Seo-Hang Lee, Ph. D. President, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy Professor Emeritus, KNDA

Transcription

1 Review of NPT: Major Challenges to NPT & Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime Seo-Hang Lee, Ph. D. President, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy Professor Emeritus, KNDA

2 Contents What is a nuclear weapon & NPT? Major Contents of NPT & Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime Outcomes of the Past Review Conferences of NPT Recent Developments & Challenges to NPT & Nuclear Non- Proliferation Regime Future of NPT: Agenda for Discussion

3 Definition of Nuclear Weapon What is a nuclear weapon? -as one of WMD*, it is a device with explosive energy, most or all of which derives from fission or a combination of fission & fusion processes primary nuclear effects are electromagnetic pulse, thermal-light energy, blast & radiation *WMD(weapons of mass destruction): a collective term that generally refers to 3 classes of weapons system: nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC or ABC) weapons clearly distinguished from conventional weapons for their potential to generate truly catastrophic levels of death & destruction Hiroshima nuclear explosion

4 NPT(Nuclear Non- proliferation Treaty) -NPT* is the international agreement on nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy that entered into force March 5, Nuclear-armed states-parties pledged to work toward disarmament, nonnuclear weapon states-parties agreed to forswear nuclear weapons, and all agreed to share in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Signing Ceremony of NPT, 1968 *Treaty on the Non- proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

5 Some Basic Facts of NPT Opened for Signature: 1 July The origins of NPT are closely connected with the Irish Resolutions at the UN in 1958 Entered into Force: 5 March 1970 Extended Indefinitely: 11 May 1995 State Parties: 191 Non-Parties: (190?) - Montenegro acceded to the NPT on 3 June Palestine acceded to the NPT on 2 Jan India, Israel, Pakistan, (North Korea?) - North Korea announced on 10 January 2003 that it would withdraw from the NPT - IAEA still considers N.K. to be party to the NPT - U.S. has not taken a position on N.K. s current legal status under the NPT

6 Major Contents of NPT - NPT consists of 2 major parts: i.e., preamble & 11 provisions Preamble: Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology should be available for peaceful purposes, To achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

7 Major Contents Art. I: - No transfer and no assistance of nuclear weapons & nuclear devices by NWS (Nuclear Weapon States) to NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapons States). continued. * Qualification for NWS is described in Art. IX-3 Art. II: - No pursuit of nuclear weapons by NNWS: They undertake not to receive the transfer of such weapons or devices or of control over them, nor to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices and not to receive any assistance in their manufacture.

8 Major Contents continued. Art. III: - Imposition of IAEA safeguards obligation on NNWS. safeguards: the process and measures to ensure that nuclear materials, equipment and facilities intended for peaceful use are not used for nuclear-weapons purposes Art. IV: - NPT acknowledges the inalienable right of NNWS to research, develop, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. - Emphasis on use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and fullest possible exchange of nuclear related information and technology between NWS and NNWS.

9 Major Contents continued. Art. V: - NPT permits NNWS access to NWS research and development on the benefits of nuclear explosions conducted for peaceful purposes (PNE). Art. VI: - Pursuit of nuclear disarmament in good faith by NWS in return for the renunciation of developing nuclear weapons by NNWS.

10 Major Contents continued. Art. VII: - This article encourages regional nuclear-weapons-free-zones (NWFZ) to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons. Art. VIII & IX: - Administrative Clauses : amendment process, review conference, depositaries, entry into force, and qualification for NWS (a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967).

11 Major Contents continued. Art. X: - The Article establishes the terms by which a state may withdraw from the Treaty, requiring three month s advance notice to all other parties & UNSC should extraordinary events jeopardize its supreme national interests. - Clause on extension of the Treaty: 25 years after the entry into force, a conference shall be convened to decide the form of extension. Art. XI: - Another administrative clause : language of the Treaty and others.

12 Three Pillars of NPT 2 1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Nuclear Co-operation for Non-military 3 (i.e., peaceful) Purposes Nuclear Disarmament

13 Major Characteristics of NPT Widely regarded as the most important, and the most successful, multilateral arms control treaty However, negative assessments exist Greatest number of states parties -- universality minus three (four?) The only multilateral treaty under which the nuclear-weapon states are legally committed to nuclear disarmament The only multilateral instrument under which non-nuclear-weapon states have permanently renounced nuclear weapons and have accepted intrusive on-site inspections of all of their nuclear material and activities The number of declared or recognized nuclear weapon states has been permanently frozen at five.

14 Assessment of NPT The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is one of the most important multilateral accords in history. Though not perfect, it is the cornerstone of the world s nuclear nonproliferation regime. Mr. BAN Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, Address to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 3 May 2010 At the time that the treaty was signed, it was widely predicted that dozens of countries would develop nuclear weapons Instead, the NPT has become the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, reinforcing international peace & security, and preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons while promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Mr. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Statement on the 45 th Anniversary of the NPT, 5 March 2015

15 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Fuel Cycle the life cycle of uranium used as fuel for nuclear power generation Reprocessing: Chemical treatment of spent reactor fuel to separate the plutonium & uranium from the spent fuel rods to be used again as fuel Enrichment: The process of increasing the concentration of one isotope of a given element; i.e., purification * E&R could produce fissile material that can be used as a direct element of nuclear weapon Source: Richard Wolfson, Nuclear Choices: A Citizen s Guide to Nuclear Technology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), P. 236

16 Horizontal Proliferation vs. Vertical Proliferation Horizontal Proliferation - the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states Vertical Proliferation - the growth of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon states

17 Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime ü inter-linked network of norms & multilateral arrangements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Nuclear Test Ban Treaties (PTBT, TTBT, CTBT) Export Control System (Zangger Committee, NSG, MTCR, etc.) Prevention of Production of Fissile Materials (Cut-off Treaty) NPT (11 Articles with Preamble) Stopping Illicit Trade (PSI * ) Nuclear-Weapons-Free- Zone Treaties (Tlatelolco, SPNFZ, Bangkok, etc.) IAEA Safeguard System (INFCIRC/153, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and Additional Protocol) Nuclear Security Assurance (PSA: UNSC Res , NSA) measures to secure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons Today, the concept of non-proliferation includes the counter-proliferation measures, which contain the use of military force to prevent the spread of nuclear materials.

18 IAEA Safeguards System Types of Inspection - ad hoc inspection: to verify a state s initial report of declared nuclear material or reports on changes - routine inspection: the type most frequently used ㅡ may be carried out according to a defined schedule - special inspection: to be carried out when information made available by the state concerned is not adequate for the IAEA Some shortcomings are found Need to strengthen IAEA safeguards system Additional Protocol based on 93+2 Program

19 Strengthened IAEA Safeguards System Additional Protocol (May 1997) - IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information & sites Ø Expanded Information and Wider Access to the Nuclearrelated Activities ( anywhere ) Ø Short-notice Inspector Access ( anytime ) Introduction of challenge inspection Ø Collection of Environmental Samples beyond Declared Locations when deemed necessary ( better use of technology ) - As of 5 Nov. 2014, 124 states have concluded the Protocol that are now in force (Another 21 states signed the Protocol).

20 1995 NPT-REC (5th Conf.) Decisions Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 3 Strengthened Review Process for the Treaty Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation / Disarmament - Universality - Nuclear Non-Proliferation - Nuclear Disarmament - Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones - Security Assurances - Safeguards - Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Indefinite Extension of the NPT Resolution on the Middle East: to establish NWFZ

21 2000 NPT-Rev Conf (6 th Conf.) Final Document Thirteen practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT 1. Early entry into force of CTBT 2. Moratorium on nuclear testing pending entry into force of CTBT 3. Promoting negotiations in the CD for a treaty banning fissile material production for nuclear weapons 4. Urging CD to agree on a program of work and to establish a subsidiary body to deal with disarmament 5. Principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament 6. Unequivocal undertaking by NWS to accomplish total elimination of nuclear weapons

22 2000 NPT-Rev Conf (6th Conf.) Final Document continued. 7. The early entry into force of START II & III, while preserving the ABM Treaty 8. Trilateral Initiative between the U.S., Russia, and the IAEA 9. Steps by all NWS leading to nuclear disarmament: ü De-alerting: measure(s) which deliberately reduce the state of readiness of military forces or of certain weapon systems. Recently de-alerting has been advocated with respect to nuclear weapons as a means of lowering the risk of surprise or accidental launches. Further efforts for unilateral reductions Increased transparency with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Art. VI Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems Diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies Engagement in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons - De-alerting could be implemented through a variety of techniques such as the separation of launchers and warheads.

23 2000 NPT-Rev Conf (6th Conf.) Final Document continued. 10. Arrangements of surplus nuclear material to place outside of military programs 11. Reaffirmation of general and complete disarmament 12. Regular reports by all states parties on implementation of Art. VI (nuclear disarmament) 13. Further development of verification capabilities *Poor implementation of the above steps & decisions adopted at the Review Conferences.

24 2005 NPT-Rev Conf (7th Conf., May 2~27) Final Document The Conference failed to adopt any kind of decisions or recommendations, but just agreed to a procedural document that enumerated the participants, meetings and agendas It failed to address vital challenges to offer practical ideas for preventing the use, acquisition, and spread of nuclear weapons. (NPT Parties had) missed a vital opportunity to strengthen our collective security against the many nuclear threats to which all states and all people are vulnerable (Kofi Annan, May 2005)

25 Why the 7 th Conf. Failed? Tensions between NWS & NNWS over how to implement the Treaty s dual obligations. - insufficient willingness of NWS to pursue nuclear disarmament - stubborn resistance by NNWS on Western proposals to make treaty withdrawal more difficult; toughen treaty monitoring, compliance, and enforcement; and tighten controls on nuclear weapons-related technology Pursuit of narrowly defined self-interests by a tiny number of influential states Prolonged battles over procedural issues, including adoption of an agenda - participants spent 3 weeks in merely adopting the agenda in a 4 weeklong schedule of the meeting

26 2010 NPT-Rev Conf (8th Conf., May 3~28) Final Document 64 action steps covering the three pillars of the treaty-- (I) nuclear disarmament (22 actions), (II) nuclear nonproliferation (23 actions) and (III) peaceful uses of nuclear energy (18 actions) -the document also includes steps toward establishing a zone free of WMD in the Middle East, a goal with which the 1995 NPT-REC has adopted. The document was widely hailed at that time and implementation of action across the 3 pillars varies greatly: most progress has been achieved on the actions dealing with nuclear energy, while those on disarmament lag far behind.

27 2015 NPT-Rev Conf (9th Conf., April 27 ~ May 22) Final Document The Conference failed to reach consensus on a final document due to major differences on establishment of Middle East NWFZ (particularly on the deadline for convening a conference & negotiations with Israel) However, a commitment from more than 100 states on Humanitarian Pledge for the prohibition & elimination of nuclear weapons is a noticeable outcome. In NPT history, the parties to the Treaty have failed to reach consensus four times(1980, 1990, 2005 & 2015) These occasions are often described as failures, disappointments, or even disasters. nuclear cataclysm

28 Changing Political Environments for Nuclear Issues in Recent Years Some Negative Developments - North Korea s withdrawal from NPT in March 1993 & January 2003 and the 4 underground nuclear tests between Oct & Jan reflects the continuing pursuit of nuclear & missile capabilities under a new policy known as Byungjin (which refers to the simultaneous development of the economy & nuclear weapons) - Russia s absorption of Crimea (2014) seriously undermined the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine handed over its Soviet-era nuclear weapons in return of guarantees of sovereignty from Western powers & Moscow implications are profound for the nuclear non-proliferation regime - Slow pace of nuclear disarmament: the nuclear-armed states of the world are engaged in programs to develop & modernize their nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and/or related infrastructure

29 Changing Political Environments for Nuclear Issues in Recent Years Some Positive Developments -Growing acknowledgement of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would be caused by any use of nuclear weapons Humanitarian Initiative one of the most significant achievements of the 2010 outcome document - U.S. President s embracement of nuclear disarmament as a long-term policy objective, April 2009, echoed by U.K., Oct a new START Accords to limit strategic warheads between US & Russia, April Agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran & P5+1, July 14, 2015, to limit Iran s most sensitive nuclear activities (i.e., to cut the number of operating centrifuges & its current stockpile LEU) & increase international monitoring of its nuclear program in return for lifting oil & financial sanctions continued.

30 Current Status of NPT & Nuclear Non- Proliferation Regime The NPT is not as effective a constraint as it was The nuclear non-proliferation regime is now at risk because of lack of compliance with existing commitments, withdrawal or threats of withdrawal from the NPT to escape those commitments, a changing international security environment and the diffusion of technology We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation (UN High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, December 2004, pp )

31 A Chain Reaction of Nuclear Proliferation Source: The New York Times, December 9, 2008

32 5 Key Challenges Confronting NPT & Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime 1. Apparent ease of withdrawal from NPT - Withdrawals from NPT could undermine the stability of the treaty itself & non-proliferation regime. Some parties argue that the right to withdraw from NPT is unconditional, while many others contend it is not unconditional (Art. X enables the UNSC to consider a party s withdrawal immediately and to take action if necessary). - UNSC Resolution 1887 (Sept. 2009) signaled the importance of this issue, stating that the UNSC undertakes to address without any delay any state s notice of withdrawal from NPT. The Resolution also affirms that a state is accountable for violations of the treaty it may have made prior to its withdrawal Actions Points (2010) demonstrate the need to strengthen the withdrawal procedure 2. Institutional weaknesses for implementing NPT and ensuring compliance - Central problem of NPT NPT parties have very restricted means & practices for ensuring compliance (no implementing agency) the real action regarding non-proliferation takes in IAEA & its Board of Governors and in UNSC. As to disarmament, there is nothing in place at all except for an important forum such as the review conferences.

33 5 Key Challenges Confronting NPT & Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime continued. 3. No attempt to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in militarysecurity doctrines & slow pace of nuclear disarmament - Despite the disarmament efforts by some nuclear-armed states, they still maintain overkill nuclear capabilities and do not surrender security value of nuclear weapons: they are investing in their arsenals with the view to keeping nuclear weapons for many decades to come( the new nuclear age ) these investments in nuclear arsenals undermine the credibility of NPT 4. The relationship between the nuclear fuel cycle and acquisition of nuclear weapons indigenous nuclear program worldwide makes the existing proliferation safeguards obsolete - Growing possibility of the spread of the sensitive nuclear technologies (enrichment & reprocessing) Particularly through an active black market, including even nuclear weapon designs. 5. Safety and security of weapons, materials, technology & facilities...loosened control over them continues to pose a worldwide threat the possibility of NW possession & use by terrorist groups is increasing!

34 Recent Developments & Related Proposals Mr. ElBaradei s Proposals (October 2003) - Limit the processing of weapon-usable material (plutonium and high-enriched uranium) in civilian nuclear programs by agreeing to restrict these operations exclusively in facilities under multinational control - Develop proliferation-resistant nuclear-energy systems - Multinational approaches to the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste He also proposed to establish an IAEA bank of LEU to guarantee supplies of nuclear fuel (June 2009) Director-General of IAEA,

35 Recent Developments & Related Proposals continued. Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report to D-G of IAEA (Feb. 2005) The objective of increasing non-proliferation assurances associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, while preserving assurances of supply and services around the world, could be achieved through a set of (5) gradually introduced multilateral nuclear approaches (MNA).

36 IAEA s 5 Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs) continued. Reinforcing existing commercial market mechanisms on a case-by-case basis through long-term contracts and transparent supplier arrangements with government backing. Developing and implementing international supply guarantees with IAEA participation Promoting voluntary conversion of existing facilities to MNAs and pursuing them as CBMs Creating multinational and, in particular, regional MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights, or co-management for functions such as uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, and disposal and storage of spent fuel The development of a nuclear fuel cycle with stronger multilateral arrangements, by region or by continent, and for broader cooperation involving the IAEA and the international community

37 Recent Developments & Related Proposals continued. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (April 2004) To facilitate an effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation, it calls on all states take steps to deny and criminalize non-state actors (terrorists) seeking WMD and their means of delivery; and all states adopt and enforce appropriate, effective laws and measures, such as export and border controls, to prevent non-state actors from acquiring WMD, as well as missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles designed to deliver such arms.

38 Recent Developments & Related Proposals Nuclear Security Summit, Washington, The meeting raised the international profile of the threat of nuclear terrorism & focused attention on the need to better secure all weaponsusable nuclear materials in all corners of the globe Nuclear Security Summit, Seoul, Participants of the meeting pledged to take specific actions to strengthen fissile material security & prevent nuclear terrorism also agreed to take specific actions intended to minimize the use of HEU Nuclear Security Summit, The Hague, The meeting agreed to strengthen the physical protection of fissile materials & minimize the use of HEU also agreed to improve the protection of highactivity radioactive sources Mr. Obama of the US proposed to host NSS again in Washington, 2016, to create a comprehensive & durable global nuclear security system.

39 Future of NPT: Agenda for Discussion Effectiveness of the NPT - Is NPT still useful & how to proceed in order to preserve the credibility of the NPT itself and make real progress on achieving its goals? - How much valid the relevant obligations and undertakings previously agreed to? Issue of the nuclear fuel cycle - Limits are needed on the spread of proliferation-sensitive technologies? If so, how to actualize? Problem of regional issues Middle East, Northeast Asia (North Korea) & South Asia - Will the Joint Plan of Action between Iran & P5+1 be implemented smoothly? - What is the possibility to establish a Middle East NWFZ? - What is the best way to resolve Pyongyang s nuclear problem? Is the 6-Party Talks defunct & how to revitalize it? - How to deal with South Asia, a troubled region with growing nuclear risks of its own? NPT withdrawals - How to discourage withdrawals, and how to deal with them if they occur? - Is the right to withdraw from NPT unconditional or not unconditional?

40 Thank You!