Executive Director Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Colorado State University Fort Collins, CO February 3, 2012

Transcription

1 A Presentation b Henr Sokolski Executive Director Nonproliferation Polic Education Center Colorado State Universit Fort Collins, CO Februar 3, 2012

2

3 50000 Op peration nall Deploed Warrheads U.S Russia

4 Operation O nall Dep ploed Wa arheads 6,000 5,000 US U.S. 4,000 3,000 Russia 2,000, 1,

5 Fissile Material Control Treat Treat (FMCT) Comprehensive Test Ban Treat (CTBT) Additional New START agreements Sharing peaceful nuclear energ technolog under proliferation controls

6 Total # o of Operattionall D Deploed d Nuclear W N Warhead ds China Pakistan India Israel France UK USSR 5000 USA Russia

7

8

9 countries countries plus the EU

10 New Nuclear Powered States Outside of the EU: 2031 Countries shown in beige alread have established nuclear power programs or are members of the EU

11 # of Operattionall D Deploed d Warheads W 5500 U.S Russia 4500 UK 4000 France 3500 India low 3000 PRC 3,000? (Karber) India high 2500 Pakistan low 2000 Pakistan high 1500 PRC 1,660? ((FAS)) 1000 Israel low New START goal Israel high China 500 China Estimate

12

13

14

15

16 1. Take T k more concerted d action i alone, l with i h out allies lli and d friends, f i d and d with Russia to clarif and constrain China s and other states offensive strategic militar capabilities. 2. Encourage nuclear supplier states to condition the further export of civilian nuclear plants upon the recipient forswearing making nuclear l ffuell and d opening their h nuclear l ffacilities l to the h llatest, most intrusive, international nuclear inspection procedures. 3. Do more to reduce states access to surplus nuclear weapons and fissile material stockpiles that the could convert into bombs.

17 SLIDE 3 : FROM U.S. STRATEGIC DOMINANCE TO A COMPRESSED NUCLEAR CROWD Russia and the USA State Department p Fact Sheet,, JJune 1,, 2011 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists UK, France, India, Pakistan, China Pakistan s Nuclear Future: Worries Beond War (Chapter 6: Fissile Materials in South Asia and the I li i Implications off the h U.S. India U S I di Nuclear N l Deal D l b b Mian Mi et al.,) l ) Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Arms Control Association SIPRI Yearbook 2011 Federation of American Scientists Israel Arms Control Association Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production, 2008, Alexander Glaser and Zia Mian Frank Barnab, Barnab The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East (I. (I B. B Tauris, Tauris London, London 1989); and M. Vanunu, Interviews with Barnab, September Air Force Report: The Third Temple s Hol of Holies: Israel s Nuclear Weapons b Warner Farr, LTC, U.S. Arm (Sept. 1999) The Sampson Option b Semor Hersh Brower, Kenneth S., A Propensit for Conflict: Potential Scenarios and Outcomes of War in the Middle East, Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report no. 14, (Februar 1997),

18 SLIDE 4: 2011: POTENTIAL NUCLEAR BREAK OUT STOCKPILES Global Fissile Material Report, 2010 SLIDE 5: FROM TWO NUCLEAR CAPABLE MISSILE COUNTRIES TO 27 Arms Control Association, Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories available from SLIDE 8: THE NEXT DECADE: NUCLEAR UNCERTAINTIES AND COMPETITIONS China William Wan, Georgetown Students Shed Light on China s Underground Missile Sstem for Nuclear Weapons, The Washington Post, November 29, 2011 Hans Kristensen, No, China Does Not Have 3,000 Nuclear Weapons, FAS Strategic Securit Blog, December 3, 2011, SLIDE 11: OUR PROLIFERATION PAST AND FUTURE Henr D. Sokolski, Nuclear 1914: The Next Big Worr, in Henr Sokolski, ed., Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Ma 2006, p. 44, available from

19 SLIDE 12: OUR PROLIFERATION PAST AND FUTURE Henr D. Sokolski, Nuclear 1914: The Next Big Worr, in Henr Sokolski, ed., Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Ma 2006, p. 44, available from