Esteban Peralta. November Office Address: Department of Economics Yale University New Haven, CT Telephone: +1 (203)

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1 Esteban Peralta Office Address: Department of Economics New Haven, CT Telephone: +1 (203) Personal web page: Citizenship: Argentina, F-1 visa Fields of Concentration: Microeconomic Theory Market Design Mechanism Design Desired Teaching: Microeconomics Game Theory Matching Theory Mechanism Design Comprehensive Examinations Completed: 2013 (Oral): Microeconomic Theory, Behavioral Economics (Written): Microeconomics, Macroeconomics. Dissertation Title: Essays on Market Design.

2 Committee: Larry Samuelson (chair). Johannes Hörner (co-chair). Laura Doval (co-chair). Expected Completion Date: May Degrees: Ph.D., Economics,, 2018 (expected). M.Phil., Economics,, M.A., Economics,, M.A., Economics, Universidad de San Andrés, B.A., Economics (magna cum laude), Universidad de Buenos Aires, Fellowships, Honors and Awards: Cowles Foundation Fellowship, Graduate Fellowship, National Research Council, (CONICET), Universidad de San Andrés, fellowship, Universidad de Buenos Aires, (UBACyT) Teaching Experience: : Intermediate Microeconomics (undergraduate, instructor: L. Samuelson): Fall Intermediate Microeconomics (undergraduate, instructor: E. Chalioti): Spring 17. Introductory Microeconomics (undergraduate, instructor: T. Koker): Summer 17. Game Theory (undergraduate, instructor: B. Nalebuff): Spring 14. Intermediate Macroeonomics (undergraduate; instructor: R. Fair): Fall 16. Universidad de San Andrés: Economics I (undergraduate, instructor: J.C. de Pablo): Macroeconomics I (undergraduate, instructor: S. Katz): Microeconomics I (undergraduate, instructor: D. Fernandez Felices): Universidad de Buenos Aires: Macroeconomics I (undergraduate, instructor: R. Albrieu):

3 Microeconomics II (undergraduate, instructor: P. Fajfar): Microeconomics II (undergraduate, instructor: Martín Rossi): Microeconomics II (undergraduate, instructor: S. Auguste): Industrial Organization (undergraduate, instructor: D. Maceira): Game Theory (undergraduate, instructor: P. Fajfar): Microeconomics I (undergraduate, instructor: M. Rossi): Research and Work Experience: Research Assistant to professor Daniel Maceira, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Research Assistant to professor Pablo Fajfar, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Research Assistant to professor Javier García Fronti, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Working papers: - Participation in matching markets with distributional constraints (job market paper). - Stability in matching markets with distributional constraints. - Bayesian implementation with verifiable information. - Expressible beliefs in complete models. Work in Progress: - The rural hospital theorem in presence of incomplete information. - Certifiable-based knowledge. - Endogenous distributional constraints in matching markets. - Ordinal constrained stability and envy-freeness. - On the relationship between awareness and completeness (with Fernando Tohme). Seminar and Conference Presentations: - Games 2012; Fourth Congress of the Game Theory Society, Istanbul, Turkey, th Conference on Logic and The Foundations of Game Theory and Decision Theory (LOFT), Bergen, Norway, Young Economists Symposium 2017,. Languages: Spanish (native), English (fluent).

4 References: Prof. Larry Samuelson Prof. Johannes Hörner Department of Economics Department of Economics New Haven, CT New Haven, CT PO Box PO Box Phone: Phone: Prof. Laura Doval Prof. Tolga Koker California Institutue of Technology Division of Humanities and Social Sciences Department of Economics Pasadena, CA New Haven, CT Phone: PO Box Phone: Dissertation abstract My dissertation focuses on understanding how and when the design of market allocations affects the market s ability to induce agents to participate and truthfully reveal their information. Chapter 1: Participation in Matching Markets with Distributional Constraints (job market paper) Many markets where individuals are assigned to institutions impose artificial capacity constraints. Some important examples include medical residency programs trying to reduce the number of residents in urban regions and school districts aiming to limit school segregation. This paper develops a theory of stability in which blocking opportunities capture matching arrangements outside the market and shows that artificial constraints might affect agents' incentives to participate. No deterministic assignment satisfying the desired constraints is stable, but lotteries over these assignments are unblocked whenever agents' preferences are not aligned; i.e., whenever the most preferred set of residents of every hospital contains some resident who deems another hospital to be preferable. Intuitively, each agent can be matched with positive probability to her/its most preferred set of agents and, so, every resident would only be willing to

5 opt out with a hospital that would not accept. My main observation is that some alignment of preferences is consistent with the existence of stable outcomes, but not too much alignment is necessary. I construct an algorithm that recursively identifies, for every preference profile, the set of coalitions that must be matched with probability one and, so, obtains the lowest constraints that can be imposed without compromising full participation. Even when stable outcomes exist, there might not be an unblocked lottery over envy-free assignments satisfying the desired constraints. Hence, markets imposing artificial constraints might face an unavoidable conflict between participation and ex-post fairness. Since existing markets employ deterministic mechanisms that do not induce full participation, these results rationalize why most of them fail to induce allocations satisfying their desired constraints and suggest that random mechanisms might constitute an effective, albeit limited, re-design. Chapter 2: Stability in matching markets with distributional constraints Some matching markets assigning individuals to institutions impose constraints on sets of institutions. For example, medical residency programs set quotas on urban regions to increase the number of residents in rural regions. Since quotas are implemented by assigning a regional share to each institution, an externality-like effect within regions where the quota binds might arise. This paper investigates whether and when the desired allocation can be achieved without externalities. I propose a stability notion -- constrained stability -- that assumes quotas are binding but that regional shares cannot be enforced. Stable outcomes are therefore fair assignments involving fair shares. I show that constrained stable outcomes exist whenever agents' preferences are sufficiently aligned; namely, whenever every agent agrees on the most preferred institution in every region and finds every other institution unacceptable. Hence, constrained stable outcomes always exist in markets where regions contain a single institution -- like most affirmative action policies pursued by school districts. Moreover, every institution is assigned the same number of agents at every constrained stable outcome and all of these outcomes coincide in every region where the quota binds. Finally, I show that a modified version of deferred acceptance produces a constrained stable outcome whenever one exists. The possible non-existence of constrained stable outcomes highlights that markets imposing aggregate distributional constraints must have the ability to enforce unfair shares. Chapter 3: Bayesian implementation with verifiable information This paper studies whether and when the ability of agents to prove their claims by presenting evidence -- enlarges the class of fully implementable allocations; namely, allocations that can be obtained as the outcome of some mechanism in all of its equilibria. I first show that generalizations of standard conditions namely, incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity - are jointly necessary, and sufficient for full implementation within a suitable class of environments. The sufficiency part constructs an indirect mechanism that exploits the presence of verifiable information by asking agents to report more than their information. A natural question is whether the presence of verifiable information can be exploited by the direct

6 mechanism. My main observation suggests, however, that the answer is negative. That is, I show that whenever some profile of reports is verifiable but gives rise to an undesirable outcome, an allocation can be fully implemented by its direct mechanism only if is not incentive compatible in the absence of verifiable information. Since the use of indirect mechanisms is typically limited in most real applications, this result suggests that the presence of verifiable information might carry limited benefits.