Nonproliferation, Deterrence, and Nuclear Strategy

Transcription

1 The OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES October 2007 No. 27 Nonproliferation, Deterrence, and Nuclear Strategy by Robert R. Monroe 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 201, Washington, DC

2 - 1 - Nonproliferation, Deterrence, and Nuclear Strategy By Robert R. Monroe * The nuclear weapons ambitions of North Korea and Iran have made front-page news of the related U.S. issues of nonproliferation, deterrence, and nuclear strategy. Both the Administration and Congress are scrambling to play catch-up ball in recovering these vital elements of U.S. foreign policy and national security, which have been unaddressed since the end of the Cold War. This paper interconnects these three critical issues, and illustrates how far we must go to have them serve America s interests today. Enforcing Nonproliferation America is at a critical moment in history. We face a momentous decision about nonproliferation, a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy since the nuclear age began. Our decision will shape the world s future. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat like no other; and America has led the effort to harness it from the start. The Baruch Plan of 1946 was followed by Eisenhower s Atoms for Peace of 1953, and these led to a decade s work forging the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of This 37-year-old treaty is arguably the most remarkable and effective arms control instrument ever conceived. It is distinguished by two characteristics. First, the NPT is a vastly unequal treaty. It approves five nuclear-weapons states (U.S., Russia, China, UK, and France the five permanent members of the UN Security Council); and it requires all other signatories to remain non-nuclear-weapons states. Second, 188 of the world s 193 states have signed the NPT, voluntarily accepting this inequality. During the Cold War the first two decades of the NPT s life nonproliferation was greatly aided by the awesome presence of thousands of U.S. and Soviet nuclear warheads, poised for instant launch. During those years, eighteen nations started developing nuclear weapons, and all subsequently terminated their programs. Since this Cold War restraint was lifted, however, nonproliferation has been failing. First India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. Now North Korea and Iran seem determined to go nuclear. This should be a real wake-up call! North Korea and Iran are rogue states, belligerent and irresponsible. If either or both acquire nuclear weapons it will mark a global watershed point of the highest order, ushering in the full-fledged era of nuclear terrorism. Clearly, nonproliferation will die if it does not evolve. The choice is ours; and in making it we should consider the two alternative futures. If we continue as in the past, we re gambling that North Korea will end their decades- * Robert R. Monroe is a retired Vice Admiral in the U.S. Navy and former Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency

3 - 2 - long pattern of deception. If they do not, they ll probably conduct a second nuclear test, and once they get the design right they ll proceed into production of nuclear weapons, selling them to anyone desiring to buy. This could easily cause Japan, South Korea, and possibly Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons in self-protection. Once the pattern has been set by North Korea, it will be difficult to stop Iran s nuclear weapons program; possibly leading to transfer of nuclear weapons to proxy organizations (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas, al Qaeda). Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other Mideast states will likely acquire balancing nuclear arsenals in response. The cascade then goes global: Venezuela, Germany, Brazil, Argentina, Algeria, etc. With so many nuclear-armed states, and with nuclear weapons and nuclear material so widely available to terrorists and criminals, frequent nuclear weapon use will surely follow. But it doesn t have to be this way. We can vastly improve our future world if we finally open our eyes to the truth about nonproliferation. It requires enforcement! And surely the stark inequality of the NPT voluntarily agreed to by every one of the 188 signatories shows that the policing organization must be one or more of the treaty s five nuclear-weapons states. Ideally all five (which have exhibited reasonably responsible stewardship over a half-century) would act together, forcibly if necessary, to prevent any hint of proliferation. Our world will probably evolve to this, years in the future, after entire cities and millions of people are lost. But at present it s unrealistic to expect this degree of international cooperation. Thus it s up to America to take the lead, informing North Korea and Iran that, in support of nonproliferation, we will use military force, if necessary, to deny them a nuclear weapons production capability. If use of force became necessary, there would surely be a number of immediate adverse effects; but long-term world prospects would be immensely better. But actual use of force will probably not be necessary. The deterrent effect of such declaratory statements, backed up by our continuing, relentless reinforcing measures, will likely cause the world s long-duration negotiations with these two states to succeed without military action. Historically, effective diplomacy on major, contentious issues has always required a background threat of force. Importantly, the first use of deterrence to stop determined proliferation will produce immense worldwide nonproliferation benefits. We must decide which path to follow. If negotiations continue to fail, the U.S. decision on whether to invoke firm use of deterrence to prevent North Korea and Iran from nuclear weapons production will shape the future world. It will have far greater impact than Britain s decision in not to disarm Hitler s Germany which subsequently cost six years of global war and over 60 million dead. If proliferation is to be stopped, it must be here and now. It s late, but not too late. Nuclear weapons exist, and they won t go away, ever. There are tens of thousands of them. More states today possess nuclear weapons than ever before in history. More than half the world s population lives in states which have them. But we can still prevent irresponsible and belligerent states from producing them, and this will make all the difference!

4 - 3 - The NPT was designed for one vital purpose, to prevent proliferation. However, over recent decades a global nonproliferation regime has attempted to transform the NPT to a false goal, nuclear disarmament; and in this reckless push it is destroying all hopes for nonproliferation. Even the objective of a world without nuclear weapons is false. A world without nuclear weapons in the hands of responsible states would be a world of unbelievable nuclear horror and chaos. America must have the wisdom to recognize that nonproliferation requires enforcement, and the courage to lead the evolution of nonproliferation to this essential higher level. If we fail in these twin challenges, future generations will not forgive America for allowing 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq to distract us from the central challenge of our era. U.S. Nuclear Umbrella and Deterrence Since the dawn of the nuclear era the U.S. has entered into mutual security assistance treaties with friendly states, such as members of NATO. In many cases, we have pledged our nuclear deterrent forces to their protection, in effect bringing them under the umbrella of our strategic nuclear weapons. These actions have been highly effective for over half a century in enhancing U.S. security, protecting threatened allies, ending the Cold War, and greatly enhancing nonproliferation! Most of these states are economically and technologically advanced, to the extent that they would have no difficulty in developing their own independent nuclear deterrent forces. Yet they have staked their lives, their very existence as nations, on the U.S. guarantee to use our strategic nuclear forces to protect them. Thus for many decades the U.S. nuclear umbrella has been the principal factor in preventing proliferation by dozens of states. It has been the dependable centerpiece of the world s nonproliferation efforts. Today some thirty states, such as Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia, live daily under our strategic umbrella. But all is not well on these fronts. Two factors of recent origin are causing growing anxiety within these allies and friends. The first is the imminent cascade of nuclear proliferation discussed in the above section. North Korea and Iran are well along to developing and producing nuclear weapons. They ve both been at it for well over a decade, and to date neither the U.S. nor the world has been able to stop them. North Korea s nuclear weapon test last year was the first ever by a rogue state or terrorist organization. If these states succeed in their goal, the probable ultimate result would be a global proliferation cascade, leading to frequent use of nuclear weapons. The second cause of concern among states which depend upon us is the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Can they continue to count on us when the chips are down? We ve let

5 - 4 - every aspect of our nuclear weapons program deteriorate for the past sixteen years. We have not transformed our nuclear strategy from one of massive retaliation against the Soviets to the surgical needs of today s distributed threats. Our stockpile of high-yield, dirty nuclear weapons, designed for the Cold War, is aged and becoming more irrelevant by the day. The nation s nuclear infrastructure has seriously deteriorated. Our advanced nuclear technology R&D effort is practically nonexistent. We ve designed no new nuclear weapons, tested no weapons, and produced no new weapons. Our Defense Department has virtually denuclearized itself, disestablishing one nuclear weapons center after another. It has specified no requirements for new nuclear weapons, stopped conducting realistic nuclear exercises, and let nuclear weapons specialists wither away in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Executive Branch of government has shown little support for nuclear weapons programs for almost two decades. Members of Congress today have almost no nuclear weapons knowledge, and they ve allowed a small number of anti-nuclear activists to kill the few tentative nuclear initiatives that have reached the Hill. Individual U.S. political leaders have flatly stated that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons. In sum, states under our nuclear umbrella may be worried over both our capability and our will to protect them. The bottom line is, unless we take action, the U.S. nuclear umbrella may shrink as state after state decides that to secure a reliable deterrent they must develop their own independent nuclear weapons programs. Thus our global security alliances will shrink, and more proliferators will join the cascade. But that s not the end of the bad news. One promising U.S. response to the threatened cascade is to extend our nuclear deterrence umbrella. There may be many creative security guarantees and alliances we could negotiate to bring newly threatened nations under our umbrella, as an alternative to their going to the expense of developing their own nuclear deterrent, in the process becoming proliferators themselves. But this approach will not be open to us if our credibility continues to decline and we start losing states which once depended on us. America must take two actions: Recognize that nonproliferation requires enforcement. Act boldly, using deterrence (which saved the world for half a century) to deny North Korea and Iran a nuclear weapons capability. This will end the cascade danger, spare the world countless future nuclear horrors, and resurrect a dying nonproliferation regime. Transform our nuclear strategy to meet the threats of today s and tomorrow s world; design, test, and produce new nuclear weapons tailored to the new threats; recapture our military expertise through training and exercises; and bring credible nuclear deterrence back into the forefront of our foreign policy and national security strategy. Deterring Cascades of Proliferation

6 - 5 - It s not too late for the U.S. to use a transformed version of deterrence to stop these two rogue states. North Korea still hasn t worked out the bugs or produced deliverable weapons; and Iran still has some distance to go in enrichment and weaponization. However, since the end of the Cold War we ve laid aside our best strategy (deterrence); and we ve failed to design, test, and produce the relevant nuclear weapons which would make today s deterrent strategy as spectacularly successful as our Cold War deterrent strategy was. The deterrence needed today is quite different from that of the Cold War. The U.S. must transform its concept of deterrence to be effective against today s adversaries and threats; and we must transform both our nuclear strategy and our weapons. To date, however, the Department of Defense has failed (for several good reasons) to take the lead in this; and as a result the U.S. has been sleepwalking for sixteen years. It isn t hard to transform deterrence, but it requires clear thinking. Deterrence is based upon fear. You deter someone from taking an action against you by threatening them. There are two steps to deterrence. First, you make a declaratory statement, informing your adversary exactly what action he must take, or must not take. Second, you embark upon a series of major reinforcing measures in preparation for carrying out your threat. These measures must be so powerful that your threat achieves total credibility in the mind of your adversary. These reinforcing measures are the key to deterrence! In the Cold War we deterred the Soviet Union from launching nuclear weapons against us by threatening to destroy them in retaliation, using nuclear weapons. To achieve the essential credibility, our reinforcing measures included creating and sustaining an immense strategic deterrent triad. This deterrence worked flawlessly for half a century. Today we should deter North Korea and Iran from producing nuclear weapons by threatening, in support of nonproliferation, to destroy their nuclear facilities preemptively, using military force, if they don t completely abandon their programs. Thus we transform deterrence by changing our thinking on four points: Soviets North Korea & Iran Our objective Must NOT launch MUST dismantle Timing of our action Retaliation Preemption Our threat Nuclear weapons Military force Our targets Many (leadership, Nuclear facilities military, launchers)

7 - 6 - Note that in today s deterrence we do not threaten to use nuclear weapons, although our activities with nuclear weapons are major elements of our reinforcing measures. Similarly, in the unlikely event that deterrence fails, our initial strikes should be conventional. Our reinforcing measures with conventional forces, all highly publicized, should include such activities as: accelerated R&D of improved weapons specialized for this mission; visible weapons testing; rapid modification or procurement of these weapons; construction of mirrorimage North Korean and Iranian target arrays at our test ranges; intensive training against these ranges; focused counterproliferation exercises; announced deployments; increased readiness; elevated worldwide alert levels; etc. Where do nuclear weapons come in? Because they re so all-powerful, so devastating, so unique, so unable to be withstood, nuclear weapons are the real power in our deterrence. They provide a fearsome, credible backdrop for our conventional forces. Our reinforcing measures with nuclear weapons should include: immediate resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing; accelerated design, testing, and production of nuclear weapons with very low yield, great accuracy, reduced collateral damage, and increased security and controllability. Individual designs should be tailored for earth penetration, agent defeat, and reduced residual radiation. All this with much publicity, visibility, training, exercises, etc. Through this transformation of nuclear strategy and weapons, deterrence will work. North Korea and Iran will abandon their nuclear weapons programs without a shot being fired; and the world will become a much better place overnight. Also of great importance, this successful deterrence of proliferation would awaken the world to the reality that nonproliferation requires enforcement, thereby moving our dying nonproliferation regime to a new level of effectiveness. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy What is our U.S. nuclear strategy, and what are our requirements for nuclear weapons? This question is being asked with increasing frequency by Congress, political leaders, government advisors, and others. And not surprisingly. Since the end of the Cold War no President of either party has outlined in detail why we need nuclear weapons in the future, what our future nuclear strategy is, and what types of nuclear weapons are needed in our stockpile. Without this leadership, the national debate needed to shape this important issue has been non-existent; and the U.S. nuclear program has been marking time for sixteen years while the world around us, and the threats we face from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have changed at an astonishing pace. Our nuclear strategy is a relic of the past century, and our nuclear weapons are aged and increasingly irrelevant. Here s a brief outline of the essential transformation. Principles. Our nuclear strategy should conform to widely accepted principles. For example: The principal purpose of our nuclear weapons should be deterrence; we should maintain the minimum number of nuclear weapons possible; their only roles should be those that cannot be met by conventional weapons (e.g., defeating severe WMD threats);

8 - 7 - our weapons should be uniquely tailored for effectiveness against the current evolving target base; they should be considered as weapons of last resort; in times of great crisis they should provide the President with viable options to protect the national interest, while meeting American humane sensitivities (e.g., fewest casualties, minimum collateral damage). Threats. We should consider three: The primary threat today and in the near future is nuclear proliferation, which will place nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue states, failed or failing states, or powerful terrorist organizations in sanctuary states. North Korea and Iran are prime examples. A secondary threat, which is not imminent but might arise in a decade or two, would be from near peers a resurgent Russia or a militaristic China with greatly increased nuclear arsenals. The third threat arises from the absolutely unknowable nature of the future. With startling speed friends could become enemies; supportive nuclear weapons states could be taken over by hostile forces; unexpected major U.S. vulnerabilities could occur; fourth-generation nuclear weapons may present us with totally new threats; unanticipated alliances may be formed among adversaries, greatly raising threat levels; etc. Nuclear Strategy. For the primary threat (nuclear weapons in hands of rogue states, etc.), our strategy should be one of deterrence, but a totally new form of deterrence. We should recognize that nonproliferation requires enforcement, and when dealing with irresponsible or belligerent states (e.g., North Korea or Iran), our strategy should be one of backing up our negotiations with a threat to use "military force" to prevent these states from acquiring or producing nuclear weapons. We need never mention nuclear weapons, but our powerful reinforcing actions must involve both conventional and nuclear weapons readiness activities. For the potential secondary threat (Russia/China), adaptations of Cold War deterrence strategy should be adequate. For the third threat (unknowable future), the essentials of our strategy are rapid response and great flexibility modern equivalents of WWII's "hot production base." For nuclear weapons, the key is to keep our PERSONNEL (scientists, engineers, technicians, testing experts, production managers and workers, and military operators) in maximum state of readiness and responsiveness in procedures, training, qualification, and experience. This requires four activities: a robust advanced-concepts R&D program in all fields of nuclear weapons interest; nuclear weapons designers (who have had the humbling experience of seeing their designs tested underground) at work designing new weapons; an ongoing underground testing program for nuclear technology and weapons; and ongoing nuclear weapons production lines. These four activities require modern facilities. Nuclear Weapons Characteristics. For the primary threat we must design, test, and produce new nuclear weapons with low yields, great accuracy, reduced collateral damage, and increased security. Individual designs should be tailored for various counterproliferation missions (e.g., earth penetration, agent-defeat, reduced residual radiation). Our adversaries have spent decades emplacing their WMD facilities underground, frequently locating them near deliberately exposed civilian populations.

9 - 8 - Any U.S. nuclear weapons that do not have the above characteristics simply will not be credible, and our deterrent strategy will fail. The transformation is urgent because the threat is upon us today; and it will still take about two decades to effect major changes to the stockpile. For the secondary threat, Cold War nuclear weapons which have received life extension or (preferably) Reliable Replacement Warheads should suffice, with improved delivery systems. Contributions to Nonproliferation. Nonproliferation is all-important to national (and world) security, and it is failing rapidly. The deterrent effect of the above nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons is essential to preserving it. By stopping North Korea and Iran by deterrence, rather than military force, we will raise nonproliferation to new high levels. If we let these two states go nuclear, we can expect cascades of proliferation, including that by advanced states which previously relied on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons outlined herein are in full accord with our responsibilities under the NPT, including Article VI (reductions). Most importantly, the national security actions summarized above must be carried out with strong popular support and bipartisan consensus. This will require national leadership, public education, and national debate, similar to those which sustained U.S. strategic deterrence for decades during the Cold War. Surely America today can meet this challenge.