Beyond Trident: A Civil Society Perspective on WMD Proliferation

Transcription

1 Beyond Trident: A Civil Society Perspective on WMD Proliferation Ian Davis, Ph.D. Co-Executive Director British American Security Information Council (BASIC) ESRC RESEARCH SEMINAR SERIES NEW APPROACHES TO WMD PROLIFERATION SPRU SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY RESEARCH 9 JANUARY 2007, University of Sussex 1

2 The British American Security Information Council Independent, non-profit research and advocacy organization founded in 1987 Offices, staff, advisors, patrons and governing board membership on both sides of the Atlantic A transatlantic bridge for policy makers and opinion shapers Mission: To facilitate the exchange of information and analysis on transatlantic security and arms control issues as a means of creating a more stable and secure world. It is our belief that a law-guided approach based on negotiated treaty regimes and cooperative security should be at the heart of the transatlantic security agenda 2

3 The British American Security Information Council Washington, DC 110 Maryland Ave, NE, Suite 205 Washington, DC Tel: , Fax: London The Grayston Centre 28 Charles Square London N1 6HT Tel: +44 (0) , Fax: +44 (0) Web site: 3

4 BASIC & Nuclear Weapons Drawing international attention to the desirability and possibility of a nuclear-weapon-free world Pushing for transparency in arms control Linking NPT commitments to US, UK and NATO nuclear policy Emphasizing the need for nuclear states to lead nuclear arms control processes, not problem states Working with others to bring pressure to bear on nuclear weapon states Pushing for a commitment from the nuclear weapon states for elimination while pursuing practical steps 4

5 Current BASIC Nuclear Weapons Priorities UK Trident replacement Iran s nuclear program Nuclear terrorism/ CTR program US/ NATO nuclear policy/ missile defence Future of NPT Proliferation Security Initiative 5

6 Context The Cold War Orthodoxy: Nuclear deterrence kept the peace in Europe The Missed Opportunities: Arms control Gains and Losses in the 1990s The New Orthodoxy: The nexus between failed states, WMD proliferation and international terrorism 6

7 US & UK Nuclear Weapon Accidents US DoD admits 32 accidents between US GAO Report: 563 nuclear weapon incidents reported by the US navy between See UK MoD (reluctantly) admits 20 accidents between

8 Post-Cold War Developments in Nuclear Arms Control POSITIVE: START I & Start II IAEA Additional Protocols Indefinite extension of NPT 1995 ICJ Ruling 1996 CTBT 1996? SORT 2002?? CTR Program/ PSI NEGATIVE: Challenges to NPT: India and Pakistan; Iraq, Iran and North Korea; P5 upgrading stockpiles Little progress on NPT 13 disarmament steps Stagnation at the CD No progress at 2005 NPT Review Conference & World Summit Illicit trafficking networks in nuclear know how US-India nuclear cooperation? 8

9 Fundamental Changes in the United States Bush Administration 2001 Terrorist attacks September 11, 2001 Constructing a new strategic build-up Primary threat rogue states and terrorists with WMD Only strengthen multilateral frameworks if do not constrain unilateral ability to act Impact on non-proliferation architecture: Dominance of US-centred world view Less reliance on international law and non-proliferation treaties, and growing emphasis on counter-proliferation and pre-emption by coalitions of the willing e.g. Iraq, PSI, Nato response force 9

10 P5 Nuclear Stocktake 2003 Warheads US USSR/ Russia UK France China 2003 stockpile 7,650 (3,000 R) 8,200 (10,000 R) Peak number 32, , Total built 70,000 55,000 1,200 1, Nuclear tests 1,030 (1992) 715 (1990) 45 (1991) 210 (1996) 45 (1996) 10

11 Death, destroyer of worlds Little Boy kilotons (Hiroshima); Fat Man 22 kilotons (Nagasaki) British Trident: max 48 warheads per submarine (x4); each warhead has a 100 kiloton yield 100 kiloton warhead on built up area =100,000+ fatalities 30,000 warheads today = 1 million Little Boys, or 5,000 megatons of destructive energy Carl Sagan & others: a war involving 100 megatons could trigger a nuclear winter 11

12 Growing stockpiles of nuclear materials SQs of nuclear material under IAEA safeguards: IAEA Inspectors in the Department of Safeguards: 1982: 18, :123, : :542 12

13 Some nuclear proliferation is acceptable US research into new nuclear weapons - although mini-nukes and bunker busters R&D curtailed by Congress, the Replacement Reliable Warhead (RRW) program continues Reduced readiness time for US nuclear test sites Israel deploys nuclear arms in submarines UK Trident Replacement - upgrades by other NWS US-India nuclear cooperation Free nations don't develop weapons of mass destruction, G.W. Bush, Wisconsin, Oct 3,

14 Beyond Trident Joint initiative: Acronym Institute, BASIC, ORG & WMD Awareness Program To promote debate on Britain s future security and especially Trident replacement Outputs: leaflet (Jan 2006); DVD/film Anthropology 101 (July 2006); Research Report (November 2006) 14

15 BASIC Green Paper (Dec 06) Assesses three options: - Delay - Upgrade - Disarm (incl. virtual nuclear option) Four reasons for believing a decision is premature: 1. longer life expectancy; 2. dropping CASD; 3. reduced lead times; and 4. point of no-return 15

16 Government White Paper (Dec 06) 40-page Defence White Paper on 'The Future of the United Kingdom s Nuclear Deterrent' (4 December) Key themes: government's view of why a deterrent remains relevant after the cold war, why a decision in principle has to be taken now, and what decisions will be taken in future. Reduction in number of "operationally available warheads" from fewer than 200 to fewer than 160, with a corresponding 20% cut in size of the overall stockpile. Detailed work on the concept of a new submarine to begin shortly with a contract for the detailed design to be placed by Costs: "Our initial estimate is that the procurement costs will be in the range of 15-20bn (at 2006/07 prices) for a four-boat solution, some 11-14bn for the submarines; 2-3bn for the possible future refurbishment or replacement of the warhead; and 2-3bn for infrastructure over the life of the submarines." At least three big decisions are postponed: whether the fleet should be four or three submarines; whether to refurbish or replace the warheads; and whether to develop a successor to the D5 missile. Bottom line: The White Paper commits Britain to a new generation of nuclear-armed submarines, was presented as a fait accompli to the cabinet and looks as though it will easily command a parliamentary majority, with Conservative support, when it is put to a vote in March

17 What next? Seek to influence vote in parliament in March 2007 Seek cross-party consensus for an amendment to delay decision Further BASIC briefings: The timing question Costs of replacement 21st Century British deterrence The ultimate insurance policy? Is non-replacement irreversible? Possible benefits to non-replacement Can we leave France as the only nuclear-weapon state in Europe? Safety concerns to deployment 17