JCC: The Six-Day War, Egypt

Transcription

1 JCC: The Six-Day War, Egypt Chair: Andrew Nell, Crisis Director: David Berris The Greater Washington Conference on International Affairs The George Washington University International Affairs Society November 1 st, 2014

2 Chair: Introduction from the Dais Dear Delegates, Welcome to the Greater Washington Conference on International Affairs (GWCIA) XIX and, more specifically, to our simulation of the 1967 Six Day War! This committee aims to reenact the historic war between Egypt and Israel and grant delegates the power to reshape history with their cunning, wit, and diplomacy. Our committee will focus around two topics of discussion: war with Israel, and the potential for a subsequent peace. The objective will be to analyze Egypt s current geopolitical status, learn from past developments, and reflect on future goals. Note that, historically, the Six Day War remains one of the largest military defeats the Egyptian Armed Forces have ever suffered and is noted by historians as one of the most one-sided conflicts of the 20 th century. There will be a great deal of responsibility on all delegates present to rewrite our fortunes, lest the pride of the Arab world collapse. Utilizing cooperation and conflict, statecraft and strikes, this body will have the power to decisively alter the events of the Six Day War. Its actions will determine not only the outcome of the conflict, but the propensity for a lasting reconciliation. Whether turmoil or tranquility is to follow will be up to the bold command, clever strategy, and decisive action delegates are able to employee throughout committee. Please note, this synopsis of events will not provide all the research you need to perform in committee; however, much of the relevant information can be found below. This Background Guide should serve as a springboard for subsequent research. Also, keep in mind that as we revisit past events, you have the power to reshape how they unfold; do not feel bound by history s portrayal on the war. Research and think of creative ideas outside of the box. This is your chance to take the helm of leadership and control the outcome of events. The best delegates are often the ones with the most unique proposals. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact myself or your Vice Chairs for guidance. I know that Samuel, Natalia, and I are all looking forward to another successful year in Model United nations as your chairs. We hope that you will come into committee as excited as we are! Sincerely, Andrew Nell AndrewNell95@gwu.edu

3 Crisis Director: Dear Delegates, Welcome to GWCIA XIX and what is probably one of your first experiences at a Model United Nations conference. My name is David Berris and it is my pleasure to be your Crisis Director for JCC: Six Day War: Israel vs. Egypt. I am a junior majoring in International Affair in the Elliott School and concentrating in Security Policy, meaning I focus on learning about the efforts that countries take to strengthen their security relative to their rival and partner nations. My passion is Model UN and I hope to show you my passion through the intricacies of this committee. Starting Model UN as a high school freshman, I did not have the luxury of partaking in Model UN conferences while in Middle School. Yet as my skills advanced and became president of my high school s club my senior year, I knew exactly what I wanted to do when I began attending college. After a countless number of conferences attended and any awards taken home in college and in high school, I received the honor of becoming the captain of GW s Model UN travel team and Model UN Coordinator of the International Affair Society, the host organization of this conference. GW is currently ranked 13 th in the nation and a top competitor on the collegiate Model UN circuit. Competing against top schools like Harvard, West Point and University of Chicago, many of the conference staff competes on our travel team. If you find yourself loving today and truly embracing everything that a Model UN conference has to offer, I urge you to continue your Model UN endeavors into high school and even in college as you figure out what path you want to pursue. Now back to our committee. Another passion of mine is Israel and its development since its inception in The road to independence was not an easy one and maintaining that independence has proven to not be any easier. A prime example of this was the Six Day War in June of With another Arab coalition planning to attack the Jewish state, we all know what history says as Israel attacked the Sinai Peninsula. However, history means nothing in this committee. It will be up to you, the delegates, to ensure your country is on the winning side of this tension filled ordeal. No matter what side you are on, you will be representing top military officials to come up with the best strategies to deal with the many crises that you will be facing over the course of each committee session. I wish you all the best of luck on your travel into the Israeli-Arab abyss. Come in with an open mind and leave with an experience that I hope you will never forget. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at the address below. I cannot wait to meet you all in November! Cheers, David Berris dberris@gwu.edu

4 Vice Chairs: My name is Samuel Pfister and I am a freshman at George Washington University originally from Hillsborough, New Jersey. I intend to be a history major and jazz studies minor. I ve been playing piano for 11 years and have written my own music that I have performed all across New Jersey. I currently play keyboard in a funk, jazz, and blues band on campus. Debate has always been a hobby of mine, eventually developing into a passion for both international affairs and history. Being involved with Model UN and Model Congress has allowed me to travel the country, the world, and meet people of all levels of importance. I also write for The Hatchet, GWU s newspaper, and the Undergraduate law review. Best, Samuel Pfister SamuelDPfister@gwu.edu Hi I'm Natalia Zeid from Long Island, New York. I have been doing Model United Nations for five years now. I have to say it was my favorite activity in high school. I was also president of my high school team, which allowed me to travel and get even more involved with MUN. This is going to be my second time vice-chairing and I'm beyond excited to get back into MUN in college! Sincerely, Natalia Zeid NataliaZeid@gwu.edu

5 Background and Historical Context The Founding of the State of Israel & the First Arab-Israeli War After centuries of persecution across continental Europe, in 1922 the Jewish people secured the first step in achieving a long sought after objective: the establishment of a Jewish state. In that year, the British Mandate was signed and approved by the League of Nations and the United States. This established Palestine, which was controlled by the British, as a Jewish safe haven. Over the next several years Jewish immigrants began flowing into Palestine, fueling tensions with neighboring Arab states and peoples. A French victory over Syria sparked Palestinian Nationalist movements throughout the region, which often blocked Jewish immigrants from reaching land promised by the British. To quell brewing hostilities, the League of Nations and British Government established immigration quotas for Jews migrating to the region. By the late 1920s, rising hostilities led governments in Europe to begin advocating for partition of the land to create a separate Jewish and Palestinian state. Beginning in 1933, riots spread across Palestine and by 1936, such riots spread from Palestine to neighboring Arab states. Following the events of the Second World War and the Nazi genocide, the newly established United Nations and world community were highly sympathetic to the plight of the Jewish people. By 1947, the UN had devised a plan to partition Palestine into a Jewish and Arab enclave, carried out by a coalition of peacekeepers led by Great Britain. War soon broke out in the region; hundreds of people, Arab and Jewish alike, were killed over a two year period during the conflict. On May 14, 1948 British Troops began to withdraw from the main area of fighting and the Israeli Declaration of Independence was read publicly in Tel-Aviv. U.S President Truman and Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin became the first world leaders to recognize the new country. Israel s declaration of independence was rejected by the Arab world and numerous states, including Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan (modern day Jordan) united to counter the newly formed state. Despite numerical advantages, most of the Arab States were equipped with outdated weaponry (mostly of British origin) and tactics, and their united invasion of Israel was rapidly countered. By the time a ceasefire was reached, Israel had repelled all its Arab invaders and expanded its borders beyond the initial partition. During this period of heightened conflict, more than 200,000 Jews immigrated to the newly formed state of Israel. Many Jews living in

6 Palestine were driven from their homes, and 726,000 Palestinians had fled or were evicted from their homes between 1947 and Initially, it appeared as though the Arab coalition would sweep through the newly created Israeli state. After a truce on June 11, the Arab forces still held a strategically advantageous position. However, in just 10 days Israeli forces were able to turn the tides of the war after a few minor victories against a depleted Egyptian army on the southern front, such as the battles of Negba and Be'erot Yitzhak. In 1949, Israel signed separate armistices with Egypt on the 24th of February, Lebanon on the 23rd of March, Jordan on the 3rd of April, and Syria on the 20th of July. During this time, Egypt also assumed control of the Gaza Strip. 6,373 Israelis were killed in the fighting, of which, about 4,000 were soldiers, the rest being civilians. While the exact number of Arab casualties is unknown, historians and experts place the number somewhere around 7,000, about 2,000 of those being Egyptian. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were displaced during and after the fighting. About 15,000 Egyptians were also displaced in the first Arab-Israeli war. The loss came as a shock to many of the Arab countries, but none more so than Egypt. At the time, the state of Egypt was a regional superpower. They were considered to have one of the finest militaries, best support networks and the prime territorial location. The loss created political and psychological shocks that reverberated across the Arab world. The Palestinian Question Throughout the Jewish migration to Israel, heightened during the first Arab-Israeli war, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled their homes, mainly to Transjordan. During the 1948 conflict for Israeli independence, about 711,000 (from a total population of around 900,000) Palestinian Arabs fled or were removed from their land. During the 1949 Lausanne Conference, Israel allowed the return of 100,000 refugees as a goodwill gesture to further negotiations; neighbouring Arab states including Transjordan, Egypt, and Syria adopted the remaining 600,000 or so refugees. Throughout the 1950s and early 60s refugees continued to flee from Israel, though there is no confirmed number of how many. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 declared that a Palestinian Refugee was: persons of Arab origin who, after 29 November 1947, left territory at present under the control of the Israeli authorities and who were Palestinian citizens at that date" and; "Persons of Arab origin who left the said territory after 6 August 1924 and before 29 November 1947 and

7 who at that latter date were Palestinian citizens; 2. Persons of Arab origin who left the territory in question before 6 August 1924 and who, having opted for Palestinian citizenship, retained that citizenship up to 29 November By 1959 the total number of registered individuals under the UN definition surpassed 914,000. Resolution 194 also granted Palestinian refugees the right to return, in contradiction with Israeli law, so long as they practice to "live at peace with their neighbors. Most Palestinians established refugee camps in Syria and Transjordan (later renamed Jordan) in the years following their removal from Israel. To this day, thousands of their descendants still live in camps established in In response to the 1948 war and subsequent Palestinian displacement, numerous extremist groups began to form among the refugee population. Founded in 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) stands as the major resistance group to the state of Israel. The PLO s declared purpose was to regain all the land lost to Israel. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had major influence in the early organization and development of the PLO, and added a focus of Pan-Arabism the idea that all Arab states should be united to the group s goals. On September 22, 1948, the Arab League, a regional organization of Arab states, created the All-Palestine Government, which was to be the be the de facto, recognized government for all of former Palestine. However, the government was weak and eventually dissolved by President Nasser because it had failed to progress the Palestinian cause. A legislative council had been established to create law for the territory Egypt kept the council in place with official decree in The Second Arab-Israeli War (Suez Crisis) After the Second World War, Britain attempted to retain governing control over Egypt and its prized Suez Canal, a main international shipping route. In 1951, the Egyptian Government attempted to diplomatically remove the British from the Suez by refusing to recognize the lease that Britain had on the canal for an additional two decades. Relying on their garrison of troops, the British refused to leave and retained possession of the canal. In early 1952, the British attempted to disarm a police force near the Canal. Their raid led to the deaths of 41 Egyptians, and caused riots throughout Cairo, leading to the deaths of 11 British Nationals. The rioting would serve as a spark for the subsequent 1952 revolution against the monarchy. After the revolution, the British lost control of the Sudan region and came under increased

8 pressure to withdraw its soldiers from the Suez. As tensions grew, the new government, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, moved to nationalize the Suez Canal. Although the British (supported by the French and Israelis) had superiority in manpower and technology, the Egyptian army was equipped with new MIG-15 fighters and Ilyushin Il-28 bombers, as well as modernized tanks and guns from the Soviet Union. Tensions escalated and war erupted on October 29, Operation Kadesh the plan adopted by the joint British-French-Israeli militaries called for Israeli forces to initially attack the Sinai region, including the Gaza Strip. Border hostilities arose along the Jordanian-Israeli border in response to suspicions that Jordan would enter the war in support of the Egyptians. In late October and early November, 1956, British and French troops tactically infiltrated and invaded the Gaza Strip, eliminating a large Egyptian force, as well as numerous civilians. The street fighting lasted for days until better equipped British and French troops prevailed. Within a matter of weeks, British troops landed in Egyptian ports and coalition paratroopers infiltrated various Egyptian territory. Under pressure from the United States, a U.N ceasefire brought the war to an end. The British and French suffered a combined 26 deaths and 129 injuries, while Israel lost 231 soldiers, with another 899 wounded. Egypt s military losses ranged between 1,000-3,000 dead and approximately 4,000 wounded. In addition to the estimated 1,000 Egyptian civilian deaths, there was extensive damage to the navy and air force that Egypt had deployed during the war. While Britain was in control of the canal at war s end, administration was turned over to the United Nations (the United Nations Emergency Force, or UNEF). By 1957, the canal was open to shipping once again under the direction of UNEF. Despite Egypt s military losses, the war provided an immense domestic boost to Nasser, who came to be seen as a leading resistance figure across the Arab world. Egypt s Internal Order The 1952 Revolution & the Free Officers Movement The years between 1952 and 1970 saw the drive for Arab unity at its height. It was an age of solidarity and the pursuit of unity through mass political movements. By the end of World War Two, colonialism still dominated large parts of the Arab World. Egypt was a monarchy

9 under British rule and the base of Britain's presence in the Middle East. Egyptian discontent with the monarchy rose after the country s humiliating military defeat in the 1948 war against Israel. A large crowd storms into the Ministry Council Headquarters on March 28th, 1954, in Cairo, during a demonstration supporting the revolutionary regime. On July 23, 1952, a group of Egyptian army officers, calling themselves the Free Officers Movement, took power in a bloodless coup. Leading this uprising was a charismatic army officer named Gamal Abdel Nasser. This was the first military coup to happen in the Arab World and it became a precedent for many to follow. The figure head for the rebellion, however, was General Muhammad Naguib, who would become Egypt s first president. Naguib lacked political skill and lost the support of many of the younger army officers. Conflict with Naguib over strategies soon resulted in his removal, and in October, 1954, Nasser was appointed president of Egypt. Gamal Nasser & Arab Nationalism Nasser rapidly set about changing Egypt, shaped by his own visions of Arab Nationalism led by Egypt. Politically, he transformed Egypt into a republic, introducing centralised parliamentary rule; however, he is best known for his domestic social programs. Nasser's aim was to improve the conditions of the country s impoverished majority and rapidly industrialize and modernize the country. He began land reforms, free educational programs for boys and girls, and developed the nation's medical apparatus. Nasser s firmly believed Arabs would be stronger

10 if united; that they shared a common struggle against colonial powers, and that the liberation of Palestine should be an Arab duty. Egypt was captivated, and the Arab World watched closely as Nasser expanded on his brand of socialism. President Gamal Nasser, a leader of not only Egypt but the most revered figure in the wider Arab World In his first major push to achieve his dream of Pan-Arabism, Nasser entered into a political union with Syria known as the United Arab Republic (UAR). The U.A.R was jointly proclaimed by Egypt and Syria on Feb. 1, 1958, and ratified in a nationwide ballot. Despite Nasser s attempts, the U.A.R nevered expanded beyond the two nations nor did it fully integrate the two independent nations. On September 28th, 1961, following a military coup, Syria declared itself independent of Egypt; Nasser never formally recognized the split, however, and continued to officially refer to Egypt as the U.A.R Along with Egypt s concerns over the Suez, another major issue for the country was the annual flooding of the Nile. Nasser planned to build a dam to hold back the waters of the Nile. Nasser could not ask the US, or other major western powers for help with this, because they supported Israel. Therefore, he asked the USSR to provide the capital and the engineers for the huge project. The USSR also assisted in Egypt s industrialization during, providing the expertise and resources for the construction of iron and steel mills, aluminum plants, and car and food factories. Despite Nasser s bold reforms, there was simmering dissent to his rule within the

11 new political establishment. Egypt's deputy supreme commander, Abdel Hakim Amer, became one of Nasser s greatest rivals for power. After attempting to remove Amer from his post, Nasser faced an internal revolt from dozens of army officers, and was forced to reinstate Amer for fear of domestic instability. Engagement in the Yemeni Civil War Yemen s crowned monarchy had made advancements to Nasser for years on joining the UAR, although with the clear exception that the monarch retain control of Yemen; acquisition to the UAR was to serve only as a political alliance. However, in 1962, rebels who supported a republican form of government, overthrew the monarchy. Egypt supported the nationalist revolutionaries for several reasons, including Syria s departure from the U.A.R, British forces stationed in Southern Yemen, and a breakdown in relations with Saudi Arabia. On December 20th, 1962, the Yemeni Republic gained formal recognition from the United Nations. As hostilities gradually escalated between the Saudis and Egyptians, Nasser formulated the Ramadan Offensive. The plan involved a series of coordinated air strikes across Yemen, followed by a series of ground attacks by a 20,000 strong Egyptian force, to be doubled to 40,000 leading up to and during the attack. Finally, tribal leaders would be bribed into supporting the new Republic. Although initially successful, the royalist forces led by al-badr grew in strength and the two sides began to fight to a stalemate. By 1965 Egypt had run up a nearly $3 billion debt, its trade deficit reached a record $500 million, and involvement in the Yemeni Civil War was averaging $500,000/day in costs, greatly straining Egypt s finances. More than 70,000 Egyptian soldiers were committed to the war, and allocations of Egyptian chemical weapons attack in the conflict began to spread. Questions of Military Capability As Egypt found itself drawn deeper and deeper into the Yemeni Civil War, and casualties topped 20,000, the failures of its army came dramatically into light. What was revered as the most powerful army in the Arab world suffered stinging defeats at the hands of inferior tribal fighters. As the years progressed, the war continued to drag in an increasing level of soldiers, supplies, air, land, and naval power, and financial resources. The war not only imposed an enormous drain on the Egyptian state, but harmed Nasser s image of power in the Arab world. With such a significant part of the army engaged in Yemen, it also hindered the ability of the

12 military to effectively respond to other foreign threats, such as the country s readiness to engage Israel. Egypt s involvement into Yemen also highlighted another failure of the Egyptian state: the politicization of the military. Dozens of Egypt's officers found themselves in command positions due to their loyalty rather than battle prowess. This significantly weakened the military. Rise of Hostilities Israeli strikes into Syria and Jordan During the 1950s, armed resistance groups began to form in Palestinian refugee camps to restore Palestinian sovereignty and eradicate the Israeli state. By the 1960s, these armed militias has coalesced into numerous, powerful guerilla entities. Operating from the Egyptian administered Gaza Strip, the Jordanian administered West Bank, and from Syria, these Palestinian guerillas conducted many raids into Israel. Many of these groups were believed to not only have the backing of neighboring Arab governments, but to be given sanctuary by Israel s Arab populous. Syria rapidly became one of the most prolific sponsors of the Palestinian fighters, providing territorial sanctuary, logistical support, arms, and funding. There were frequent border skirmishes between these groups and Israel throughout the decade, and eventually, the Soviet Union pushed the Egyptian and Syrian governments into a mutual defense pact in November, The Soviets believed the alliance, would serve as a mutual deterrence on all side from escalating the conflict. On April 7th, 1967, during one such skirmish on the Israeli border, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) was deployed. The IAF struck dozens of Syrian positions along the border and advanced into the country, striking as far as the capital, Damascus. The Syrians responded with heavy shelling along the border and the two drew close to a full scale war. Only after heavy international pressure, including a Soviet threat to invoke the Egyptian-Syrian defense pact, did Israel full back its forces. During this time, the Jordanian government, which maintained closer ties with the West than most Arab states, began to crack down on cross-border incursions from the West Bank. Jordan s government also communicated a desire to reduce hostilities with Israel. However, it was also limited in its ability to decisively challenge the Palestinian fighters given their widespread support among the majority-palestinian population saw multiple PLO attacks

13 into Israel; on November 11th, one of these led to the death of three Israeli soldiers after hitting a landmine. In response, the Israelis authorized Operation Shredder to attack a PLO in the West Bank. On November 13th, thousands of Israeli soldiers, tanks, and aircraft invaded Jordan to target the PLO forces in the West Bank. However, they encountered a division of the Jordanian army and later the Jordanian air force. While the fighting lasted just four hours before Israel withdrew across the border, it resulted in dozens of Jordanian deaths and hundreds of injuries. The Israeli incursion, known as the Samu Incident, destroyed all Jordanian attempts to establish relations with Israel. In response to the Israeli attack, Jordan declared that Egypt and Syria had failed to defend the country against Israeli aggression. The expulsion of U.N forces and the closing of the Straits of Tiran On May 13th,1967, just one month after Israel and Syria came to the brink of war, Soviet intelligence falsely reported to the Egyptian government that Israeli troops were mobilizing along the Syrian border for a planned invasion. Israel had repeatedly threatened throughout 1967 to invade Syria in response to its support for Palestinian guerillas, and the April incident only reinforced the perception that Israel was preparing to attack. After Nasser s humiliation in the Samu Incident, and given his defense pact with the Syrians, Nasser began to mobilize the Egyptian army for war. On May 14th, Egypt began to remilitarize the Sinai Peninsula, and on May 16th, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces delivered a letter to international monitors requesting their withdrawal from Sinai. Talks between the Egyptian government and United Nations Secretary General broke down. However, the United States continued to believe that Nasser s deployment of military forces in Sinai was just a deterrent against an Israeli attack on Syria; Nasser was not, and would not, invade Israel. On May 22nd the situation escalated when Egypt announced it was closing the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli shipping. The Straits were the main transit point for all Israeli vessels and their closure represented a significant strategic threat to Israel. Invoking earlier statements made at the end of the second Arab-Israeli War, Israel declared that the closure of the Straits was equivalent to a declaration of war.

14 The Straits of Tiran, located between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, was the main exit point for Israeli shipping

15 American-Soviet intervention During the escalation of tensions, the Soviets and Americans played a very active role in trying to draw down tensions between the two sides. The Soviets had actively courted the Arab States in their broader Cold War standoff with the West. The U.S.S.R provided nearly all of the military armament of the Arab armies, and was one of their chief international backers in the U.N. It was also chiefly Soviet diplomacy that kept the April, 1967, border skirmishes between Israel and Syria from metastasizing into a full scale war. During this time, United States saw Israel as an important Cold War ally, but openly expressed its belief that the Israelis were inflaming tensions in the Middle East. Along with Israel, the U.S maintained a strategic relationship with the Saudi royal family and, to a lesser extent, the Jordanian monarch. As tensions built in the lead up to war, the United States continued to maintain a cool demeanor. American intelligence repeatedly asserted that Egypt had no desire, or strength, to initiate a war against Israel. In diplomatic communications, the U.S asserted its belief that Nasser was acting to deter an Israeli attack on Syria, and maintained that the situation could be peacefully be resolved. However, the U.S also communicated to the Soviets that an Egyptian attack on Israel could lead to a global war, and in turn the Soviets communicated to Egypt their firm desire that Egypt not initiate any war with the Israelis. Although Egypt had little strategic interest in igniting a war, and Nasser appeared to believe in a long-term drawdown of tensions, the mood of Arabs across the region was fully, passionately, and strongly in favor of war with Israel. Regional Players, Strengths, and Relations Jordan The Jordanian government, led by King Hussein bin Talal, had long had a fraught relationship with Nasser. Egypt had attempted on multiple occasions to assassinate King Hussein, and the two nations diverged over their handling of Palestine (with Egypt controlling the Gaza Strip and Jordan the West Bank), Yemen, and Arab Nationalism. Like the Saudis, Jordan saw Nasser s attempts at forming a united Arab State as a threat to its rule. Despite this divide, Egypt s militarization of Sinai peninsula created a wave of support across the Arab world that the Jordanians could not ignore, and Israeli raids into the West Bank further pushed the Jordanians to Nasser. Believing that Israel would seek to occupy the West Bank in any war, regardless of Jordanian neutrality, on May 30th, 1967, King Hussein followed Syria and signed a

16 defense agreement with Nasser. The defense pact placed Jordanian forces under the control of an Egyptian general and united the countries in resistance against Israeli. During the rise of hostilities, Jordan deployed 10 of its 11 brigades in the West Bank, totaling nearly 50,000 men and 300 tanks. The Jordanians also had a small air force of approximately 25 planes, though they were modern fighter jets. Unlike most of the Arab armies, which relied primarily on the Soviet Union for military training and supplies, the Jordanians received most of their military support from the United States. Unlike the Egyptians, who were deployed in the open desert of the Sinai, the Jordanians were stationed in the urban settings of the West Bank, which allowed for a terrain preferable to the defender. Syria The Israeli-Syrian border was one of the most frequent to experience flare ups of violence amongst Israel s Arab neighbors. As the war drew closer, Israel repeatedly conducted airstrikes over Syria, and Syrian artillery shelled Israeli positions from the Golan Heights. Although Syria had withdrawn from the United Arab Republic alliance with Egypt, the two maintained close military and political ties in the face of Israeli aggression. Nur al-din al-atasi, President of Syria, also received extensive aid from the Soviet Union. It was Soviet reports of an impending invasion of Syria that prompted Nasser to move his military into the Sinai. During the hostilities, Syria has been amassing 75,000 of it s approximately 100,000 man army along the Israeli-Syrian border. The Golan Heights, a portion of Syria along the border, was a steep inclination that had been heavily fortified for years in anticipation of war. Syrian artillery was stationed along the Golan and easily rained down on Israeli positions. However, the Syrians were military outmatched by Israel, and the country relied heavily on its defense pact with Egypt to hold back the Israelis. The Egyptian Armed Forces Command Structure The army was divided into four regional commands - Regional Commander of Suez, Regional Commander of Sinai, Regional Commander of Nile Delta, and Regional Commander of the Nile Valley - with the rest of Egypt falling under the defense of the Commander of the Frontier Corps. The Commander of the Navy administered Egypt s naval forces, while the Commander of Air Forces and Defense was tasked with maintaining both Egypt s offensive air

17 force and defensive anti aircraft measures. All three branches of the military were led by the Commander of the Armed Forces, who reported directly to President Nasser. In the Sinai, command was divided between individual division commanders, who reported to the Commander of the Field Army. Preparations Egypt s battle strategy against the Israelis was known as the Qahir Defense Plan. This was a strategy that called for the Egyptian frontline divisions to defend and absorb an Israeli attack, and then for their forces in reserve to launch a counteroffensive against Israel. Despite the defensive nature of the Egyptian battle plan, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer began to draw up plans for a war-starting offensive against the Israelis. Known as Operation Dawn, the Egyptian plan called for the Egyptian Air Force to launch a coordinated strategic bombing campaign against Israeli airfields, cities, and ports. The aerial assault would be followed by a subsequent ground invasion, with armored divisions from Egypt and Jordan linking to cut Israel in half. Egyptian forces were sent to Jordan on June 2nd, along with Soviet artillery and other military supplies. While President Nasser opposed Amer s proposal, he allowed planning to continue to avoid a political standoff. After the Soviet warning to Egypt about initiating a war, however, Nasser scuttled all plans for the offensive. Committee Positions & Powers 1. Commander of the Air Force and Defense, Air Marshal Muhammad Sidqi Mahmoud Entails full operational control of the Egyptian Air Force, the largest in the Arab World. These forces can be deployed offensively against the Israelis or held back to defend Egyptian territory. In addition, the Air Marshal maintained full responsibility for defending the sovereign airspace of the Egyptian state, including the defense of air bases, ground forces, and civilian centers from the Israeli Air Force. Egypt s air defense system is reportedly uncoordinated, inadequate, and vulnerable to Israeli incursions. The Air Force is also understaffed for pilots and support crew, and pilot training is subpar to their Israeli counterparts 2. Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer Besides President Nasser, Field Marshal Amer may be one of the most powerful men in Egypt. He has repeatedly clashed with Nasser over military policy, and often acts independent his leader in making tactical decisions. However, there are limits to how far he can act along, especially given Nasser s wide popularity in the country and region. Amer maintains effective command of the entire spectrum of the Egyptian Armed Forces, and his loyalists maintain senior positions in all branches of the armed forces. Amer notoriously favors personal loyalties over merit, and is widely held responsible for Egypt s failed performance in Yemen. He is also far

18 more eager than Nasser for war with the Israelis, believing Egypt will triumphantly march into Israel and reclaim the entire country as an Arab State. 3. Director of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), Salah Nasr The GID is responsible for providing national and regional intelligence to Nasser. The GID was first established in 1954 by Nasser, Salah Nasr is seen as a competent leader who has vastly reformed the GID into an effective intelligence agency. GID has figured prominently into Egyptian foreign policy, and has been used by President Nasser on numerous occasions to aid independence movements across the globe. However, Egyptian Intelligence is still vastly behind its Israeli counterpart in capabilities. GID is tasked with implanting spies in the Israeli government, discovering Israeli battle plans and intentions, uncovering the objectives of neighboring Arab States and foreign governments, and routing out any Israeli spies that may have penetrated the government. 4. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Mohamed Fawzi Entails coordinating Egypt s military officers so that the army acts in unison. The Chief of Staff serves as a go-between for President Nasser and the military, and is in charge of managing the civilian-military divide. The Chief of Staff may also advise the President on military policy. General Fawzi also serves as the military Secretary General of the Arab League. Fawzi has a good relationship with President Nasser, and unconfirmed reports claim he had clashed with Field Marshal Amer over military policy. 5. Minister of War, Shams Badran In charge of military colleges, recruitment, mobilization, veterans affairs, and military facilities in Egypt. The Minister of War is responsible for ensuring Egypt is adequately prepared for war. The task is particularly daunting given that tens of thousands of Egypt s and nearly half of its western trained officers are currently committed to Yemen. The Minister of War is also the civilian authority over the military, though its actual command powers are limited. Badran has close ties to Field Marshal Amer and his rise to Minister of War is directly tied to his personal relationship with Amer. The Minister of War will also be in charge of maintaining adequate supplies from Cairo reach the armed forces during the course of the war. 6. Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, Major-General Sa adi Nagib A division is unit of several thousands soldiers composed of several brigades, and is the smallest unit capable of independent battlefield operation. An Infantry Division is one in which a majority, though not all, of the division s battalions are infantry (foot soldiers). The 2nd division is stationed in Northeastern Sinai, south of the 7th division, and is part of the first line of defense against the Israelis. Any significant Israeli crossing into Northern Sinai will undoubtedly encounter this force. The 2nd division is designed to offer a strong, frontal resistance of minefield, entrenched positions, and pillar boxes, with artillery further back, and to encircle an invading Israeli force. 7. Commander of the 6th Mechanized Division, Major-General Abd el Kader Hassan A division is unit of several thousands soldiers composed of several brigades, and is the smallest unit capable of independent battlefield operation. A mechanized division is one in which a majority of the division s battalions are transported in armored fighting vehicles, stronger both

19 offensively and defensively than lighter-sheathed motorized divisions. The division in an inbetween in terms of its ability to be rapidly mobile. It is a heavy fighting force, however, capable of utilizing significant firepower. The 6th division is part of the first line of defense and is sprawled back into the heart of the Sinai. Given its location, should it fall it would leave the 4th armored division vulnerable to an Israeli attack on its flank. 8. Commander of the 7th Infantry Division, Major-General Abd el Aziz Soliman A division is unit of several thousands soldiers composed of several brigades, and is the smallest unit capable of independent battlefield operation. An Infantry Division is one in which a majority, though not all, of the division s battalions are infantry (foot soldiers). The 7th division is situated in the northernmost point of the Sinai Peninsula and is within the first ring of defense against the Israelis. The 7th division also lays at the Gaza-Egyptian border, and can both send forces from the Sinai into Gaza, and receive forces from Gaza into the Sinai. 9. Commander of the Special Task Forces, General Sa ad el Din Shazly The Special Task Forces are composed of commandos (elite infantry and special forces) and paratroopers (soldiers trained to operate in conjunction with the air force to drop behind enemy lines). The Special Forces are elite soldiers and are stationed just north of the back end of the 6th division. They are part of the secondary line of defense, capable of blunting any Israeli forces that break through the first line of defense or leading a counteroffensive against the Israelis after the front line forces absorb the initial attack. General Shazly remains loyal to President Nasser, and previously commanded the 2nd Infantry Division, commanded Arab forces in the UN Congo mission, and served as a commander of a Paratrooper Battalion. 10. Commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, Major-General Osman Nasser A division is unit of several thousands soldiers composed of several brigades, and is the smallest unit capable of independent battlefield operation. An Infantry Division is one in which a majority, though not all, of the division s battalions are infantry (foot soldiers). The 3rd Infantry Division is situated ~ 30 miles behind the Second Division, and is strategically aligned in a similar manner as the Second. They are part of the secondary line of defense, capable of blunting any Israeli forces that break through the first line of defense or leading a counteroffensive against the Israelis after the front line forces absorb the initial attack. The 3rd Infantry Division contains more armored and motorized brigades than its counterparts in the first line of defense, combining enhanced speed with additional firepower. 11. Commander of the 4th Armored Division, Major-General Sidki el Ghoul A division is unit of several thousands soldiers composed of several brigades, and is the smallest unit capable of independent battlefield operation. An Armored Division is one in which the battalions are a mix of infantry (foot soldiers), armored fighting vehicles, and tanks. The Armored Division is highly mobile and contains the most firepower of any force in the Sinai. The 4th Armored is part of the third line of defense against the Israelis, capable of blunting any Israeli forces that break through the first two lines of defense and in charge of leading the Egyptian counteroffensive. The 4th Armored Division is also the first line of ground defense for the Egyptian air base in Bir Gifgafa in the Sinai. Perhaps most importantly, the 4th is the primary line of defense against the Gidi and Milta Mountain Passes. All Egyptian supplies to

20 southern and central Sinai pass through these passes, and should they fall to Israeli control IDF forces could rapidly cut off the Sinai Peninsula from the rest of Egypt. 12. Commander of the Palestinian Division, Major-General Mohammed Abd el Moneim Khalil A division is unit of several thousand soldiers composed of several brigades, and is the smallest unit capable of independent battlefield operation. The majority of the Palestinian Division battalions are infantry. The Palestinian Division is in charge of the entire defense of the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip. In addition, the Palestinian Division will be fighting alongside the Palestinian Fedayeen, who are mostly irregular guerrilla forces more adept to hit and run tactics than prolonged battlefield operations. Nonetheless, the Fedayeen provide a large potential for increased manpower. 13. Regional Commander of the Sinai, General Abd el Mushin Murtaga The Regional Commander of Sinai is one of five forces in charge of the defense of Egypt (the other four being the regional commanders of Suez, Nile Delta, Nile Valley, and Frontier Corps). The Regional Command, Sinai, is in charge of all Armed Divisions stationed in the Sinai Peninsula. The Regional Commander primarily relays orders from Cairo to the on-the-ground commanders. As such, it is the commander s responsibility to ensure the battle decisions of Field Marshal Amer materialize into action; this speaks nothing to your relationship with him or Nasser. Sinai is perhaps the most important battlefield in the war, and should any orders from the top fail to be carried out, a Court Martial may follow. The Sinai Regional Commander will have to work alongside the Commander of the Field Army (see Field Army position for further information) 14. Commander of the Navy, Admiral Suleiman Ezzat After the Second Arab Israeli War, Egypt s small navy was almost entirely defeated. Since that time it has only half-heartedly been rebuilt, and it is still largely a spent force. However, the Navy still remains some capabilities, and with the main land flashpoints lying along the sea, the Navy can still play a significant role. The Navy is tasked with offensive naval assaults, defending Egypt s waterways, and amphibious troop movements. While the abilities of this position at face value are limited, creative utilization of the powers of maritime control can allow for broad portfolio powers. 15. Commander of the Field Army, Lt. Gen. Salah el Din Mukhsayn The Commander of the Field Army is in charge of coordinating all ground forces in the Sinai and Suez and maintaining communication between divisions. Receives battles assessments and relays those conditions up. You can, along with the Regional Commander, freely pass information between any division commanders; however, any battlefield orders will require the approval of Field Marshal Amer. Together, you may try to issue orders without Amer s authority, but such action will be deemed insubordination and carries significant risk. 16. Regional Commander of the Suez The Regional Commander of Suez is one of five forces in charge of the defense of Egypt (the other four being the regional commanders of Sinai, Nile Delta, Nile Valley, and Frontier Corps). The Regional Command, Suez, is in charge of all Armed Divisions stationed in the along the Suez Canal. It is the commander s responsibility to ensure the battle decisions of Field Marshal

21 Amer materialize into action. The Suez Regional Command has ~80,000 soldiers under its command. The Suez Regional Commander will have to work alongside the Commander of the Field Army to manage any forces involved in battle (see Field Army position for further information). 17. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mahmoud Riad The Foreign Affairs Minister will be in charge of managing Egypt s relationships with all foreign governments. These include coordinating responses with Jordanian and Syrian allies as well as leveraging diplomatic alliances with more distant nations, such as the Soviet Union. You may use this role to try and draw foreign powers more directly into any conflict, or to try and leverage their power to push for a decrease in hostilities 18. Vice President, Zakaria Mohieddin The Vice President will be Egypt s point person for relations with Israel. You will be in charge of maintaining lines of communication with the Zionist entity during and after the war, and gauging their willingness for a ceasefire and, later, a formal peace treaty. It is your job to represent the collective voice of Egypt, and if you are found to be heading too far astray of President Nasser you may find yourself quickly expelled from office. Questions to Consider 1. Will the tensions with Israel inevitably lead to war? Is war in Egypt s interests? 2. As each of you will have differing perspectives, how will you work together to form a unified Egyptian response? 3. How best can you leverage Egypt s foreign alliances? 4. What would Egypt want in a peace treaty? What can it, realistically, also expect Israel to cede in negotiations. And how will the Egyptian people, not to mention the Arab World, react to any deal you sign? 5. What role should the Palestinians have in any future negotiations? 6. How will the results of a victory, or defeat, affect Egypt s internal order?