Rethinking the Nuclear Terrorism Threat from Iran and North Korea

Transcription

1 Rethinking the Nuclear Terrorism Threat from Iran and North Korea A Presentation by Henry Sokolski Executive Director The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center 1718 M Street, NW, Suite 244 Washington, DC npec@npec-web.org; website: npec-web.org Made before a Symposium on Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction Grinnell College October 31, 2005

2 Presumed Worst Worry: Iran and the DPRK Will Pass the Bomb on to Terrorists October 11, 2001Al Qaeda threat to New York could be followed by other Axis of Evil hand offs Iran, DPRK Justification for nuclear talks with DPRK and maintaining military and UNSC option for Iran is that they could sell their nuclear production to terrorists Need for Homeland Security Office to spend billions on first responders, install radiation detection capability at major seaports, airports and border crossings As US-Russian efforts to blend down and secure surplus nuclear weapons uranium (the nuclear terrorist material of choice) advance, odds Iran or DPRK may become source for terrorist uranium bomb increase

3 Alternative View: Terrorist Takeover of Pakistan, Nuclear 1914 At least As Worrisome More likely and terrifying than an Iranian or North Korean hand off of nuclear weapons or material to terrorists is the terrorist take over of an existing nuclear country e.g., Pakistan More likely and terrifying still is that Iran s and North Korea s example will continue to a.) distort a firm reading of the nuclear rules b.) encourage an incremental increase in the number of nuclear-ready states, and c.) lead to a Nuclear 1914, in which the least terrorist incident or political miscalculation could bring nuclear war Emphasis on conventional view is encouraging civilian nuclear and nuclear nonproliferation policies that may only increase the prospects of these alternative threats being reallized

4 Highly Enriched Uranium: Nuclear Terrorist Material of Choice

5 Plutonium Nuclear Weapon: A More Complicated Proposition

6 Bad News: Laws of Physics Unfriendly to Nuclear Detection Gamma rays from Plutonium are local Radiation from weapons uranium is minimal Detection of heavy masses with, protons, mueons, x-rays, produces high false alarm rate Shielding, deconstructing critical mass, further complicates detection

7 Good News: Iranian Nuclear Handoff to Terrorist Is Not Imminent Iran HEU will initially be rare and closely guarded by Iranian regime (only offers to share nuclear technology to date is with other states) Shias and Persians are distrustful of Arab Sunnis Much more controllable conventional, terrorist explosives are available Loss of Iranian state control of nuclear program is a bigger worry major new mission of Revolutionary Guards

8 Why DPRK Handoff Is Also Unlikely Have suggested nuclear sales but not to terrorist groups Risk of intelligence penetration of nuclear program (especially HEU production, which DPRK has yet to admit to) Alternative means to make cash (conventional arms sales, counterfeiting, drug trade) far less risky to continued Party rule and international reaction

9 Most Worrisome Terrorist Threat: Not State Nuclear Handoff, but a Terrorist Takeover of a Nuclear State Pakistan A.Q. Khan actively sympathetic to Taliban, could be elected president today 4 Senior Pakistani nuclear scientists discussed nuclear topics with Al Qaeda At least 2 assassination attempts on President Musharraf by military officers cooperating with Al Qaeda Pakistani intelligence service and retired military are very supportive of Taliban, Al Qaeda, and related groups

10 Worth Rethinking: State-based Nuclear Threats and Securing Nuclear Materials Terrorist takeover of state Penetration of state-run nuclear programs (e.g., Pakistan, Iran) Highlights need for states to secure nuclear weapons-related technology and materials

11 Good News: Progress on Reducing and Securing Some Nuclear Materials Global Threat Reduction Initiative and Cooperative Threat Initiative are making real progress in securing Russian materials and reducing HEU and HEU use

12 Bad News: Increased Civilian Nuclear Fuel Production Plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants and the fuels they can make can be quickly converted to make bombs None of these plants can be monitored to detect military diversions or theft in a timely manner Brazil and Iran are starting up new enrichment plants US planning new enrichment and reprocessing plants Japan is completing a large reprocessing plant

13 The Amount of Weapons-usable Civilian Plutonium Is Eclipsing Military Holdings

14 Do States Have a Right to Get to the Brink of Having an Arsenal? DPRK, Iran insists the answer is yes and are demanding recognition of this right South Africa, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Germany and most Non-aligned Movement states agree as does U.S. State Legal Division says France, Israel, Some US officials disagree

15 History, Legal Common Sense Say No NPT is a Nonproliferation Treaty NPT amendments of Spain and Mexico for a right to entire fuel cycle were rejected No perse prohibition or right Depends if safeguardable and economically imperative (article III and preamble of NPT)

16 Greatest DPRK, Iranian Nuclear Threat Ultimately May Be to the Nuclear Rules If DPRK, Iranian challenge to the rules sticks, all nations that openly declare their nuclear activities may come within days of having bombs, even if it is uneconomical, and withdraw from NPT with impunity US and others have only two options To give up and manage proliferation Toughen their reading of the rules to establish 5-year moratorium on net expansion of fuel making everywhere, and build consensus behind no new fuel making unless economical and in weapons states

17 Current Proliferation Seems Manageable

18 Future Proliferation: Ramp Up to Nuclear 1914?