offer peace albeit uneasy peace with no political effort whatsoever. In this respect mutual deterrence was a comforting philosophy, but by imposing a military solution on what was fundamentally a political problem it was a misconceived strategy. Its effect was to stultify diplomacy, and keep American and Western foreign policy in a tense straightjacket for thirty years. To be fair, many of the nuclear strategists who had articulated and supported the philosophy of mutual deterrence were fully aware of its weaknesses. They accepted it not because it was ideal but because they could see no alternative. It was the least bad solution to the problems of the nuclear age and the Cold War. Evaluating this strategy is not easy, if only because it is impossible to prove a connection between the absence of war and the threat made to deter it. It is much easier to point to the things which mutual deterrence did not do during the Cold War. It did not diminish East-West conflict; it did not halt the arms race; it did not prevent a whole series of international crises from Berlin to Cuba; nor did it prevent Soviet adventurism in the Third World. However, what cannot be disputed is that despite ideological rivalry and political hostility, war between the superpowers did not occur, and common sense suggests that the possession of overwhelming nuclear capability by both sides probably had something to do with it. After all, there is something terribly persuasive about a nuclear missile pointing down your throat, and even before deterrence became mutual and stable the prospect of thermo-nuclear war must have induced a mood of caution on both sides. There is plenty of evidence, for example, that during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the fear of nuclear war caused both sides to pull back from the brink. Another way in which this caution manifested itself was in the determination of both superpowers to avoid direct physical conflict and the dangers of escalation which would be inherent in even low level wars between them. During the Cold War years both the United States and the Soviet Union were involved in a number of major
5 wars from Korea in 1950, to Afghanistan in 1979, but they were careful not to tread too heavily on each other s toes. Now that the Cold War is history and the long shadow of nuclear war has been lifted, deterrence seems to have lost some of its relevance. Nevertheless, it remains a foundation stone in the defence policies of both the United States and Russia, and it features equally prominently in the military policies of all the nuclear powers, including Britain. Although the international scene has been transformed since 1989, the pervasive logic which convinced a generation of post-war strategists may yet convince the next generation. Further Reading: L. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (Macmillan, 1981) B. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, (Princeton University Press, 1966) P. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, (Cassell & Co.,1977) G. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton University Press, 1961) A Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, Foreign Affairs, Vol.39, No 3 (April 1961). About the Author: John Garnett is Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth and coauthor with L.W. Martin of British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the 21st Century (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997).
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