MEMORANDUM. NFPA 85 BCS-SBB First Draft TC FINAL Ballot Results (F2014 Cycle)

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1 National Fire Protection Association 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA Phone: Fax: MEMORANDUM To: From: NFPA Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers Kim Shea Date: June 11, 2013 Subject: NFPA 85 BCS-SBB First Draft TC FINAL Ballot Results (F2014 Cycle) According to the final ballot results, all ballot items received the necessary affirmative votes to pass ballot. 18 Members Eligible to Vote 0 Not Returned 15 Members voted Affirmative (w/comment on one or more revision J. Fehr, T. Jablkowski) 3 Members voted Negative on one or more revision (R. Dobbins, J. Eibl, G. Shrider) The attached report shows the number of affirmative, negative, and abstaining votes as well as the explanation of the vote for each first/second revision. There are two criteria necessary for each first/second revision to pass ballot: (1) simple majority and (2) affirmative 2 / 3 vote. The mock examples below show how the calculations are determined. (1) Example for Simple Majority: Assuming there are 20 vote eligible committee members, 11 affirmative votes are required to pass ballot. (Sample calculation: 20 members eligible to vote 2 = = 11) (2) Example for Affirmative 2 / 3 : Assuming there are 20 vote eligible committee members and 1 member did not return their ballot and 2 members abstained, the number of affirmative votes required would be 12. (Sample calculation: 20 members eligble to vote 1 not returned 2 abstentions = 17 x 0.66 = = 12 )

2 NFPA 85 BCS SBB First Draft Ballot Results FR 230, Section No. 5.2, See FR 230 FR 232, Section No , See FR 232 FR 233, Section No , See FR 233

3 FR 231, Section No , See FR 231 FR 234, Section No , See FR 234 Affirmative 16 Negative 2 Gary J. Shrider 1. The substantiation for this public input refers to the bypass of low water and atomizing media interlocks as a basis for the allowance of bypasses on other safety interlocks. These bypasses are provided for special cases as a part of normal boiler operation. It would not be part of normal boiler operation to bypass a flame scanner for example. 2. There is a provision in Chapter 4 Section to allow the bypass of safety interlocks for the purpose of boiler maintenance without taking the boiler out of service. 3. There are a large number of boilers addressed by the language in our section that are small unattended commercial and institutional units with little or no attendance. Adoption of this language will result in uncertainty as to whether interlocks are being bypassed in a manner that will result in a safe operation of the units. The fact that there is no need in normal boiler operation to bypass safety interlocks and the fact that there is language to allow such bypass in a maintenance situation lead me to conclude that there is no reason to accept this proposal. Robert Dobbins The permissive to bypass interlocks during operation should be restricted to testing activities. Maintenance activities should be addressed separately and include the use of tags.

4 FR 235, Section No , See FR 235 FR 238, Section No , See FR 238 Affirmative 17 Negative 1 John J. Eibl I do not believe we should be requiring parts of ISA in the Code in just one small area as the wording creates additional questions regarding the determination of SIL level and other issues. This shouild be addressed by the Correlating Committee as to how the Code should align itself with ISA regarding control issues. FR 239, Section No , See FR 239

5 FR 236, Section No , See FR 236 FR 237, Section No. A , See FR 237 FR 189, New Section after A , See FR 189

6 Affirmative 15 Affirmative with Comment 2 Joseph E. Fehr I do not see FR 188 on my ballot. The annex material created by this FR is intended to support the new subparagraph added by FR 188. Ted Jablkowski I am suggesting a small change to the FR text to correct that SIL 0 is not defined. In the first sentence, replace "...SIL 0." with "...not SIL capable." as shown in the text below. A (3) SIL 2 capable was purposely specified as the minimum safety level based on the existing safety levels presently required in this code, which can be considered SIL 2, SIL 1, and/or not SIL capable. The notified body or third party certification is critical in the SIL 2 capable requirement because self certification is permitted in the safety rated PLC marketplace, and with self certification there is no assurance that critical safety functions, such as the secure separation of the safety and process logic, are provided. Use of a logic system that has been self certified is not permitted. Isolation between the burner management system and the other logic can be accomplished by using separate processors or by selecting a single processor that ensures isolation through the use of an isolated programming area protected by locks or passwords. Negative 1 Gary J. Shrider 1. A definition does not exist for the term SIL capability. 2. The term listed and labeled is referred to in (2) and a definition does not exist for this term. This constitutes un enforceable language. 3. The Committee Statement states that The Notified Body or 3rd party certification is critical in the SIL 2 capable requirement. The term notified body is referred to in (3) and a definition does not exist for this term. This constitutes un enforceable language. 4. The substantiation for this public input states that modern hardware and software control systems with a minimum of SIL 2 capability have drastically reduced the number of undetected unsafe failures. The provider of this public input provided no background data that supports this statement. SIL level 2 design includes not only the processor and input/output modules but also includes field instrumentation. A SIL capability doesn t determine the safety level of an individual component of a system. 5. The substantiation for this public input states that modern systems separate the systems logic to prohibit unintentional modification of the safety logic. Not all systems are capable of meeting this requirement and there is no means to confirm/enforce the requirement. The fact that there are terms which are undefined in the language and language that is unenforceable leads me to conclude that there is no reason to adopt this