Russian General Staff Preparations for New Generation Warfare

Transcription

1 Russian General Staff Preparations for New Generation Warfare DOI: 25 April 2015 Dr. Phillip A. Petersen Senior Fellow

2 Vladimir Pu5n seems to perceive an existen5al struggle between the Russian/Eurasian civiliza5on and the Atlan5c civiliza5on led by the USA.

3 u When the USSR collapsed, liberalism defeated the last 20 th Century ideology (communism) to remain the sole ideology on the global arena. u The fourth theory (as opposed to liberalism, communism, and fascism) will be a neo- conserva5ve post- liberal ideological superstate. u In its war on liberalism, Russia will defend tradi5on, conserva5ve values, and true liberty.

4 Cultural differences do not always coincide with territorial divisions; in this case the division line will cut through the territory, the land. We have always wanted this line to run as close to the west as possible, while the geopoli5cians in Washington are trying to find a way to push it as much to the east as possible. This is what the Ukrainian issue is like. Anyone who says it is not like this is either being diploma5c or is not sufficiently informed. Aleksandr Dugin 2009

5 The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direc5on of the broad use of poli5cal, economic, informa5onal, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures applied in coordina5on with the protest poten5al of the popula5on. All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out ac:ons of informa:onal conflict and the ac:ons of special- opera:ons forces. The open use of forces o@en under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regula:on is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.

6 On the Character & Content of New Genera:on Warfare, Voyenna mysl, Oct. 2013, by Col. S. G. Chekinov & LTG S. A. Bogdanov 1 - Non- military asymmetric warfare to establish favorable socio- economic & poli5cal environment; 2 - Special opera5ons to misdirect elites; 3 - In5mida5on, fraud, bribery; 4 - Destabiliza5on opera5ons & organiza5on of militant opposi5on; 5 - Introduc5on of armed insurgents & support thereof; 6 - Clandes5ne military interven5on; 7 - Use of EW & high- tech reconnaissance to facilitate the destruc5on of resis5ng forces; 8 - Overt interven5on to occupy territory and suppress any remaining resistance; 9 - Threats to use nuclear weapons, and to use precision weapons to destroy nuclear power plants, chemical industry facili5es & large hydro- electric power plants.

7 General Staff Opera:onal Planning w Managing ethnic and religious divisions is not dissimilar to waging coali5onal warfare providing both vulnerabili5es and opportuni5es that must be planned for and exercised. w Non- contact and netcentric warfare demands a transforma5on from a tradi5onal massed army to highly mobile flexible forces that may be rapidly reconfigured during the course of conflict. w Nuclear weapons are to be fully integrated into the opera5onal plan so, should their use be required to restore stability to the military situa5on, they could be employed to isolate the zone of conflict and break the will of the opposing forces and coali5on to con5nue the war.

8 Russian General Staff Opera:onal- Strategic Exercises Since 1991 ZAPAD 1999 VOSTOK 2003 VOSTOK 2005 VOSTOK 2007 VOSTOK 2008 OSEN [AUTUMN] 2009 One Scenario for Three Strategic Direc5ons VOSTOK 2010 ZAPAD 2013 SNAP CHECK 2013 VOSTOK 2014 SNAP CHECK 2014 LADOGA ZAPAD KAVKAS

9 Aggressor Forces Exercise Elements Aggressor forces aiempt to exploit ethnic or religious diversity to promote separa5sm ; Separa5st elements are supported by arms and advisors; To avoid destruc5on of separa5st forces, diversionary regulars are commiied to combat; The aggressor s tradi5onal armed forces intervene to prevent defeat of rebellion.

10 Friendly Forces Exercise Elements Russian forces aiack foreign forces on territories from which the aggression has been launched; Allied forces isolate diversionary regulars of aggressor forces, and Interior Ministry forces complete their destruc5on; Russian forces employ nuclear weapons to isolate the conflict region from aggressor reinforcement, and compel nego5a5ons.

11 De- escala:ng Aggression by Disrup:ng Command of the Aggression, Elimina:ng the Threat of Defeat & Changing the Correla:on of Forces u Limited nuclear aiacks were made within the theater and against targets in the United States, by Long Range Avia5on; Strategic Rocket Forces employ SS- 27 strikes against theater targets. u Fearing that the conflict may develop into a total nuclear war, the enemy is compelled to start nego5a5ons.

12 Russian'Theory'of'Nuclear'De3escalation' Stage&1& "Demonstra,on"" Level "(unpopulated"targets)" Stage&2& "In,mida,on6Demonstra,on"" Level "(single"strikes)" Stage&3& "In,mida,on" Level "(group"strikes"to"change"balance"on"opera,onal"direc,on)" Stage&4& "In,mida,on6Retalia,on"" Level "(strikes"across"the"theater"to" eliminate"the"threat"of" defeat )" Stage&5& "Retalia,on6In,mida,on" Level "(massive"strikes"to"annihilate"the"enemy"in"the"theater)" Stage&6& "Retalia,on" Level "(massive"theater"&"strategic"strikes)" V.I"Levshin,"A.V."Nedelin"and"M.E."Sosnovsky," O#Primeenenii#Yadernogo#Oruzhiya#Dlya#Deeskalatsii#Voyennyskh# Deistviy#[On"Use"of"Nuclear"Weapons"for"De6escala,on"of"Military"Opera,ons], Voyennaya#Mysl,"May"1999."

13 Discon:nuous In:mida:on Model Escalate to De- escalate Escalate'to'De3escalate' Intensity Yield""x""Number""x""Depth""x""Popula,on"Lethality" Strategic"Nuke" Theater"Nuke" BaXlefield"Nuke" Conven,onal" Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Time" Level 4 Level 5 Level 6

14 Prac:cal Effect of Opera:onal- Strategic Russian Exercises u IN PROVIDING AGRESSOR FORCES FOR EXERCISES GRU officers are trained to organize and lead terrorists and illegal armed forma5ons under cover of decep5ve measures.!!spetznaz brigades are trained to support separa5st combat ac5vi5es as a typical special opera5on in a certain sense resembling textbook peacekeeping ones. u AS A RESULT OF THE EXERCISES Russian Armed Forces are trained to use par5san- style conflict that prac5cally eliminates the dis5nc5on between the ac5ons of diversionary groups, the regular army and par5san units that can be extraordinarily effec5ve against opponents who rely only on regular units. Interior Troops are trained to pacify occupied areas once major offensive opera5ons have terminated.

15 Russian New Generation Warfare

16 New MD/High Command Structure