Piecing together the puzzle: North Korea country briefing

Transcription

1 Jane's Defence Weekly [Content preview Subscribe to IHS Jane s Defence Weekly for full article] Piecing together the puzzle: North Korea country briefing Recent provocations by North Korea - and the ongoing development of its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capabilities - continue to demonstrate the active threat Pyongyang poses to regional stability. James Hardy reports The 4 August maiming of two South Korean soldiers by land mines recently emplaced on the southern side of the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) was a reminder - if one were needed - that North Korea is the geopolitical equivalent of the neighbour from hell. US intelligence officials have suggested that the KN-08 ICBM, seen here in April 2012, has been fielded. (Press Association/AP Photo) While the worst most inhabitants have to contend with is a parked car blocking the driveway, a trampled flower bed, or an all-night party, Pyongyang has made a speciality of pushing Seoul's buttons to garner a reaction just short of serious military retaliation. Article 1 Page 1 of 15

2 Since the dual shocks of the sinking of the Republic of Korea Navy corvette Chon An and the shelling of Yeonpyeong island, which between them cost 50 South Korean lives - North Korea has jammed aircraft GPS signals close to Incheon International Airport, launched cyber attacks on South Korean banks and government institutions, and flown unmanned aerial vehicles on surveillance missions over downtown Seoul. In the meantime Pyongyang continues to move forward with its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes with almost no likelihood of progress on disarmament talks. Any hope that the deal with Iran might offer a template for a similar agreement with North Korea was quickly shot down. A foreign ministry official was quoted by the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) as saying that Pyongyang "is not interested at all in the dialogue to discuss the issue of making it freeze or dismantle its nukes unilaterally first", adding that North Korea's nuclear deterrent is "not a plaything to be put on the negotiating table, as it is the essential means to protect its sovereignty and vital rights from the US nuclear threat and hostile policy, which have lasted for more than half a century". Article 1 Page 2 of 15

3 The Sohae launch centre seen on 3 June. Continuing construction at the rail siding and launch pad suggests it will be the site for satellite launches that officials have suggested could happen later in (CNES 2015, Distribution Airbus DS / IHS) IHS Jane's has recently reported continuing modifications to two key sites in North Korea's nuclear weapon development and delivery programme. Upgrades to the launch pad at the Sohae satellite launch centre suggest it will be the location for upcoming launches of multi-stage rockets - a programme widely seen as a cover for the North's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) ambitions. Meanwhile, recent analysis of the Yongbyon nuclear site suggests there is now a second hall containing centrifuges, which play an important part in uranium enrichment. Article 1 Page 3 of 15

4 Satellite imagery published by IHS Jane's of the Sohae launch site shows that it has become the main hub for North Korea's space and long-range missile programme. It will almost certainly host the launch of a new 'Earth observation satellite' revealed by the vice director of Scientific Research and Development at the National Aeronautics Development Agency (NADA) in an interview with the Associated Press in late May. Following the interview, IHS Jane's suggested two possible dates for the new satellite's launch, based on North Korea's modus operandi of linking major technological developments to key dates for the regime. The first was 15 August - the date of Japan's surrender in the Second World War and so the end of Korea's colonial status - while the second is 10 October, which marks the 70th anniversary of the Korean Workers' Party. There have been two launches from Sohae, although neither has been fully successful. An Unha-3 rocket launch in April 2012 suffered a catastrophic failure in its first stage, while in December 2012 an Unha-3 was successfully launched but failed to put its payload - a small satellite - into the correct orbit. Despite these failures, Sohae has undergone a second stage of evolution following its first incarnation - from 2001 onwards - as a test range developed to launch satellites using the Unha rocket and as a site for rocket engine testing. Imagery showing the increase in snowmelt between January and February 2015 at the centrifuge halls of the Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Workshop. (CNES 2015, Distribution Airbus DS / IHS) Article 1 Page 4 of 15

5 Delivery systems The two possible delivery systems for a North Korean nuclear weapon that attract most interest are the road-mobile KN-08 ICBM and the 'Polaris-1' submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Andrea Berger, deputy director of the Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme at the Royal United Services Institute in London, told IHS Jane's that, as with most things North Korean, the issue was corroboration. "North Korea has made reasonably large strides with the missile programme under Kim Jong-un. The difficulty is substantiating official assessments about the status when we come to systems like the KN-08," Berger noted. "We had the NORAD commander [Admiral Bill Gortney] stating his belief [in April] that the KN-08 is operational, we had [US Director of National Intelligence] James Clapper back in 2013 saying that the North Koreans had taken initial steps towards fielding the system," Berger said. "It is difficult to appreciate what information has gone into that assessment but prudence would tell us that we have to assume that there is some truth to that." 'Polaris-1' and second strike capability The major development in North Korea's nuclear weapon delivery programme so far in 2015 has been the test launch off Sinpo of the 'Polaris-1' SLBM, which Pyongyang announced on 9 May. What North Korea described as the "underwater test-fire of a Korean-style powerful strategic submarine ballistic missile" from a "strategic submarine" is seen by most analysts as an ejection launch of an R-27 Zyb SS-N-6 'Serb' clone from a submersible test barge. Berger said the key takeaway is that, at the moment, "the Polaris does not demonstrate capability but it does demonstrate intent". The intent is, apparently, "to diversify delivery platforms" and, in doing so, "complicate the deterrence picture in East Asia", she said. Article 1 Page 5 of 15

6 DigitalGlobe satellite imagery published by Google Earth shows North Korea's new submarine alongside at Sinpo dockyard on 2 March 2015 next to what appears to be a submersible missile testing barge. Historical imagery of a Soviet PSD-4 missile barge, inset, and a schematic show possible influences on the North Korean design. (DigitalGlobe / GoogleEarth / IHS) The reasons are fairly straightforward. In a nuclear context North Korea's arsenal of ballistic missiles remains potentially vulnerable to a first strike by the United States. Pyongyang has sought to increase survivability by camouflaging and geographically distributing its road mobile forces, but as IHS Jane's analysis of North Korean missile belts has shown, road-mobile missile infrastructure can be identified remotely and raises the spectre of its nuclear-armed forces being identified and destroyed before they can be used. The advantage of an SLBM is that it lowers the risk of the United States initiating a 'perfect first strike' and disarming North Korea of its nuclear arsenal. While the Polaris programme will be limited by the survivability of the Sinpo-class diesel-electric submarine platform that carries it and is unlikely to be able to threaten the continental United States, the increased chances of surviving a first strike means Pyongyang would be in position to inflict devastating damage to US regional allies such as Japan and South Korea. Countering 'tailored deterrence' North Korean nuclear developments are not occurring in a vacuum. Berger points to the October 2013 announcement by the United States and South Korea of a new 'tailored deterrence' strategy as a catalyst for further North Korean developments such as its SLBM programme. A joint communiqué published by the United States and South Korea reaffirmed Washington's commitment to providing and strengthening Article 1 Page 6 of 15

7 deterrence for South Korea "using the full range of military capabilities, including the US nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities". The Pentagon added that it also provides for a "comprehensive counter-missile strategy to detect, defend, deter, and destroy" North Korean nuclear threats. Berger suggests that the US-South Korean embrace of a pre-emptive or preventative doctrine "didn't go unnoticed in Pyongyang" and is reflected in the North's "emphasis on survivability. Complicating the ability [of its nuclear weapon delivery systems] to be detected by adversaries, for example, during preparations for a launch is quite important from the North Korean perspective," Berger added. Conventional developments North Korea's focus on its nuclear weapon programme has been accompanied by incremental developments in its conventional weapon capabilities across all three services. Perhaps most notable have been investments in naval systems and platforms, in part a response to South Korea's quiet development of a modern and well-armed surface and submarine fleet in recent years. In February North Korean media released imagery of an anti-ship missile that strongly resembles the Russian Kh-35 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 'Switchblade') anti-ship missile, although it has a minor modification - a tube - to the solid-propellant rocket booster section. The new missile, which was also briefly viewed being launched in a video in mid-2014, is the most modern air-to-surface missile (ASM) in Korean People's Navy (KPN) service and enhances its ability to conduct littoral patrol and coastal defence. In June KCNA reported that Kim Jong-un had viewed a test firing of the ASM being launched from a missile patrol craft during which it "safely flew at the designated altitude, accurately detecting and hitting the 'enemy' warship". Some sources suggest that the KPN's Najin-class frigates - two of which have been seen at naval bases on the east and west coasts - are being fitted with the new missile. For its part, the army has been reportedly developing a new tank based on the T-72, but of greater interest is the firing in 2014 of a new 300 mm projectile, sometimes called the KN-09 missile. IHS Jane's reported that a total of eight KN-09s had been launched into the sea in late February and early March 2014 as part of a series of ballistic missile and rocket firings that were seen as a response to upcoming US-South Korean military exercises. The launches were only the second and third time that the KN-09 had been reported to have been test fired; the first was from May 2013 when four were launched from the east coast and flew approximately 150 km before landing in the East Sea/Sea of Japan. Article 1 Page 7 of 15

8 The Pon'gae-6 SAM appears similar in size and design to the Chinese HQ-9 or Russian S-300 systems. (KCNA) "We're seeing that with the North Koreans at the moment. They are introducing artillery pieces that can hit targets further away, concentrate more firepower on a single target, and which have a longer range that can reduce their vulnerability to counter-battery fire if they are stationed further back from the DMZ," Berger said. In the air, international sanctions on arms imports and exports have degraded North Korea's fleet of MiG combat aircraft; attempts to source engines for its MiG-21s via former Soviet states and Cuba have failed or been intercepted. Instead, North Korea appears to be upgrading its air-defence systems: an area of traditional strength that has not kept pace with Western developments in electronic warfare and countersurface-to-air missile (SAM) technology. A graphic showing the key individuals, state organs, and offices of the North Korean elite and their relations to each other following the Supreme People's Assembly elections in (IHS) In September 2014 IHS Jane's reported on the development of two new fourth-generation SAMs. The Pon'gae-5, or KN-06, first seen in 2011, uses a cold-launch tube that may be similar in size to the Chinese Article 1 Page 8 of 15

9 HQ-16A SAM. The Pon'gae-6, which was first unveiled at a parade in 2010, appears to use a tube closer in size to the Chinese HQ-9 or the Russian S-300 systems. The Pon'gae-5, or KN-06 SAM system, first seen in 2011, has similarities to the Chinese HQ-16A SAM. (KCNA) LEADERSHIP WATCHING Since Kim Jong-un succeeded his late father, Kim Jong-il, as Supreme Leader in December 2011, there has been a consolidation of power and shift towards younger, more technocratic leadership. While the removal of many of Kim Jong-il's advisers - including the chief mourners at his state funeral - and other high-profile purges, such as the execution of Jang Sung-taek, suggests a dramatic reordering of the senior leadership, the changes have taken place over a number of years and have followed traditional North Korean procedures for political appointments. For example, the parliamentary election for the 13th session of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) in March 2014 and the elections for all 227 local assemblies in July 2015 were carried out almost identically to those under Kim Jong-il and his father Kim Il-sung. However, the significance of elections in North Korea lies in their ideological value and the opportunity to assert control over the population through, for example, increased surveillance of voters' residency. Article 1 Page 9 of 15

10 STRATEGIC LOGIC - NORTH KOREA'S NEED FOR NUKES Despite a regular stream of rhetoric promising pre-emptive nuclear strikes, North Korea's limited arsenal and lack of strategic depth means Pyongyang cannot fight or win a nuclear war, let alone ensure the survival of the Kim family in a post-nuclear environment. Instead, North Korea's current nuclear weapons probably represent a means of 'minimum deterrence': that is, they are designed to increase the perceived cost of any attack - nuclear or conventional - by the United States or South Korea to unacceptably high levels. The deterrence includes threats to use nuclear weapons against US allies such as South Korea or Japan, US bases in Guam or Hawaii, and possibly one day the US west coast. While North Korea probably only has a small nuclear inventory, in many ways its nuclear programme is similar to the artillery threat it poses to Seoul. The proximity of the city to the Demilitarised Zone has led South Korea to have a longstanding reluctance to interfere with North Korea's actions, which in turn has allowed Pyongyang to coercively alter the South's cost-benefit calculations of action against it. A previous example of this was in 1994, when Seoul pressured the United States not to attack the Yongbyon nuclear site out of fear of attack. WHEAT AND CHAFF: READING NORTH KOREA FROM THE OUTSIDE When the Twitter commenting on the controversy around a recent Republican Party debate, posted 'US media in total disarray as venomous Fox News declares war on noted scholar Donald Trump', Bloomberg political analyst Mark Halperin went on US TV and noted that, whatever else happened, Trump still had the support of North Korea. Unfortunately for Halperin, he became the latest Western journalist to be taken in a spoof Twitter account run by a group of US bloggers. It has fooled many media organisations with tweets such as 'Latest babblings of John Kerry rebutted as impotent venom of a toothless scorpion' and 'Ministry of Agriculture reports 25% increase in harvest of bottlenosed dolphins and porpoises, greatly overfulfilling five-year plan'. Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2015 Article 1 Page 10 of 15

11 For the full version and more content: IHS Jane's Defence Industry and Markets Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from IHS Jane s Defence Industry & Markets Intelligence Centre, which provides world-leading analysis of commercial, industrial and technological defence developments, budget and programme forecasts, and insight into new and emerging defence markets around the world. IHS defence industry and markets news and analysis is also available within IHS Jane s Defence Weekly. To learn more and to subscribe to IHS Jane s Defence Weekly online, offline or print visit For advertising solutions contact the IHS Jane s Advertising team Article 1 Page 11 of 15