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1 16,965 active nuclear bombs and the threat to the world from its WEAPONS MASS DESTRUCTION OF Compiled by the organizing committee of the INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE WORLD CITY MONTESSORI SCHOOL, 12, Station Road, Lucknow (U.P.) INDIA Mobile: Phones : , Fax : article51@cmseducation.org; Website:

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3 Threat to the world from its Weapons of Mass Destruction Statistics By country Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States

4 The following is a list of states that have admitted the possession of nuclear weapons, the approximate number of warheads under their control, and the year they tested their first weapon and their force configuration. This list is informally known in global politics as the "Nuclear Club."With the exception of Russia and the United States (which have subjected their nuclear forces to independent verification under various treaties) these figures are estimates, in some cases quite unreliable estimates. In particular, under the SORT treaty thousands of Russian and U.S. nuclear warheads are inactive in stockpiles awaiting processing. The fissile material contained in the warheads can then be recycled for use in nuclear reactors. From a high of 68,000 active weapons in 1985, as of 2014 there are some 4,000 active nuclear warheads and 10,144 total nuclear warheads in the world. Many of the decommissioned weapons were simply stored or partially dismantled, not destroyed. It is also noteworthy that since the dawn of the Atomic Age the delivery methods of most states with nuclear weapons has evolved with some achieving a nuclear triad while others have consolidated away from land and air deterrents to submarine based forces. Country Warheads active/total [nb 1] Year of first test CTBT status [4] The five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT United States 2,104 / 4, ("Trinity") Signatory Russia 1,600 / 4, ("RDS-1") Ratifier United Kingdom 160 / ("Hurricane") Ratifier France 290 / ("Gerboise Bleue") Ratifier China n.a. / ("596") Signatory Non-NPT nuclear powers India n.a. / 110 [2] 1974 ("Smiling Buddha") Non-signatory Pakistan n.a. / 120 [2] 1998 ("Chagai-I") Non-signatory North Korea n.a. / < Non-signatory Undeclared nuclear powers Israel n.a. / Unknown (possibly 1979) Signatory :: 1 ::

5 Five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT An early stage in the "Trinity" fireball, the first nuclear explosion, 1945 U.S. and USSR/Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles, A Trident missile launched from a Royal Navy Vanguard class ballistic missile submarine French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (right) and the American nuclear-powered carrier USS Enterprise (left), each of which carries nuclear-capable warplanes :: 2 ::

6 United States The United States developed the first atomic weapons, during World War II in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada as part of the Manhattan Project, out of the fear that Nazi Germany would develop them first. It tested the first nuclear weapon in 1945 ("Trinity"), and remains the only country to have used nuclear weapons against an enemy state in warfare, devastating the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was the first nation to develop the hydrogen bomb, testing an experimental prototype in 1952 ("Ivy Mike") and a deployable weapon in 1954 ("Castle Bravo"). Throughout the Cold War it continued to modernize and enlarge its nuclear arsenal, but from 1992 on has been involved primarily in a program of Stockpile stewardship.[26][27][28] The U.S. nuclear arsenal contained 31,175 warheads at its Cold War height (in 1966).[29] During the Cold War the United States built approximately 70,000 nuclear warheads, more than all other nuclear-weapon states combined. Russian Federation The Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon ("RDS-1") in 1949, in a crash project developed partially with espionage obtained during and after World War II (see: Soviet atomic bomb project). The Soviet Union was the second nation to have developed and tested a nuclear weapon. The direct motivation for Soviet weapons development was to achieve a balance of power during the Cold War. It tested its first megaton-range hydrogen bomb ("RDS-37") in The Soviet Union also tested the most powerful explosive ever detonated by humans, ("Tsar Bomba"), with a theoretical yield of 100 megatons, intentionally reduced to 50 when detonated. After its dissolution in 1991, the Soviet weapons entered officially into the possession of the Russian Federation.[32] The Soviet nuclear arsenal contained some 45,000 warheads at its peak (in 1986); the Soviet Union built about 55,000 nuclear warheads since United Kingdom The United Kingdom tested its first nuclear weapon ("Hurricane") in Britain had provided considerable impetus and initial research for the early conception of the atomic bomb, aided by the presence of refugee scientists working in British laboratories who had fled the continent. It collaborated closely with the United States and Canada during the Manhattan Project, but had to develop its own method for manufacturing and detonating a bomb as U.S. secrecy grew after The United Kingdom was the third country in the world, after the United States and Soviet Union, to develop and test a nuclear weapon. Its programme was motivated to have an independent deterrent against the Soviet Union, while also maintaining its status as a great power. It tested its first hydrogen bomb in 1957 (Operation Grapple), making it the third country to do so after the United States and Soviet Union.[33][34] The UK maintained a fleet of V bomber strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped with nuclear weapons during the Cold War. It currently maintains a fleet of four 'Vanguard' class ballistic missile submarines equipped with Trident II missiles. The British government announced a replacement to the current system to take place between :: 3 ::

7 France France tested its first nuclear weapon in 1960 ("Gerboise Bleue"), based mostly on its own research. It was motivated by the Suez Crisis diplomatic tension vis-à-vis both the Soviet Union and the Free World allies United States and United Kingdom. It was also relevant to retain great power status, alongside the United Kingdom, during the post-colonial Cold War (see: Force de frappe). France tested its first hydrogen bomb in 1968 ("Opération Canopus"). After the Cold War, France has disarmed 175 warheads with the reduction and modernization of its arsenal that has now evolved to a dual system based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and medium-range air-to-surface missiles (Rafale fighter-bombers). However new nuclear weapons are in development[citation needed] and reformed nuclear squadrons were trained during Enduring Freedom operations in Afghanistan.[citation needed] France signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992.[35] In January 2006, President Jacques Chirac stated a terrorist act or the use of weapons of mass destruction against France would result in a nuclear counterattack.[36] In February 2015, President Francois Hollande stressed the need for a nuclear deterrent in "a dangerous world". He also detailed the French deterrent as "less than 300" nuclear warheads, three sets of 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 54 mediumrange air-to-surface missiles" and urged other states to show similar transparency.[37] China China tested its first nuclear weapon device ("596") in 1964 at the Lop Nur test site. The weapon was developed as a deterrent against both the United States and the Soviet Union. Two years later, China had a fission bomb capable of being put onto a nuclear missile. It tested its first hydrogen bomb ("Test No. 6") in 1967, a mere 32 months after testing its first nuclear weapon (the shortest fission-to-fusion development known in history).[38] The country is currently thought to have had a stockpile of around 240 warheads, though because of the limited information available, estimates range from 100 to 400.[39][40][41] China is the only NPT nuclear-weapon state to give an unqualified negative security assurance due to its "no first use" policy.[42][43] China signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992.[35] On February 25, 2015 U.S. Vice Admiral Joseph Mulloy stated to the House Armed Services Committee's seapower subcommittee that the U.S. does not believe the PLAN currently deploys SLBMs on their submarine fleet. :: 4 ::

8 Other states declaring possession of nuclear weapons Large stockpile with global range (dark blue), smaller stockpile with global range (medium blue), small stockpile with regional range (pale blue) India Launch of the first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile by India having a range of over 5000 km or more. India is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. India tested what it called a "peaceful nuclear explosive" in 1974 (which became known as "Smiling Buddha"). The test was the first test developed after the creation of the NPT, and created new questions about how civilian nuclear technology could be diverted secretly to weapons purposes (dual-use technology). India's secret development caused great concern and anger particularly from nations, such as Canada, that had supplied its nuclear reactors for peaceful and power generating needs. Indian officials rejected the NPT in the 1960s on the grounds that it created a world of nuclear "haves" and "have-nots," arguing that it unnecessarily restricted "peaceful activity" (including "peaceful nuclear explosives"), and that India would not accede to international control of their nuclear facilities unless all other countries engaged in unilateral disarmament of their own nuclear weapons. The Indian position has also asserted that the NPT is in many ways a neocolonial regime designed to deny security to post-colonial powers.[45] Even after its 1974 test, India maintained that its nuclear capability was primarily "peaceful", but between 1988 and 1990 it apparently weaponized two dozen nuclear weapons for delivery by air.[46] In 1998 India tested weaponized nuclear warheads ("Operation Shakti"), including a thermonuclear device.[47] In July 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced plans to conclude an Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement.[48] This came to fruition through a series of steps that included India s announced plan to separate its civil and military :: 5 ::

9 nuclear programs in March 2006,[49] the passage of the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act by the U.S. Congress in December 2006, the conclusion of a U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement in July 2007,[50] approval by the IAEA of an India-specific safeguards agreement,[51] agreement by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to a waiver of export restrictions for India,[52] approval by the U.S. Congress[53] and culminating in the signature of U.S.-India agreement for civil nuclear cooperation[54] in October The U.S. State Department said it made it "very clear that we will not recognize India as a nuclear-weapon state".[55] The United States is bound by the Hyde Act with India and may cease all cooperation with India if India detonates a nuclear explosive device. The US had further said it is not its intention to assist India in the design, construction or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-use items.[56] In establishing an exemption for India, the Nuclear Suppliers Group reserved the right to consult on any future issues which might trouble it.[57] As of early 2013, India was estimated to have had a stockpile of around warheads.[1] Pakistan Pakistan also is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan covertly developed nuclear weapons over decades, beginning in the late 1970s. Pakistan first delved into nuclear power after the establishment of its first nuclear power plant near Karachi with equipment and materials supplied mainly by western nations in the early 1970s. Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto promised in 1965 that if India could build nuclear weapons then Pakistan would too, "even if we have to eat grass." It is believed that Pakistan has possessed nuclear weapons since the mid-1980s.[58] The United States continued to certify that Pakistan did not possess such weapons until 1990, when sanctions were imposed under the Pressler Amendment, requiring a cutoff of U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan.[59] In 1998, Pakistan conducted its first six nuclear tests at the Chagai Hills, in response to the five tests conducted by India a few weeks before. In 2004, the Pakistani metallurgist A.Q. Khan, a key figure in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, confessed to heading an international black market ring involved in selling nuclear weapons technology. In particular, Khan had been selling gas centrifuge technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Khan denied complicity by the Pakistani government or Army, but this has been called into question by journalists and IAEA officials, and was later contradicted by statements from Khan himself. As of early 2013, Pakistan was estimated to have had a stockpile of around warheads,[1] and in November 2014 it was projected that by 2020 Pakistan would have enough fissile material for 200 warheads. North Korea North Korea was a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but announced a withdrawal on January 10, 2003, after the United States accused it of having a secret uranium enrichment program and cut off energy assistance under the 1994 Agreed Framework. In February 2005, North Korea claimed to possess functional nuclear weapons, though their lack of a test at the time led many experts to doubt the claim. However, in October 2006, North Korea stated that :: 6 ::

10 due to growing intimidation by the USA, it would conduct a nuclear test to confirm its nuclear status. North Korea reported a successful nuclear test on October 9, 2006 (see 2006 North Korean nuclear test). Most U.S. intelligence officials believe that North Korea did, in fact, test a nuclear device due to radioactive isotopes detected by U.S. aircraft; however, most agree that the test was probably only partially successful.[62] The yield may have been less than a kiloton, which is much smaller than the first successful tests of other powers; boosted fission weapons may have an unboosted yield in this range, which is sufficient to start deuterium-tritium fusion in the boost gas at the center; the fast neutrons from fusion then ensure a full fission yield. North Korea conducted a second, higher yield test on 25 May 2009 (see 2009 North Korean nuclear test) and a third test with still higher yield on 12 February 2013 (see 2013 North Korean nuclear test). Other states believed to possess nuclear weapons On October 5, 1986, the British newspaper The Sunday Times ran Mordechai Vanunu's story on its front page under the headline: "Revealed the secrets of Israel's nuclear arsenal." Israel Israel is widely believed to have been the sixth country in the world to develop nuclear weapons, with "rudimentary, but deliverable," nuclear weapons available as early as 1967.[63] Israel is not a party to the NPT. Israel engages in strategic ambiguity, saying it would not be the first country to "introduce" nuclear weapons into the region, but refusing to otherwise confirm or deny a nuclear weapons program or arsenal. This policy of "nuclear opacity" has been interpreted as an attempt to get the benefits of deterrence with a minimum political cost.[63][64] In 1968, the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, affirmed to the United States State Department that Israel would "not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East." Upon further questioning about what "introduce" meant in this context, however, he said that "he would not consider a weapon that had not been tested a weapon," and affirmed that he did not believe that "an unadvertised, untested nuclear device" was really "a nuclear weapon." He also agreed, however, that an "advertised but untested" device would be considered "introduction." This has been interpreted to mean that official Israeli policy was that the country could possess a nuclear weapon without technically "introducing" it, so long as it did not test it, and as long as it was "unadvertised".[65][66] There is extensive evidence Israel has nuclear weapons or a near-ready nuclear weapons capability. There is also speculation that Israel may have tested a nuclear weapon along with South Africa in 1979, but this has not been confirmed, and interpretation of the Vela Incident is controversial. The stated purpose of the Negev Nuclear Research Center near Dimona is to advance basic nuclear science and applied research on nuclear energy.[67] :: 7 ::

11 In 1986, a former Dimona technician, Mordechai Vanunu, disclosed extensive information about the nuclear program to the British press, including photographs of the secret areas of the nuclear site, some of which depicted nuclear weapons cores and designs. Vanunu gave detailed descriptions of lithium-6 separation required for the production of tritium, an essential ingredient of fusion-boosted fission bombs, as well as information about the rate of plutonium production. Vanunu's evidence was vetted by experienced technical experts before publication, and is considered to be among the strongest evidence for the advanced state of the Israeli nuclear weapons program.[64][68] According to the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Federation of American Scientists, Israel likely possesses around nuclear weapons.[22][69] The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that Israel has approximately 80 intact nuclear weapons, of which 50 are for delivery by Jericho II mediumrange ballistic missiles and 30 are gravity bombs for delivery by aircraft. SIPRI also reports that there was renewed speculation in 2012 that Israel may also have developed nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missiles.[70] On the 12th of February 2015, the Pentagon declassified a top-secret 386-page Department of Defense document from 1987 detailing Israel's nuclear program. This represents the first time Israel s nuclear program has ever been officially and publicly referenced by the U.S. authorities.[71] Nuclear weapons sharing U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe [46] Country Air base Custodian Warheads Belgium Kleine Brogel 52d Fighter Wing 10~20 Germany Büchel 52d Fighter Wing 10~20 Netherlands Volkel 52d Fighter Wing 10~20 Italy Ghedi 52d Fighter Wing 20~40 Italy Aviano 31st Fighter Wing 50 Turkey Incirlik 39th Air Base Wing 50~90 Total 150~240 Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey Under NATO nuclear weapons sharing, the United States has provided nuclear weapons for Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey to deploy and store.[73] This involves pilots and other staff of the "non-nuclear" NATO states practicing, handling, and delivering the U.S. nuclear bombs, and adapting non-u.s. warplanes to deliver U.S. nuclear bombs. However, since all U.S. nuclear weapons are protected with Permissive Action Links, the host states cannot arm the bombs without authorization codes from the United States Air Force.[citation needed] :: 8 ::

12 U.S. nuclear weapons were also deployed in Canada until 1984, and in Greece until 2001 for nuclear sharing purposes.[74] Members of the Non-Aligned Movement have called on all countries to "refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements."[75] The Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) has criticized the arrangement for allegedly violating Articles I and II of the NPT, arguing that "these Articles do not permit the NWS to delegate the control of their nuclear weapons directly or indirectly to others."[76] NATO has argued that the weapons' sharing is compliant with the NPT because "the U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe are in the sole possession and under constant and complete custody and control of the United States." States formerly possessing nuclear weapons Nuclear Africa produced six nuclear weapons in the 1980s, but disassembled them in the early 1990s. In 1979, there was a putative detection of a covert nuclear test in the Indian Ocean, called the Vela incident. It has long been speculated that it was possibly a test by Israel, in collaboration with and support of South Africa, though this has never been confirmed. South Africa could not have constructed such a nuclear bomb until November 1979, two months after the "double flash" incident. South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991, South Africa South Africa produced six nuclear weapons in the 1980s, but disassembled them in the early 1990s. In 1979, there was a putative detection of a covert nuclear test in the Indian Ocean, called the Vela incident. It has long been speculated that it was possibly a test by Israel, in collaboration with and support of South Africa, though this has never been confirmed. South Africa could not have constructed such a nuclear bomb until November 1979, two months after the "double flash" incident. South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in Former Soviet countries Belarus had 81 single warhead missiles stationed on its territory after the Soviet Union collapsed in They were all transferred to Russia by In May 1992, Belarus acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Kazakhstan inherited 1,400 nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, and transferred them all to Russia by Kazakhstan has since acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ukraine has acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ukraine inherited about 5,000 nuclear weapons when it became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991, making its nuclear arsenal the third-largest in the world.[83] By 1996, Ukraine had voluntarily disposed of all nuclear weapons within its territory, disassembling them in Russia. :: 9 ::

13 Country System Status Range Propellant Afghanistan Scud-B Unknown 300 km Liquid Armenia Scud-B Operational 300 km Liquid Bahrain ATACMS (MGM-140) Operational Up to 300 km Belarus SS-21 Operational 120 km Scud-B Operational 300 km Liquid China B611 (CSS-X-11) Operational 250 km M-7 (CSS-8) Operational km Liquid DF-3A (CSS-2) Operational 2,800 km Liquid DF-4 (CSS-3) Operational 5,470+ km DF-5 (CSS-4, Mod 1) Operational 12,000 km DF-5A (CSS-4, Mod 2) Operational 13,000 km Liquid Liquid Liquid DF-11 (CSS-7) Operational 300 km DF-11A (CSS-7) Operational 600 km DF-15 (CSS-6) Operational 600 km DF-15? (CSS-6 Mod 2) Operational 880+ km DF-15? (CSS-6 Mod 3) Operational 720+ km DF-21 (CSS-5, Mod 1) Operational 2,500 km DF-21A (CSS-5, Mod 2) Operational 1,770+ km DF-21C (CSS-5 Mod 3) Operational 2,150-2,500 km DF-21D ASBMvariant Development 1,500 km DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) Operational 7,250+ km DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) Operational 11,270+ km Julang (JL) 1 (SLBM) Operational 1,700+ km Julang (JL) 2 (SLBM) Tested/Development 7400 km Egypt Scud-B Operational 300 km Liquid Project-T (Scud B) Operational 450 km Liquid Scud-C Operational 550 km Liquid :: 10 ::

14 France M4A/B (SLBM) Operational 6,000 km M45 (SLBM) Operational 6,000 km M51 (SLBM) Tested/Development 8,000 km Georgia Scud B Operational 300 km Liquid Greece ATACMS (MGM-140) Operational 165 km India Prithvi-1 Operational 150 km Liquid Prithvi-2 Operational 250 km Liquid Prithvi-3 Development 350 km Dhanush Operational 400 Liquid Sagarika/K-15 (SLBM) Tested 750 Agni-1 Operational 700 km Agni-2 Operational 2,000 km Agni-3 Operational 3,000 km Agni-4 Tested 3,500 km Agni-5 Development 5,000 km Iran Mushak-120 Operational 130 km Mushak-160 Operational 160 km Qiam-1 Operational +300 km Liquid Fateh-110 Operational 200 km Tondar-69 (CSS-8) Operational 150 km Scud-B Operational 300 km Liquid Scud-C Operational 550 km Liquid Shahab-3 (Zelzal-3) Operational 1,300-2,000 km Liquid Ghadr 1/Ghadr 110 Tested/Development 2,500 km Liquid Ashura/Sejjil/Sejjil-2 Tested/Development 2,000-2,500 km Iraq Al Fat h Unknown 160 km Al Samoud II Unknown km Liquid Israel Lance Operational 130 km Liquid Jericho-1 Operational 500 km Jericho-2 Operational 1,500 km Jericho-3 Operational? 4,800 km /Liquid Kazakhstan Tochka-U (SS-21) Operational 120 km Scud-B Operational 300 km Liquid Libya Al Fatah (Itislat) Tested/Development 200 km Liquid Scud-B Operational 300 km Liquid North Korea Toksa/SS-21 variant Tested/Development 120 km :: 11 ::

15 Scud-Bvariant/Hwasong 5 Operational 300 km Liquid Scud-Cvariant/Hwasong 6 Operational 500 km Liquid No-Dong-1 Operational 1,300 km Liquid No-Dong-2 Tested/Development 1,500 km Liquid Taepo Dong-1 Tested 2,000 km Liquid Taepo Dong-2 (2-stage) Tested/Development 9,000+ km Liquid Taepo Dong-2 (3- stage)/unha-2 SLV Musudan/BM-25/SS-N- 6 variant Tested/Development 15,000 km Liquid Development? 4,000 km Liquid Pakistan Hatf-1 Operational km Hatf-2 (Abdali) Tested/Development 190 km Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi) Operational 300 km Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) Operational 750 km Ghauri-1 (Hatf-5) Operational 1,300 km Liquid Ghauri-2 (Hatf-5a) Tested/Development 2,300 km Liquid Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6) Tested/Development 2,500 km Ghauri-3 Development 3,000 km Liquid Romania Scud-B Operational 300 km Liquid Russia Scud-B (SS-1c Mod 1) Operational 300 km Liquid Scud-B (SS-1c Mod 2) Operational 240 km Liquid SS-18 Operational 10,000 km Liquid SS-19 Operational 10,000 km Liquid SS-21 Operational 120 km SS-21 Mod 2 Operational 120 km SS-21 Mod 3 Operational 70 km SS-24 Operational 10,000 km SS-25 Operational 10,500 km SS-27 (Topol M) Operational 11,000 km SS-27 Mod-X-2 Operational 11,000 km SS-26 (Iskander) Operational 400 km SS-N-8 (SLBM) Operational 8,000 km Liquid SS-N-18 (SLBM) Operational 6,500-8,000 km Liquid SS-N-20 (SLBM) Being Retired 8,300 km SS-N-23 (SLBM) Operational 8,000 km Liquid RSM-56 (Bulava-30) Tested/Development 10,000 km SS-26 Stone (Iskader-E) Operational 280 km Saudi Arabia DF-3 (CSS-2) Operational 2,600 km Liquid Slovakia SS-21 Operational 120 km :: 12 ::

16 South Korea NHK-1 Operational 180 km NHK-2 Operational km ATACMS Block 1/A Operational 300 km Syria SS-21 Operational 120 km Scud-B Operational 300 km Liquid Scud-C Operational 500 km Liquid Scud-D Tested/Development 700 km Liquid Taiwan Ching Feng Operational 130 km Liquid Tien Chi Operational 300 km Turkey ATACMS (MGM-140) Operational 165 km Project J Development 150 km Turkmenistan Scud-B Operational 300 km Liquid United Arab Emirates United Kingdom Scud-B Operational 300 km Liquid D-5 Trident II (SLBM) Operational 7,400 km United States ATACMS Block I Operational 165 km ATACMS Block IA Operational 300 km ATACMS Block II Operational 140 km Minuteman III Operational 9,650-13,000 km D-5 Trident II (SLBM) Operational 7,400+ km Vietnam Scud-B Operational 300 km Liquid Yemen Scud-B Operational 300 km Liquid SS-21 Operational 120 km Scud variant Operational km Liquid :: 13 ::

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