Volume II Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence. AUTiiORS: John G. Hines, Senior Author Ellis M. Mishulovich. John F. Shull BDM FEDERAL, INC.

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1 m BDM Federa, ru:. 150tBDMWay McLea, VA SOVET NTENTONS Voume Soviet Post-Cod War Testimoia Evidece AUTiiORS: oh G. Hies, Seior Author Eis M. Mishuovich oh F. Shu BDM FEDERAL, NC. September 22, 1995 CONTRACf #MDA C-0147 OSD-NET ASSESSMENT

2 t ~1 : 1 1 ~ TABLE OF CONTENTS Commets o terview Process... i Marsha Sergei F. Akhromeev... 3 Marsha Sergei F. Akhromeev ; Ge.-U Geii Viktorovich Bateru... 7 Sergei Bagovoi... :.~... ~ Harod Brow Zbigiew Brzeziski... ;... ~ :... ~... ~... ;... :....'... : Dmitrii S. Cheresbki Ge.-Co. (Ret.) AdriaA. Daievich Ge.-CoL (Ret) AdriaA Daievich Ge. -Co. (Ret.) Adria A Daievich Ge.-Co. (Ret) Adria A. Daievich... ~... :... ~ ~ Ge.-Co. (Ret) AdriaA Daievich Ge.-Co. (Ret) AdriaA. Daicvich... :... :....:.. 58 Ge.-Co. (Ret) AdriaA Daievich... :... ~ Ge.-Maj. V1adiir Ziovievich Dvorki... :... : Ge. Mak:hmut A. Gareev Ge. Mak:hmut A. Gareev Fred c. ke... ~... : Ge.-Co. gor' V. arioov..., Ge.-Co. gor' V. Darioov... ;... ;... ~ A. S. Kaashikov A S. Kaashikov... :... :... ~....' Vitaii Leoidovich Kataev Vitaii Leoidovich Kataev... ~......:... ~ Ge.-Maj. (Ret) urii.a Kirshi... _ Ge.-Maj. (Ret.) urii A. Kirshii... ; Robert W. Komer... 1 OS Ge.-Co (Ret) Varfoomei Vadimirovich Korobushi Ge.-U (Ret) Nikoai Vasi'evich Kravets... ;_, Ge.-Co. Gregorii Fedorovich Krivosbeev Cooe Petr M. Lapuov... ~:...;... ~...:... ~...;... ~.. 115

3 . [ '1 _j w m. Adrew W. Marsha Rod McDaie u. A. Mozzhori... ;~ u. A. Mozzhori... ; Vadimir Rubaov... ~.....,.~... ;... ; aes R. Schesiger Vitaii V. Shykov...;......;... ~. ~ :...: Boris Aeksadrovich Strogoov Victor M. Surikov Dr. Vitaii Nikoaevich Tsygichko Dr. Vitaii Nikoaevich Tsygichko Dr. Vitaii Nikoaevich Tsygichk:o ~... :.~... ~ Dr. Vitaii Nikoaevich Tsygichko Dr. Vitaii Ni.koaevicb Tsygichk:o... ~...;:......:: : Dr. Vitaii Nikoaevicb Tsygichko Ge.-Co. Dmitrii Vokogoov ~...: APPENDX A: Partia List of Decisio Makers ad Aaysts APPENDX B: Research Questios for Soviet terview Respodets APPENDX C: Research Questios for U.S. terview Respodets... ; APPENDX D: List of Acroyms ad Abbreviatios APPENDX B: Tsygichko's Kommetarii k iterv'iu v godu... ~.. ~... ~ dex

4 -1 '. 0 1 D D.. terviews ad Discussios with Cod-War Era Paers ad.aaysts This voume cotais much of the raw materia o which this study is based. A items i this coectio represet the testimoy, i some form, of Soviet ad America strategic paers ad aaysts whose professioa careers were argey domiated by the eed to uderstad ad respod effectivey to the miitary threat from their Cod War oppoets. Most of the item.s are structured as records or summaries of iterviews coducted o the basis of a specific ist of questios. foow-up iterviews or iterviews with difficut subjects, the questios served oy as a geera guide to research. Log, arrative resposes aso ofte did ot address questios i the same format ad sequece i which the questios were preseted. For may reasos, items do ot foow precisey the sequece ad cotets of the iterview questios. Soviet iterview subjects ofte were ucomfortabe with the iterview situatio, the questios, or the impicatios of the research (the Cod War was over ad the West had wo). As a resut, the ature of the record of iterview or discussio varies from iterview to iterview. Trascripts of taped iterviews are the record of choice, of course, foowed by records based o otes ad, fmay, summaries based o the memory of the itervie:wer prepared shorty after the iterview. May Soviet iterview subjects were ucomfortabe with tape recorders~ especiay eary i the project ( ) whe severa were far from coviced that the Cod War was, ideed, over. Likewise, severa of the questios caused discomfort which forced rephrasig ad specia promptig (provocative statemets or ausios to other iformatio) o the part of the iterviewer. Some iterview subjects respoded with amost a stream-of-cosciousess fow of iformatio that moved from associatio to associatio through a etire series of reated issues. Stoppig such a respose to adhere precisey to our questios coud resut i the oss of vauabe isights ad iformatio ot aticipated by the questioer......

5 " Cod War terviews This resuted i icompete coverage of some questios requirig, whe possibe, subsequet, suppemetary iterviews focused o specific issues. To compesate whe possibe, we revisited some of the most kowedgeabe iterview subjects severa times over the course of 3 or 4 years. We tried, whe possibe, to isoate the iterview subject from his coeagues. durig questioig to avoid murua itimidatio, coegia resposes, ad cotamiatio of data ad observatios. We were geeray successfu i meetig this objective but were sometimes forced by those who heped arrage a give iterview to ivove them i the process. Whe possibe, we woud subsequety isoate the iterview subject ad revisit oe or two key questios to vaidate the origia respose.,.. The record that foows, therefore, is icosistet i eve of detai ad comprehesiveess despite the paig ad good itetios of the researchers. mperfect as they are, they evertheess represet a uique record of iformatio ad beiefs of Cod war participats who were abe to trust their former eemies sufficiety to share their thoughts ad beiefs i some detai before they themseves passed ito history. For the coveiece of the reader, a ist of acroyms ad abbreviatios appears i the appedices, as we as a seective ist of decisio makers ad aaysts cited or referred to i tbe iterview record. ~ '..,' ii

6 Subject: Positio: Locatio: SUMMARY OF NTERVEW Ge.-Co. (Ret.) Varfoomei Vadimirovich Korobushi Former Deputy Chief of Staff of Strategic Rocket Forces Office of Vitaii Kataev, Former Cetra Committee Buidig, Moscow ; 1 ) \ terviewer: Datefime: Duratio: Laguage: Prepared by: Note: oh G. Hies December 10, 1992 Approx. 1 hr. Russia Eis Mishuovich, based o otes Vitaii Kataev participated i the exchage. Throughout the d-970s ad up through the mid-1980s, fmy beieved that the U.S. was wiig ad capabe of a first strike agaist us. NATO's officia stace, which did ot rue out this possibiity, oy affirmed my beief that this was possibe. We were very much afraid of this possibiity. was resposibe for cotro systems for the Strategic Rocket Forces. Because our mai fear was of a U.S. first strike, our mai objective was to desig a system that was capabe of auchig as soo as auches were detected. beieve that we reached this objective.... As for our side, am deepy coviced that o oe o otir side was capabe of iitiatig a first strike. Q: Eve at the theater eve? A: At the theater eve, i case of a war i Europe, we woud have crushed NATO forces i a covetioa cofict, ad NATO woud have bee forced to use ucear weapos first. Q: Our reatios with Europe were aways very compicated.. discussios with former Secretaries of Defese, it was cear to me that ucear use woud have bee. uikey. ' '. A: the mid-1980s the U.S. hed exercises i which it used three to five prevetive seective ucear strikes agaist the territory of the Soviet Uio durig a imagiary cofict i Europe. This was doe i order to demostrate U.S. wiigess to use ucear weapos if ecessary. A cofict i Europe was possibe. We came cosest to ucear war durig the Cuba crisis. This was Khrushchev's adveture ad did ot agree with what we did there. But we i the miitary did our job. Marsha Biriuzov, the commader of Soviet forces i Cuba, iformed us of the decisio 106

.. 1. : } : 1 Cod War terviews Korobushi to coupe our existig ucear warheads to our missies. We had very few missies at that time capabe of reachig the U.S. There were some i Pesetsk.

7 .. 1. : } : 1 Cod War terviews Korobushi to coupe our existig ucear warheads to our missies. We had very few missies at that time capabe of reachig the U.S. There were some i Pesetsk. But i Cuba there were aroud 40 missies, icudig 9 R-573 missies with a 5,000 km rage ad carryig 1 megato warheads. [Accordig to Daievich, the missies based i Cuba carried two type~ of warheads: 1.8 ad 4.2 megatos. f it had come to war, we woud have wiped out Europe, Mrica, srae, Turkey. We ever paed ay seective strikes [vybomye udary. As Grechko stated o more tha oe occasio, we woud aswer with fu force to ay use of ucear weapos o the part of the Americas, o matter how imited. We ever coducted ay exercises usig seective strikes, ad kow because participated i a our ucear exercises. suggested to Akhromeev that we coduct exercises usig imited strikes, but he rejected this idea We ever cosidered usig seective strikes eve i theory. There were ever documets or studies suggestig their use. Up uti the 1970s we ever eve cosidered that the Americas might use imited strikes, so we did ot cosider how to respod to them. Limited ucear use oy occurred i America exercises i Q: What ed to fears i the eary 1980s that a U.S. attack was immiet? A: A U.S. actios poited i this directio: the depoymet of more Miutema missies, the depoymet of MRVs, the depoymet of the L-492 fyig commad ceters which used the recorded voice of the presidet to activate auch commads. These commad ceters bega deveopmet i the eary 1970s we deveoped a simiar but better system which coud order missie auches. Q: Did the issuig of Presidetia Directive No. 59 (PD-59)74 ifuece Geera Staff perceptios? A: Yes, but your PD-59 woud have bee futie. Right ow we have a sy~tem i pace which woud automaticay auch a missies remaiig i our arsea eve if every ucear commad ceter ad a of our eaders were destroyed. This system, caed the Dead Had [Mertvaia Ruca woud have bee triggered by a combiatio of ight, radioactivity, ad overpressure, ad woud cause severa commad rockets to be auched ito orbit, from where they woud sed auch codes to a our remaiig missies. These. specia rockets were protected i specia hardeed sios with protectio to 240 kg/cm2 [3,412 psi. Thus, there was o eed for ayoe to push a butto. A of our groudauched missies are protected to over 100 kg/cm2 [1,422 psi. Your missies are ot as we protected. We assumed this was because they were meat to be frrst strike weapos. Q: What about accideta triggerig, by earthquakes, for exampe? A: The system is ot o. t is to be activated oy durig a crisis... Kataev: We i the Cetra Committee's Defese Departmet cosidered the eary 1980s to be a crisis period, a pre-wartime period. We orgaized ight shifts so that there was aways someoe o duty i the Cetra Committee. Whe Pershig Ts were depoyed, there appeared the questio of what to do with them i case they were i f 73 Probaby the missie NATO desigated the SS-5, athough other Soviet sow-ces idetified the SS-S as the R-14. R-5 may be a abbreviated idustria desigatio for the same missie. 74 Presid~tia Directive 59, a key White House statemet, o U.S. ucear strategy that was discussed by kowedgeabe U.S. govermet officias i the U.S. press.- Pubished accouts reiforced the cocept of seective use of ucear strikes uder various scearios ad suggested eary targetig of Soviet eadership ad commad ad cotro i the evet of Soviet aggressio. 107

-'1 ~ 0 ~. '. if. ~. Cod War terviews Korobushi dager of faig ito Warsaw Pact hads durig a war. These missies had to be auched. This made them extremey destabiizig.

8 -'1 ~ 0 ~. '. if. ~. Cod War terviews Korobushi dager of faig ito Warsaw Pact hads durig a war. These missies had to be auched. This made them extremey destabiizig. Furthermore, the oy possibe targets of these missies was our eadership i Moscow because Pershigs coud ot reach most of our missies.... Korobushi: offer oe more piece of evidece that we had o itetio of iitiatig a first strike. case of a covetioa attack agaist us, we aways paed to destroy a our missies ad sios, rather tha use them to auch missies. This was stadard operatig procedure. We had o had mies ad destructio devices which we woud. have empaced i our sios if they were ever i dager of beig overru. Q: Were there aso provisios for destroyig mobie missies i Europe? Kataey [after come hesitatio: Yes. The same was paed for theater weapos. Korobushi: argued with Akhromeev that because of our ucear shied, we o oger had ay eed for East Germay ad that we eeded to egotiate directy with the FRG, ot with the U.S. regardig the withdrawa of a our troops from Germay. argued that it did ot matter how may me the Americas had i Europe. did ot care if they icreased their forces i Germay. We had to get out. But Akhromeev was soidy agaist this kid of move. Kataev: Shevardadze ad the Foreig Miistry -argued that the mber of U.S. troops ad our troops i Europe shoud ot be iked. However, the miitary ad the poitica-miitary eadership were agaist it.. Korobushi: We were very afraid of the Americas. f we were ot afraid, why woud we eed missies ad sios with ready times of 60 secods!? Our EW s~teites were abe to detect a strategic missie attack upo auch, approximatey 30 miutes from impact.. but we did ot cosider the attack cofirmed uti our radar cofirmed the trajectory to target approximatey 14 miutes prior to the first spash. Yet our cotro system was so we prepared that this was more tha eough time to auch a retaiatory strike, eve if it took the eadership over 10 miutesto make a decisio. t took just 13 secods to deiver the decisio from Moscow to a of the auch sites i the Soviet Uio. This shows that we were preparig oy for a retaiatory-meetig strike [otveto-vstrechyi udar. Why ese woud we have spet biios of rubes to desig ad buid such a sophisticated commad ad cotro system? Q: Was such a term as "deterrece" [sde;hivaie ever used i regard to strategy? A: Maybe amog the eadership there was such a cocept. But speakig as a miitary ma have to say that a of our cacuatios for force buidig were based o the sceario of the retaiatory-meetig strike, ot o the idea of deterrece. We cacuated that a 40-45% destructio of the U.S. GDP woud be eough to be cosidered uacceptabe damage. Likewise, we kow that the Americas cacuated that 30-40% destructio of our GDP woud be cosidered uacceptabe. Our eary missie, the R-4, 75 was ot capabe of a retaiatory;..meetg strike. t had a ready time of 20 miutes. t was oy i the mid-1970s that we had acquired a geeratio of missies with retaiatory-meetig capabiity.,'5 Probaby the iquid-fueed desigated, "SS-T' by NATO.. 108

. Volumell Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence. AUTiiORS: John G. Hines, Senior Author Ellis M. Mishulovich John F. Shull BDM FEDERAL, INC.

m BDM Federal, c. 1501BDMWay Mclea, VA 22.102 SOVET NTENTONS 1965-1985. Volumell Soviet Post-Cold War Testimoial Evidece AUTiiORS: oh G. Hies, Seior Author Ellis M. Mishulovich oh F. Shull BDM FEDERAL,