Hegemony versus Offshore Balancing: New Names for an Old Debate. James D. Perry

Transcription

1 Hegemony versus Offshore Balancing: New Names for an Old Debate James D. Perry

2 Overview What Is Hegemony? Grand Strategies: Hegemony versus Offshore Balancing National Goals: Security, Economics, Democracy National Willpower: How Badly Do We Want Hegemony? Economics: Can We Afford Hegemony? Military Power: Are We Strong Enough for Hegemony? Strategic Choices: Force Structure Implications

3 What Is Hegemony? Elements of Hegemony Asymmetry of Power Goals: security, economics, ideology National Willpower Resources: Preponderant Military Power Preponderant Economic Power You usually get what you want What you want How badly you want it Are you strong enough to get it and keep it? Structure: Organizations, treaties, alliances, etc. that exercise military and economic preponderance to assure the fulfillment of national goals How you sustain it over the long term History abounds with states whose resources or willpower were inadequate to achieve hegemony or keep it. Good reason to question current US resources and willpower but are we willing to recast our goals and retreat from hegemony? Hegemons rarely abandon their goals without a fight.

4 Basic Grand Strategies Strategy Military Posture Advantages Disadvantages Hegemony (Containment) Strong forward presence Full spectrum of capabilities Greatest US influence Regional rivalries dampened Eurasian hegemons checked Nuclear proliferation reduced Freedom & prosperity flourish? Most expensive Provokes counterbalancing Must keep challengers down Provokes terrorism Offshore Balancing (Détente) Limited forward presence Emphasis on air and sea power Freedom of action Shifts burden to others Cheaper than hegemony Reduced tension w/ PRC, Russia Avoids wars of credibility Less terrorism? Encourages aggressors Finlandization Nuclear proliferation Regional instability Hard for US to return Less influence Less freedom & prosperity? Isolationism Hemispheric defense plus nuclear deterrent Cheapest Everyone else may fight and weaken each other Least US influence We may get drawn in if everyone else fights

5 Security Goals Mostly acquired until NATO expansion DoD obligated to defend 25% of world population and 65% of world GDP (not including Middle East oil) De facto protectorates Overstretch? We don t want hostile powers to dominate Europe or Japan but how much help should these wealthy countries get from us now?

6 Ideological Goals: Necessary and Affordable? American strategy since 1943 has always been about much more than just security Idealism: We must propagate our values because we are only safe and prosperous in a world in which our values prevail (i.e. democracy and open markets) Realism: We do not need to propagate our values, because this leads to overexpansion, unnecessary war, and avoidable hostility. Focus strictly on security, do business with bad guys. Difficult to argue that promotion of democracy has succeeded and improved American security since 2001 If it is necessary to propagate democracy and open markets, are these goals actually achievable, and at what price?

7 Promoting Democracy Lacks Popular Support POLITICO Poll July 2014 U.S. military actions should be limited to direct threats to our national security 67% As the world s moral leader, the U.S. has a responsibility to use its military to protect democracy around the globe 22% Rebuild public support or change strategy

8 Decreasing Popular Support for Intervention Abroad Pew, May 2016 Product of: War fatigue High cost Unattainable goals Bad execution Public and elite at odds: Rebuild public support or change strategy

9 Popular Skepticism About Free Trade Negative views of free trade significantly higher than these totals for people who make under $75,000 / year General public does not regard Free Trade as a particularly compelling benefit

10 Significant Unemployment The average citizen could reasonably conclude that American foreign policy does not benefit him personally High Trade Deficits = Jobs Exported Stagnant Real Wages Since 1973

11 Realist Foreign Policy: Thwarted Inside the Beltway? Free Trade, human rights, promotion of democracy, etc. enjoy very strong support from many in government, academia, think tanks, etc. American public is less convinced we should actively promote these ideals and is unwilling to pay much for them Realist candidate could certainly get elected but would face tremendous resistance from entire establishment Foreign policy elite has a long history of ignoring and mocking what the public wants

12 National Morale and Willpower National character: energy, ambition, discipline, initiative National beliefs, myths, ideology, religion Culture of honor, valor, hardship, self-sacrifice Internal unity, cohesion Tradition of victory Patriotic education Defeat can motivate (Germany 1918) or demotivate (1945) Long, costly wars demotivate especially COIN campaigns Inspirational leadership Self-preservation versus existential threat Sense of national momentum Weary hegemon versus hungry challenger

13 Vietnam GWOT Current average trust level is 19% but level is lower among certain groups: Gen X, Boomers (15%) Whites (15%) Republicans (11%) Higher but still not impressive trust levels among Democrats, minorities, youth (26%) Is an activist foreign policy of any kind let alone hegemony sustainable with such a low level of public trust in government?

14 Economic Factors

15 Source: Eurostat, Bloomberg U.S. Economy Strong but No Longer Preponderant Soviet GDP was perhaps 1/3 that of US during Cold War. Not an equal competition. But US versus China Completely inexcusable for EU (with 5x population and 12x the GDP) to permit Russia to intimidate it. Share of World GDP Inconceivable that Russia will give up nuclear weapons given her economic and geographic situation.

16 Major Power Demographics, Pop (m) 2050 Pop (m) TFR 2015 Median Age 2010 Median Age 2050 Age (%) Age (%) USA China 1,360 1, Japan Russia Germany France UK USA 1950: TFR 3.75, Median Age 30, Age 65+ 8% (only LDCs have these numbers today) Today s Major Powers Have Sub-Replacement Fertility and Increasingly Old Populations Source: Aging in the U.S. and Other Countries, 2010 to 2050, Pew Research Center, 1/30/14

17 Major Power Demographics: Implications More spending on pensions/health, less on defense Fewer kids = unwilling to risk them in war = more robots? Money, technical expertise more important than raw manpower for air, sea, nuclear force generation Less capability to do occupation/pacification/coin: Forget occupying any large, poor country Europe, Japan, Korea weaker and less useful as allies Russia increasingly weak Major Powers more threatened by LDCs than each other? Today s Major Powers Have Sub-Replacement Fertility and Increasingly Old Populations

18 Economic Burden of Defense Hegemony is Very Affordable! Unless You Are a Welfare State! (Entitlements Overstretch) Gross Government Debt as % of GDP USA 106 China 66 Japan 238 Russia 11 Germany 82 France 90 UK 85 Defense Share of Federal Spending Defense as Percentage of GDP CBO: Unsustainable Federal spending and debt

19 Military Factors

20 Military Downsizing US military was deployed forward during the Cold War and backstopped with powerful strategic deterrent Military buildup during the 1980s revitalized the strategic deterrent, the Navy, and forward deployed forces After 1991, some US forces remained forward but military began transitioning to a CONUS-based force Services have been on a procurement holiday since 1992

21 Nuclear Deterrent Forces Smaller, Older than in % Last US nuclear weapon tested in 1992 no engineers today have tested or designed one US nuclear weapons experts aging (40% over 50 in 2009) Delivery systems and weapons aging, need replacement Weapons rely on tritium, which US has not produced since 1988, and stockpile is decaying Number Entered Service Minuteman III Ohio SSBN B-52H Bomber B-2 Bomber Recapitalization IOC New ICBM 2027 Ohio Replacement 2030 B-21 Bomber 2030

22 US Troop Deployments, : >2m troops 431,000 overseas (21%) : >3m troops 782,000 overseas (27%) 2015: 1.3m troops 201,000 overseas (15%) Long-Term Trend: Strategic Withdrawal of US Forces from Eurasia Source: Tim Kane, The Decline of American Engagement, Hoover Institution, 1/11/16.

23 Overseas US Troop Deployments, Korea Vietnam War on Terror 93% of US troops overseas were in Europe, Japan, and Korea in 2015 Source: Tim Kane, The Decline of American Engagement, Hoover Institution, 1/11/16.

24 Trend in US Troop Deployments Zero US troops overseas by 2045 if current trend continues unchanged Source: Tim Kane, The Decline of American Engagement, Hoover Institution, 1/11/16.

25 US Army in Europe: Currently 13% of 1989 Level 1989: 6 Divisions 1,500 tanks 213,000 troops 41 garrisons (850 sites) 2016: 2 Brigade CTs 0 tanks (250 in POL) 28,000 troops 7 garrisons (90 sites) Army still operating equipment acquired in the 1980s: Abrams, Bradley, Apache - and plans to keep this equipment until 2050 (!)

26 60% Reduction in USAF Since 1990 Type 1990 Inventory 2015 Inventory Entered Service Very few current aircraft have the stealth and range needed to fight large enemies who have advanced air defenses A F-15C/D F-15E F-16 1, F F B B B KC KC C C Other 5,760 1,178 52% of the current inventory is a legacy of the Reagan-era buildup. Only 21% of current inventory was built after Total 9,907 4,029 (41%)

27 USAF Reduction in Europe 74,715 personnel 784 aircraft 8 Fighter Wings 14 other Wings 32 Main Bases 33,000 personnel 200 aircraft 3 Fighter Wings 7 other Wings 7 Main Bases Relative to 1986: 56% Decline in Personnel 75% Decline in Aircraft

28 1980s Navy Nearly 600 Ships 2016 Navy Under 300 Ships Aircraft Carrier Large Surface Combatant Small Surface Combatant SSN SSGN SSBN Amphibious Combat Logistics Force Support Vessels Total Current Reagan-era Ships: 4 CVN, 18 CG/DD, 15 SSN, 14 SSBN, 10 Amphibs Attack sub shortfall starting in 2025 and lack of numbers, range and stealth in naval aviation have negative implications for control of the Western Pacific

29 Declining Overseas Base Structure Most US Bases are still in Britain, Germany, Japan, and Korea DoD Overseas Bases Reduction Number Bases 1, % Million Acres

30 Retreating to CONUS 55% reduction in forward-deployed force levels since % reduction in troops and airpower in Europe We are already in an Offshore Balancing posture there Make this official and pull the plug in Europe to enable forward defense in Asia? US forces are still, to a great extent, living on the legacy of the Reagan-era buildup Any strategy selected will require significant military modernization, but with different numbers and with emphasis on different types of forces Hegemony clearly requires far larger and more expensive forces than Offshore Balancing

31 Force Structure Implications Army Air Force Navy Isolationism Offshore Balancing Hegemony Small Support to Civil Authorities Continental Air Defense Coastal Defense Not Power Projection Less 6 Divisions? Command Sea/Air Emphasis on airpower, stealth, long-range strike More Divisions? Defend Allies Fight two MRCs Sea/Air Control plus punishment plus support for forward ground forces Deter by Punishment Deter by Denial Strategic Forces Minimum Deterrent Coercive Force Coercive Force plus Extended Deterrence Strategic forces, stealthy long-range strike especially important to deter Russia, China Offshore Balancing may not save money relative to today, but forces needed to support hegemony would cost a great deal more than that

32 Conclusions Hegemony versus Offshore Balancing is an extension of the Cold War containment versus détente debate US has been retreating to CONUS since 1991 question is whether or not this can and should be reversed Offshore balancing with an emphasis on long-range, stealthy land- and sea-based airpower is cheaper than hegemony but still requires military modernization Will this inevitably collapse into isolationism? Hegemony (engagement in Eurasia) requires: Leadership with the will to win Economic expansion Expanding and modernizing the military