JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE June 2005 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami. FL (FOUO) Personal Information: JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSA{DRC Reference Name: Faizullah o Aliases and Current/True Name: Faiz Ullah o Place of Birth: Bamian. Afshanistan (AF) o Date of Birth: I Januar.v 1956 r Citizenship: Afshanistan o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-00091gDP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health, has no known allergies and is not currently on any medications. He has completed therapy for latent TB. Detainee has no travel restrictions 3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be Transfened to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD). b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD (DoD) on l5 November Based upon information obtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is now recommended he be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD). For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed a Hezb-E Islami/Gulbuddin (HIG) operative, who was involved in anti-coalition activities in Bamian province, AF. (Analyst Note: HIG is a Tier I Target, which is defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: s E c R E T //NOFORN

2 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.) He is believed to be involved in an assassination plot against Afghan Military Forces. Additionally, detainee was identified as a HIG mine specialist/expert for Mullah Nasim, the present HIG commander in Madr, AF. Detainee has not admitted to any involvement in laying mines; however, these actions have been confirmed by a number of credible sources. Detainee was found to be in possession of four letters connected to Mullah Nasim. Nasim is still operating against US forces in Afghanistan. Due to the identifications of detainee made by a number of individuals and his ties to other HIG and Taliban members still operating in Afghanistan, it is assessed that this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. 4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements. a. (S) Prior History: Detainee attended school up to the 72th grade, but he was unable to finish due to the Russian invasion ( ). Detainee, being the oldest, became a farmer growing wheat and potatoes to supply food for his family upon the death of his father. When the Taliban took control of Bamian, AF, detainee took his family and moved to Dariyousuf, AF. Upon the removal of the Taliban by US forces, detainee retumed to his home and farms in Bamian, AF, and Khamard, AF, in spring Detainee has worked as a farmer, shoe repairer, and woodcutter. b. (S) Recruitment and Travel: Around December 2001, Adel Khan, Deputy Director of the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) in Bamian province, AF, and a former schoolmate of detainee recruited detainee to act as a spy for the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly). He was to work on behalf of the local govenrment in efforts to assist in cleaning up the region. Detainee accepted the position. Adel Khan wrote a letter to HIG commander, Mullah Nasim, asking him how many and what type of weapons he had. He then asked detainee to deliver this letter. (Analyst note: As of March 2004, Adel Khan was the Deputy of Operations for NDS.) c. (S) Training and Activities: HIG Commander, Mullah Nasim provided detainee with four letters and asked him to deliver them to various individuals throughout Bamian, AF, during the latter part of December of 2002 (approximately 20 December 2002). Detainee brought the letters home, read through them with his family, and kept them for four days pondering what to do with them. He sought advice from his neighbor, Sher Agha. He wanted Sher Agha to help him deliver the letters that night (1900 hrs) on 24December Sher Agha talked detainee into staying for dinner, and he later told detainee to go and stay at detainee's uncle's house for the night. The following day, Sher Agha and his family were going to deliver the letters with detainee. 2 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O300603

3 s E c R E T // NOFORN I d. (S//NF) Capture Information: Detainee was taken into custody after an inter-tribal dispute over a requesto marry his sister. Detainee believed Sher Agha, provided false information to the US linking him to the Taliban and terrorist organizations. According to capture data, detainee was arrested at his cousin's house in the early morning hours (0500) by Afghan Military Forces (AMF) on25 December 2002 after they were warned of his impending arrival. Detainee was handed over to US forces a short time later. e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 6 February 2003 f. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on Mullah Nasim, HIG Commander; Mullah Zoi, an Al-Qaida leader in Khamard; Madr; and Commander Rahmatullah, Afghan Military commander. 5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Gontinued Detention:. (S/AIF) Detainee has been identified as being connected with HIG leaders in Bamian Province, AF. o (S//I{F) It is believed detainee was HIG commander, Mullah Nasim's, most trusted man and was believed to be involved in an assassination plot against Afghan Military Forces (AMF) General Toufon of Bamian, AF. Reporting stated that HIG commanders Mullah Nasim and Mullah Zoi sent detainee to Bamian, AF, to kill AMF general Toufon. They offered detainee between $5,000 and $10,000 USD and a pickup truck as a bonus to assassinate the general.. (S/A{F) Mullah Nasim is a HIG leader in Madr Valley, who was and may still be allied with Mullah Zoi. Reporting indicates that they possess a combined force of approximately soldiers in Madr, AF, and Khamard, AF. Commander Ramatullah of Khamard, an official Afghan military commander, supported them. They are comrpt and involved in a variety of illegal activities.. (S/A{F) Mullah Zoiis reportedly a former Taliban commander who has provided safe haven to Arabs in the area of Khamard and is suspected of war crimes in the vicinity of Paymuri village. (Analyst Note: As of February 2005, the NDS have obtained a letter of promise that Zoi will no longer be involved in illegal activities. Zoiis moving his family tomazar-e-sharif because his continued presence in Khamard district would cause too much conflict and he is remembered by many locals for killing a large number of people during the Taliban era.) 3 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O30O603

4 S E C R E T // NOFORN I / 2030O603 o (S/A{F) Numerous individuals identified detainee as being a HIG operative.. (S//NF) Detainee was identifred as a HIG mine specialist/expert who had planted land mines for the Taliban during their reign, and he was a mine specialist for Mullah Nasim, the present HIG commander in Madr, AF. a (S/A{F) Various sources have identified detainee as being an expert in the laying of mines as well as being able to make improvised explosive devices (leds). (Analyst Note: Even though detainee has denied any knowledge of mine-laying or of ever handling or being in contact with explosives, it is assessedetainee' statement is false due to the reliability of some of the sources.). (S/A{F) On 7 January 2003, USSF interviewed the local Afghan security police in Bamian, AF. During the conversation, the security police commented detainee was a HIG operative who specialized in mine laying and worked for Mulah Nasim in Madr, AF. a (S/A{D Ghulam Sakhi remarked detainee had been the Minister of Transportation for Bamian during the Taliban reign and was a HIG follower of Nasim, specializing in mine laying and clearing. Detainee was described as being an operative. He would execute Nasim's orders to make the streets unsafe in Bamian. o (S//I\F) Detainee has been identified as being involved in past operations, as well as future operational planning against US forces. o (S/A{F) Detainee has been identified as having laid mines found near the fighting positions in Madr, AF. He was believed to have arrived in Bamian, AF, to conduct mining operations against US forces. He was knowledgeable of a future plan involving the laying of mines in Madr, AF, valley near New Zealand Firebase Romero. It is likely detainee is involved with or has knowledge of future plans made by Mullahs Nasim, Shamshad andzoi. He may also have knowledge of Commanders Rahmatullah's and Frutan's plans to ambush US forces driving into the Khamard, AF, and Madr, AF, valleys. (Analyst Note: According to sensitive reporting, a number of individuals from Khamard district, Bamian province, were Al- Qaida members formerly on Usama Bin Laden's (UBL's) payroll and were Taliban Leaders.). (S//IJF) Mullah Habibullah Shamshad was Lieutenant Governor of Bamian province under Mullah Islam and has been reported to have links with Taliban and Al-Qaida.. (S/AIF) Commander Ramatullah is a former Northem alliance commander who has threatened to fire on US forces if they re-enter the Khamard valley.. (S/A{F) Commander Frutan is possibly Mullah Frutan, one of four members involved in the destruction of the Budda monuments in Bamian in April of s E c R E T // NOFORN / I

5 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3006O3 o (S/AIF) According to reporting, detainee was sent to Bamian, AF, as a courier carrying letters for some local contacts of Mullahs Nasim and Zoi. During a search of detainee, messages to third party individuals were recovered.. (S/AIF) It is assessedetainee' statement concerning Sher Agha and the animosity between the two as well as his reasons for delivering the letter was to gain sympathy from the debriefers. He was attempting to avoid detection of his actual position within the HIG to include terrorists' acts committed. c. (S) Detainee's Gonduct: Detainee is assessed as a low threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior pattern has been of compliance with a few incidents within his time in Camp Delta. Detainee's Report of Disciplinary Infraction involves: one possession of contraband (food etc) and a physical altercation with another detainee. Detainee is cunently in Camp 4 and at a Low Risk Level one, which indicates a passive and compliant behavior pattern. Detainee does not have an aggressive history, with the exception of the altercation mentioned above. 6. (S/NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.. (S) Detainee has been identified as an expert minelayer. He was responsible for mines found near fighting positions in Madr, AF. Detainee has also been identified as knowing how to put together IEDs and handled ordnance. Detainee is associated to a number of Taliban and HIG leaders. Due to the identifications and associations made, detainee may be able to provide information on future and past terrorist acts against US and coalition forces as well as personalitie still attacking US forces. b. (S/NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:. Terrorist Organizations detainee is involved with or has knowledge of to include the HIG and Taliban o Future and past terrorist acts against US and coalition forces o Mine Laying o Ambushes o Attacks o HIG Leadership connections e Individuals of interest 5 S E C R E T //NOFORN I /

6 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 10 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. I *-blj'.gl / ny w. HooD \--lbrigadier General. USA Commandins 6 S E C R E T // NOFORN / I