The political relationship between Canada and. During the Second World War, the US invested heavily in. Introduction
|
|
- Godwin Ford
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 CFJIC Photo PC-3107 by Flight Officer Sankey military philosophy Four CF-100 Canucks overfly a radar site near RCAF Station Cold Lake. The Politics of Sovereignty Continental Defence and the Creation of NORAD by Michael T. Fawcett Introduction The political relationship between Canada and the United States has undergone many trials and tribulations over the last century. The defence relationship, however, has remained relatively stable. One of the most enduring pillars of this stability is the bilateral North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). During the late 1940s and early 1950s, two factors played a key role in the evolution of North American air defence. One was the growing threat of the Soviet Union, and another was the encroachment of US military forces into the Canadian North and the concomitant perceived loss of Canadian territorial sovereignty. Overlaying these two factors was the cost, both financial and political, for Canada. The Soviet threat and the politics of Canadian sovereignty played a very important role in the planning, development, and implementation of the air defence system for North America. It was said that the traditional fear of American encroachment increased and decreased in an inverse relationship to the perceived threat of Soviet aggression. When the need for security against an alien aggressor became paramount, the objective to guarantee sovereignty rights was superseded 1 In May 2008, NORAD celebrated its 50 th anniversary. Accordingly, now is an appropriate time to look back and examine the political and military imperatives that influenced the formal establishment of NORAD on 12 May Arctic Sovereignty and the Joint Canada - US Basic Security Plan During the Second World War, the US invested heavily in the construction of several Northern projects, including the Alaskan Highway and series of weather stations and air bases dubbed the Crimson Highway. 2 Worried that the US would translate its wartime financial investment into permanent rights, the Canadian government implemented a process of Canadianization of the North. In early 1944, the Canadian government began to assume control of all defence facilities in the North. In spite of this policy, the US continued to make requests for development therein. These included overflight Major M.T. Skip Fawcett, an Aerospace Controller (AEC), is currently serving as a Mission Crew Commander with 962 Airborne Air Control Squadron (AWACS) located at Elmendorf, Alaska. Actively pursuing a Master of Arts degree in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, he was recently a staff officer for Officer Professional Development at the Canadian Defence Academy. Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010 Canadian Military Journal 33
2 authorization, the installation of additional arctic meteorological stations and low frequency communications (Loran) stations, and the construction of new airfields. These US requests were perceived as a desire to control Canadian territory and airspace, which it was believed would directly infringe upon Canadian sovereignty. Lester B. Pearson, then Canadian Ambassador in Washington, voiced the government s concern in 1946 when he said [that] there is already an increasing and in some of its manifestations an unhealthy pre-occupation with the strategic aspects of the North; the staking of claims, the establishment of bases, the calculation of risks. For no country have these faint stirrings of unhallowed but all too familiar fears had a greater or more sinister significance than for Canada. 3 It is therefore clear that, in 1946, Canadian sovereignty concerns were a top priority for the government. In 1946, the Soviets did not possess the required longrange bomber aircraft or the weaponry to conduct a successful attack against North America. The lack of a direct and immediate threat to North America allowed politicians to continue to seek a peace dividend through post-war demobilization and the dramatic reduction of defence expenditures. However, the US military believed that the Soviet Union was a growing threat and that it would eventually develop the offensive military capacity to attack North America. The US and Canada utilized the wartime-established Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) and the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) for cooperative defence planning. 4 In May 1946, the MCC produced two significant documents with respect to the defence of North America. 5 The first, An Appreciation of the Requirements for Canada-United States Security, outlined the threat to North America, and it stated that hostile powers would not be able to conduct sustained long range air operations but limited long range air attacks are possible. 6 The Appreciation also stated that, in the longer term, adversaries would be able to develop the required long-range bombers and improved weaponry for a larger-scale attack on North America, and [that] it will probably require three to five years for any potential enemy to develop and produce the atomic bomb. 7 In effect, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in September The second document produced was the Joint Canadian United States Basic Security Plan (BSP). The BSP was designed to counter this potential threat. Continental defence would be secured through Appendix A to the BSP, the Air Intercept and Air Warning Plan. The Air Appendix envisioned a Fortress America 8 with three distinct radar-warning lines, including one in the far north, numerous new radar stations for the command and control of the air battle, eight of which would be located in Canada, and a significant increase in the number of air defence fighters. This was the military planners dream plan. The reality was that the financial cost to both the US and to Canada to implement the BSP would have been enormous. In a memorandum to Prime Minister (PM) William Lyon Mackenzie King in October 1946, Pearson cautioned that, with respect to the BSP, the scale of installations would be so great that it would strain our capacity to provide and man them from Canadian resources. Furthermore, if we undertook ourselves to equip and maintain these installations, it would probably mean that our military activities were concentrated almost wholly on the protection of North America from the possibility of sporadic bombardment from the air. 9 Canada, in light of the limited immediate threat to North America, was not prepared to expend vast financial resources on the BSP, and, in particular, to fund the Air Appendix. In fact, American politicians were also not prepared to pay these costs. However, they did propose further cooperative development of the North. In a memorandum to Mackenzie King in January 1947, Minister of National Defence (MND) Brooke Claxton told the PM that the US cooperative development proposals would add little to defence expenditure. Further, they would fit in with any plans ultimately adopted and would assist in the development of the north for civilian as well as for military purposes. 10 In February 1947, the Canadian and American governments released a Joint Statement on Defence Collaboration. It outlined the nature of Canada-US defence cooperation and established the principles to guard against any loss, or perceived loss, of Canadian sovereignty. In early 1947, the Canadian government strongly believed that there was no direct threat to Canada from the Soviet Union. And the government was not prepared to dispense significant funding in order defend the country from a non-existent threat. Where Canadian sovereignty was concerned, they believed there was no need to make any compromise. Canada s jet fleet. An F-86 Sabre (foreground), a CF-100 Canuck (centre), and a T-33 Silver Star in formation, circa CFJIC Photo PC Canadian Military Journal Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010
3 Soviet Weapons and the Pinetree Line series of events that occurred over the next three years A would dramatically affect this train of thought. At the 1947 Moscow May Day parade, the Soviets displayed the new Tupolev Tu-4 Bull long-range strategic bomber, which was a brilliant reverse-engineering of an interned wartime Boeing B-29 Superfortress. Soviet actions during the March 1948 Berlin Blockade, as well as the testing/detonation of an atomic bomb in September 1949, completed a triumvirate of concerns. The Soviets had demonstrated they had the will, the weapon, and the delivery vehicle to truly threaten North America. The June 1950 invasion of Korea solidified in many minds the belligerent nature of the Soviets. President Harry S. Truman declared [that] the attack on Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. 11 In Canada, the November 1948 federal election promoted Louis St. Laurent to Prime Minister, established Brooke Claxton as the MND, and confirmed Lester B. Pearson as Secretary of State External Affairs (SSEA). To counter the increasing Soviet air threat, Canada initiated the development of a made-in-canada air defence system which would be fully funded, manned, and controlled by Canadians. The envisioned system would include jet interceptors with the necessary radar equipment and communications system 12 In December 1948, the first air defence operational unit, 410 Squadron, was established at St. Hubert in Quebec PQ, along with the 1 st Air Defence Group, later renamed the Canadian Air Defence Command (Cdn ADC). In September 1949, a second unit, 420 Squadron, was established at Chatham, New Brunswick. In order to equip these new squadrons, Canada arranged with Britain for a trade of obsolete Second World War Supermarine Spitfires for 85 newer de Havilland Vampire jet fighters. Claxton soon replaced the Vampires with 56 North American F-86 Sabre fighters, and obtained a licence to build more in Canada. C.D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply, pressed for a made in Canada air defence solution, and the CF-100 Canuck, designed and built by A.V. Roe (later Avro) of Toronto, was ordered. Successful test flights of the Canadian-made F-86s (by Canadair in Cartierville, Quebec) and CF-100s convinced Claxton to announce, on 2 June 1950, the expansion of the Canadian air defence network to five operational squadrons. To provide command and control, the RCAF was authorized to construct five radar sites, later expanded to nine sites, 13 all of which would be positioned to defend the eastern economic heartland. The creation of this rudimentary Canadian air defence system reflected Ottawa s increasing perception of a Soviet threat, manifest in the deteriorating international scene and the growing Soviet air capability. 14 In the US, the United States Air Force (USAF) developed Plan Supremacy, which called for a system of 411 air defence radars, 36 of which would be located in Canada. 15 Limited funding significantly reduced this plan to a US-only 74-unit Permanent Radar Net. The USAF and the RCAF collaborated to develop a continental defence system, A Plan for the Extension of the Permanent Radar Net of the Continental Air Defence System, later referred to as the Pinetree Line, in the summer of The plan called for an expanded, continentwide, early warning and control radar system. All 32 new radar sites, with the exception of one situated in Greenland, would be located in Canada, and they were to be manned by Canadian personnel. Funding for the 32 radars would be based upon the defensive coverage provided. This essentially meant that the US would pay two-thirds of costs, with Canada paying the balance. 16 In February 1951, PJBD Recommendation 51/1 17 formally outlined the cost-sharing and manning arrangement for the Pinetree Line, and confirmed that all sites would remain Canadian property in perpetuity. Unfortunately, the RCAF did not have a sufficient number of trained personnel, and thus, the US would have to man most of the radar sites. And US military personnel being permanently located on Canadian territory and tasked with its defence was to become a sovereignty issue for the government. Although politicians supported full RCAF manning, the reality was that Canada did not have the personnel to make this happen. The development of a more extensive radar detection and control system also illuminated issues of command and control, interception, identification, and engagement (destruction or shoot down ) of enemy aircraft within Canadian airspace. In early 1950, the USAF requested broad authority to conduct operations in Canadian territory. Canadian officials understood that the granting of broad authority would not be politically Two CF-100 Canucks in their natural element. CFJIC Photo PC-551 military history Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010 Canadian Military Journal 35
4 possible, as the RCAF did not possess full engagement authority for its own forces. The RCAF was not granted shoot down authority until November Negotiation of this issue resulted in the August 1951 PJBD Recommendation 51/4, which authorized US aircraft to intercept adversary aircraft in Canadian airspace. However, actual engagement could only occur in US airspace. The command and control issue was essentially a sovereignty question as to who would control whose aircraft where. A proposal was developed that would allow for aircraft to be controlled by the local Air Defence Control Centre (ADCC). If US aircraft entered Canadian airspace, they would fall under the tactical command and control of the regional Canadian ADCC. However, Canadian air defences were concentrated in the east, which meant that US forces generally defended the Canadian prairies and Newfoundland. PJBD Recommendation 53/1, adopted in October 1953, stipulated that fighters, regardless of nationality, would follow the Rules of Interception and Engagement of the country over which the interception or engagement takes place 19 Additionally, that engagement would be conducted under the command of, [the] Air Defence Commander of the country over which the engagement is to take place, or by an officer who has been delegated the requisite powers. 20 It is interesting to note that Claxton, who must have known of the limitations in the prairie region, briefed his Cabinet colleagues that his understanding (was) that any force located in Canada will operate under a commander designated by Canada. 21 Recognizing its own defence limitations, and, given that the threat was so significant, Canada was prepared to compromise on its sovereignty concerns. Ultimately, due to the lack of fully operational radars on the prairies, Canada had to delegate intercept, engagement, and command authority to the US commander. scientists from the Defence Research Board and McGill University, under the guidance of Dr. George Lindsey, developed a highly automated early warning radar system. Accordingly, the 'McGill Fence, later known as the Mid- Canada Line, was developed for installation in the area of the 54 th Parallel. The automated nature of the system would allow for the use of unmanned radars, a key requirement due to ongoing RCAF manning shortages. The US, conducting its own research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), developed a computerized system for rapid defence data handling. 23 The resulting Lincoln Transition system was later incorporated into the air defence system under the name of the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system. The first SAGE system was operational in January In the summer of 1952, a group of mostly American scientists from MIT s Lincoln Laboratory gathered to theorize about the scale of a Soviet nuclear attack. In their much publicized February 1953 final report, they concluded that a Soviet nuclear attack would kill millions of people and devastate the economy, and that the current air defence system was inadequate. They proposed a new radar defence system that would consist of two Distant Early Warning (DEW) lines located in the Canadian far north. DEW Line 1 would be located at the 75 th Parallel, while DEW Line 2 would be located at the 70 th Parallel. 25 Canada s support for the expansion of the continental air defence system, the construction of the Pinetree Line, and the approval of the intercept and command and control policies demonstrated that the Canadian government was convinced of the importance of defence against Soviet attack. James Eayrs, in his book In Defence of Canada, clearly articulated this idea. Modest in cost and conception by comparison with the Artic warning systems subsequently to be constructed, the Pinetree Line would not have been undertaken but for two external and related developments upon the international scene. One was the enormous increase in defence budgets following the outbreak of the Korean War in June The other was the no less enormous increase in the severity of the Soviet threat to North America. 22 The last of the 33 Pinetree Line stations became fully operational by McGill Fence and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line The Pinetree Line was designed to provide one-hour notice of an air attack, which meant that detection would not occur until the Soviet bombers were well inside Canadian airspace. This reality, and the ever-increasing capabilities of Soviet strike aircraft and nuclear weapons, prompted the government to develop a new Canadian radar system. Defence Air Marshal Charles Ray Slemon, Chief of the Air Staff, RCAF, , and the first Deputy Commander-in-Chief of NORAD. DND Photo 36 Canadian Military Journal Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010
5 In December 1952, in response to public fears of nuclear holocaust, President Truman directed the development of a new DEW line system. The ensuing USAF Project Counterchange, later renamed Corrode, would provide the US with three-to-six hours warning of an air attack. 26 At a January 1953 PJBD meeting, the US presented Counterchange, and formally requested Canadian permission to construct a testing facility in the Canadian north. Once again, the US was requesting authority for its own developmental initiatives in Canada's north. In response, Pearson stated his fear [that] one of the most important questions facing us now is this one of Arctic development and the danger of being excluded from such development on our own territory by US penetration. 27 Despite these fears, the Cabinet Defence Committee, on 10 February 1953, reviewed and approved the US request. In acknowledgement of the sovereignty concerns, the Committee added a number of stipulations. These included a statement that the project was an experiment that would involve no follow-on commitment by the Canadian government to an operational radar system, that full Canadian participation was required, that all sites had to be approved by Canada, and that all sites would retain Canadian ownership. 28 The agreement also stipulated the formation of a new Canada-United States Military Study Group (MSG). The MSG, Canada hoped, would be able to provide the government with direct feedback on testing, and give it more insight into what further plans the US had for air defence. 29 The January 1953 inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower as the US President brought with it a number of changes with respect to US defence policy. The Bull Committee Report, National Security Council Memorandum 159 (NCS- 159), stated [that] the present continental defence programs are not now adequate to prevent, neutralize or seriously deter the military or covert acts which the Soviet Union is capable of launching. 30 The report also stated that the establishment of a Southern Canadian Line was essential. They deemed that the SAGE data management system and the establishment of a DEW line were necessary requirements. 31 To fund all this, the Eisenhower administration underwent a complete defence review. The Review of Basic National Security Policy (NCS-162) was completed in October Eisenhower, on 30 October 1953, approved the Basic National Security Plan NCS-162/2. The New The trio of early warning radar lines erected on Canadian soil. Look policy established a new security posture that would be [based] on massive atomic capability and an integrated and effective continental defence system. 33 Canadian politicians were very concerned about the New Look policy implications for Canadian security. Claxton had already almost doubled defence approbations that were funding the rapid expansion of the armed forces. Canada was still committed to financing its operations in Korea and Canada s NATO forces in Europe. Large amounts were already being expended upon increasing Canadian-based air defence squadrons and the construction of the Pinetree Line. The cost of any new defence program became a significant concern. Claxton believed that if Canada was forced to pay for both early warning lines, it would be forced to scale back commitments to Europe. He suggested to St. Laurent that it might be better for Canada to utilize a cost avoidance strategy, 34 which would entail Canada paying for the Mid-Canada Line, and the Americans paying for the DEW Line. In this way, Claxton believed Canada could keep (its) self respect without having to put out too great an expenditure 35 Accordingly, in November 1953, the Canadian government informed the US that the Mid-Canada Line would be funded as a Canadian project, and it supported the US funded construction of the DEW Line. In recognition of Canadian sovereignty concerns, the US agreed to a number of conditions with respect to the construction and operation of the DEW Line. The May 1955 diplomatic note establishing the DEW Line contained an annex entitled Statement of Conditions to Govern the Establishment Map by Christopher Johnson military history Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010 Canadian Military Journal 37
6 of a Distant Early Warning System on Canadian Territory. It included 21 separate provisions encompassing location and title to sites, liaison requirements, provision of Canadianmade electronic equipment, application of Canadian law, operations and manning, including the Canadian right to take over the operation and manning of any or all of the installations, issues affecting Canadian Eskimos, immigration and customs, and the construction of airstrips. 36 By the end of 1953, both the Soviet threat and the requirement to defend North America had gained prominence in Canada-US relations. Canada had to balance the cost of defence versus the cost of sovereignty. Pragmatically, if Canada did not assume full responsibly for defence programs in the north, then the US would do it for them. In the final analysis, the Canadian government knew it could not afford the cost of maintaining complete control over its sovereignty. Ultimately, the government agreed to the DEW / Mid-Canada Line cost sharing arrangement, and it stipulated conditions to guard against any loss of sovereignty. Construction of the Mid-Canada Line, located 300 miles (480 kilometres) north of the Pinetree Line along the 55 th Parallel, was completed in The 57 radar station DEW Line, paid for by the US and stretching along the 70 th Parallel, almost 200 miles (320 kilometres) north of the Arctic Circle, was completed in Operational Integration ~ NORAD The vastly expanded air defence system brought with it new problems. An arising issue became that of overall air battle management. In order to defeat an air attack, it was necessary to determine the size of threat, its intended direction, its target areas, and an assessment as to if it was the only attack wave or the first of many. Commanders had to allocate air defence fighter resources, and the fighters required control to intercept and engage the enemy. The DEW Line allowed for the initial detection and analysis of the threat. The Mid-Canada Line would be used to determine the direction of the attack, and the Pinetree Line provided the command and control radars for initial engagements. These systems would eventually be fully electronically integrated. The major problem was that there was no operational integration. There was not a single unified command or commander provided to efficiently and effectively direct the air battle. Operational engagements with enemy aircraft carrying Canadian politicians were very concerned about the New Look policy implications for Canadian security. nuclear weapons, and being in Canadian airspace, were a sovereignty concern. Canada wanted, indeed, needed to have more than just a minor role. In 1954, the US established a Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), which would assume operational command of all continental US air defence assets. It was then tasked to develop a continental air defence master plan that would integrate the activities of the US and Canada. This was a necessary step in the evolution of continental air defence, but the politicians in Canada needed convincing. In February 1956, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) addressed a letter to General Charles Foulkes, Chair of Canadian Chiefs of Staff (COS), indicating their desire to share views on operational integration. Foulkes agreed to the establishment of an ad hoc committee, but warned that to avoid raising delicate political problems the ad hoc group should limit their discussions and recommendations to the problems of operational control. (The) subject of operational control is very sensitive politically in Canada and that it is important that there should be no leakage of information regarding the proposed group or the subject of its discussions to the press. 37 While the military issues were relatively straightforward to overcome, the political issues were not. Two primary political issues had to be resolved. One dealt with how Canadian command and control (sovereignty) issues would be addressed, and the other concerned how a new unified command would fit into NATO, or how it would not fit there, depending upon American concerns. The sovereignty issue was brought to light in the reaction to comments made by Air Marshal Roy Slemon in June The Minister of National Defence, the Honourable George Pearkes, VC, inspecting naval ratings. CFJIC Photo E Canadian Military Journal Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010
7 He stated that, in his estimation, a joint Canada-United States air defence command was inevitable. 38 This infuriated the government, as they had taken great pains during the Pinetree Line debates to ensure Canadian command within Canadian airspace. A US officer in command and control of all air defence forces was wholly unacceptable to Canadian politicians. However, it was becoming increasingly apparent that observance of the Canada-US political boundary as a dividing line of military responsibility imposed limitations which made it impossible to achieve the best air defence arrangements. 39 Foulkes, aware of the sovereignty concerns, knew that the plan would have to demonstrate compelling military advantages to an integrated air defence command system to counterbalance political disadvantages. 40 In its 1956 report, the ad hoc study group proposed a palatable solution. Operational control could be instilled in a single individual, the Commander-in- Chief, Air Defence Canada-United States (CINCADCANUS), instead of a unified command organization. Operational control would be invested in this individual for all forces delegated to him for the air defence of North America. CINCADCADUS would report simultaneously to the US JCS and the Canadian COS, who would, in turn, report to their respective political masters. This was not a unique proposal, since NATO already had a similar structure embodied in the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) position. Canada had already approved the NATO structure, along with its inherent loss of control over forces assigned to it. 41 If the new continental air defence command was similar, the loss of sovereignty was supportable. The NATO linkage appealed to Canada, but not to the United States. The Americans were adamantly opposed to the idea as they feared [that the] US and Canadian resources [would be] planned on a joint basis by representatives of all the parties to the Atlantic Treaty. 42 Europeans would then have a say in how the US defended itself, and the US would not tolerate any interference with its Strategic Air Command and its nuclear deterrence plans and capabilities. In February 1957, the US JCS, supported by the US Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, and the Canadian COS, formally approved the concept, renaming it the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). This proposal was to be presented to the Canadian Cabinet Defence Committee for approval, but the process was overtaken by the June 1957 federal election. The ensuing Conservative victory established John G. Diefenbaker as PM and George Pearkes as MND. Immediately after the election, General Foulkes, as COS, sought a quick approval of the air defence initiative. He advanced two fundamental arguments in support of the NORAD agreement. One was the fact that the US had already approved it, and the Liberal government had been preparing to do so before the vote. As a result, there should be no political opposition to NORAD in Parliament, in spite of the change of ruling party. The second argument, the NATO linkage, was by far the most convincing. Foulkes, aware that the US did not and would not support any NATO linkage, knew that the only way to get government approval was to lessen The formal creation of NORAD on 12 May 1958 created a 50-year legacy that, in all likelihood, will last for at least another 50 years. the perceived loss of sovereignty. Thus, he deliberately minimized the sovereignty issues while over-emphasizing the nonexistent NATO linkage. As Foulkes admitted later, he stampeded the incoming government with the NORAD Agreement. 43 Foulkes was able to convince Pearkes, who, in turn, went directly to Diefenbaker for approval. Diefenbaker, without consulting Cabinet, approved the NORAD plan on 24 July And at the 27 July Cabinet meeting, Pearkes presented NORAD as a fait accompli, and the only related decision Cabinet made was to appoint Air Marshal Slemon as Deputy Commander (DCINCNORAD). 44 On 1 August 1957, Pearkes and Wilson jointly announced the NORAD Agreement, and concluded with the statement that, [the] new bilateral arrangement extends the mutual security objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the air defence of Canada-US region. 45 The Diefenbaker government staked its decision to favour defence over sovereignty concerns on the belief that the political repercussions of the loss of sovereignty were overcome by the NATO linkage. Unfortunately for Diefenbaker, the NATO linkage was unfounded. In his first speech to NATO, Diefenbaker stated that this integrated force (NORAD) is an integral part of our NATO military structure in the Canada/USA region and will report to the Standing Group and the NATO Council in a manner similar to that followed by the other NATO military commands. 46 The Liberal opposition, led by Pearson, attacked the government on this issue, and the Diefenbaker government was forced to concede the point. In reality, NORAD was a bilateral agreement and there was no direct connection between NORAD and NATO. Even in defeat, Diefenbaker maintained the NATO connection when he stated: whether it [NORAD] is part of NATO or not, it does strengthen NATO, which is all that matters. 47 In the wake of the Agreement, NORAD was formally inaugurated on 12 May Conclusion The politics of Canadian sovereignty played a very important role in the planning, development, and implementation of an air defence system for North America. As both the Soviet threat to North America and the perceived likelihood of an attack increased, the Canadian government was forced to balance the political and financial cost of maintaining sovereignty with the requirement for defence. In the case of the 1946 Basic Security Plan, the lack of a viable threat tipped the equation in favour of sovereignty and resulted in the sovereignty reinforcing Joint Statement on Defence Collaboration. The 1950s witnessed the rapid rise of the Soviet threat. Additionally, there were the ongoing commitments to Korea, NATO, and the US New Look security policy. Canada simply could not afford the financial and personnel cost associated with developing and maintaining a 'made in Canada' defence policy. US manning and cost-sharing of the Pinetree Line was the first of many compromises on sovereignty. As the threat increased, so did the requirement for more extensive defensive systems. The resulting DEW Line and Mid- military history Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010 Canadian Military Journal 39
8 Canada Line were created to provide a robust and integrated air defence system. Canada had to make compromises on sovereignty issues in order to ensure this system was deployed. The final stage of evolution of Canada s air defence system was NORAD. Operational integration was a military necessity, but, for Canadians, it was politically unpalatable. Foulkes s false NATO gambit nevertheless provided the key to the Canadian government s support of defence over sovereignty. In the final analysis, it can be said that, as both the threat and associated defence costs increased, the political sovereignty concerns were overcome by the military imperatives of the day. The formal creation of NORAD on 12 May 1958 created a 50-year legacy that, in all likelihood, will last for at least another 50 years. NOTES 1 Shelagh D. Grant, Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), p The Crimson Highway was a series of northern air bases used by transport aircraft that were repatriating wounded soldiers back to North America during the Second World War. 3 Lester B. Pearson quoted in Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs - Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), p The PJBD, formed in 1940, is a bilateral defence forum for senior military and diplomatic representatives, and it reports directly to the PM and the President. The MCC, formed in 1946, manages military cooperation at the strategic level. 5 Copies of both documents located in Canada, Documents on External Relations, Volume 12, 1946, Vol , pp An Appreciation of the Requirements for Canada- United States Security in Ibid., p Ibid. 8 Jockel, p Lester B. Pearson, in Memorandum from Ambassador in US to PM, in Documents on External Relations, Volume 12, 1946, Vol , p Brooke Claxton, quoted in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p Henry S. Truman, quoted in Jockel, p Ibid., p The RCAF was authorized to build only five sites, but they projected the requirement to build nine sites in order to make the cost benefits of the new Pinetree system appear more palatable. 14 Jockel, p Project Supremacy is further detailed in Jockel, pp A detailed breakdown of the funding formula is found in Ibid., pp Created by Canada and the United States in 1940, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) is the senior advisory body on continental defence matters. It is composed of military and diplomatic representatives from both nations. 18 The Cabinet Defence Committee authorized the RCAF shoot down authority in a Cabinet document entitled Authority to Intercept and Engage Unidentified Aircraft, dated 22 November Jockel, p Ibid. 21 Ibid., p Eayrs, p Jockel, p Authors Note: Although replaced by the ROCC system in the early 1980s, the SAGE system was still in use as a back-up system when I conducted my initial Aerospace Control training in North Bay, Ontario, in the autumn of Detailed discussion of the LSSG report is found in Jockel, pp NCS-139 Statement of Policy on an Early Warning System, dated 31 December 1952, referenced in Jockel, pp L.B. Pearson, Defence Relations in the North in Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 18, 1952, Vol , 15 January Canada, DEW System and Mid-Canada Line in Canada, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 19, 1953 (Donald Barry (ed.) Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), Vol , 10 February Eayrs, p Quoted in Philippe Legassé, Northern Command and the Evolution of Canada-US Defence Relations, in Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 2003, p NSC-159 is broadly referenced and quoted in Jockel, p Government of USA, National Security Council, Review of Basic National Security Policy -NCS- 162, October Ibid., p Jockel, p Ibid., p Government of Canada, Notes between Canada and the US Governing the Establishment of a Distant Early Warning System in Canadian Territory, Note No. 306, Washington, DC, 5 May Government of Canada, Continental Air Defence in Canada, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 23, Part II, Vol , 6 April Jockel, p Government of Canada, Continental Air Defence in Canada, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol , 6 May Ibid. 41 NATO was formally established on 4 April Canada, Implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty in Canada, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 15, Vol , 1 April Charles Foulkes, quoted in Jockel, p Government of Canada, Continental Air Defence - Extracts from Cabinet Conclusions, Vol , 31 July Jockel, p John G. Diefenbaker, Prime Minister s Statement to Meeting of NATO Heads of Governments in Canada, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 24, 1958 (Michael Stevenson (ed.), Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1997), Vol , 16 December John G. Diefenbaker, quoted in Jockel, p Canadian Military Journal Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010
NATO. Canada & The Cold War. Canada and the Creation of NATO. Chapter 8-9 Social Studies
Canada & The Cold War Chapter 8-9 Social Studies Canada and the Creation of NATO Shortly after WW2 it became evident that the Allies had split into 2 opposing camps: The Soviet Union and the West The West
When/why was the word teenager invented? a) Have teenagers changed all that much since the word was made? Why or why not?
The Cold War When/why was the word teenager invented? a) Have teenagers changed all that much since the word was made? Why or why not? Louis St. Laurent Uncle Louis -Trans Canada Highway and Great Lakes,
Chapter 6 Canada at War
Chapter 6 Canada at War After the end of World War I, the countries that had been at war created a treaty of peace called the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles Germany had to take full responsibility
Unit Six: Canada Matures: Growth in the Post-War Period ( )
Unit Six: Canada Matures: Growth in the Post-War Period (1945-1970) 6.4: Canada s role on the international stage: emergence as a middle power, involvement in international organizations Meeting the Aliens
YEARS OF WAR. Chapters 6
YEARS OF WAR Chapters 6 The Wars In Asia 1937- Second Sino Japanese War In Europe, Germany invades Poland 1 st of September 1939 Second Sino-Japanese War This war began in 1937. It was fought between China
Work Period: WW II European Front Notes Video Clip WW II Pacific Front Notes Video Clip. Closing: Quiz
Standard 7.0 Demonstrate an understanding of the impact of World War II on the US and the nation s subsequent role in the world. Opening: Pages 249-250 and 253-254 in your Reading Study Guide. Work Period:
9. Guidance to the NATO Military Authorities from the Defence Planning Committee 1967
DOCTRINES AND STRATEGIES OF THE ALLIANCE 79 9. Guidance to the NATO Military Authorities from the Defence Planning Committee 1967 GUIDANCE TO THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES In the preparation of force proposals
Why Japan Should Support No First Use
Why Japan Should Support No First Use Last year, the New York Times and the Washington Post reported that President Obama was considering ruling out the first-use of nuclear weapons, as one of several
National Security Policy: American National Security Policy 1
National Security Policy: 1950-1952 Policy 1 Review: 1945-1949 Dominant Threat Economy National Security Strategy Military demobilization Economic aid to threatened interests Truman Doctrine Political-economic
NOTE BY THE SECRETARY. to the NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENSE COMMITTEE THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA
1 December 1949 Pages 1-7, incl. NOTE BY THE SECRETARY to the NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENSE COMMITTEE on THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA The enclosed report is a revision of DC
HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-4. Subject: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
[National Security Presidential Directives -17] HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-4 Unclassified version December 2002 Subject: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction "The gravest
FINAL DECISION ON MC 48/2. A Report by the Military Committee MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT
MC 48/2 (Final Decision) 23 May 1957 FINAL DECISION ON MC 48/2 A Report by the Military Committee on MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT 1. On 9 May 1957 the North Atlantic Council approved MC
SSUSH20 The student will analyze the domestic and international impact of the Cold War on the United States.
SSUSH20 The student will analyze the domestic and international impact of the Cold War on the United States. The Cold War The Cold War (1947-1991) was the era of confrontation and competition beginning
Cuban Missile Crisis 13 Days that Changed the almost changed World
Cuban Missile Crisis 13 Days that Changed the almost changed World Location Setting the Stage 1. The Truman Doctrine 2. The Marshall Plan 3. Containment 4. The Domino Theory 5. The Berlin Blockade 6. The
Bell Quiz: Pages
Bell Quiz: Pages 569 577 1. What did Hitler do to the U.S. three days after Pearl Harbor? 2. What system did the U.S. employ to successfully attack German U-boats? 3. Which country in the axis powers did
Challenges of a New Capability-Based Defense Strategy: Transforming US Strategic Forces. J.D. Crouch II March 5, 2003
Challenges of a New Capability-Based Defense Strategy: Transforming US Strategic Forces J.D. Crouch II March 5, 2003 Current and Future Security Environment Weapons of Mass Destruction Missile Proliferation?
Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations
Section 2 Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations It is of utmost importance for the national government to establish a national response framework as a basis for an SDF operational structure
The War in Europe 5.2
The War in Europe 5.2 On September 1, 1939, Hitler unleashed a massive air & land attack on Poland. Britain & France immediately declared war on Germany. Canada asserting its independence declares war
Lesson 1: Air Force Beginnings Through the Korean War
Lesson 1: Air Force Beginnings Through the Korean War A. Define, Describe, or Identify: 1. Nuclear deterrence 2. Arms 3. United Nations 4. Marshall Plan 5. Strategic Triad 6. Missiles 7. Satellite 8. Mach
Guided Notes. Chapter 21; the Cold War Begins. Section 1:
Guided Notes Chapter 21; the Cold War Begins Section 1: A Clash of Interests (pages 654 655) A. After War, the United and the Union became, leading to an of and that from about to known as the. B. were
The Korean War: Conflict and Compromise
The Korean War: Conflict and Compromise Adam Polak Junior Division Research Paper 1,551 Words Have you ever wondered why the Korean War started? Or why the United States thought it was worth it to defend
Terms. Administration Outlook. The Setting Massive Retaliation ( ) Eisenhower State of the Union Address (2/53)
Terms 1952-1959 Bomber Gap ICBM BMEWS Missile Gap Sputnik CENTO U2 DIA Disarmament The Nuclearization of U.S. National Security Policy Arms control hardening sites Open Skies SLBM Gaither Report First
SS.7.C.4.3 Describe examples of how the United States has dealt with international conflicts.
SS.7.C.4.3 Benchmark Clarification 1: Students will identify specific examples of international conflicts in which the United States has been involved. The United States Constitution grants specific powers
the atom against another. To do so now is a political decision of the highest order.
Thomas C. Schelling The most spectacular event of the past half century is one that did not occur. We have enjoyed sixty years without nuclear weapons exploded in anger. What a stunning achievement--or,
Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada Revised edition (Book Review) by J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman
Canadian Military History Volume 26 Issue 2 Article 9 11-24-2017 Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada Revised edition (Book Review) by J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman Caroline d Amours
A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race
SUB Hamburg A/602564 A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race Weapons, Strategy, and Politics Volume 1 RICHARD DEAN BURNS AND JOSEPH M. SIRACUSA Praeger Security International Q PRAEGER AN IMPRINT OF
Pakistan, Russia and the Threat to the Afghan War
Pakistan, Russia and the Threat to the Afghan War November 30, 2011 0338 GMT By George Friedman Days after the Pakistanis closed their borders to the passage of fuel and supplies for the NATO-led war effort
DIEPPE - BASIC FACTS. Canadians in Battle - Dieppe
DIEPPE - BASIC FACTS To defeat the Axis powers, the Allies knew they had to fight in Western Europe. Even though they were inexperienced, the Second Canadian Division was selected to attack the French
The Cold War Begins. Chapter 16 &18 (old) Focus Question: How did U.S. leaders respond to the threat of Soviet expansion in Europe?
The Cold War Begins Chapter 16 &18 (old) Focus Question: How did U.S. leaders respond to the threat of Soviet expansion in Europe? 1 Post WW II Europe Divided 2 Section 1 Notes: Stalin does not allow free
Introduction. General Bernard W. Rogers, Follow-On Forces Attack: Myths lnd Realities, NATO Review, No. 6, December 1984, pp. 1-9.
Introduction On November 9, 1984, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization s (NATO s) Defence Planning Committee formally approved the Long Term Planning Guideline for Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) that
SACT s remarks to UN ambassadors and military advisors from NATO countries. New York City, 18 Apr 2018
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION SACT s remarks to UN ambassadors and military advisors from NATO countries New York City, 18 Apr 2018 Général d armée aérienne
Timeline: Battles of the Second World War. SO WHAT? (Canadian Involvement / Significance) BATTLE: THE INVASION OF POLAND
Refer to the Student Workbook p.96-106 Complete the tables for each battle of the Second World War. You will need to consult several sections of the Student Workbook in order to find all of the information.
NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment
Page 1 of 9 Last updated: 03-Jun-2004 9:36 NATO Issues Eng./Fr. NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment Background The dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY. National Missile Defense: Why? And Why Now?
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY National Missile Defense: Why? And Why Now? By Dr. Keith B. Payne President, National Institute for Public Policy Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Distributed
HAWAII OPERATION ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
HAWAII OPERATION ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR PROPAGANDA: Attack was on Sunday, December 7, 1941 Sunday = Day off for US soldiers OVERALL: On December 7, 1941, Japan surprise attacks Pearl Harbor Japan dropped
European Parliament Nov 30, 2010
European Parliament Nov 30, 2010 1. Introduction Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen! I will very shortly remind you what MBDA is: a world leading missile system company, with facilities in France, Germany,
A FUTURE MARITIME CONFLICT
Chapter Two A FUTURE MARITIME CONFLICT The conflict hypothesized involves a small island country facing a large hostile neighboring nation determined to annex the island. The fact that the primary attack
Nuclear Forces: Restore the Primacy of Deterrence
December 2016 Nuclear Forces: Restore the Primacy of Deterrence Thomas Karako Overview U.S. nuclear deterrent forces have long been the foundation of U.S. national security and the highest priority of
National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario KI A OK2. Quartler general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1AOK2
UNCLASSIFIED Chief of the Defence Staff National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario KI A OK2 Quartler general de la Defense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1AOK2 Chef d'etat-major de la Defense..// January
Italy s Nuclear Anniversary: Fake Reassurance For a King s Ransom
Italy s Nuclear Anniversary: Fake Reassurance For a King s Ransom Posted on Jun.30, 2014 in NATO, Nuclear Weapons, United States by Hans M. Kristensen A new placard at Ghedi Air Base implies that U.S.
5/27/2016 CHC2P I HUNT. 2 minutes
18 CHC2P I HUNT 2016 CHC2P I HUNT 2016 19 1 CHC2P I HUNT 2016 20 September 1, 1939 Poland Germans invaded Poland using blitzkrieg tactics Britain and France declare war on Germany Canada s declaration
Canada s Space Policy and its Future with NORAD
Canada s Space Policy and its Future with NORAD A POLICY PAPER 2016 POLICY REVIEW SERIES Adjunct Professor, Canadian Defence Academy This essay is one in a series commissioned by Canadian Global Affairs
Eisenhower, McCarthyism, and the Cold War
US History Name Date Pd Eisenhower, McCarthyism, and the Cold War I. The Early Years of the Cold War: 1945-1949 A. During the Cold War, the USA & USSR were rival who competed to spread their ideology B.
Guerrilla fighting in the south and clashes between southern and northern forces along the 38th parallel intensified during
The Korean War June 25th, 1950 - July 27th, 1953 In 1948 two different governments were established on the Korean Peninsula, fixing the South-North division of Korea. The Republic of Korea (South Korea)
LESSON 5: THE U.S. AIR FORCE
LESSON 5: THE U.S. AIR FORCE avionics parity payload proliferation stealth INTRODUCTION The U.S. Air Force exemplifies the dominant role of air and space power in meeting this nation s security needs across
Ch 25-4 The Korean War
Ch 25-4 The Korean War The Main Idea Cold War tensions finally erupted in a shooting war in 1950. The United States confronted a difficult challenge defending freedom halfway around the world. Content
EXPERT EVIDENCE REPORT
Criminal Justice Act 1988, s.30 Magistrates Courts Act 1980, s.5e Criminal Procedure Rules (2014), r.33.3(3) & 33.4 EXPERT EVIDENCE REPORT NOTE: only this side of the paper to be used and a continuation
Cold War
Cold War - 1945-1989 -A worldwide struggle for power between the United States and the Soviet Union -It never resulted in direct military conflict between the superpowers (they were each afraid of Nuclear
Cyber Strategy & Policy: International Law Dimensions. Written Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee
Cyber Strategy & Policy: International Law Dimensions Written Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Matthew C. Waxman Liviu Librescu Professor of Law, Columbia Law School Co-Chair, Columbia
SEEKING A RESPONSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INFRASTRUCTURE AND STOCKPILE TRANSFORMATION. John R. Harvey National Nuclear Security Administration
SEEKING A RESPONSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INFRASTRUCTURE AND STOCKPILE TRANSFORMATION John R. Harvey National Nuclear Security Administration Presented to the National Academy of Sciences Symposium on: Post-Cold
the War of 1812 is not just a war between Canada and the United States, Great Britain and the First Nations played a large part in the war the
the War of 1812 is not just a war between Canada and the United States, Great Britain and the First Nations played a large part in the war the Americans did have just cause for a war with the British The
Report to the Public Accounts Committee on the basis for a possible acquisition of combat aircraft. March 2009
Report to the Public Accounts Committee on the basis for a possible acquisition of combat aircraft March 2009 REPORT ON THE BASIS FOR A POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT Contents I. Introduction
TEKS 8C: Calculate percent composition and empirical and molecular formulas. Cold War Tensions
Cold War Tensions Objectives Understand how two sides faced off in Europe during the Cold War. Learn how nuclear weapons threatened the world. Understand how the Cold War spread globally. Compare and contrast
Strong. Secure. Engaged: Canada s New Defence Policy
Strong. Secure. Engaged: Canada s New Defence Policy Putting People First Long-term Capability Investments Spending Growth and Financial Transparency Bold New Vision 2 Putting People First People are the
Origins of the Cold War
Origins of the Cold War Development of the Cold War The Cold War (1945-91) was one of perception where neither side fully understood the intentions and ambitions of the other. This led to mistrust and
China U.S. Strategic Stability
The Nuclear Order Build or Break Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington, D.C. April 6-7, 2009 China U.S. Strategic Stability presented by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. This panel has been asked
Americ a s Strategic Posture
Americ a s Strategic Posture The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States William J. Perry, Chairman James R. Schlesinger, Vice-Chairman Harry Cartland
Reducing the waste in nuclear weapons modernization
Reducing the waste in nuclear weapons modernization Frank von Hippel, Program on Science and Global Security and International Panel on Fissile Materials, Princeton University Coalition for Peace Action
The War of 1812 Webquest and Video Analysis- Key Directions: Complete the following questions using resources from the link listed below:
Name: The War of 1812 Webquest and Video Analysis- Key Directions: Complete the following questions using resources from the link listed below: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmxqg2pkjzu (Crash Course
SSUSH20 Analyze U.S. international and domestic policies including their influences on technological advancements and social changes during the
SSUSH20 Analyze U.S. international and domestic policies including their influences on technological advancements and social changes during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. a. Analyze the international
The First Years of World War II
The First Years of World War II ON THE GROUND IN THE AIR ON THE SEA We know that Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and that both Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939.
Unit 1-5: Reading Guide. Canada and World War II
Learning Guide for Counterpoints: Exploring Canadian Issues Unit 1-5: Reading Guide Name: / 92 Canada and World War II Resource: Counterpoints: Exploring Canadian Issues, Chapter 5 Canada Declares War
Turkey Doesn t Need Article V NATO Support to Defend Itself Against Syria. by John Noble
Turkey Doesn t Need Article V NATO Support A POLICY December, PAPER 2012 POLICY UPDATE Turkey Doesn t Need Article V NATO Support CDFAI, Fellow December, 2012 Prepared for the Canadian Defence & Foreign
UNIDIR RESOURCES IDEAS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY. Practical Steps towards Transparency of Nuclear Arsenals January Introduction
IDEAS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY UNIDIR RESOURCES Practical Steps towards Transparency of Nuclear Arsenals January 2012 Pavel Podvig WMD Programme Lead, UNIDIR Introduction Nuclear disarmament is one the key
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I and II
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I and II The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) refers to two arms control treaties SALT I and SALT II that were negotiated over ten years, from 1969 to 1979.
WEAPONS TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES Agreement Between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and ROMANIA
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 11-1223 WEAPONS Agreement Between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and ROMANIA Signed at Washington September 13, 2011 with Attachment NOTE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
Chapter 17: Foreign Policy and National Defense Section 3
Chapter 17: Foreign Policy and National Defense Section 3 Objectives 1. Summarize American foreign policy from independence through World War I. 2. Show how the two World Wars affected America s traditional
THE DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Journal of Defense Resources Management No. 1 (1) / 2010 THE DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS Laszlo STICZ Hungary, Ministry of Defense, Development & Logistics Agency Abstract: Defense
Methodology The assessment portion of the Index of U.S.
Methodology The assessment portion of the Index of U.S. Military Strength is composed of three major sections that address America s military power, the operating environments within or through which it
On 21 November, Ukraine
Reforming Ukraine s Armed Forces while Facing Russia s Aggression: the Triple Five Strategy Stepan Poltorak Four years after Ukraine s Euromaidan Revolution and Russia s subsequent invasion, Minister of
US-Russian Nuclear Disarmament: Current Record and Possible Further Steps 1. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov
US-Russian Nuclear Disarmament: Current Record and Possible Further Steps 1 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov Nuclear disarmament is getting higher and higher on international agenda. The
The best days in this job are when I have the privilege of visiting our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
The best days in this job are when I have the privilege of visiting our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians who serve each day and are either involved in war, preparing for war, or executing
Test - Social Studies US History Unit 08: World War II
Test - Social Studies US History Unit 08: World War II 2014-2015 1. Which of the following best summarize the role of the United States during the Second World War? A. The United States maintained neutrality
Origins of the Cold War
Origins of the Cold War Development of the Cold War The Cold War (1945-91) was one of perception where neither side fully understood the intentions and ambitions of the other. This led to mistrust and
Bending but not Broken: The USAF s Expeditionary Air Force Experience in the 21 st Century 1
Bending but not Broken: The USAF s Expeditionary Air Force Experience in the 21 st Century 1 Major-General Timothy A. Peppe, USAF and Rachel Lea Heide The international scene faced by the United States
A HOT COLD WAR: KOREA
A HOT COLD WAR: KOREA 1950 - -1953 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE HELD AT THE POMPEY ELLIOT MEMORIAL HALL, CAMBERWELL RSL BY MILITARY HISTORY AND HERITAGE, VICTORIA. 21 NOVEMBER 2015 Proudly supported
Reading Essentials and Study Guide
Lesson 3 Cold War Conflicts ESSENTIAL QUESTION How does conflict influence political relationships? Reading HELPDESK Academic Vocabulary temporary lasting for a limited time; not permanent emerge to come
Nuclear dependency. John Ainslie
Nuclear dependency John Ainslie John Ainslie is coordinator of the Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. These excerpts are from The Future of the British Bomb, his comprehensive review of the issues
Smart Defence International Seminar - INCIPE Conference
Smart Defence International Seminar - INCIPE Conference General José Luiz Pinto Ramalho First I would like to thank the invitation to participate in this important conference. I presume that it is expected
Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
Airspace Control in the Combat Zone Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.7 4 June 1998 BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2 1.7 4 JUNE 1998 OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Maj Chris Larson,
Defending the Homeland: The Role of the Alaskan Command
NCTR Annual Convention Defending the Homeland: The Role of the Alaskan Command A L A S K A N A C O M M N D Lt Gen Howie Chandler Commander, Alaskan Command, Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command
ASSIGNMENT An element that enables a seadependent nation to project its political, economic, and military strengths seaward is known as 1-5.
ASSIGNMENT 1 Textbook Assignment: Chapter 1, U.S. Naval Tradition, pages 1-1 through 1-22 and Chapter 2, Leadership and Administrative Responsibilities, pages 2-1 through 2-8. 1-n element that enables
European Theatre. Videos
European Theatre Videos What do you SEE? THINK? WONDER? Now, what do you THINK? WONDER? 'Fallen 9000' Project: Thousands Of Stenciled Bodies In The Sand Serve As Poignant D-Day Tribute An ambitious installation
Ch. 9.4 The War of 1812
Ch. 9.4 The War of 1812 Objectives 1. How did the war progress at sea and in the Great Lakes region? 2. How did actions by American Indians aid the British during the war? 3. What strategy did the British
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON. December 11, 1993
21355 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON December 11, 1993 PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-17 MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Postwar America ( ) Lesson 3 The Cold War Intensifies
Postwar America (1945-1960) Lesson 3 The Cold War Intensifies Postwar America (1945-1960) Lesson 3 The Cold War Intensifies Learning Objectives Describe how Cold War tensions were intensified by the arms
During the Cold War, the USA & USSR were rival superpowers who competed to spread their ideology
Eisenhower Years During the Cold War, the USA & USSR were rival superpowers who competed to spread their ideology From 1945 to 1949, President Truman used containment to successfully stop the spread of
Essential Question: What caused an Arms Race to develop between the US and USSR? How did space exploration factor into the Arms Race?
Essential Question: What caused an Arms Race to develop between the US and USSR? How did space exploration factor into the Arms Race? During the Cold War, the USA & USSR were rival superpowers who competed
The main tasks and joint force application of the Hungarian Air Force
AARMS Vol. 7, No. 4 (2008) 685 692 SECURITY The main tasks and joint force application of the Hungarian Air Force ZOLTÁN OROSZ Hungarian Defence Forces, Budapest, Hungary The tasks and joint force application
The. Most Devastating War Battles
The 7 Most Devastating War Battles Prepared By: Kalon Jonasson, Ashley Rechik, April Spring, Trisha Marteinsson, Yasmin Busuttil, Laura Oddleifsson, Alicia Vernaus The Vietnam War took place from 1957
Facts on the Bilateral Cooperation Program between Thailand and Sweden by the Swedish Government
Facts on the Bilateral Cooperation Program between Thailand and Sweden by the Swedish Government Preamble In January 2004 Swedish Prime Minister and Swedish delegates paid a visit to Thailand. During the
I. The Pacific Front Introduction Read the following introductory passage and answer the questions that follow.
I. The Pacific Front Introduction Read the following introductory passage and answer the questions that follow. The United States entered World War II after the attack at Pearl Harbor. There were two theaters
CHAPTER 18 SECTION 2: THE COLD WAR HEATS UP
CHAPTER 18 SECTION 2: THE COLD WAR HEATS UP CHINA S CIVIL WAR ENDS FROM 1945 THROUGH 1949 AMERICA SENT SUPPORT TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK S NATIONALIST CAUSE WHY? BECAUSE THEY WERE FIGHTING COMMUNISTS!! THE REALITY
Innovation in Military Organizations Fall 2005
MIT OpenCourseWare http://ocw.mit.edu 17.462 Innovation in Military Organizations Fall 2005 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms. 17.462 Military
U.S. AIR STRIKE MISSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
U.S. AIR STRIKE MISSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST THE QUANTITATIVE DIFFERENCES OF TODAY S AIR CAMPAIGNS IN CONTEXT AND THE IMPACT OF COMPETING PRIORITIES JUNE 2016 Operations to degrade, defeat, and destroy
Vocabulary. Theatre of War Tecumseh Impressment William Henry Harrison War Hawk Elitist Paradox
Vocabulary Theatre of War Tecumseh Impressment William Henry Harrison War Hawk Elitist Paradox Thomas Jefferson leaves a mess The Embargo Act FAILED Meriwether Lewis controversy England and Natives were
World War II Ends Ch 24-5
World War II Ends Ch 24-5 The Main Idea While the Allies completed the defeat of the Axis Powers on the battlefield, Allied leaders were making plans for the postwar world. Content Statement Summarize
Missile Defense: A View from Warsaw
Working Paper Research Division European and Atlantic Security Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Elisabieta Horoszko : A View from Warsaw FG03-WP
Canada in the Cold War. Social Studies 11 Exam Review: Pacific School of Innovation and Inquiry
Canada in the Cold War Social Studies 11 Exam Review: Pacific School of Innovation and Inquiry What was the Cold War? It began as soon as World War Two Ended and lasted until the early 1990s. (Almost 50
Historical Studies 349: Canadian Military History University of Calgary
Historical Studies 349: Canadian Military History University of Calgary Summer 2009 Lecture Hours: TR 13:00-15:45 Instructor: Christine Leppard Lecture Room: SS 012 Office: SS 635 Office Telephone #: 220-2669