JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE February 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (S) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Mohammad A Fazl Current/True Name and Aliases: Mullah Mohammad Fazl, Mullah Fazl Ahmad, Mullah Fazl Mazloom, Haji Fazl Akhund Place of Birth: Sekzi, Charchineh District, Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan (AF) Date of Birth: 1967 Citizenship: Afghanistan Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health with stable chronic medical problems. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 20 August b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee was the Taliban Deputy Minister of Defense during Operation Enduring Freedom and is an admitted senior commander who served as Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army and as a commander of the 22nd Division. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes including the murder of thousands of Shiites. Detainee was associated with terrorist groups currently opposing US and Coalition forces CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 including al-qaida, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and an Anti-Coalition Militia group known as Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami. 1 Detainee wielded considerable influence throughout the northern region of Afghanistan and his influence continued after his capture. Detainee s name and capture have been used, in recruiting campaigns by the Taliban, and $500,000 US was paid to ensure detainees safe passage. If released, detainee would likely rejoin the Taliban and establish ties with ACM elements participating in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. JTF- GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A LOW threat from a detention perspective Of HIGH intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Provided further detail regarding detainee s interaction with senior al-qaida members 4. (U) Detainee s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee and his mother moved from Uruzgan Province to Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan (PK) during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ( ). In Pakistan, detainee received six years of religious training at the Rabinyah Madrassa in Quetta, PK. 2 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: After detainee left the madrassa, Mullah Abdul Ghafar encouraged him to join the Taliban at its inception in Detainee left Quetta and traveled to Kandahar, AF, to join the movement. Detainee met Taliban members Mullah Assam Allah and Mullah Khayr Allah, who assigned detainee to his first military position as a Taliban soldier in Kandahar. 3 1 Analyst Note: IMU, HIG, and ACM are National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Counterterrorism (CT) priority 2 targets. Priority 2 targets are defined as Issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack U.S. persons or interests FEB-2002, IIR IIR , MFR 13-AUG-2004, Analyst Note: A variant of Khayr Allah is Khairullah. 2

3 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: In 1996, detainee commanded 30 troops. A year later, he was in command of 100 troops. From 1999 to 2001, detainee commanded 2,500-3,000 troops who participated in hostilities against the Northern Alliance in the Takhar Province, AF. Shortly thereafter, detainee stated he became the Taliban Chief of Army Staff and Commander of the 10th Division (comprised of approximately 5,000 troops) in Takhar Province (U) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) In November 2001, detainee surrendered to Northern Alliance commander General Dostum. 5 In late November 2001, detainee and Taliban leaders Mullah Norullah Noori, ISN US9AF DP (AF-006), and Abdullah Gulam Rasoul, ISN US9AF DP (AF-008, transferred), along with two other men, turned themselves, subordinate troops, and weapons over to General Dostum. 6 Dostum moved the group to the Qala-i-Jangi fortress in Mazar-e-Sharif, AF, where in late November captured al-qaida and Taliban troops instigated a revolt against their Northern Alliance captors during which hundreds of prisoners were killed. During the uprising, about 80 fighters secured themselves in a bunker, refusing to come out and shooting at anyone who approached. Dostum brought detainee and AF-006 to the bunker to ask the prisoners to surrender; detainee and AF-006 refused. 7 In early December 2001, Dostum transported detainee, AF-006, and AF-008 to a jail in Sheberghan, AF, and they were then transferred to US custody about 20 December. 8 b. (S) Property Held: 1 analog watch c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 11 January 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: Taliban order of battle Taliban personnel FEB-2002, MFR 12-MAR-2002, Analyst Note: Mullah Khayr Allah is assessed to be Khirullah Said Wali Khairkhwa, ISN US9AF DP (AF-579) FEB IIR , Analyst Note: In IIR , the date of surrender is given as 12 December IIR , Deception at Qala-I Jangi Prison USSOC May IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR , JOHN WALKER LINDH SEP-2002, IIR

4 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee s Account: Detainee withholds details of his full relationship with Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar and his close association with senior Taliban and al-qaida personnel. Detainee fails to explain his long-term relationship with other extremist groups and associated personal relationships. Detainee neglects to relate the events surrounding his involvement in military affairs associated with his senior-level Taliban positions. 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is an admitted senior official of the Taliban government and army and was last assigned to the position of Deputy Minister of Defense. Detainee also served as Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army and a commander of the 22nd Division. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes including the murder of thousands of Shiites. Detainee had operational associations with significant al-qaida and other extremist personnel. Detainee wielded considerable influence throughout the northern region of Afghanistan and his influence continued even after his capture. If released, detainee would likely rejoin the Taliban and establish ties with anti-coalition militias (ACM) participating in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. (S//NF) Detainee is an admitted senior official of the Taliban government and army and was last assigned to the position of Deputy Minister of Defense. (S//NF) Detainee admitted progressing through the Taliban ranks between 1996 and 2001 and was appointed as the Taliban Chief of Army Staff and Commander of the 10th Division. 9 (S//NF) Abdul Zahir, ISN US9AF DP (AF-753), reported detainee replaced Abdul Razzaq as Deputy Minister of Defense (probably in mid to late 2001). AF-753 also stated detainee commanded the 22nd Division. The 22nd Division was composed of 1,100 foreign fighters and was based at the Daruleman military complex, which was located approximately 25 km from Kabul, AF. 10 (Analyst Note: Daruleman is probably a known, or a series of known, al-qaida and Taliban associated guesthouse referred to as the Dar Aman and Dar al-aman, used for processing and lodging fighters supporting jihad against the Northern Alliance. 11 ) FEB-2002, MFR 12-MAR IIR , IIR , SIR 08-DEC-2003, Analyst Note: Detainee was reported assuming the Deputy Minister of Defense position from Mullah Abdul Razzaq in the last days of the Taliban. A variant of Razzaq is Razak Apr 2002 (reported two hours from Kabul), IIR (reported in Konduz), IIR and IIR (reported in Kabul) 4

5 (S//NF) Detainee and his troops were supplied with weapons by Taliban Minister of Defense, Mullah Haji Obaidullah Akhund. 12 Upon his capture, detainee was replaced as Deputy Minister of Defense by Haji Mullah Abdallah. 13 (S//NF) Detainee probably commanded the 22nd Division through IMU leader Jumaboy Khojiyev Namangani (deceased), who was in charge of foreign fighters in Afghanistan. 14 Jumaboy was the immediate commander of the 22nd Division. 15 (S//NF) Senior al-qaida commander Nashwan Abd al-razzaq Abd al-baqi, aka (Abd al-hadi al-iraqi), ISN US9IZ-10026DP (IZ-10026), was the deputy commander and representative of the 22nd Division. 16 (S//NF) Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander Akhtiar Mohammed, ISN US9AF DP (AF-1036, transferred), identified detainee as second-in-command of the Taliban military until the former Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army died in an aerial bombardment, whereupon detainee became Chief of Staff. 17 (Analyst Note: Detainee s level of association with the HIG requires further investigation.) (S//NF) Deputy Taliban Minister of Intelligence, Abdul Haq Wasiq, ISN US9AF DP (AF-004), identified detainee as a commander of the Takhar region. 18 Many other current and former JTF-GTMO detainees identified detainee as a Taliban commander operating in the northern region of Afghanistan. 19 Detainee was also identified as the Taliban Deputy Minister of War for the Northern Front. 20 (S//NF) Convicted al-qaida member John Walker Lindh identified detainee as a top Afghan Taliban general in northern Afghanistan and an associate of AF Detainee was also identified as the commander of Taliban forces fighting in Nahrin, AF in November SIR 22-SEP TD-314/ IIR IIR , Analyst Note: A variant of Jumaboy is Jumna. 16 IIR SIR 30-JAN-2006, Analyst Note: Additional reporting of detainee s position as Army Chief of Staff can be found in TD IIR Analyst Note: These detainees included AF-008 (see KB 12-FEB-2002); ISN US9PK DP (transferred, see KB 11-FEB-2002); ISN US9PK DP (see KB 13-FEB-2002); ISN US9AF DP (transferred, see IIR ); ISN US9AF DP (see KB 15-FEB-2002); ISN US9AF DP (transferred, see KB 07-FEB-2002); ISN US9KU DP (transferred, see KB 12-FEB-2002); ISN US9AF DP (see IIR ); ISN US9AF DP (see IIR ); ISN US9AF DP (transferred, see IIR , IIR ); and ISN US9AF DP (see HANDNOTE 04-APR-2003). 20 IIR IIR IIR

6 (S/NF) Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes while serving as a Taliban Army Chief of Staff and was noted having a long record of human rights abuses. 23 (S//NF) Detainee was implicated in the murder of thousands of Shiites in northern Afghanistan during the Taliban reign. When asked about the murders, detainee and AF-006 did not express any regret and stated they did what they needed to do in their struggle to establish their ideal state. 24 The UN added detainee to the financial freeze list pursuant to UN Security Council Regulation (UNSCR) UNSCR 1267 requires member states to freeze financial resources of suspected Taliban members. 25 (S//NF) Detainee stated the Iranian government suspected him of being connected to the killing of Iranian diplomats at the Iranian Consulate in Mazar-e- Sharif in Iranian officials questioned detainee while he was held prisoner by General Dostum. Detainee stated that when the Taliban gained control of the Mazare-Sharif area in 1998, the Iranians were foreigners and were considered to be supporting the enemy. 26 (Analyst Note: Although detainee has not expressly admitted involvement in the diplomats killings, he has tried to justify their deaths by stating they were enemies of the Taliban.) (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) Shortly after detainee s surrender to Northern Alliance forces, Northern Alliance commanders discussed giving detainee amnesty. However, some Northern Alliance commanders strongly opposed amnesty for detainee, because he and Dadullah Lang were allegedly responsible for massacres at Yakawlang, Bamyan Province, AF, in which several hundred civilians were killed. 27 (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) In late January 2001, the UN launched an investigation into an allegation Taliban forces massacred hundreds of civilians following the Taliban recapture of Yakawlang. 28 By mid-february, the UN Security Council issued a public statement condemning the Taliban for the deliberate killing of civilians in Yakawlang. 29 (S//REL TO USA, NATO, AUS, NZL) Detainee protected a subordinate accused of mass murder. Detainee s deputy commander, Mullah Dadullah Lang, aka (Commander Dadullah), was reportedly responsible for the murder of 500 Shia, Hazara, and Uzbek civilians, including men, women, and children, during the winter 23 IIR , SECSTATE May IIR SECSTATE May SIR 27-MAR TEARLINE 28 NOV TEARLINE 30-JAN UNMISSION USUN NEW YORK FEB

7 of Dadullah Lang s troops seized the people near Sar-i-Pol, AF, trucked them to Baghlan Province, AF, killed them, and threw the bodies into gorges. 30 (S//REL TO USA, ISAF) After Mullah Omar found out about the massacre, he ordered Dadullah Lang to be disarmed and brought to Kandahar to explain his actions. Detainee vouched for Dadullah Lang, reportedly telling Supreme Leader of the Taliban Mullah Muhammad Omar that if Dadullah Lang was disarmed, detainee would disarm Mullah Omar. 31 (Analyst Note: Detainee was directly subordinate to Mullah Omar. 32 Detainee s threat directly against the Supreme Leader of the Taliban indicates he held great authority and power within the Taliban. Mullah Omar continues to lead the Taliban and is active in Anti- Coalition Militia Operations against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. 33 ) (S//NF) Detainee had operational associations with significant al-qaida and other extremist personnel. (S//NF) Senior al-qaida commander IZ met with detainee on several occasions to include immediately following the assassination of Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud in September IZ stated the Northern Alliance was demoralized after the assassination and met with detainee to immediately coordinate an attack with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. 34 (S//NF) IZ s interpreter, AF-753, stated detainee and IZ met near Khwajah Ghar, AF in the summer of At the time, detainee was visiting all front-line commanders to get status reports on front-line divisions. 35 IZ confirmed he (IZ-10026) held meetings with detainee and the Taliban on the front lines at Takhar. 36 (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged meeting IMU leader Jumaboy Khojiyev Namangani (deceased), who was in charge of foreign fighters in Afghanistan. 37 (Analyst Note: Namangani and the IMU also received direct funding from Usama Bin Laden (UBL). 38 ) (S//NF) Detainee stated Tohir Abduhalilovich Yuldashev, aka (Qari Tahirjan), the political leader of the IMU, met with Mullah Rabbani of the Taliban government at Kandahar in approximately During the meeting, they agreed the Taliban would support the IMU with money, weapons and 30 TD-314/ IIR TRRS IIR , IIR , IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR , SIR 27-OCT

8 logistical support; and in return, the IMU would provide soldiers for the Taliban. 39 (S//NF) Detainee was associated with the ACM group Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami. Detainee was accompanied by Taliban official Shams ul-haq and Taliban Minister of Hajj and Endowment Maulawi Sayed Ghiasuddin Agha in late November 2001 to negotiate surrender to the Northern Alliance. 40 (Analyst Note: Maulawi Agha was affiliated with the Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami.) (S//NF) Detainee possessed vast power and financial resources at the time of his capture. He would likely use his prominence in the Taliban to participate in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan if he were released. (S//NF) On 7 November 2001, the US Treasury Department, in conjunction with Swiss authorities, froze the assets of the al-taqwa Bank headquartered in Lugano, Switzerland. Detainee maintained an account at the bank, whose other account holders included al-qaida, Taliban, and HIG personnel. 41 (S//NF) Detainee was reportedly involved in Taliban narcotics trafficking activities. According to a Tajik government service, a leader among narcotics smugglers, Haji Dur, maintained close contact with detainee. 42 (Analyst Note: Detainee probably received financial benefits from this relationship.) (S//NF) In November 2001, a Taliban official paid General Dostum $500,000 US on behalf of detainee to ensure safe passage from Konduz, AF, for detainee, an undetermined number of Arabs, and several hard-line senior Taliban officials, including AF-006 and Dadullah Lang. 43 (Analyst Note: The large sum paid by the Taliban on detainee s behalf highlights detainee s importance within the Taliban hierarchy.) (S//NF) In May 2002, Taliban forces near Kandahar posted leaflets that included detainee and AF-006 s names in attempts to recruit new members. The leaflet rallied support by highlighting General Dostum s betrayal resulting in the illegal detainment of detainee and AF-006. The leaflet implied General Dostum broke his word with detainee and AF-006 concerning their surrender at Mazar-e-Sharif in November (S//NF) AF-1036 stated detainee has continued to spread anti-afghan government and anti-us messages among detainees at JTF-GTMO. AF-1036 lists detainee among several detainees at JTF-GTMO who would likely pose a threat to the Afghan government it released IIR FEB-2002; SECSTATE May-2002, Number TD-314/ , TEARLINE 17-OCT TD-314/ TD-314/ IIR SIR 30-JAN

9 (S//NF) Detainee s Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a LOW threat from a detention perspective. Detainee s overall behavior has been compliant and rarely hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 10 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 31 May 2007, when he was in possession of a pair of shorts with the elastic pulled from the waistline. Detainee has one Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault occurring on 18 August 2003, when he threw a cup of water at a guard. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include failure to follow instructions and camp rules, attempted assault, damage to government property, and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, detainee had a total of one Report of Disciplinary Infraction and none so far in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainee s most recent interrogation session occurred on 23 November b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was a member of the Taliban regime from 1995 until his surrender in November of Detainee held several important military positions with direct access to the highest level strategic planning and operational activities. Detainee probably had access to information concerning weapons, narcotics trafficking, and financial networks. Detainee was directly connected to several extremist organizations and facilitated programs supporting the Taliban, including al-qaida and IMU. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee s placement and access provided him knowledge on many key individuals, decisions, and activities of the Taliban regime. He has specific information on biographical data of Taliban leaders and Taliban hierarchical networks. Detainee has specific information relating to several extremist organizations that provide support to the Taliban. Detainee also probably has significant information on Taliban and al-qaida personnel still active today. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: Biographical data on active Taliban and al-qaida senior personnel Taliban associations with extremist organizations, including al-qaida Data on early stages of Taliban Information on Mazar-e-Sharif prison uprising Information on assassination of Iranian diplomats Information on war crimes committed by former commanders under his control Terrorists and foreign fighters training, motivation, recruitment, leadership, and networks 9

10 S E C R E T //NOFORN / I o o o Taliban influence in Pakistan Terrorists and associated facilities in Quetta Detainee's intentions after release from US custody 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 6 December 2004, and he remains an enemv combatant., YItr ' w*% MARK H. BUZB\ Rear Admiral, US Navy Commandins ' Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminologt. 10 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I