Lithtuania s International Obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Field

Transcription

1 Conference Nuclear Power Safety Regulation Challenges to commemorate the 20 th anniversary of Lithuanian State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) Lithtuania s International Obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Field Marius Davainis Head of Nuclear Material Control and Physical Security Division State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) Vilnius, 10 November 2011

2 Contents International Context: Evolution of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime Safeguards Application in Lithuania

3 The First Twenty-Five Years: Creation of IAEA and its Safeguards System USSR NW test Atoms for IAEA Peace Proposalestablished 1 st IAEA SG system (INFCIRC/26) Expansion of SG system (INFCIRC/66, Rev.1 and Rev.2) US 1 st and only use of nuclear weapons UK NW test France NW test China NW test Latin American NWFZ Treaty opened for signature NPT opened for signature

4 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Coverage Under 66 Safeguards Agreements Heavy Water Production Spent Fuel Storage Mining Ore Concentration Conversion Fuel Fab. Reactors and CAs Reprocessing Nuclear-related infrastructure: research centers and laboratories, industry activities and capabilities Enrichment HEU PU WEAPONIZATION

5 The NPT Nuclear-Weapon States (NWSs) Not to provide nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices to NNWS (Art. I) Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWSs) Not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Art. II) Accept Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in the State (Art. III.1) Conclude CSA within 18 months (Art. III.4) All States Parties Not to transfer nuclear material and special equipment to NNWSs except subject to Agency safeguards (Art. III.2) Pursue negotiations in good faith on cessation of arms race and on disarmament (Art. VI)

6 CSAs: State s s undertaking The Agreement should contain an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere... INFCIRC/153, Para. 1

7 CSAs: State s s tasks Establish a State System of Accounting and Control, including measures for tracking inventories, production, imports and exports of nuclear material Agree with IAEA on Subsidiary Arrangements Adopt necessary implementing legislation, regulations to ensure that natural and juridical persons comply with the obligations under the CSA, so the State may comply with its obligations

8 The Following Two Decades: Comprehensive Safeguards System NPT enters into force INFCIRC/153: Model for NPT SG Agreements approved India tests peaceful nuclear device South Pacific NWFZ Treaty EIF IAEA starts strengthening SG NPT Zangger Committee (Trigger List published in 1974 INFCIRC/209) 1 st NPT SG Agreement enters into force Nuclear Suppliers Group (Guidelines published in 1978 INFCIRC/254) Iraq invades Kuwait

9 Fuel Cycle Coverage under CSAs Heavy Water Production Spent Fuel Storage Mining Ore Concentration Conversion Fuel Fab. Reactors and CAs Reprocessing Nuclear-related infrastructure: research centers and laboratories, industry activities and capabilities Enrichment HEU PU WEAPONIZATION

10 The Next Decade: Strengthened Safeguards System IAEA discovery of Iraq s nuclear weapons programme South Africa: declares dismantled 6 weapons DPRK: noncompliance; report to UNSC African and South-East Asian NWFZ Treaties developed India, Pakistan NW tests IAEA s Programme 93+2 initiated DPRK: IAEA detects inconsistencies NPT extended indefinitely Model Additional Protocol approved (INFCIRC/ 540)

11 Coverage under CSAs with APs Heavy Water Production Spent Fuel Storage Mining Ore Concentration Conversion Fuel Fab. Reactors and CAs Reprocessing Nuclear-related infrastructure: research centers and laboratories, industry activities and capabilities Enrichment HEU PU WEAPONIZATION

12 Aspects of Integrated Safeguards Broader conclusion No diversion of nuclear material Absence of undeclared nuclear activities State-level approach Unannounced inspections Satellite imagery Remote monitoring

13 Lithuania: Safeguards Legal Framework NPT adhered in 1991 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153) concluded in 1992 Additional Protocol came in force since 2000 Euratom Treaty joined in 2004 INFCIRC/193 took over INFCIRC/153 in 2008

14 Timeline of Lithuania s s involvement in the Non-Proliferation Regime Signing the NPT Signing of Additional Protocol Additional Protocol enters into force EU Membership (Joining the Euratom Treaty) Integrated safeguards started Conclusion of Safeguatds Agreement (INFCIRC/413) Ratification of CTBT Broader conclusion in the IAEA SIR for 2003 Joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group INRCIRC/193 superseded INFCIRC/413

15 Nuclear facilities (1) Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) Two RBMK type reactors Operation life time MBA code WLTA 10 inventory KMPs

16 Material Balance Area WLTA Structure of INPP material balance area UNIT 1 KMP-B KMP-C KMP-D KMP-2 KMP-E KMP-1 KMP-A KMP-4 KMP-1 KMP-3 KMP-3 KMP-F KMP-G KMP-H KMP-2 KMP-I UNIT 2

17 Nuclear facilities (2) INPP was the only nuclear facility until 1999 That year the spent nuclear fuel dry storage came into operation the spent fuel is planned to be stored for 50 years in this interim storage

18 Nuclear facilities (2) Spent nuclear fuel dry storage for CASTOR and CONSTOR type containers MBA code WLTD 2 inventory KMPs

19 Material Balance Area WLTD Structure of dry storage material balance area КMP - 1 KMP-A KMP-B КMP - 2 КMP - 3

20 Material Balance Areas LT-A LT-C LT-D

21 Additional Protocol Signed on 11 March 1998 Ratified on 21 March 2000 Entered into force on 5 July 2000

22 Summary of Article 2.a. 2.a.(i) Nuclear fuel cycle related research and development activities not involving nuclear material; authorized or controlled by the State 2.a.(ii) Operational activities of safeguards relevance at facilities and locations outside facilities 2.a.(iii) Buildings on sites 2.a.(iv) Scale of operations for Annex I activities 2.a.(v) Uranium mines, uranium and thorium concentration plants 2.a.(vi) Source material holdings, imports and exports 2.a.(vii) Exempted nuclear material

23 Summary of Article 2.a. 2.a.(viii) Intermediate or high-level waste 2.a.(ix) Exports and imports of specified equipment and non-nuclear materials 2.a.(x) Plans for development of fuel-cycle and/or fuel cycle related research and development 2.b.(i) Non-governmental fuel cycle research & development not involving nuclear material 2.b.(ii) Activities identified by the Agency 2.c Amplifications and clarifications

24 Initial Declaration Major part of information was related to the Ignalina NPP site R&D activities did not quite fall into the definition provided in the Additional Protocol Scientific institutions and their activity profiles were indicated Exempted nuclear material was deduced

25 Subsequent Declarations Updated declarations submitted annually Updates included: R&D activities mainly in the nuclear safety area New buildings or changing content of buildings on the sites Change of location of exempted nuclear material New long term projects (10 year plans) Report entitled Lithuania s Nuclear Past: a Historical Survey was issued

26 Broader Conclusion Conclusion for Lithuania of no diversion of nuclear material and absence of undeclared nuclear activities was reported in the IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report for 2003 The conclusion was reiterated for the subsequent years

27 Integrated Safeguards Unique on-load fuelled reactor Spent fuel transfers to the dry storage Decommissioning projects Transfer of nuclear fuel from Unit 1 to Unit 2 Commissioning of new dry storage and subsequent spent nuclear fuel shipments Control of nuclear material in the radioactive waste New safeguards elements introduced: Unannounced inspections Remote monitoring

28 Trilateral Agreement INFCIRC/193 and its AP came into force in Lithuania on 1 January 2008 Final and initial PILs sent respectively to the IAEA and European Commission VATESI issued new regulation Copies of all reports sent to EC have to be submitted to VATESI VATESI responsible for the AP issues

29 AP of the Trilateral Agreement (INFCIR/193) Articles 2a(v), (vi), (vii), v(iii) EC responsibility. Articles 2a(i), (iv), (x), 2b(i) State responsibility. Articles 2a(iii) shared responsibility.

30 Latest Developments Updating of the state accounting system (STAR) New input format (XML file) Reorganization of WLTC MBA 20 new MBA codes Information flow between operator, VATESI, EC and IAEA and their involvement Operator reports directly to EC, copies to VATESI Inspections planned by EC, unannounced inspections by IAEA

31 Future Safeguards Application Implementation of Safeguards by Design Concept for new nuclear facilities B1 project (New MBA WLTE) Visaginas NPP

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