Public Opinion on Global Issues. Chapter 12b: U.S. Opinion on Transnational Threats: Weapons of Mass Destruction

Transcription

1 Public Opinion on Global Issues Chapter 12b: U.S. Opinion on Transnational Threats: Weapons of Mass Destruction July 16, 2012

2 CHAPTER 12B: U.S. OPINION ON COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Concerns about Nuclear Proliferation A large majority of Americans are concerned about the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers and believe that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is an important foreign policy goal for the United States. Overwhelmingly, Americans perceive nuclear proliferation as a critical threat. According to a 2010 Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) poll, more than two-thirds of U.S. respondents (69 percent) believe the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers is a critical threat, compared to 27 percent who believe it is important but not critical, and only 3 percent who believe it is not important. This level of concern was essentially the same as is in the 2006 CCGA poll. It was also higher than the average of nine other countries polled in 2006 by WPO and CCGA: on average 58 percent of respondents in these countries regarded the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by unfriendly countries as a critical threat, 28 percent as important but not critical, and 8 percent as unimportant. 1 A large majority of U.S. respondents (73 percent) said that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is a very important foreign policy goal, with another 24 percent saying that it is an important goal, and just 2 percent saying it is not an important goal (CCGA 2010). When previously asked in the 2006 international poll, responses were virtually the same. This U.S. level of concern is a bit higher than the average across eight countries polled in 2006: 63 percent of international respondents indicated that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is a very important goal, 25 percent that it is an important goal, and 7 percent that it is unimportant. 2 Goal of Abolition of Nuclear Weapons A large majority of Americans favor an international agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons, even when this would include an intrusive international inspection regime. In 2011 Americans were asked by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) about the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, preceded by arguments for and against making elimination a goal. The argument against it cast doubt on the efficacy of verification: Even if we have a system for verifying that nations are complying, there will always be some evil leaders who will find a way to cheat. We should not pursue the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Sixtythree percent found this convincing (18 percent very convincing); 34 percent found it unconvincing (11 percent very). 3 The argument supporting the goal of elimination focused on the risk of nuclear use: Given the potential for evil, the risk is too great that someday nuclear weapons be used, creating untold destruction. We should work to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons through an international agreement with an advanced monitoring system. Seventy-five percent found this convincing (24% very convincing); 24 percent found this unconvincing (8% very). 4 Having been exposed to both pro and con arguments respondents were asked about whether they supported an international agreement for eliminating nuclear weapons according to a timetable, with international monitoring. Sixty-nine percent were in favor and 28 percent opposed. 5 In a 2008 WPO poll, respondents in twenty-one nations, including the United States, were similarly asked about the possibility of an agreement for eliminating nuclear weapons, in which all nuclear-armed countries would be required to disarm according to a timetable and all other states would be prohibited from developing nuclear weapons. The question specified that all countries, including the country of the respondent, would be monitored. A majority of Americans (77 percent) favored the idea of such an agreement (39 percent strongly), while only 20 percent were opposed (7 percent strongly). On average across all twenty-one nations polled, 76 percent favored the idea of an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons (50 percent strongly) while 16 percent were opposed (7 percent strongly). 6 1

3 A 2011 PIPA poll of Americans found a majority in favor of the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, in a question that offered a range of four positions on U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Fifty-five percent thought that either Our goal should be to gradually eliminate all nuclear weapons through an international agreement, while developing effective systems for verifying all countries are eliminating theirs, too (47 percent, up from 38 percent in ), or thought the United States should proceed to eliminate its arsenal unilaterally if necessary, because nuclear weapons are morally wrong (8 percent). Another 30 percent supported reducing the U.S. arsenal through verifiable agreements without taking on the goal of elimination. Only 11 percent disagreed with reductions, saying Nuclear weapons give the U.S. a uniquely powerful position in the world. It is not in the interest of the U.S. to participate in treaties that would reduce or eliminate its nuclear arsenal. Support for the goal of elimination in this question was ten points higher in 2011 than when it was asked in In 2005, Pew also found that 70 percent of Americans favor the United States signing a treaty with other nations to reduce and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons, including our own. 9 Interestingly, support was a little lower than in the 2008 WPO poll discussed above, which mentioned an international inspections regime. Use of Force by the United Nations to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation Americans favor the UN Security Council having the power to authorize the use of military force to prevent a country from acquiring nuclear weapons. Though the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is something that states enter into voluntarily and from which they have the right to withdraw, Americans favor the UN Security Council having the power to authorize the use of military force to prevent a country from acquiring nuclear weapons. A large majority of Americans (62 percent) favored giving the UN Security Council this authority in a 2006 CCGA poll (33 percent were opposed). This was slightly higher than the average of the seventeen nations polled, where 59 percent of respondents favored the Security Council having such a right and 31 percent were opposed (WPO/CCGA ). 10 General Attitudes Regarding Binding International Agreements on Nuclear Weapons Almost all Americans begin with a generally positive outlook on the idea of international agreements to govern nuclear issues. In 2011 WPO asked Americans a series of questions about international agreements taken broadly as an approach to dealing with global problems. They were told that there is some discussion about whether or not it is a good idea for nations to work together to establish legally binding agreements, such as treaties, to address certain international problems. They were then offered a series of problem areas, three of them concerning nuclear weapons. In each of the nuclear cases, nine in ten thought binding international agreements were a good idea, specifically when geared toward: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (92 percent), 11 reducing the number of nuclear weapons (90 percent), 12 and reducing the risk of nuclear war (92 percent). 13 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty An overwhelming majority of Americans support U.S. participation in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) seeks to reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation by preventing nonnuclear nations from developing nuclear weapons and hindering nuclear nations from improving them. The idea of such a treaty, which the United States has not ratified, enjoys strong U.S. public support. When asked in a 2010 CCGA poll, 82 percent of Americans said the United States should participate in a treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapon test explosions worldwide. In 2006, support for U.S. participation was slightly higher (86 percent). Among all of the four countries asked in the earlier poll, the average was a bit lower, with 76 percent saying their country should participate in such a treaty and 18 percent saying their country should not participate. 14 Proposed Agreement to Lower the Number of Nuclear Weapons On High Alert There is strong majority support among Americans for negotiating an agreement with other nuclear powers that would reduce the number of nuclear weapons on high alert. 2

4 Four in five Americans are supportive of the idea of negotiations to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world that are on trigger alert and hence more prone to fire in an accidental war situation. Respondents in a 2011 WPO poll were told that some people have proposed that the U.S. and the other nuclear powers could lower the risk of accidental nuclear war by having a verifiable agreement to lower the number of nuclear weapons each country has on high alert that is, ready to fire on very short notice. Others oppose this idea, saying it is too difficult to make sure that the other countries would not cheat. Eighty-two percent said the U.S. should work with other nuclear powers to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on high alert. 15 This is exactly the percentage who took this position in (in 2007, 79 percent). 17 Multilateral Control of Nuclear Fuel Production There is substantial U.S. public support for prohibiting some countries from developing nuclear fuel out of concern that they will use it to develop nuclear weapons. Americans would also favor an international regime under the United Nations that would stop new countries from beginning production of nuclear fuel and instead supply them with the fuel they need for energy production. Americans even favor giving the UN Security Council the right to authorize military force to prevent a country from developing nuclear fuel that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. The NPT puts limits on the development of nuclear weapons, but does not limit the production of nuclear fuel provided that nations only do so to produce nuclear energy and submit to monitoring from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To prevent diversion into weapons programs, there have been calls for greater international regulation of nuclear fuel production. Several polls show strong U.S. support for greater control over the production of nuclear fuel. CCGA asked the following question in 2006: In the past, the international community has agreed that all countries have the right to produce nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. Now it has been proposed that certain countries not be allowed to develop nuclear fuel out of concern they will use it to develop nuclear weapons. Do you think this proposal is a good idea or a bad idea? A large majority of U.S. respondents (66 percent) said the proposal is a good idea, while 31 percent said it is a bad idea. This was somewhat higher than the average of the thirteen countries that participated in the poll: 56 percent of respondents in these nations said the proposal is a good idea and 29 percent said it is a bad idea (WPO/CCGA ). 18 A British Broadcasting Company (BBC)/GlobeScan/Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll in 2006 asked respondents to choose between two arguments about new countries developing nuclear fuel: All countries should be free to produce nuclear fuel under United Nations oversight, because they have the right to have nuclear energy and should not have to depend on other countries OR Because nuclear fuel can be developed for use in nuclear weapons, the United Nations should try to stop new countries from producing nuclear fuel, but should provide them with the fuel they need. A majority of Americans (56 percent) endorsed the statement that the United Nations should try to stop countries from producing nuclear fuel, while 29 percent said that all countries should have a right to produce fuel. U.S. support for UN action to prevent new countries from developing nuclear fuel was slightly higher than the average (52 percent) of twentyfive countries polled. Thirty-three percent of respondents in these nations said that all countries should have a right to produce fuel. 19 Some of the strongest U.S. public support for multilateral control of the production of nuclear fuel emerged in a 2006 CCGA poll that asked whether the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of force to stop a country that did not have nuclear weapons from producing nuclear fuel that could be used to produce such weapons. Fiftyseven percent of Americans supported granting the UN Security Council such authority, with 39 percent opposed. This is almost exactly the same as the average of sixteen countries polled (56 percent to 32 percent) (WPO/CCGA ). 20 3

5 In 2010, CCGA also asked about an idea, similar to one proposed by then-iaea Director Mohamed ElBaradei, that called for having a UN agency control access to all nuclear fuel in the world to ensure that none is used for weapons production. Sixty-four percent of Americans favored the idea. 21 In 2008 CCGA found the same level of support for the idea. 22 Dealing with Iran s Nuclear Program A large majority of Americans believe that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, rather than limiting itself to energy production, and there is substantial concern over this. There is widespread pessimism that a nuclear armed Iran would be deterred by the threat of retaliation. Nonetheless, presented a menu of options, few endorse a military option while majorities favor either diplomatic options or sanctions. Majorities express pessimism about the likely effectiveness of a military strike. Diplomatic efforts to engage Iran are supported by majorities. However, questions that present a choice between a military option and inaction, imply that a military strike would be effective in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon (a controversial assumption), or pose a hypothetical scenario in which Iran is clearly on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapon, elicit support for military action among about half of respondents or modest majorities. Americans support the idea of allowing Iran to produce nuclear fuel if it accepts intrusive UN inspections. Asked which institution would best handle the issue of Iranian nuclear weapons, Americans are divided, though a plurality chooses the United Nations. In March 2012 a PIPA/ Sadat Chair poll asked Americans about Iran s intent in its nuclear program. Three options were offered including the position endorsed by the U.S. intelligence community that Iran is developing some of the technical ability necessary to produce nuclear weapons, but has not decided whether to produce them. However this option was only endorsed by 30 percent. A majority of 58 percent said Iran has decided to produce nuclear weapons and is actively working to do so. Only 6 percent thought Iran is producing nuclear fuel strictly for its energy needs. 23 Further, in the same poll, almost all respondents (89 percent) thought it was very (49 percent) or somewhat (40 percent) likely that Iran will eventually develop nuclear weapons. 24 In October 2009 CNN found 88 percent of Americans believed that Iran was attempting to develop nuclear weapons. This marked a significant increase from a 2007 CNN finding in which 61 percent believed Iran was trying to develop nuclear weapons. (The 2007 finding came shortly after a National Intelligence Estimate report saying that Iran had abandoned its nuclear weapons program). 25 International polling conducted in 2006 found that American perceptions that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons were higher than in other countries. BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA surveyed twenty-five countries, including the United States, on whether Iran is producing nuclear fuel strictly for its energy needs or is also trying to develop nuclear weapons. An overwhelming majority of U.S. respondents (83 percent) believed Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons, while only 5 percent believed that it was producing nuclear fuel solely for its energy needs. Among the 25 countries polled on average 60 percent of respondents believed Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons and 17 percent that it was producing nuclear fuel strictly for its energy needs. 26 Level of Concern Americans and Europeans both express a high level of concern about the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Polled by the German Marshall Fund in 2011, 76 percent of Americans expressed concern (56 percent very concerned). In the European average, 75 percent of respondents were concerned (44 percent very). 27 A 2010, Fox News poll asked [Americans?] How concerned are you about Iran getting a nuclear bomb? Phrased this way, 78% were concerned (38% extremely concerned). 28 A November 2011 Quinnipiac poll of Americans asked a question premised on the view, contrary to the views of the U.S. intelligence community, that Iran is seeking to develop a nuclear weapon by asking about Iran s efforts to develop nuclear weapons. In this case concern was substantially higher. Eighty-eight percent called it a serious threat to US national security (55 percent very). 29 4

6 Other polls have simply asked about Iran s nuclear program. When asked by CCGA in 2010, 68% of Americans saw Iran s nuclear program as a critical threat to the vital interest of the United States in the next ten years, and 27% saw it as important but not critical. Only 4% said Iran s nuclear program was not an important threat. 30 In 2009 a Pew poll found that a large majority (69 percent) of Americans believed that Iran s nuclear program poses a major threat, and Gallup found a modest majority (54 percent) saying they were very concerned about it (moderately concerned, 29 percent). 31 Americans show higher levels of concern than publics in other countries, though concern is quite high globally. The 2006 BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll asked about the level of concern "if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons." An overwhelming 92 percent of U.S. respondents said they would be concerned (72 percent very concerned), while just 7 percent said they would not be concerned. Comparable global averages were 72 percent and 20 percent, respectively. 32 A 2006 German Marshall Fund (GMF) poll found that the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons was considered an extremely important threat by three-quarters of Americans. Nineteen percent called it an important threat, and 5 percent said it was not an important threat at all. This indicates a greater level of concern than the average of respondents polled in Europe, where 53 percent called it an extremely important threat, 27 percent called it an important threat, and 10 percent said it was not a threat. 33 The high level of concern about the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons appears to be related to pessimistic assumptions about how Iran would behave with a nuclear weapon. Americans assume that a nuclear-armed Iran would not make rational calculations as a nuclear actor and fit its behavior into a logic of deterrence. In a March 2012 Sadat Chair/PIPA question, respondents were asked to suppose Iran develops nuclear weapons and to say which of two alternatives they thought more likely to occur. Three in five (62%) chose, Iran would be likely to use them against Israel because it is so hostile toward Israel, while only 32 percent chose, Iran would be deterred from striking Israel for fear of being destroyed in a nuclear retaliatory strike. 34 (It should be noted that this poll did not measure how many respondents were aware that Israel has nuclear weapons.) A 2008 GMF poll also found a majority of Americans convinced that Iran would actually use nuclear weapons in higher percentages than among Europeans. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons 75 percent of Americans believed Iran would attack other countries in the region (58 percent of Europeans held this view); and 66 percent believed Iran would threaten Europe with nuclear weapons (a view held by 54 percent of Europeans) Fifty-two percent said it was unlikely that would only use nuclear weapons for defensive purposes, whereas more 40 percent of Europeans took this position. Eighty-three percent of Americans also thought it was at least somewhat likely that Iran would supply nuclear weapons to terrorists (compared to 66 percent of Europeans). 35 Americans are also pessimistic about the effect of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon on the potential for a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Eighty-three percent of Americans believed that with a nuclear-armed Iran, other Middle Eastern countries would likely decide to pursue nuclear weapons (a view held by 68 percent of Europeans); What Action to Take Presented a menu of options, most Americas want to put international pressure on Iran to stop it from producing nuclear fuel, while few endorse the option of military force. In 2011 GMF presented respondents with five policy options for dealing with Iran s nuclear program, not mutually exclusive, and asked which one they thought was best. Imposing economic sanctions was the most commonly chosen option at 33 percent. Twenty-eight percent chose more accommodating options either to offer economic incentives for Iran to drop the program (20%) or to simply accept that Iran may develop nuclear weapons (8%). Twenty-six percent chose approaches that would be more threatening to Iran s regime either to provide support to opponents of the current government (13%) or to take military action (13%). In the European average, the most commonly chosen option was to offer economic incentives (32%), with imposing sanctions a close second (28%). 36 5

7 A 2010 CCGA poll showed similar views. When asked what the UN Security Council should do if Iran continues to enrich uranium and presented four options, only 21 percent of Americans chose the approach of authorizing a military strike against Iran s nuclear energy facilities. The most popular approach (endorsed by 45 percent) was to impose economic sanctions, followed by simply continuing diplomatic efforts (26 percent). Just 4 percent favored applying no pressure. Responses were virtually the same when CCGA asked the question previously in In an international poll conducted in December 2007, with the same four response options, Americans support for military action was similarly low. The BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll asked about actions the UN Security Council should take if Iran continues to develop nuclear fuel and offered four options. Among Americans, only 15 percent favored authorizing military strikes, while the largest number favored economic sanctions (45 percent) and 35 percent favored softer approaches (31 percent diplomacy, 4 percent no pressure). In contrast, on average among the twenty-six countries polled, 56 percent favored softer approaches (42 percent use only diplomatic efforts, 14 percent not pressure Iran) and just 33 percent supported tougher measures (26 percent impose economic sanctions, 8 percent authorize military strikes). 38 A 2008 GMF poll that did not offer a military strike as an option found Americans were divided between those in favor of increasing pressure while maintaining the option of using military force (49 percent), and those in support of taking a range of milder approaches, including: accepting that Iran may develop nuclear weapons (6 percent); maintaining the level of diplomatic pressure on Iran (13 percent); and increasing diplomatic pressure while ruling out use of military force (27 percent). On average among Europeans, only 21 percent supported increasing pressure while keeping force as an option, whereas 47 percent supported increasing diplomatic pressure but ruling out military force. Sixteen percent of Europeans supported maintaining the present level of diplomatic pressure and 6 percent supported accepting that Iran may develop nuclear weapons. 39 In 2007, Gallup initially asked what the United States should do to get Iran to shut down its nuclear program, providing two options: Take military action and Rely on economic/diplomatic efforts. Only 18 percent of Americans opted for military action, while 73 percent favored relying on economic and diplomatic efforts. These 73 percent were then asked, Suppose U.S. economic and diplomatic efforts do not work [should the United States] take military action? Thirtyfour percent of this group (25 percent of the full sample) said the United States should then take military action while 55 percent still rejected the idea of military action. 40 Consistent with this emphasis on diplomatic approaches, majorities of Americans support diplomatic engagement with Iran. In 2010 CCGA found that 62 percent thought U.S. leaders should be ready to meet and talk with leaders of Iran, 41 similar to the 65 percent level in Sixty-two percent said in November 2008 that President-elect Obama should personally negotiate with the leaders of Iran to limit their nuclear program (Quinnipiac University 2008). 43 In a different poll in 2008, a more modest majority (53 percent) said that the United States should establish diplomatic relations with Iran while Iran has a nuclear program (CBS/New York Times 2009). 44 However, CCGA in 2010 found this willingness had eroded somewhat: 54 percent were opposed to diplomatic relations with Iran, with 42 percent in favor. 45 In a November 2011 CBS poll question that named Iran but did not evoke the nuclear issue directly, Americans were asked: Which comes closer to your opinion--iran is a threat to the United States that requires military action now, Iran is a threat that can be contained with diplomacy now, or Iran is not a threat to the United States as this time? Only 15 percent thought Iran was a threat requiring military action now; 55 percent saw it as a threat that can be contained via diplomacy now, and another 17 percent said it is not a threat at this time. 46 Resistance to military options may well arise from pessimism about its likely effects. CCGA in 2010 asked Americans to consider the possible outcomes of a military strike. Eight in ten (80 percent) believed that Iran s nuclear program would be slowed but not stopped, and three quarters (76 percent) did not believe strikes would cause Iran to give up its nuclear program. Large majorities believed that Iranians would rally around their government (74 percent) and that Muslim people worldwide would become more hostile toward the United States (82 percent). Similarly large numbers believed that Iran would retaliate against U.S. targets in neighboring states (82 percent) and that retaliatory attacks against the 6

8 United States itself would be likely (81 percent). The only positive effect that a modest majority (52%) foresaw was that other countries in the region would likely be deterred from developing their own nuclear weapons. 47 Several polls have found support for military strikes from half or more US respondents. In all cases these questions have one or more of the following features: the military option is the only option presented, so that the alternative is not associated with any form of effort to address the problem; the military action is presented as being effective in achieving the desired end of stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons; or it is placed in a hypothetical context in which it becomes somehow established that diplomatic efforts have conclusively failed to stop Iran from building a nuclear weapon. These findings have limited applicability in a policy context. First, the military option is never considered in isolation from other alternatives. Second, the notion that a military strike would prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is doubtful unless it were to be accompanied by occupation of the country; while it would slow Iran s program, it would not prevent it from proceeding in a facility protected from bombing attacks. Third, a hypothetical scenario in which it established that diplomatic efforts have conclusively failed to stop Iran from building a nuclear weapon are not entirely plausible as it is not clear how this would occur, short of Iran actually acquiring nuclear weapons, which is not specified in the questions. Finally, in many of the cases it is not specified whether the military action would be unilateral or multilateral, a factor that has shown to have a strong effect on support. A question that presented a military option and no other option and implied that a strike would be effective elicited support from about half of respondents. CBS/NY Times asked in March 2012, Would you support or oppose the United States taking military action against Iran in order to prevent it from developing a nuclear weapons program? 51 percent said they supported it, while 36 percent were opposed. In the 2011 GMF poll those who initially chose an option other than military force or accepting a nuclear-armed Iran (81 percent of the sample) were asked to consider a hypothetical scenario, Now imagine that all of these non-military options have been tried and the only option left to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is the use of military force. Then offered two options, 36 percent of the sub-sample supported taking military action and 28 percent opted to simply accept that Iran could acquire nuclear weapons. Combined with the original 13 percent who favored military action this equals 49 percent favoring military action. 48 An NBC/Wall Street Journal poll told respondents to assume that Iran is close to developing a nuclear weapon, and only offered the option of taking military action. In percent favored military action, rising to 54 percent in December CCGA in 2010 first asked respondents to consider the possible outcomes of a military strike and then posed a hypothetical scenario in which diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions failed to stop or slow down Iran s nuclear program. In this context 47 percent favored a strike and 49 percent were opposed. 50 Two other polls had the additional complexity of making the implicit assertion that Iran already has a nuclear weapons program, not just a nuclear energy program. This is a point of controversy. As discussed above, U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program though it is developing capacities that could be applied to such a program. This is also the position of a substantial number of Americans when polled (see above). A 2012 Pew poll of the United States and 20 other countries asked respondents which would be more important and offered two options: to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, even if it means taking military action (implying that Iran is developing nuclear weapons) or avoiding a military conflict with Iran, even if it means they may develop nuclear weapons (implying that the failure to take military action means accepting Iran having a nuclear weapon as no other means of taking action was offered). Fifty-nine percent (of the whole sample) took the first position (down from 61% in 2009) and 30 percent the second (up six points). 51 (Note: There was some confusion in the press reporting on this question as Pew presented the percentage of a subsample who were asked this question and some mistook this for the whole sample.) 7

9 However this should not be interpreted as signifying support for military action over diplomatic methods. In the same poll when Pew asked those who had said they opposed Iran acquiring nuclear weapons whether they favored tougher international economic sanctions on Iran to try to stop it from developing nuclear weapons, 75 percent (of the whole sample) said they did favor it. This highlights how support for an option presented in isolation should not be read as absolute support but as relative to the other options posed in the question, which in some cases is implicitly no action. The only way to determine whether military action or intensified sanctions are preferred is to compare them in the same question. 52 Another question that asserted that Iran is developing nuclear weapons was a November 2011 Quinnipiac poll. It began by asking simply Do you think the U.S. should take military action to prevent Iran s development of a nuclear weapon, or not (a wording which also implies military action would result in prevention). Thirty-six percent said the U.S. should take military action, while a 55 percent majority said it should not. This 55 percent were then posed a hypothetical context, asking whether the United States should take military action if the economic sanctions are unable to stop Iran s nuclear weapons program. A further 14 percent of the full sample said it would change its view in this case, meaning that, combined with the 36 percent who supported it initially, half (50 percent) would support military action under some conditions. 53 Scenario: Israel Preparing to Attack Iran s Nuclear Facilities Beginning in 2011, there was increasing discussion in Israeli government circles, and in the United States, of the prospect that Israel might attempt an airstrike against Iran s nuclear facilities along the lines of the 1980 airstrike that destroyed the Osirak reactor in Iraq. There is little sentiment in the U.S. public in favor of such a move. In March 2012 a Sadat Chair/PIPA poll asked whether Americans preferred Israel to conduct a military strike against Iran s nuclear program before it makes further progress, or whether it is better for to wait for the newly-increased sanctions against Iran to take effect and that the U.S. and other major powers should continue pursuing negotiations with Iran. Only 24 percent favored Israel conducting such a strike, while 69 percent preferred the United States and other powers to keep pursuing negotiations. 54 The same poll asked a series of questions on what the U.S. government s stance should be regarding the possibility that Israel would undertake such a strike. First, respondents separately evaluated how convincing they found three arguments- -one that the United States should discourage Israel, another that the United States should take a neutral stance, and a third that the United States should encourage Israel. Finally they were asked to come to a conclusion. The argument for discouraging Israel from attacking was found convincing by the greatest number. It said that there are huge risks to U.S. national interests, since Iran may attack U.S. assets in retaliation, pulling the U.S. into a war --and that such attacks would not be ultimately successful, since U.S. military leaders say the most that could be achieved would be to slow down Iran s nuclear program a bit and probably just lead them to rebuild it underground. A large majority (71 percent) found this argument convincing (unconvincing, 24 percent). 55 Second most popular was the argument for neutrality, which said that while Israel has a right to take actions it sees as necessary for its own defense, the U.S. should think about its own interests and make a clear statement distancing itself from whatever Israel may choose to do, to reduce the chance that Iran will retaliate against U.S. targets. A modest majority of 52 percent found this argument convincing, while 45 percent found it unconvincing. 56 The least convincing argument was the one that supported the United States encouraging Israel to attack. Clearly Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons, it stated, and if Israel will take the heat for stopping or at least slowing down the program, all the better for the U.S. Only 38 percent found this argument convincing, while 57 percent found it unconvincing. 57 In a final question, respondents were offered the three options again and asked to choose which the United States should follow. Fewer than one in five (14 percent) thought the United States should encourage Israel to attack Iran s nuclear 8

10 program. The largest number (46 percent) said that the United States should take a neutral stance. Thirty-four percent said that the United States should discourage Israel from attacking (34 percent). 58 As just discussed, these two stances arguments were both found convincing by majorities. Making a Deal A December 2007 BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll asked, "If Iran were to allow UN inspectors permanent and full access throughout Iran to make sure it is not developing nuclear weapons, do you think Iran should or should not be allowed to produce nuclear fuel for producing electricity?" A majority of respondents in the United States (55 percent) favored granting Iran permission to produce nuclear fuel for energy (while 38 percent were opposed). Interestingly, this was somewhat higher than the average of 47 percent across all twenty-six countries polled who favored the idea (36 percent were opposed). 59 CCGA asked this same question in 2010 and 52 percent of U.S. respondents favored the idea, while 45 percent were opposed. 60 This same bargain has been proposed to respondents in more detailed questions as well. On each occasion supporters have outnumbered opponents, though the numbers in support have diminished somewhat over the years. In a November 2006 PIPA poll the bargain was explained in this way: Iran should be able to enrich uranium, but only on two conditions: 1) Enrichment must be limited to the low levels necessary for nuclear energy, while enrichment to higher levels needed for nuclear weapons would be forbidden. 2) Iran must fully cooperate with the U.N. inspectors, allowing full access to make inspections throughout the country, to make certain Iran is limiting its uranium enrichment to low levels. Respondents also received a pro and a con argument as part of the question. On the positive side, it was argued that if Iran were to try to cheat, it would take them years to enrich uranium to the higher levels necessary for nuclear weapons, and with full access for U.N. inspectors they would be caught. On the negative side, it was argued that Iran should not be allowed to enrich uranium at all, because doing so would give them technical experience that would put them in a strong position if they later decide to violate the agreement and build nuclear weapons. After considering all this, 55 percent said making such an agreement was a good idea, while 38 percent saw it as a bad idea. 61 This 55 percent majority support is identical to the level found a year later in the BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll, cited above. Most recently (March 2012) in the midst of high international tension and domestic debate over a possible Israeli plan to attack Iran s nuclear facilities PIPA presented fuller arguments about the same bargain, and asked respondents to rate each argument. The argument favoring such an agreement said: Sanctions and threats haven t worked to stop Iranians from enriching. And bombing their program would just lead them to rebuild it underground, as well as risking major war. The best hope is to hold Iran to its word by having inspectors free to check anything suspicious. We will then be able to spot any moves toward building a bomb and respond in time. Sixty-six percent found this argument convincing, while 26 percent found it unconvincing. 62 The argument opposing such an agreement went: Iran should not be allowed to enrich uranium at all, because if they do they will gain technical expertise that would make them more capable if they later decide to violate the agreement and develop nuclear weapons. We should continue to use economic sanctions and the threat of possible air strikes to try to get Iran to stop all enrichment. This argument was also found convincing by a majority 55 percent though by a lesser margin than for those who found the argument in favor of the agreement, while 39 percent found it unconvincing. 63 9

11 Finally, asked then whether such an agreement would be a good or a bad idea, a 50 percent plurality said it was a good idea, while 43 percent called it a bad idea. 64 Who Best to Handle Iran? Three quarters of Americans prefer for the United States to try to primarily act through the UN Security Council in dealing with the Iran nuclear issue and this was true when tensions were high over Israel s consideration of airstrikes against Iran s nuclear facilities. A March 2012 poll by the Sadat Chair, University of Maryland/PIPA asked: In dealing with the problem of Iran s nuclear program, do you think that the U.S. should primarily act by itself, or try to primarily act through the U.N. Security Council? Seventy-four percent said the United States should try to primarily act through the Security Council; 20 percent said it should primarily act by itself. 65 In 2006, GMF asked who could best handle the issue of Iranian nuclear weapons, offering respondents a larger range of options. A plurality of Americans (36 percent) said the United Nations was the best to handle the issue, 22 percent said the United States, 18 percent said the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 13 percent said the European Union. Comparatively, in Europe, an average of 43 percent supported the United Nations handling the issue, 19 percent supported the European Union, 15 percent supported NATO, and 8 percent favored the United States. 66 When Americans are not offered the option of the United Nations, a slight majority prefers the European Union taking the lead on Iran rather than the United States. In 2006, Pew asked Who should take the lead in dealing with Iran s nuclear program the United States or countries in the European Union? Fifty-one percent said the European Union, while 30 percent said the United States

12 The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR carries out its mission by maintaining a diverse membership, with special programs to promote interest and develop expertise in the next generation of foreign policy leaders; convening meetings at its headquarters in New York and in Washington, DC, and other cities where senior government officials, members of Congress, global leaders, and prominent thinkers come together with CFR members to discuss and debate major international issues; supporting a Studies Program that fosters independent research, enabling CFR scholars to produce articles, reports, and books and hold roundtables that analyze foreign policy issues and make concrete policy recommendations; publishing Foreign Affairs, the preeminent journal on international affairs and U.S. foreign policy; sponsoring Independent Task Forces that produce reports with both findings and policy prescriptions on the most important foreign policy topics; and providing up-to-date information and analysis about world events and American foreign policy on its website, CFR.org. The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the U.S. government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors. For further information about CFR or this paper, please write to the Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065, or call the Director of Communications at Visit CFR s website, 1 Chicago Council on Global Affairs Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. The possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers Critical Important but not critical Not important Not sure/ Decline WorldPublicOpinion.org/Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2006 Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of [survey country] in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. The possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers Critical Important but not critical Not important Not sure/ Decline United States Armenia Australia China

13 India Israel Mexico South Korea Ukraine Chicago Council on Global Affairs Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all? Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons Very important Somewhat important Not important Not sure/ Decline WorldPublicOpinion.org/Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2006 Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that [survey country] might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of [survey country], a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all? Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons Very important Somewhat important Not important Not sure/ Decline United States Armenia Australia China India Mexico South Korea Thailand Program on International Policy Attitudes, September 2011 Even if we have a system for verifying that nations are complying, there will always be some evil leaders who will find a way to cheat. We should not pursue the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. 18% Very convincing 12

14 45 Somewhat convincing 23 Somewhat unconvincing 11 Very unconvincing 2 Don t know/refused 4 Program on International Policy Attitudes, September 2011 Given the potential for evil, the risk is too great that someday nuclear weapons will be used, creating untold destruction. We should work to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons through an international agreement with an advanced monitoring system. 23% Very convincing 51 Somewhat convincing 16 Somewhat unconvincing 7 Very unconvincing 2 Don t know/refused 5 Program on International Policy Attitudes, September 2011 So now would you favor or oppose an international agreement for eliminating nuclear weapons according to a timetable, with international monitoring? 69% Favor 28 Oppose 3 Don t know/refused 6 WorldPublicOpinion.org 2008 I would like you to consider a possible international agreement for eliminating all nuclear weapons. All countries with nuclear weapons would be required to eliminate them according to a timetable. All other countries would be required not to develop them. All countries, including [country], would be monitored to make sure they are following the agreement. Would you favor or oppose such an agreement? Strongly favor Somewhat favor Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose DK / NS Argentina Mexico United States France Britain Russia Ukraine Azerbaijan Egypt Iran Israel Pakistan Palestinian Territories Turkey Kenya Nigeria China India

15 Indonesia South Korea Thailand Average Program on International Policy Attitudes, September 2007 Which position on nuclear weapons is closest to yours? 7% Nuclear weapons are morally wrong, and the US should proceed to eliminate its arsenal whether or not others follow our lead 38 Our goal should be to gradually eliminate all nuclear weapons through an international agreement, while developing effective systems for verifying all countries are eliminating theirs, too 33 We should do our best to reduce the number of nuclear weapons through verifiable international agreements, but it should not be our goal to eliminate them entirely 19 Nuclear weapons give the US a uniquely powerful position in the world. It is not in the interest of the US to participate in treaties that would reduce or eliminate its nuclear arsenal 2 Don t know/refused 8 Program on International Policy Attitudes, September 2011 Which position on nuclear weapons is closest to yours? 8% Nuclear weapons are morally wrong, and the US should proceed to eliminate its arsenal whether or not others follow our lead 47 Our goal should be to gradually eliminate all nuclear weapons through an international agreement, while developing effective systems for verifying all countries are eliminating theirs, too 30 We should do our best to reduce the number of nuclear weapons through verifiable international agreements, but it should not be our goal to eliminate them entirely 11 Nuclear weapons give the US a uniquely powerful position in the world. It is not in the interest of the US to participate in treaties that would reduce or eliminate its nuclear arsenal 3 Don t know/refused 9 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press/CFR America's Place In The World Survey October 2005 Would you favor or oppose the U.S. (United States) signing a treaty with other nations to reduce and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons, including our own? 70% Favor 24 Oppose 6 Don t know/refused 10 WorldPublicOpinion.org Do you think that the UN Security Council should or should not have the right to authorize the use of military force for each of the following purposes: 14