DISPATCHES. Lessons Learned for Soldiers. Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) The Army Lessons Learned Centre. Vol 15 No 1 March 2010

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1 The Army Lessons Learned Centre Vol 15 No 1 March 2010 DISPATCHES Lessons Learned for Soldiers Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) DISPATCHES i

2 How to Contact The Army Lessons Learned Centre CFB Kingston (613) Extension xxxx CSN 271-xxxx Director ALLC Major SR Rankin 5117 SO Plans ALLC Major J.S. Bilodeau 4816 ALLC Coordinator Capt J.W. Hooyer 2890 ALLC Sergeant-Major MWO M.A. Brander 2890 Disclosure Statement Dispatches are targeted at disseminating information and increasing the knowledge of the soldiers and leaders across the Canadian Army and the Canadian Forces. The discussion is a snapshot of relatively current issues or procedures in a specific operating environment. Dispatch articles may not reflect doctrine, but articulate evolving ideas based on the recent operational experiences of our deployed forces. The information contained within this Dispatch is UNCLASSIFIED but sensitive in nature and distribution should be controlled. Distribution Some of the material in this document may be considered sensitive in nature and is not for general distribution. Recipients of this document should carefully consider the necessity or requirement to distribute this document outside official Canadian Forces Chains of Command or it s designated ABCA partners. If unsure of the distribution of this material, please contact the Army Lessons Learned Centre.

3 Director s Introduction Counter-Improvised Explosive Device In the conduct of counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations, emphasis must be placed on the inextricable relationship that exists with regards to counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. IEDs are merely a sub-set of a number of kinetic forms of asymmetric kinetic attack used by insurgents. And, asymmetric kinetic attack is just one form or line of operations used in guerrilla warfare. Therefore, C-IED operations are a subset of COIN operations. It must be reinforced that these operations are not against IEDs, but rather against insurgents. Within this context, it should also be reinforced that, at least in the context of Afghanistan, that insurgents, especially at the tactical level are more likely generalists and the division between insurgents who specialize in IEDs must be waged against insurgents in general. It is a tactical battle against people not against devices. And, as such, the human decision by insurgents to use IEDs provides the opportunity to attack the enemy. CF C-IED TF COMD Colonel Omer H. Lavoie Since commencement of the Afghan mission, IEDs have been the number one concern of the Canadian Forces (CF). Learning from each IED incident continues to be the top priority in the Army. In support of troops preparing for deployment, the Army Lessons Learned Centre s (ALLC) reports are designed to provide situational awareness (SA), indicate potential changes to insurgent modus operandi and highlight CF C-IED activities. After years of experiencing a high IED threat environment it is time to record what has been learned. This C-IED Dispatch is a result of knowledge often acquired in the aftermath of studying very raw battlefield circumstances. I would like to think that this C-IED Dispatch is in honour of all those Canadians who gave up so much so that their brethren could learn how better to survive in a high IED threat environment. Director ALLC Major Stephen R. Rankin DISPATCHES i

4 Table of Contents PART 1: Introduction... 1 > IED Definitions... 1 > C-IED Lines of Operation... 2 > CF C-IED Framework... 2 > C-IED Activities... 2 PART 2: The Threat... 6 > IED Threat Triad... 6 > IED Threat Evolution... 7 > The Improvised Explosive Device... 7 > IED Indicators PART 3: Targeting IED Systems...11 > Concept for IED Targeting...11 > C-IED ISTAR Activities...11 > C-IED Targeting > Intelligence > Search and Site Exploitation PART 4: C-IED Drills > Top 12 C-IED Points to Consider > 5 and 20 Drills > Mounted Search > Searching while in Convoy > Vulnerable Point Search PART 5: Reaction to an IED Incident > The 5 C s > Securing and IED Incident Site > Recovery of Evidence PART 6: Conclusion References A. Land Force Doctrine Note 1-09: C-IED, dated 16 Jan 09 B. Land Force Counter Insurgency Operations, dated 13 Dec 08 C. CF C-IED TF Aide Memoire for Tactical Commanders, dated 1 Feb 09 D. Tactics School Attack the Network Brief, dated Jun 09 E. US CALL Newsletter Attack the Network, dated Apr 09 F. TRADOC/JIEDDO Battle Staff Operations in COIN, version 1.1 dated Jan 08 G. JIEDDO Wpns Tech Int (WTI) Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Lexicon, Sep 07 H. CF C-IED Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Handbook, B-GJ /FP-004 I. CF Joint Doctrine for C-IED B-GJ /FP-0XX, Draft as of Dec 09 J. CF C-IED within the Bde Gp, Draft as of Dec 09. DISPATCHES ii

5 Part 1 Introduction IEDs are tactical weapons that can have a strategic effect; they can cause high casualty rates and restrict the ability of friendly forces to manoeuvre at the tactical level. When combined with a proactive information operations campaign, IED use can have a disproportionate effect on the conduct of operations at the operational and strategic levels. IEDs can be employed to create a variety of battlefield effects such as denial, delay, shaping or destruction. They are a reality of asymmetric warfare that enables a numerically or technologically inferior force to harass and attrit otherwise significantly superior forces. The IED has rapidly become the weapon of choice for insurgents, terrorists and criminals. Keeping within the Afghanistan and COIN context, the term insurgent will be used throughout this Dispatch to describe all potential adversary and enemy. IED Definitions Improvised Explosive Device (IED). An IED is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals, designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. IEDs may be composed of commercial or military explosives, homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance components. IED System. An IED system comprises personnel, resources and activities and the linkages between them that are necessary to resource, plan, execute and exploit an IED event. Counter IED (C-IED). C-IED is a collective effort, at all levels, to defeat the IED system by attacking the network, defeating the device and preparing the force to reduce or eliminate the effects of all forms of IEDs for use against friendly forces and non-combatants. C-IED is not solely an engineer responsibility; it is an all-arms concern and fight, whereby everyone has a role, starting with the Commander. C-IED Lines of Operation. The CF C-IED strategy employs three complimentary and concurrent lines of operation (LOO). The three C-IED LOO are Attack the Network, Defeat the Device and Prepare the Force. The diagram below schematically represents the LOO and C-IED activities on a time scale of a typical IED event. Figure 1: C-IED LOO and Activities Related to an IED Event. DISPATCHES 1

6 Attack the Network (AtN). AtN focuses on proactive actions and activities that take the fight to the insurgent. Full success in this LOO will prevent an IED from being emplaced (ultimately by denying the supply of components, finance, leaders and recruits) and detonated. If, however, a detonation does occur, activity in the information operations domain will prevent the enemy from fully capitalizing on the event. Defeat the Device (DtD). DtD LOO involves all of the activities that occur once a device has been emplaced. Measures taken here have an immediate effect and are designed to directly save lives. DtD includes the identification of effective tactics techniques and procedures (TTP), protection of friendly forces and the development of technologies that detect, identify, classify, mark and disrupt an IED. Prepare the Force (PtF). PtF encompasses efforts, education, training, equipment and measures that ready the friendly force to conduct operations in an IED threat environment. CF C-IED Framework In order to ensure all C-IED LOO are synchronized, the established CF C-IED framework and centres of excellence (Fig 2 below) consider and rapidly adapt C-IED TTP and update the contemporary operating environment (COE) as it evolves. Figure 2: CF C-IED Framework C-IED Activities At the tactical level, activities related to C-IED have been grouped into seven categories. Three of the activities; predict, prevent and exploit, fall within the AtN LOO which proactively disrupts the IED system. These activities undermine the ability and will of the insurgent to construct and employ IEDs. AtN activities may include: deterrence, exploiting evidence recovered from IEDs, network and geographic profiling, counter-bomber targeting, law enforcement, persistent surveillance, interdicting the IED re-supply apparatus and information operations. The remaining four C-IED activities are: protect, detect, neutralize and mitigate, and they relate to the DtD LOO which enables units and personnel to maintain operations and determine and execute the appropriate response upon encountering a suspected IED. A brief explanation of each of the C-IED activities follows. DISPATCHES 2

7 Predict. Predict activities identify enemy threats in a timely manner to assist Commanders to take preventative, protective and mitigating measures more efficiently. Predicting the IED network s activities necessitates identification of patterns associated with the development and employment of IED threats. It includes the identification of insurgent command and control (C2) structures, critical resources and vulnerabilities. Prediction is linked directly to a wide variety of intelligence capabilities and information sources which may include; patrol reports, after action reports, SITREPs, C-IED technical and tactical exploitation reports, electronic support measures, HUMINT, biometrics, human terrain teams, open source media exploitation, language and cultural advisors and host nation (HN) military, police and civil authorities. Prevent. Prevent activities are primarily offensive in nature and can be both kinetic and non-kinetic. The aim is to proactively disrupt and interdict the IED networks ability to conduct IED operations at the earliest opportunity. Kinetic activities include operations to destroy, clear, neutralize, disrupt or capture IED network nodes, personnel, resources or infrastructure and/or supporting sub-systems. Non-kinetic preventative activities are primarily information activities including messaging to deter attacks by condemning attacks, influencing HN public support, establishing mechanisms to report IEDs and operations to collect legacy ordnance and weapons. Figure 3: Exploitation of an IED Event in Afghanistan Exploit. Exploit activities are the most important activities as they support the development of accurate intelligence in order to effectively predict, prevent, detect, protect, mitigate and neutralize the IED threat. IED exploitation is the process whereby an IED incident is technically and tactically assessed to feed into the intelligence cycle, lessons learned process, force protection development and unit TTP. Evidence is collated and preserved, local and friendly forces interviewed and surrounding areas searched in order to gain significant information of IED systems. Exploit activities are grouped in AtN LOO because the AtN main effort is to support C-IED targeting, a preventative task. DISPATCHES 3

8 Protect. Protect activities are mainly defensive in nature and are associated with disrupting, channelling, blocking, reducing exposure and redirecting blast energy, projectiles or fragmentation. Improved tactics and technology are utilized to reduce the effects of IEDs on individuals, equipment and facilities. These measures include vehicle up-armour, personal protective equipment and infrastructure hardening and activities to hinder the IED such as electronic counter-measures (ECM), excluding functions relating to EOD. Protection activities alone are insufficient to ensure the safety of soldiers as increased protective measures cannot prevent insurgents from employing ever more powerful main charges. In addition, enhanced protective measures offer the appearance of friendly forces depending on fortified camps and reinforced vehicles an image that runs counter to successful COIN operations where the appearance of normal levels of security and maximum interaction with the local population is desired. Figure 4: Emplacement of unmanned pervasive surveillance capabilities in Afghanistan Detect. Detect activities and technologies involve the identification and location of explosive devices, IED components, other weapons, related personnel and infrastructure prior to IED assembly or initiation. Detect activities normally serve as a warning system of IED activity in the area and they prevent the insurgent s ability to emplace or initiate an IED. The aim is to provide relevant (accurate and timely) information to commanders. Detection involves a combination of operating space awareness, employing tactical SOPs to visually search and identify threats, making use of technical resources, and engaging enablers (EDD and Engrs) and other C-IED trained soldiers. All personnel involved in IED detection activities must be capable of accurately and effectively searching and reacting to an IED and IED components (including detection of CBRN materials assembled in IEDs, if the threat exists). Mitigate. Mitigate activities are short-term defensive activities that occur prior to a mission and after an IED event. Mitigation activities typically include the following: DISPATCHES 4

9 tactical planning, lessons learned, SOPs, tactical aide memoires, theatre TTPs and risk assessments. These measures facilitate adaptation and improve passage of information, thorough battle procedure and the selection and execution of tasks reducing the effects of IEDs on individuals, equipment and facilities. IED mitigating activities are tactical and support predictive, preventative and training activities. Mitigate activities leverage best practices, improve reaction to IED threats, and ensure effective information passage in an effort to avoid IED strikes and/or repeating mistakes. Figure 5: EOD Neutralizes an IED in Afghanistan Neutralize. Neutralize C-IED activities are reactive, employing EOD SOPs and technologies to disrupt, disarm, render safe, dispose or destroy IEDs and their components. The aim of neutralize C-IED activities is to eliminate the IED hazard(s) by rendering them safe at the time and place chosen by friendly forces and to support exploitation of the IED detection incident. Contingency plans should be made for dealing with IEDs containing CBRN material, if assessed to be a threat. Neutralize activities are normally associated with EOD/IEDD operators (IEDs) and Engrs (conventional munitions). When possible, it is preferable for EOD/IEDD operators to render a device safe rather than blow it in place to mitigate collateral damage and thereby allow detailed forensic exploitation. In simple terms, the C-IED scheme of manoeuvre is to predict the adversary s actions, prevent the adversary from executing plans, protect from the effects of IED functioning, detect IED material and devices, mitigate the likely threats and effects of the attack, neutralize emplaced devices, exploit IED events and continually train the force. DISPATCHES 5

10 Part 2 The Threat IED Threat Triad It is necessary for every soldier to understand the IED threat triad in order to effectively determine and then assess threat(s). The insurgent s intent coupled with his capabilities, superimposed onto terrain, will most often yield an accurate idea of the target location and type of attack. The difficulty when operating in highly canalizing terrain is that there are often multiple vulnerable points along any given route. For friendly forces, checking every vulnerable point can result in the loss of momentum and freedom of movement. However, the risk associated with not checking a route or vulnerable point can be catastrophic. In a high IED threat environment, the balance between speed and security is delicate. Figure 6: The IED Threat Triad Intent. The insurgent s intent is often constrained by the limits of their capabilities. However, there could be cases where the fulfillment of their intent does not require the use of their complete arsenal. The following list is an example of intentions for IED use: inflict casualties for strategic effect (decrease moral / perceptions of security); R&D (to determine how much explosives are required to kill a certain vehicle); target specific vehicles / forces (Armd, Engr, EOD, Comd, Log, Avn, etc); tactical obstacle covered by fire; disruption or deception; revenge for loss of honour (tribal vice insurgent contact); destroy infrastructure; protect leadership, caches or narcotics; and friendly force TTP identification. Capability. Every capability has a tactical and technical signature and a required set of conditions for employment (often terrain based). This signature often identifies exploitable capabilities, procedures and people in the IED system. A C-IED estimate includes many factors related to the insurgents IED capabilities, such as: technical design, tactical employment, direct and indirect fire systems, surveillance, night vision, air defence, EW, OPSEC, insurgent sanctuaries, logistics, C2 and communications. DISPATCHES 6

11 IED Threat Evolution While Afghan insurgents have made advancements in IED technology, it is fair to say that as an adversary, they are more adaptive than technologically innovative. Perhaps, from the insurgent perspective, significant technological innovations have not been necessary simply because minor adaptations of the basics techniques have yielded effective tactical successes. The diagram (Fig. 7) below is based on the Afghan theatre experience; however, the model when considered against the IED threat triad can and should be applicable to any future mission. The chart below offers a simplified view of the evolution that the CF has faced in Kandahar Region. IED evolution is not purely a linear change as depicted nor should it suggest that once a new TTP has emerged that all previous insurgent IED TTP are discarded. Figure 7: IED Threat Evolution in Kandahar (Feb 06-Aug 09) What s Next? Is it a guess based on trial and error. Should friendly forces remain defensive in terms of the action reaction counter-action cycle, or do they view the environment through the insurgent s eyes (difficult to do from a cultural perspective but entirely possible when considering tactical options) and attempt to deduce what are the threats? It is this red teaming or looking at the conflict through the insurgent lens that will contribute to continued offensive C-IED success. The Improvised Explosive Device IED Characteristics. An IED typically consists of five primary components. The primary components are: a switch, an initiator, a main charge, a container and a power source. DISPATCHES 7

12 Figure 8: Examples of Primary Components of an IED Switch. A switch is a device for making, breaking or changing a connection that is used to trigger a device. A switch could be a pressure plate or a pressure release spring. Initiator. An initiator is a device used as the first element of an explosive train which, upon receipt of the proper impulse, causes the detonation or burning of an explosive item. For example, an anti-personnel mine fuse or a grenade fuse could be used as an initiator. Main Charge. A main charge is a quantity of explosive, bulk or contained in a bomb, projectile, mine or similar device, or used as a propellant. Commercial or homemade explosives or military ordnance could be used as a main charge. A directionally focused fragmentation charge (DFFC) is a device designed to explosively propel fragmentation in a directed pattern. It can be initiated by any means and is used to target dismounted troops and armoured vehicles. Container. A container is an item that houses the whole IED or principle components of an IED. Containers such as a water can, length of pipe, backpack and sacks have been used to house IEDs and/or IED components. Power Source. A power supply is an item that creates electrical energy for an electrically initiated IED. Power sources such as commercial batteries, car batteries or anything that holds a charge can be used for initiation. Enhancements. Any additional components that modify and/or add to the harmful effects of an IED are considered enhancements. For example, adding substances such as diesel, shrapnel or CBRN material have been added to IEDs. Means of Initiation. Some IEDs employ multiple methods of initiation. For example, one method of initiation might arm the IED before a second initiates it. Evidence indicates that the majority of IED initiation means fall into three classes: Command Initiated. Command initiated IEDs feature a degree of separation between the main charge and the switch at the firing point thereby reducing the risk to DISPATCHES 8

13 the operator and selection of the optimum time for initiation to create the greatest effect. Although a variety of command initiation methods may be employed the most common are command wire and radio controlled initiation. o Command Wire IEDs (CWIED). Command wire initiated IEDs have an electrical wire link between the switch at the firing point and the initiator at the main charge. This offers advantages of simplicity and potential to mitigate the effectiveness of ECM. However, the disadvantage to this means of initiation is that the long wire, if not concealed properly, is easy to detect and traced to the operator at the firing point. o Radio Control IEDs (RCIED). Radio controlled IEDs employ a radio frequency (RF) transmitter at the firing point and an associated receiver which operates the switch, normally located with the initiator. RCIEDs are quick to deploy since they can be pre-assembled and do not need a physical link between the firing point and the switch. However, they are relatively complex and can be inhibited by ECM. Time Controlled. Time controlled IEDs provide a delay to initiation allowing the operator to be elsewhere when the device functions or can be set to detonate when the intended target is expected to be in the IED s vicinity. The most common time devices are electrical or mechanical timers, although chemical and/or igniferous are also potential time controlled devices. Figure 9: Examples of Time Controlled IEDs Victim Operated (VOIED). Victim operated IEDs are initiated by an action performed by the target. VOIEDs may employ a variety of switches such as pressure, pressure or tension release, passive or active infrared and/or trip wire. VOIEDs may be armed remotely after deployment by a timer device or command device. Means of Deployment. IED are defined and categorized by the means of delivery for deployment. The means of delivery for deployment for an IED are: Manual Emplacement. Manually deployed IEDs are placed by hand in order to attack targets at a specific location or within a certain area. Projected. Projected IEDs are frequently used against locations that are sufficiently well protected making targeting, by other means, difficult. IEDs can be delivered by mortars, rockets or similar improvised devices. In some cases, the explosive device itself may be made up of conventional munitions that are projected by improvised means. Projected IEDs normally detonate on impact or by time delay. DISPATCHES 9

14 Figure 10: An Example of a Main Charge Concealed in a Seat of a Vehicle Borne IED Person/Vehicle-Borne. A person-borne IED (PBIED) is an IED transported by a person (often concealed) to a target. A vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) is an IED mounted in or on any type of vehicle and delivered to a target. The use of a vehicle offers both easier concealment of the device and the potential for larger main charges. Suicide Attack. Suicide attacks present difficulty in detection and defeat. Suicide attacks are either person borne or vehicle borne, allowing the adversary to choose the optimum time and place of detonation. Suicide attacks provide the potential to engage targets of opportunity. This type of attack is the most difficult to predict, prevent and detect. Complex Attacks. First and foremost, an IED attack is an ambush. As with any ambush, the lethality of the attack can be enhanced by synchronizing multiple attacks and methods. Individual IEDs of the types described above can be combined to form multiple attack chains of the same or different type of IED and in conjunction with other weapon systems to produce complex attacks. Complex attacks are frequently designed to target personnel responding to the initial IED. IED Indicators There are often signs that an IED has been emplaced. It should be noted, however, that indicators will evolve with changes in enemy tactics and capabilities. The following observation may indicate the presence of an IED: changes in the pattern of life; lack of civilian presence; disturbed earth; rags, cloth, water bottles or anything out of place; wires protruding from clothes or unusually bulky clothing; sagging or uneven suspension on vehicles; location of parked cars forcing you to move to the left or right; and DISPATCHES 10

15 obstacles or vulnerable points such as culverts, bends in the road or canalizing ground. Note: Threat indicators continue to evolve and can be unique to a location, region or area of operations (AO). Part 3 Targeting IED Systems Concept for IED Targeting Despite numerous improvements to C-IED operations over the past several years, the threat to mission success and soldiers has not diminished. In response, a focus on offensive C-IED operations designed to attack and dismantle IED systems has emerged. The requirement to conduct intelligence enabled attacks on network centric systems, or an IED system, is adapting our TTP as well as organizational structures. C-IED activities begin with soldiers identifying and exploiting various types of information from all activities in the AO in order to facilitate effective intelligence preparation of the environment. Once information is processed into knowledge and factored into the planning process, the dismantling and disruption of the IED system can begin. The dedication of effort and resources to obtain and improve C-IED knowledge is intense, but a necessity to maintain effective force protection in the COE. Figure 11: Concept for C-IED Targeting Targeting the IED system requires integrated support from the strategic to the tactical level. Usually, key IED network nodes employ security measures (change of meeting location, constant movement, concealment within the local population, etc ) to render targeting more difficult. To counter these tactics, special operations forces are often involved with the tracking and surgical prosecution of such operations. Conventional forces with sensing and striking enablers have the ability to conduct larger scale AtN operations such as denying caches and avenues of approach, collection and exploitation. C-IED ISTAR Activities Experience has proven that persistent surveillance is critical in defeating the emplacement of IED and targeting efforts. Tactical forces must develop a multi-layer DISPATCHES 11

16 intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) plan (multi-sensors and specific time) that considers deductions from C-IED analysis to achieve persistent coverage over high threat areas. Due to the limited Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and capacities, manoeuvre forces and intelligence staffs must proactively exchange the results of their estimates, analysis and experiences of insurgent activities in order to minimize surveillance gaps. Figure 12: ISR Activities Related to an IED System and Event Prior to developing an ISTAR plan, it is paramount to conduct an in-depth analysis of the IED threat triad and the related C-IED circumstances; simply establishing standing named areas of interest (NAI) and targeted areas of interest (TAI) over hotspots is not sufficient to prevent the emplacement of IEDs. C-IED ISTAR NAIs and TAIs must be constantly adapted to counter a dynamic insurgent modus operandi and simultaneously enable C-IED targeting. Some of the IED factors to consider when establishing an ISTAR plan are: hotspot locations, avenues of approach and trends, the types of IED employed in the area, insurgent C2, activities and facilities or compounds of interest throughout the area. While the aforementioned factors are primarily tied to the terrain and are more defensive in nature, findings from exploitation activities can often indentify significant human terrain factors. Specific collection operations such as HUMINT, tactical questioning, site exploitation, and SIGINT can assist in mapping the linkages and nodes within an IED network which, in turn, can trigger subsequent detailed collection and C-IED targeting activities. It is important that commanders provide clear intent on desired information or subsequent effect of the ISTAR plan by utilizing terminology such as detect to strike, detect to follow or detect to follow and exploit. C-IED Targeting C-IED targeting results in activities that consider and affect the IED system as a whole; including personnel, infrastructure and the insurgent IED planning and execution processes. Actions against a single point in the network can often produce valuable intelligence or a desired effect on the network. Related concurrent C-IED operations against key nodes; leaders, seconds-in-command, facilitators, trainers, caches DISPATCHES 12

17 and avenues of approach are often required to disrupt, influence or shut down the network. C-IED targeting considers the broader implications of direct actions and is not necessarily linked to the neutralization of a threat, but may be designed to influence the local population, known sympathizers and/or lower level insurgents. To be most effective, C-IED targeting should be followed by the application of broader COIN-related activities; in order to effectively build and maintain influence over an area. C-IED Targeting Working Group (WG). In a high IED threat environment, establishing a C-IED targeting work group is recommended. The focus of the C-IED targeting WG is integrating technical, tactical and social network analysis with a view to defining IED trends, IED cells/groups signatures, defining origins of components, determine intelligence gaps and identifying possible sources to cover information gaps. A C-IED targeting WG provides information and subject matter expertise to the commander s targeting board and contributes to ISTAR planning coordination. Employing the find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze and disseminate (F3EAD) methodology (see Fig 13) to AtN activities can assist in C-IED targeting which in turn supports the land force targeting cycle. Figure 13: C-IED Targeting Employing the F3EAD Methodology Intelligence The speed of the insurgent decision/action cycle and volume of information required to conduct successful COIN operations in a high IED threat environment challenges intelligence capabilities. The application of traditional intelligence collection and analysis methodologies to counter network centric operations may produce a fragmented intelligence picture. Recently practiced integrated analysis techniques which focus on network-centric operations that includes; social network analysis, forensic-enabled intelligence and criminal investigative methods, have captured a more comprehensive and defined C-IED and COIN intelligence picture. Training individuals at the sub-unit level on the Tactical Intelligence Operators Course (TIOC) has provided a dedicated intelligence capacity that has facilitated the collation and passage of relevant and targeted information that can support higher intelligence fusion capabilities. In addition, deploying intelligence analysts with manoeuvre elements can have several benefits, including; improved analyst understanding of the COE resulting in improved quality of analysis, improving the definition of intelligence gaps for manoeuvre forces, timely targeting products, shaping mission planning with the commander s priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and more effective interpretation of patrol and mission reports. Dedicating an intelligence capacity at the sub-unit level and increased interaction DISPATCHES 13

18 between intelligence staff and tactical troops produces personnel that understand how technical and tactical capabilities support the targeting cycle as applied to the AtN mission and its place in the COIN fight. This in turn can improve the level of definition of IED systems and can result in activities that place continuous stress and disrupt IED systems. Search and Site Exploitation IED site exploitation feeds all C-IED activities. IED site exploitation is the process by which the IED scene, events and associated physical materials are recorded and analyzed in order to understand the IED threat triad, insurgent modus operandi and the interpersonal relationships within an IED Network. It is imperative that IED exploitation activities are conducted consistently and at each IED event in order to provide an accurate intelligence picture and to develop effective countermeasures. IED site exploitation is essential to defining IED trends and group signatures and to provide material to develop IED forensic evidence. The conduct of IED site exploitations, however, only provides a limited perspective of the IED network s operations. Search and exploitation operations must be conducted against specific NAIs and TAIs linked to IED systems to achieve a higher level of fidelity. Manoeuvre forces must develop trained tactical site exploitation (TSE) expertise and sensitive site exploitation (SSE) teams to assist in the collection and quick exploitation of captured enemy equipment (CEE) and captured enemy documents (CED). Such a dedicated capability should work directly with specialist exploitation capabilities, intelligence staffs and the tactical on-site commanders to increase effective collection on the IED network. All Arms Search Training. All soldiers are potential sensors. Therefore, in a high IED threat environment all soldiers should be trained in basic C-IED search techniques and should be familiar with collection and reporting of CEE/CEDs. All-arms search training should not replace the requirements to have specialized search teams and tactical exploitation teams; however, having and maintaining dedicated all arms IED Search capability at the sub-unit level during all operations enhances the ability to locate threats, recognize suspicious items and assist in IED data collection. Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE). TSE is the action taken to ensure that personnel, documents, electronic data, IED components, weapons and other material are collected, identified, protected and evaluated in order to facilitate follow-on actions. There are two types of TSE; hasty and deliberate. A hasty TSE occurs when there is not enough time or the insurgent threat is too high to complete a thorough TSE. The tactical unit or element utilizes their organic TSE capability and conducts a quick exploitation before leaving the site. A deliberate TSE is conducted when a unit has enough time and assets to secure a site, while additional TSE specialist support (tactical and device exploitation teams) are ordered to complete the investigation. It should be noted that a TSE is an implied all-arms task during all operations. TSE focuses on the actions taken by soldiers and leaders at the point of initial contact. TSE, which includes tactical questioning, builds the IED intelligence picture and provides information for IED analysis and adaptations to C-IED TTP. Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE). SSE is a series of related activities usually conducted by joint agencies inside an insurgent compound or site. SSE is designed to exploit personnel, documents, electronic data, IED components, weapons and other material, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents. SSE is an in-depth search capability that is conducted at a higher level requiring the use of technically trained operators from specialized agencies/units. It is often a lengthy process that requires the target site to be meticulously disassembled for maximum recovery of evidence. SSE is the final or most complete step of directed operations and exploitation of an IED site. DISPATCHES 14

19 Part 4 Counter-IED Drills The Prepare the Force (PtF) concept involves integrating C-IED knowledge and capabilities into force development, individual and collective training systems, pre-deployment and in-theatre continuation training. C-IED TTP and/or drills provide options to consider for the planning and execution of every mission when applied against the IED threat triad intent, capability and terrain. The C-IED Top 12 Points to Consider 1. DO NOT SET PATTERNS; 2. Stand-off distance is a lifesaver; 3. Dominate the road when possible; 4. Always wear your personal protective equipment (inside/outside vehicle); 5. Treat every road move as a combat mission; 6. Maintain your situational awareness; 7. Use your optics system to investigate suspected IEDs; 8. Vary your speed, spacing and order of march during convoys or patrols; 9. Always have a contingency plan; 10. Perform 5 and 20 Drills at every halt; 11. ECM use it and fire test it as part of you battle procedure; and 12. Always suspect a secondary device. The 5 and 20 Drills Stationary forces are extremely vulnerable to IED attack. Any time a static position is assumed, whether mounted or not, it is essential to conduct searches of the immediate surrounding area for IED indicators. Depending on the length of time in a position and the IED threat triad (intent, terrain and capability) the crucial search area varies from 5 to 20 metres in all directions. The 5 and 20 metre drills should be conducted immediately and thoroughly upon adopting a static position. In order to avoid stopping at a possible IED location, all members of the crew or patrol should be scanning a potential halt location prior to making the stop. The 5 and 20 drills are life-saving procedures in a high IED threat environment. The following drills have evolved to counter insurgent IED TTPs. During the conflict, there is a constant evolution of both friendly force and insurgent TTPs in attempt to gain an edge. Selecting the right C-IED drills depends on a quick combat estimate that considers the mission and the IED threat triad. Mounted Search The immediate action for all halts is to remain mounted while the vehicle commander assigns arcs to ensure complete scanning coverage around the vehicle. The crew then conduct a visual search of the area surrounding the vehicle out to 5 metres within assigned arcs. The vehicle commander monitors the crew s progress and visually searches; providing a second vantage point. Once the immediate 5 metres has been cleared, the visual search continues out to 20 metres; when available, employing vehicle optics or binoculars. Dependant on the tactical situation, a dismounted search may be DISPATCHES 15

20 required. The dismounted search will be conducted in accordance with the following seven steps: 1. Open the vehicle door or lower the ramp without touching the ground and search the ground before stepping from the vehicle. If using the ramp, ensure a visual inspection is completed under the ramp, before it touches the ground. 2. Dismount and close the door or ramp in order to provide maximum protection to the remaining crew in the event of a blast or small arms fire. 3. Visually inspect the ground under the vehicle and along the sides ensuring a complete search under the vehicle and around the wheels or tracks. 4. If two or more crew dismount, they will conduct one of several search techniques. The search technique selected will be dictated by the tactical situation and IED threat triad (enemy intent, terrain and capability). It is important that the searchers are not in the same place at the same time. Searchers will respectively scan the ground for combat indicators until the 5 metres have been completed. The vehicle commander will direct this search from the vehicle ensuring overlap of the searchers as well as identifying any areas of additional interest or suspicion. 5. Once the drill is complete, the convoy commander will direct area security that will meet the tactical needs. 6. For a long halt, or upon the convoy commander orders, each vehicle will expand the search area to 20 metres. Searchers must remember that threats may be camouflaged to prevent observation from the road. 7. If multiple vehicles are in line and spaced less than 40 metres apart, the searcher must ensure a search overlap between vehicles to the front and rear. Depending on the threat, the mounted search drill may pose its own hazards and may not be feasible or prudent. It is preferred to only conduct a physical search of the known safe ground and a visual search be conducted for the remainder of the immediate area. The visual search shall be conducted from at least two vantage points to ensure best coverage. If the area still cannot be confirmed as safe, the convoy should move to a new area. Figure 14: Adaptive Search Techniques in Afghanistan DISPATCHES 16

21 Vehicle Box Search (2 or more personnel). If two crew members dismount to search around a vehicle, they will conduct a box search, scanning the ground for combat indicators until 5 metres has been covered. Searchers must stagger their search to avoid meeting at the front or rear of the vehicle. The vehicle commander will direct the search ensuring overlap of the searchers as well as identifying any areas of additional interest or suspicion. Using the centre line of the vehicle as a reference point, the searchers will continue the box search to expand the search area out to 20 metres. Once the drill is complete, the convoy commander will direct area security that meets the tactical needs. Figure 15: Vehicle Box Search Drill Spiral Search (1 Dismount). The spiral search drill is conducted by moving away from the vehicle in a circular pattern, increasing the distance from the vehicle on each pass. This search technique is best used for a single-person search. It should be noted, however, that as the searcher moves further from a vehicle it is more difficult to ensure complete ground coverage and is therefore important that the vehicle commander observe and supervise the search. Once the drill is complete, the convoy commander will direct area security that meets the tactical needs. Figure 16: Vehicle Spiral Search DISPATCHES 17

22 Zigzag Search (1 or more personnel). The zigzag search is best used if there are several areas of interest or suspicion that the vehicle commander deems a threat or search priority. Searchers will move from the vehicle and check areas of interest and then, upon completion, move back to the vehicle, completing the ground search. The zigzag search is completed with searchers moving in opposite directions and maintaining maximum distance between each other. Note: It is important that the searchers are not in the same place at the same time. Once the drill is complete convoy commander will direct area security that meets the tactical need. Figure 17: Vehicle Zigzag Search Searching while in Convoy Vehicle spacing in convoy will be directed based on the tactical situation, IED threat triad (particularly the RCIED threat) and environmental conditions. If multiple vehicles are in line and spaced less than 40 metres, searchers must ensure an overlap of areas scanned between vehicles to the front and rear. However, if the vehicles are spaced greater than 40 metres apart, there will be skip zones created because the 20-metre searches taking place on each vehicle. Skip zones will have to be searched. The skip zone is defined as the road surface and verges. The convoy commander will direct area security that meets the tactical needs. Figure 18: Convoy Spacing at the Halt DISPATCHES 18

23 Vulnerable Point Search Drills (VPS) Vulnerable points are locations along a route where it would be advantageous or easy for an insurgent to launch an attack, which could be a combination of an IED attack and ambush. Utilizing intelligence assessments, proper battle procedures, unit SOPs and appropriate detection techniques, VPS drills are procedures that assist in locating immediate threats that may restrict the friendly force and non-combatant freedom of movement. Examples of vulnerable points are canalizing ground, points with prominent markers; sharp turns or dominated terrain with high features. The locations of previous IED events should be considered in planning, marked on maps and treated as vulnerable points. IEDs will likely be utilized in a place where targets have to slow down (a slower moving target is easier to attack than one moving at speed), or where movement off road is unlikely or difficult. VPS are conducted to mitigate the risks associated with restrictive terrain by systematically searching the area for IED and/or insurgent indicators. V Drill. The V drill is conducted in order to search vulnerable points for IED indicators. It is conducted by dismounted troops searching in advance of a vehicle providing dismounted soldiers overwatch protection. The outside flank positions of the V are searching for indications of a command wire laid perpendicular to a route and/or exposed antennas as well as identifying any potential firing points. The searchers advance in a V shape formation past the vulnerable point, stopping to investigate threat terrain such as culverts. It should be noted that, threats may be camouflaged from observation from the road with the best camouflage being on or nearest the road surface. This V formation offers the advantage of good observation and firepower to the flanks and to the front and can easily be controlled from the centre. Figure 19: The V Drill Box Search. The box search is conducted in areas with a high occurrence or likelihood of a command wire IED or areas where command wires are normally found to be laid parallel to a route. It is a method of isolating an area prior to the physical search of the immediate area surrounding a vulnerable point. It is conducted by two teams searching in a box shape around the vulnerable point location. Each team will depart the vehicle conduct a search out from and parallel to the route. After clearing one side of the route, the teams cross over the road and return along the opposite side of the road to return to DISPATCHES 19

24 the start point. Once the search teams have returned to the start point and no signs of a potential command wire or IED were detected, a physical search of the road surface and the vulnerable point should be conducted in a similar fashion as the V Drill. Figure 20: Box Search Part 5 Reaction To An IED Incident The Five C s The Five C s refers to a simple set of procedures used when a suspected IED has been encountered or following a detonation. The guidelines have been created with the priority placed on the safety of both the troops involved and local inhabitants. An incident site must be secured ensuring no other IEDs exist and to facilitate the follow up investigation and forensic collection. The steps are not necessarily conducted sequentially and can occur concurrently. All steps should be conducted while using tactical cover to best advantage. The Five C s are: 1. Confirm from a safe distance the presence of a device ensuring to maximize the use of optics for standoff distances. Perform the 5 and 20 drill in the immediate area to ensure no secondary devices are present. 2. Contact the appropriate operations centre immediately and request assistance. Provide as much detail as possible and include a direction of approach so that the quick reaction force (QRF) do not have to drive past the device to reach the rendezvous point. 3. Clear the area of people within 300 metres of the device. 4. Cordon off the area to ensure the ground is undisturbed before the arrival of specialist team(s). Establish each security position of the cordon, conduct the 5 and 20 drills and establish an incident control point (ICP). 5. Control the perimeter until the All Clear is given and the mission is complete. Securing an IED Incident Site After discovering a suspected IED or following an IED incident, follow the 5 C s and disturb as little as possible while securing an area. This will assist to avoid detonating a possible secondary IED, any unexploded or partially exploded ammunition and to preserve any potential IED related evidence. Follow unit SOP to treat any injuries or handle persons of interest. In order to conduct and exploitation of the area, an effective DISPATCHES 20

25 cordon of an area must be established to maintain control and security for the arrival of the QRF, C-IED team, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) assets and/or any other investigative services arrive. It is extremely important that the cordon remain in place until the completion of the exploitation task. The site security and preservation of evidence that is offered by an effective cordon and crowd control is the key in allowing C-IED teams to work effectively and efficiently. The CF endeavours to exploit as many IED incidents as possible in support of the C-IED main effort Attack the Network. Recovery of Evidence Exploitation teams endeavour to investigate all IED incidents and sites of interest to gather as much technical and tactical information as possible. Soldiers involved in an incident are not authorized to recover evidence from an IED event unless under orders. Often, specialists or special investigators have been dispatched to exploit and the site must remain uncontaminated. All threats must be assessed prior to and during evidence exploitation including but not limited to: insurgent counter attack, secondary devices, UXO, bio-hazardous materials, chemical threat (primarily spills) and fire. All human remains require special attention and Task Force SOPs will dictate their handling. Information gathering is done through various methods including; questioning witnesses to an event, analysis of the terrain and collection of all physical evidence remaining at the scene. Once the results from the collection are exploited, C-IED TTP can be confirmed or adapted, force protection can be enhanced and most importantly, the IED system can be attacked. In the event that specialist teams are not available to exploit an IED incident, the chain of command may order the collection of evidentiary material by soldiers at the scene. When authorized to exploit the scene, the following steps apply: Step 1 Photographic Evidence. Take several photos of the scene and crowd for analysts to gain an appreciation of the event. Photographing the crowd is particularly important in order to identify possible insurgents. Insurgents often linger at an IED event to gain information such as; photos or videos for propaganda purposes, intelligence for future operations and to learn friendly force TTP. It is essential to identify items of possible evidence and photograph the material before handled or moved. It should be noted that to provide effective photographs a digital camera over 5 megapixels is preferred. Step 2 Wear Gloves. Do not touch the evidence with your bare hands. Surgical gloves should always be part of full fighting order and worn when handling any potential evidence or bio-hazardous material. Step 3 Collection. In order to preserve forensic material, do not pick up the item in the same manner as an insurgent would have. For example, do not pick up a weapon by the handle where finger prints may remain. Step 4 Storage. Place potential evidential material in a sterile clear plastic bag. All items are to be bagged individually. Step 5 Identification. Draw a scale diagram of the IED incident scene indicating where each significant item was recovered. Make sure that all individual plastic bags used for collecting evidence are marked using a permanent marker with the following information: item, date/time group, mission name, unit, gatherers name and rank. CONCLUSION Over the past two decades, many of the conflicts around the world have been characterized by the use of IED. Canada s experience in Afghanistan has highlighted the IED threat and the significance of IED to an insurgent in counter-insurgency operations. A high IED threat environment will likely shape most future conflicts. As warriors, it is our DISPATCHES 21