JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3OO9IO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA APO AE September 2005 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami. FL SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo 1. (S//NF) Personal Information: JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSA{DRC Reference Name: Akhtiar Mohammad o Aliases and Current/True Name: Akhtiar Mohammad. Haji Bakhtiar. Haji Akhtiar Mohammad. Aktiar Gul. Ikhtiar Mohammad o Place of Birth: kunderkhel. Savyed Karam District Afghanistan. (AF) o Date of Birth: 1 Januar.v 1953 o Citizenship: Afghanistan o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. He refused treatment for latent TB and has chronic constipation. He is followed by Behavioral Health Services for adjustment disorder. He is on medications for chronic constipation and insomnia, as well as artificial tears for chronic dry eyes. Detainee has no known drug allergies. 3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD Control (DoD) on27 August CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3OIOO9

2 S E C R E T i /NOFORN I I 2O3OIOO9 Detainee is assessed as a high level Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander. Detainee has demonstrated knowledge of several Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) groups and networks located in the Paktia province, Afghanistan (AF). Due to detainee's placement and access, coupled with his experience as a field commander and ability to recruit men, this detainee is a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies if released from DoD control. 4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee became a member of the Afghan Army in He trained and served in an artillery unit in Kabul, AF until 1979 when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan. Detainee fled to Mazar-e-Sharif for six months until he joined the jihad againsthe Soviets. Detainee primarily attacked Soviet convoys traveling in the Said Karam district of the Paktia province in southeastern Afghanistan. b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee claimed he left Afghanistan in 1981 to live at a refugee camp in Peshawar, Pakistan (PK). Detainee remained in Pakistan until the Soviets were driven from Afghanistan in Detainee again rejoined the Afghan military in 1991, but fled the country again in 1993 after the Taliban acquired power. Detainee remained in Pakistan until 1995, when he returned to Afghanistan to join the Northern Alliance and fight the Taliban in Panju, AF. c. (S/NF) Training and Activities: In the fall of 2002, detainee claimed he visited General Aliqullah Lodin, the Corps Commander for the Afghan provinces of Paktia, Khowst, Logar, Paktika and Ghazni. Lodin told detainee he would give him a command, provided he could recruit 300 men who would be serving under him. Detainee claimed Mullah Jailani, an anti-coalition and a member of the Taliban, arrested him. Detainee remained in jail for two months until he paid a fine of two million Pakistani rupees, and agreed not to join the Karzai government for nine months. d. (S//NF) Gapture tnformatioh: On May 4'h, 2003, US forces conducted a raid on a suspected Hizbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) compound. Nasser Gul US9AF-1037DP (ISN 1037) and detainee were captured during the raid. Detainees were transferred to Bagram Airbase. e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 17 luly S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3OO9IO

3 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3OIOO9 f. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following: o Pacha Khan Zadran,HajiZa&an and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar o The internal structure of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG and Seyyef) o HIG and Seyyef ties to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) 5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: o (S/AJF) Detainee is assessed to be a high level Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander who was in the process of coordinating offensive operations against US/Coalition forces when he was captured. Detainee is a key operative in the Paktia province in southeast Afghanistan. He also worked with rogue elements of the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISID). Detainee has provided intelligence on ISID operations within Afghanistan. o (S/REL ISAF and LTU) Nassar Gul aka Chaman aka Sargul US9AF DP (ISNI037) and detainee were captured at detainee's compound. US forces targeted this compound because of reports of two high level HIG members conducting explosives training at the compound. ISN 1037 is assessed as probably a highranking explosives expert in the HIG. o (S/REL ISAF and LTU) ISN 1037, is reported to have served as the top HIG commander for all of Paktia province Afghanistan, and is considered to be the 7th or 8th most senior HIG commander. ISN1037 brought a remote controlled IED into the region. o (S/REL ISAF and LTU) Detainee was the HIG commander in charge of the Salyed Karam District in the Paktia province, AF, and a long time HIG commander. o (S/REL ISAF and LTU) According to US forces reporting in Afghanistan, detainee and ISN 1037 tried to infiltrate the 3rd Corps of the Afghan National Army. Both detainees occupied a position overlooking the US Special Forces (USSF) in Gardez for over a month. 3 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3OO9IO

4 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3OIOO9 o (S/REL ISAF and LTU) Detainee worked with commander Daud, helping infiltrate ISID personnel into Afghanistan. The ISID were attempting to infiltrate the Afghan villages of Breeze Khiel, Jabor Khiel, and Ali-Khiel. o (S/REL ISAF and LTU) The ISID officers gave training to HIG operatives in the Paktia province. The training included remote controlled Improvised Explosive Device (RCIED) and sniper training. o (S/REL ISAF and LTU) Detainee was captured with an American made boltaction sniper rifle with associated 7.62 x 51mm ammunition. o (S/REL ISAF and LTU) Detainee sold weapons to Taliban commander Saifullah Rahman Mansour in the Zormat, AF. o (S/A{F) ISN 1037 reported that detainee used the alias Hajji Bahki when he worked at the fuel depot in Gardez, AF. One rocket launcher and possible RPG's were located at the depot. o (S/A{F) Detainee reported on STINGER missiles, who owned them, and where they might be located. o (S/AIF) Detainee claimed that the former defense Minister for Afghanistan, Fahim Khan, smuggled precious stones and heroin into Pakistan in order to buy guns. Khan used the monies raised from the sale of the stones and drugs to buy Kalashnikovs and other small arms. o (SiAIF) Detainee claimed knowledge of an unknown chemical used as a physiological stimulus, inhibitor and readily available within thebazaars near Peshawar, PK. This chemical is used in two forms, liquid and solid. The solid is crushed into a powder and inserted into foods; the liquid is introduced in the form of an aerosol. The purpose of this chemical is to incapacitate the intended victim, and can be used for kidnapping or robbery events. o (S/AIF) Detainee reported on several Anti-Coalition Militia members located in the Sayyed Karam District of Paktia province, Afghanistan. o (S/A{F) Mullah Jalani had a compound in the Sayyed Karam district of Afghanistan with men under his command. Within the village, Jalani had various small arms, including AK-47's and RPGs. Detainee reported that Jalani also had two tanks and artillery pieces, although his men were not proficient on either of the two weapons systems.. (U) Detainee possessed a Pakistani issued passport assigned to detainee's alias, Ikhtiar Gul. Passport recorded travel to Saudi Arabia, France, Italy and Spain. o (S/AIF) Three passports with detainee's name were retrieved from the Zhawar Kili Complex, which Al-Qaida forces used for training. One of the passports was stamped "Cleared for proceeding for direct employment" in Saudi Arabia. Also found were 4 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3OO9IO

5 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3OIOO9 documents containing a letter with the letterhead from Al-Shaikh Jalaluddin Haqqani Hezbi Islami Afghanistan. (Analyst Note: This letter does not mention detainee by narne, and its relationship to the passports is unclear.). (S/AIF) Detainee claimed the ISID participated in several assassinations or attempted assassinations of Key Afghan leaders. c. (FOUO) Detainee's Gonduct: Detainee is assessed a LOW threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and staff. 6. (S/NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of HIGH intelligence value. o (S/A{F) Detainee is well connected within his province and the local ACM movement. He has demonstrated a high degree of knowledge concerning anti-coalition forces. Detainee is assessed to have personal knowledge of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the HIG organization planning and operations cycles. Detainee is also aware of HIG safehouses, weapons caches and command centers. Detainee can provide information on which ISID retired and active duty personnel are helping anti-coalition militia, Taliban, Al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan area of operations. Detainee is knowledgeable of Jalaluddin Haqqani's anti-coalition network due to his access and placement in the Paktia province. b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Hezbi-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) personnel, activities and operations. o Safehouses in Sayyed Kamar District Afghanistan. o Weapons caches o Al Falal mosque in New York, New York. o Jamaat Tablighi. Tablighi personnel attending Mosque in New York.. Mission in New York. Jalaluddin Haqqani o Mullah Jalani o Abdullah 5 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3OO9IO

6 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3OIOO9 7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on I I December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. >'1/..J*\ ( /AY W. HOOD VMulor General, USA Commanding 6 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3OO9IO