UWEL6SSl~ UNCLASSIAEO. I i I: L L~ [~i GAME WARDEN. r : CRC 284. January 1976 CEN~ER

Transcription

1 _,"0 _ r : L CRC 284 WEL6SSl~ L; L l: [1 [j fl ~ L, " " GAME WARDEN A CEN~ER CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES 1401 Wilson Bolevard Bovlevard Arlington Virginia c C Operations Evalation Grop anary 1976 By: VCTORY CAXELS, OANELS DTH C ERDHEM ERDHE1M c i; i L -1 l 1 - [~i [ : L L~, i ~:, L L ), l', Prepared for: / 0 A/ OFFCE OF N~L N AL RESEARCH Department of the Navy Washington, DC" DC: OFFCE OF THE CHEF OF NAVAL OPERATONS (Op03) (OPO3) Department of'the Navy " t~!? Wash"ington, Wash'ington, DC , _-!! i ",-,--,,,;,-- ~_ -'-"-' NCLASSAEO i- -, - A : '' " (i00 M84oo;oo,^_ ~ - : ", ~,,- ~

2 ,: TABLE OF CONTENT$ COm'ENTS Foreword '" ", " iii ntrodction 1 Smmary ~, 3 Conclsions, j 5 ntrodction ", " " Backgrond, " Backgrond 7 Mekong Vekong Delta end and the RSSZ, '", 7 ~atre Satwe of the threat ', " 9 V S Navy k:erdiction efforts :, 12 t: S Navy L"'terdiction efforts l Setting Setcicg p the operation- o,eration--decernber - December throgh September j Acqisitionofassets of andbases 15 CoordL"'Etion Coordbtion within TF 116 a!ld and with other commands 18 PBR operational tactics and and techniqes tec~ :1iqes " f, " " " " " " " " " ", " ~ 20 Psychological operacions 24 Psychologicalo?erations _ " " " " ~ "" " " " "" " Game Warden \Vt;den in iatkexssz t:ce RSSZ ''', ~,;ff " ~, 26 Game Wvden h ttt hlekong Delta 30 Game \Varden n the ~1ekong Delta "" " " l " " " t " " " " ", " " ", 30 The slt'ation sita:ion l:l inoctober 1968 " """ " """" ",, f " " 37 Bibliography 39 Btbliogt"aphy * " " " " "" "" " " " " " " " " " " "" ", " ", " " " 39 Appendix A Distribtion of enemy spplies to and V Corps A-1 A-2 Appendlx A - Distribtion of enemy spplies to and V Corps " " A- - A-12 Append lx B VC/'SVA base areas and Order of Battle in SVN B-1 B- 4 Appendix B VC/WA base areas 2nd Order of kttle in SVN B Appendlx Appendix C - Ot~r 0r:kr military militvy and qaslmilltary qasimilitary forces operating in tbe: Delta and RSSZ "",,", " "" "" " Col - C-3 t " " i0 h Delta and RSSZ c-1 C-3 Appendlx D - Gane Warden task organization f D-l - D-O Appendix D Gaze Wwden task organization D-1 D-10 Appendix E C&Lxacteristics of Game Warden assets E-1 E-4 Append lx E - Craracterlstics of Game Warden assets " /E '", /E /E /E " E-! - E-4 Appendix F Force!evelsr'~* "" "" 't ';" _' " Fool F-4 Appendix F Force levels F-1 P-4 Appendix G,Pdes of eqagement G-1 G-9 Append x G - Rles of engagement /E " /E /E /E, /E " "", /E, '' ",; " G l G- 9 Appendk H Meiozg River merchant ship smggling H-1 H-2 Appendix Lx: 1 Game Gazt: "'arden Warden chronology /E " " /E r " ",," ;' Append lx H - Mej:ong River rnercharit ship smgglin,g " /E " ", H--H-2 _-, _ Page "15' 11 [] o -----~-~ ~~-,,:' -, -, --'----"--~ ' ''

3 / i '-' " [ L [, Li FOREWORD n n "addition to to the docments listed in in the bibliography appearing at at the end of of the main text, this research contribtion Contribtion is s based on: command histories; NavForV in-hose work- working papers, memormda, memoranda, and drafts of of brieffngs briefings and stdies: stdies; interviews; and intonnation information provided by the Central ntelligence Agency (CA) and the Defense ntelligence Agency (DA) Most of this information (except that provided by the intelligence agencies) can be fond in the Vietnam Command Files and the NavForV Provenance Files at the Naval History Division Archives ArChives The athors express their appreciation to Oscar Fitzgerdd Fitzgerald of the Naval History Division DiviSion for his patience and help in sing these files The athors, of corse, assme fll responsibility for their Fnterpretations interpretations of these docments docwnents [ " " - - iii- " _-,-,""-,""

4 -~ ~---~ '- -- NTRODCTON Game W~en Warden was the s S Navy/Vietnamese Navyfliemamese Navy (VNN) operation established established in fn December 1965 to deny enemy movement and respply' on the major rivers of the Mekong Delta and the Rng Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) in Soth Vietnam (SVN) The S s considered Considered river control to be an essential essena element in the overall plan phn to pacify pacffy SVN This research contribtion examines the threat in the Mekong Delta and the RSSZ, specifically on the rivers Game Warden's response to the threat and limitations on that response are discssed, and enemy respply needs, logistic rotes, and infiltration options are examined Game Warde:l'S Warda's fll effect on the enemy remains nknown, -hown, bt changing trends in his se of Delta and RSSZ waterways are noted The Game Warden concept was expanded with the beginning of Sea Lords in OctOber October 1968 Sea Lords is beyond e scope of this report, and the discssion discssion of Game Warden in the Delta and the RSSZ encs enls with September 1968 / /' di i~ Figre 1 shows some soxe of :he key geographical locations loc~tions highlighted in this report i o -1-, ~_~_-~i,,_a " *\,t--,r-: < ~-' * ::-,---2,,? /? i 1 L

5 ~~ /' r CORPS r L [ CORPS 1!! i! (: 1: _T ~ ~ GLF OF THALAND A" XYllN "fivcorps XYEN V CORPS FG 1: SOTH 'VETNAM, ' -2-'"; '\ CORPS - ~ RNG SAT SPECAL ZONE SOTH CHNA SEA ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

6 ~~ :-3-, / SMMARY bmnwcy Dring the early 1960s, 1960s the Viet Cong (VC) in sothern SVN sccessflly SCCeSSfiLY ndermined the SVN government's attempts to develop a sense of national responsibility among the poplation Mch of the sothern half of the contry-- contry--1 and V N Corpsl_-was COrpsl--was nder VC vc control Bt to maintain and increase this control, the Vc VC had to infiltrate war W materials materm lilto into SVN Throgh the early part of 1965, the S Military Assistance Command, Vie- Vietnam (MAC V), considered the sea to be the main infiltration respply rote to sothern SVN Even before the major S commitment in SVN in 1965, Cambodia was sspected to be a link in the respply chain There was, however, a qestion concerning the emphasis, the commnists placed on infiltrating spplies from Cambodia in relation to the emphasis on seaborne infiltration (MACV), considered the sea to be the main infiltration respply rote to sothern w ~, Before 1963, the Mekong/Bassac River complex was the major rote from Cambodia to SVN sed by the enemy for respply By 1966, additional enemy crossing points were located on the Cambodian/SVN Cambdian/SVN border, and there were implications of high-level Cambodian military or govemment government complicity in spplying the VC MACV noted that Cambodia was the only area borderkg bordering SVN that cold harbor commnist forces with no threat of being contered by S military action Spplies from Cambodia were broght into SVN by inland waterways and overland rotes ntil 1966, the VC openly transited the major rivers of sothern SVN and taxed the local poplation popdation The insrgents' se of the rivers for logistical movement was thoght to be generally cross-!;tream cross-meam rather than along-stream, especially in the lower Delta provinces fronting on m the Soth China Sea Lines of commnication connecting VC base areas ran across major mjor rivers Near the Cambodian border, thogh, there was more along-stream tra fic traffic SVN military and md civilian control of land, sea, and inland waterway rotes was inadeqate; adeqate: the VNN River Ricer Force was particlarly ineffective ts main fnction was to infrnish waterborne waterbome deployments tlqloyments and spport for SVN army operations Bt river patrol was given a low priority; conseqently, the VNN River Force had inadeqate resorces with which to develop deveb a Significant significant capability capabjlity for sch patrols TO 'To avoid confsionaith with thevc system of dtaq military regions in SVN (MR-l, (MR-1, etc), &! t this report ses the older designation'of of "Corps areas" for allied operations--that operations--thzt is, 18, Corps,, etc' ~,', -3-,,',' - --_- ~, ~ ~~ f '- L l ' '

7 , [: f -' (: l ' --~ l: [ L: L / TheS Navy made its first 'hge large commitment in SVN in March 1965 with the establishment of Market Time, a a S Navy/VhW (Vl\'N coastal srveillance operation Market Time was to seal off the SVN coast from infiltrators By mid-1966, 4CV MAGV disconted seaborne infiltration Lnfiltratim as a major, workable respply method for the VC Game Warden was established in December 1965 as a joint S Navy/VNN Navy(VNN operation to deny enemy movement and respply on the major rivers of the Mekong Delta and the RSSZ The rivers in the pper Delta in SVN are the Mekong and the Bassac n the lower Delta, the Mekong splits spts into 3 smaller smaer branches; in the RSSZ, the Long Ta River was the major shipping channel to Saigon Game Warden assets inclded nclded shallow-draft river patrol boats (PBRs), armed H-lB helicopters, and, n in the RSSZ, minesweeping minesweeplng boats (MSBs) PBRs and helicopters were based ashore or on On bases afloat Three of the afloat bases were tank landing ships (LSTs) stationed on the 3 major rivers of the lower Delta PBRs operating from an i~n LST or One one of the other afloat bases were nch mch more flexible in meeting the threat than were those operating from shore bases Game Warden river patrols enforced SVN crfews, interdicted nterdicted some VC logistical and tactical movements, and scceeded in n inilencing if"1enclng some of the Delta poplarion poplation in n formerly VC-contro&d VC-controlled area8 areas to spport the SVN government n the RSSZ, MSBs swept mines along dong the main shipping Shipphg channels chznnels and prevented the VC from closing off these vital links Links to Saigon Game Warden forces in the Mekong Delta were originally intended to give abot eqal coverage to the major rivers 8y By mid-1967, nits its in the pper Delta had reported only Ody Light light contact with the enemy and were repositioned to give maximm concentration of forces on the lower Delta rirers, rivers, where extensive VC activity had been noted By spring 1968, the enemy was infiltrating spplies over the Cambodian border with impnity n response, PBRs sere were again deployed to the pper Delta Bt in ly, PBRs in the pper Delta,were, once %ah, again, experiencing Ody oilly light contact with the enemy Evidence sed in the planning of Sea Lords later in n 1968 showed that the enemy generally crossed the border by canals &n& or overland rotes between the Bassac River and the Glf of Thailand, or to the north of the Mekong River, Riverthogh Althogh the VC may have sed the major rivers to cross the '1e border before then, they probably changed their rote to avoid PBR patrols n the hmer Delta, however, the VC were forced to cross major rivers to spply their base L a'"e:as? in the provinces between the rivers The concept of a, a static btnier bamer on the major rivers of the Delta-&d Delta-and RSSZ proved inadeqate by 1968, and the (3-me Game Warden concept was expanded when Sea Lords began in October 1968 Sea Lords ;;as a Delta-wide operation coordinating the combined assem assets 4 L:-- -, ~ j / ----~--~---- -~----~ '-----'

8 /', C' of the River Patrol Force, and 2 other S Navy in-contry task task forces, and S and SVN grond forces Sea Lords wold continally harass VC strongholds and interdict spplies infiltrated from Cambodia The fitst first Sea Lords barriers were established on canals 35 to 40 &mi stmi from and parallel to the Cambodian border CONCLSONS ntil more information becomes available concerning Game Warden's effect on enemy operations, it is nlikely that its total impact can be assessed Some analysts have pointed to trends in the nmbers of enemy incidents on the rivers as indicating afeas areas that were critical spply rotes for for the enemy Bt basing basing patrols on the freqency and intensity of contact with the enemy cold be misleading For example, the few PBRs deploy& deployed to the pper Delta experienced far fewer incidents than did those in the lower Delta This cold have signified heavier enemy concentrations in the ower lower Delta However, the more intensive PBR coverage in the lower Delta and comparable enemy concentrations in both areas cold have reslted in the greater nmber of incidents in the lower Delta Some conc~siols, conclsions, however, can be drawn from available intelligence, from assess- assessments of Game Wvdei Warden participants, and from an examination of the evoltion evoltion of the operation: * Game Warden Waden interrpted enemy movement On on traditional rotes across the major Delta Del rivers Enemy efforts efforts to close the sea lanes to Saigon--a major VC objective~-were objective--were denied by S Navy/VNN Navy/V" Game Warden secred many sections of the major Delta and RSSZ rivers for commercial se Coordin"'tion CoOrdinifion between Game Warden and grond fore forceoperations e operations was inadeqate Weqate The mo::,!1e mofiile afloat base concept provided flexibility to river boat operations, enabling river nser forces to respond to a continally changing threat * Crfews crfews proved to be absoltely crcial to flfilling Game Warden's mission Helicopters were essential to riverine operations in fire spport, observation, and medical media evacation PBRs were adeqate for patrols on large major rivers, bt smaller waterways vraterways reqired more mxe armor and armament - ]!~,-::-====--, _ --_-_--

9 [, c, r L ' )1 ' li 1 :, / /,/ The yong S S Navy officers and easted enlisted men assigned assigned to tiver river patrols performed aggressively and responsibly on their own hitiathe initiative The enemy proved to be flexible in adapting to Game Warden Waxden in the Delta by continally finding new rotes for his spply lines i \ 1 [, (, ' ' \1 [, L 1~:

10 "'r ~ -_ MEKONG DELTA AND THE RSSZ BACKGROLTND BACKGROND To nderstand the natre of the enemy that Game Warden had to deal with, it is impor- important to first nderstand the environment in which he operated The Mekong Delta is a vast lowland plain laced with an intricate and extensive waterway system (see figre 2) Most of the Delta is less than 10 feet above sea level There are 2 major rivers in the pper Delta: the Mekong and kssac Bassac The Mekong in the lower Delta has 3 branches: the Co Chien Ham Long, and My Tho TlO The Blta Delta is also veined with thosands of canals, streams, and ditches The wet season lasts from mid-may to early October becase of the sothwest monsoon, and the dry season lasts from November throgh mid-march &ring dring the northeast monsoon Dring the wet season, the grond in inndated becase of the heavy rains and poor srface drainage Typhoons Gin c,1n also case flooding from ly throgh Bcember December From ne throgh November, most canals are navigable by ships with a draft of more than 6 feet, bt the canals are sbject to tidal inflences from the Soth China Sea and the mlf Glf of Thailand, making navigation difficlt The Rng Sat Special Zone is a mangrove swamp laced with With an intricate network of canals sotheast of Saigon The 2 major rivers of the Rng Sat are the Long Ta and the Soirap The Long Ta River is the critical shipping link to Saigon Dring high tides, any part of the Rng Sat can be reached by sampan Abot 6 million people -- almost 40 percent of SVN's Sv"s poplation -- lived in the area soth of Saigon in 1967 The average poplation density in the Delta was 460 persons per sqare mile; near Saigon, poplation density was 1,000 persons per sqare mile The farm poplation in the Delta Celta was concentrated in small hamlets Marsh areas - were ninhabited since they are nsitable for growing rice, the main occpation of most of the Delta poplation The most densely poplated provinces were those along the major rivers The Soth Vietnamese farmer relied on the rivers and other waterways not only to carry his rich rice crop to market, bt as his main line of commnication n 1966, there were more than 45,000 registered watercraft and nconted thosands of sampans that traveled the estimated 3~ 3,000 nmi of navigable rivers and canals Villagers in the Delta Blta (except for those' thse arond the port cities) had very little contact with the otside world Their knowledge and interest in areas beyond keyond their immediate environment was extremely limited For centries, tight~knit tight-knit families had been keen the center of small village soci8l social strctres known hown as hamlets cen- They _0 were socially conservative consemative ~ and strongly resisted external mernal inflences This sitation presented the SVN government with a difficlt problem --- developing a sense of national resp?llsibility responsibility ~ ~ ~ - ~~, ~ / -- ~ '] \ o [] o

11 ~ ~-"- L, ~-, i,, 1 i i! i, 00 ~\ ' ~, ~~ ' SOTH VETNAM 1 ii! ' i ii i 1,, i 1 GLF OF SAM SOTH CHNA SEA \ 'i i 'i i FG 2: MEKONG DELTA AND RNG SAT i,

12 ~ /"/ The enemy in SVN capitalized on this weabess weakness The VC, ve, directed and Spported spported by NVN, conhcted condcted a tampaign (:ampaign of terror, propaganda, political sbversion, economic sabo- sabotage, and military aggression By 1964, according to DA, VC ve objectives in SVN seemed to be to destroy and prevent establishment of pacified hamlets, consolidate liberated areas, and destroy government forces VC military sccesses dring 1964 inclded gains in territory and poplation control as well as vial virtal isolation of government forces in many provincial and district capitais capitals Operations involving one or more battalions were carried ot with relative impnity Terrorism and propaganda efforts, particlarly among the rral poplation, were sc- sccessfl in gaining either widespread cooperation with the VC or at least noncooperation with the SVN government govennent ] ] NATRE OF THE THREAT Docmentation for shows that the nited States originally had an inadeqate nderstanding of the intricate and detailed organization and in-contry network sed by the VC to transport spplies into SVN (see appendix A) n abot 1962, rhe the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi established the Central Committee for SVN (COSVN) t was w s throgh this organization that NVN controlled the VC logistic spply system in SVN After SVN President Diem's death in 1963, the enemy's logistic logistic sys sys- sptem began to evolve rapidly The commnications and liaison system (established abot 1959) was virtally contrywide cont~ywide and frnished COSVN with a very efficient network of control down to the village level con- Throgh the beginning q@ning of 1965, MACV considered the sea to be the main infiltration ----,-' rote for VC respply to sothern SVN Between 1963 and March 1965, p to 4,200 tons --,, of arms and ammnition were delivered by commnist trawlers to SVN SW The destinations &stinations _ of the early trawlers were probably An Xyen and Kien Hoa Provinces in V Corps By -- - mid-1966, becase of the bildp hil&p of Market Time, MACV disconted seaborne infiltration as a major VC respply resllpply method _- rote for VC resply to sothern SVN Between 1963 and March 1965, p to 4,200 tons- - - Even before the major inajor S, S commitment in SVN dring 1965, Cambodla Cambodia was sspected of playing a role in the commnist respply effort to and V Corps ft ht there is some qestion as to the emphasis that was placed on infiltration from Cambodia in relation to the emphasis on seaborne infiltration Wtration i [ ~ ~, _- o -9': l ~ l

13 11 i i ~, L l j L (, L: t L [; ' t:, ""~_ Before 1963, the,mekong/bassac River complex was the main rote from Cambodia for respply in SVN By 1966, crossing points on the Cambodia/SVN border had been pinpointed, and there were implications of high-level Cambodian military or goverrrient government com con- pinplicity in the infiltration of Of spplies to the VC MACV noted that Cambodia was the only area bordering SVN that cold harbor commnist forces with no threat of S military action (see appendix A) Spplies from Cambodia wi=re wgre broght into SVN by inland waterways and overland rotes They were transported by sampans, jnks, ox carts, and porters Spplies were moved in stages and handled throgh as many spply depots as were necessary to ensre secrity No single nit carried spplies over an entire rote Spplies were shifted from one rear service area 2rea to another when needed or when a particlar rote and destination were not impeded l:rf by SVN or S forces Each rear-service area covered only one portion of a rote ' Each commnist military region had its o"'m own spply system and organization VC base bse areas played an integral role in the respply network (see appendix B) They SErved sorved either as way-stations or Or as fbal fi1 destinations for spplies The base areas on the Soth China Sea coast were originally originalljy the focs of major respply efforts by sea After 1965, rear service grops on the ceast cozst shifted their orientation to receiving spplies from Cambodia Game Came Warden had to cope With Kith an enemy who controlled mch of the RSSZ and Delta Blta The enemy knew the terrain and interconnecting watenvays, waterways, allowing him considerable freedom of movement The VC sed the rivers overtly and covertly They disgised themselves as civilians (with forged identification cards) or sed someone with legitimate papers to smggle for them Smggled Snggled goods were hidden il) ip false bottoms, hlkheads l:lkheads or --- overheads of jnks, or were hried rried nder sch hard-to-move cargo as rice, sgar cane, - and-fish fi'ih One smggler of raw materials for explosives said that he be concealed contra- contra -ls~b '-nand in iii a fa1se false overhead of tk the jqqk's jll,k's deckhose and'carried no other cargo He dis- discovered that jnks appearing expy empty stood less chance of a thorogh search, than jnks carrying an obviosly fll l&d load - -, -_ n covert se of the rivers, the VC moved careflly to avoid contact with government -, representatives represemtatives They preferred to travel at night, sally between 2000 and 2200 hors and jst before dawn Game W2rden Warden Delta river patrols later forced the VC to attempt movements &ring dring the day The enemy also generally moved at or near high tide, since the tide opened areas closer to the brsh for bats boats When spplies were moved toward crossing points, bar- harassing fire was sed against SYN SVN army otposts in the area To make it more difficlt for friendly forces to predict 2 a crossing attempt, the VC did not maintain grops of Water- watercraft at the crossing point; tkq they procred sampans from the immediate area when needed ": -1o-L ,,/"

14 - The VC normally moved in grops of 4 or 5 per sampan, and the sampans traveled in pairs The VC transited the river as cross-stream instead of p- or downstream traffic in many areas, especially in the lower Delta provinces on the Soth China Sea VC control in these provinces was extensive, and the enemy had large base areas in Go Cong, Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, Bac Lie, and Ba Pa Xyenhovinces Provinces The lines of commnication connecting these base areas ran across major rivers n the provinces near the Cambodian br- bor comectder, there rhere was more enemy along-stream trafac traffic n addition to their extensive se of waterways for logistical and tactical movemeas, movements, the VC freqently channeled and taxed legitimate civilian maritime traffic, especially in those areas where they had firm control along the river banks n the SVN-controlled SVN-COntrolled areas, mobile VC tax stations operated with no discernible patterns Tax levies were sally extracted in the form of rice, salt, fish, livestock, and prodce Transportation taxes were also significant &case Becase tax collecting was an important sorce of vc VC Transporn- revene, it was almost a daily ndertaking The largest VC threats to river patrols were amrshes amhshes and mines ndividal enemy craft foght PBRs with small arms and atomatic weapons, and there were reports of sicide teams in sampans who had been trained to move alongside the PBRs PERs in the best posi posi- mition to damage the roats bats with self-destrct charges Most mining incidents incicknts occrred when patrols were retrning and secrity and srveillance were lax Mining attempts were sally coordinated Coordinated with small arms, atomatic weapons, and, occasionally, recoilless rifle fire srveil- Amrshes Amhshes sally took place in daylight and at low tide They were monted from protected firing positions posirions along narrow parts of waterways The enemy lred boats r (r toward the shore or fired from one bank to drive a PBR toward the oppostie bank, where the boat was amrs!wd amhshed / -r -- n one incident, a PBR Sighted sighted a 1/4-inch wire leading into the brsh from &om the riv~t's- river s ~ edge jst down stream from an RF/PF (police (Police and Regional Force and Poplar Pophr Force)91!t:::-- Gt; --- post A platoonwas dispatched to investigate and discovered a lo-kilo 10-kilo mine along with' -a& food and fresh water near the area They traced the wire into the river and fond a large mine, which was recovered by the explosive ordnance disposal team from Nha Be lk The platoon also fond a well-laid ambsh site with 3 foxholes, aiming stakes,l a claymore mine facing the river, and 2 spools of wire lwooden Wooden stakes stck mck into info the bottom of the river with the tops showing, providing exact range and line-oi-sight line-of-si& information -===-::==-:::c: =:::--:== := ==c===;::= :; ""' :: ::: ::::=-1l-~========= / : \ ] :] ]! " [l ] ] ' 0

15 L l l' r : L, [1 Ll, l The enemy often had excellent intelligence on watercraft schedles and capabilities As with minings, the VC Preferred preferred to carry ot ambshes when craft were retrning from f~om an operation becase the boat's rote wold ke be more predictable; 57mm or 75mm recoil- recoilless rifles spported by atomatic weapons were often sed instead of mines dring an ambsh, amhsh The rifles were more accrate than mines becase the target did not have to be in one position to be attacked Moreover, the recoilless rifles were more flexible flexible and easier to set p than were mines The VC were generally patient enogh to wait ot patrols f they were forced to move, they wold begin sniper fire pstream or downstream from their crossing point to decoy the patrol away from the area They needed an intricate warning system against patrols, sing colored lights, gongs, bells, and 2nd shots At the end of 1965, the S did not how know the extent of VC se of the Rlta Delta and RSSZ The first Game Warden operatiozla operatiola1 order identified major knoivn knovnl VC-controlled areas adjacent to the rivers and selected selened sspected enemy crossing points (see figre 3) S NAVY NTERDCTON EFFORTS MACV made a Significant significant effort to detennine determine the natre of the threat in the Delta Lklta and the RSSZ and how to efficiently eeicient1y tilize SVN forces to meet this threat n anary 1964, a team of senior S Naval officers was directed to stdy and analyze the natre of the threat and offer recommendatiozs recommendations for improved control and prevention of infiltration of war spplies and personnel into im:o SVN SV" The conclsions reached by this stdy grop (docmented in the "Blcklew "Ecklew Report'? Report") indicated that there was evidence of enemy infiltration, (doc- and that this infiltration was aided 2id5d by inadeqate SVN military and civilian control of the land, Land, sea, and inland waterway watenray rotes Althogh the report did not initiate any immediate direct S involvement, it did point ot Soth Vietnamese deficiencies deficiencies in dealing with the sitation S advisors to the VSN Th~ were Tere aware of the ineffectiveness of the River Force in i addition to what was cited in t~ k "Blcklew "Fcklew Report VM' VNN craft were slow and noisy and %&-srews thetr~ews nenthsiastic Since S b the main role of the River Force was to provide capa- -_ bilities for waterborne deployme;tts deplyievs and spport for SVN anny army operations, the V\W VN'N paid relatlvely relatively Tttle little attention to nter ri,er control The rgency of denying the VC se of Delta and RSSZ waterways was not recognized; therefore, river patrol was given a very low priority A As s a remlt, reslt, the River Ri,er Force had totally inadeqate resorces for river patrol The first large-scale S in-contry naval commitment in SVN came in Febrary 1965 after a North Vietnamese trawler was discovered to have delivered arms and ammnition to the VC at Vng RO Ro By Pay inil Corps n response, the S Navy established Market Time Ships and aiz-inh aircraft patrolled the 1,000, nmi nmi~ of SVN coast to conter seaborne infiltration amm- ======---:;::: _::;:: ~ ::=-c::-=====~-12--,/'

16 sland i!, f ;, " C;> t, '\, \ t C Lao Mag sland ) :i,>$(:::,, \C Lao Dng Lao Dng sland : : i: ::: ~,:y+ Selected" "seiected" sspect crossing points (OpOrder 1966) '''i:>:x5 Enemy-controlled areas ~:fff~: Enemy-controlled areas FG3: '3: KNOWN VC CONTROLLED VC-CONTROLLED AREAS AND SSPECTED ENEMY CROSSNG PONTS' FEBRARY 1966 SOTH CHNA SEA 0 PBR bases \ ,----,--

17 / l! [: [1 The Chief of the Naval Advisory Grop (CHNAG), (CMG), MACV, MACV who was responsible for Market Time, initiated stdies to determine determlne whether Market Time cold be x expanded into the Mekong Delta and the RSSZ The possibility of assigning major rivers to the S Army was discssed t was finally decided decided that the S Navy -- with its experienced boat personnel and close coordination with VNN River Assalt Grops (RAGs, (RAGS see appendix C) and Task Force (TF) was better keener sited for the job Representatives from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Commander in Chief, Pacific (CinCPac), (ChCPac), Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt), MACV, and CHNAG met in Saigon in September Septemhr 1965 to draft plans for the expanded Market Time force They recommended that 120 sitable river boats be prchased for the Delta/RSSZ operation Between September Septemker and December 1965, the Navy Yavy realized tl1at that the problem of the rivers was separate from that of Of the coast and warranted its own task force - On 18 December 1965, Game Warden, the river patrol force, was established as TF 116 appen- [ ; [ ~: -=:-::: _: - -1:,:4-:::;--==-:,::====-====::=:=-=----=--=-----:;::---:='--'-- j

18 SETTNG SETNG P THE OPERATON--DECEMBER 1965 THROGH SEPTEMBER 1968 ACQSTON OF ASSETS AND BASES From December 1965 throgh h?arch March 1966, the Naval Advisory Grop establish& established the basic operational and logistical framework for Game Warden The first OpOrder ';FS was issed in Febrary 1966 Game Warden was divided kit0 into 2 task grops: TG 1161 for the Mekong Delta and TG 1162 for the RSSZ (see appendix D) Finding a river patrol boat sitable for the Delta was an rgent reqirement The boat had to be fast, lightweight, maneverable, eqipped with a proplsion system that wold Operate operate in sllallow shallow waters infested with a variety of plant and animalllie, nid Life, and with- withstand a hot and hnid hr:tid environment The boat also had to be selected from existmg existing corn- commercial designs The PBR PER finally chosen had a glass-fiber hll and was powered by what was then a new propaion proplsion system--a jet water pmp (see appendix E) n all, 120 PBRs were schedled to be operational by the end of the year--40 in the RSSZ and 80 in the Delta Each "river patrol area was to be covered by a grop of 10 PBRs PERs : For inactive LSTs were recommissioned dring 1966 to serve as floating bases, bases Each LST wold spport 10 PBRs and a fire-spport fh-e-spport team of 2 helicopters The LSTs provided provided both 24-hor-a-day spport for the PBRs and 40mm gnfire spport The LSTs were extensively modified for Game Warden They received new boathandling booms, a helicopter Micopter deck eqipped for day and night operations, and the newest electronic electronic gear ntil rtil the first fhst of these specially configred LSTs arrived aaived in SVN %N early in November 1966, 3 dock landing ships (LSDs) eqipped with temporary helicopter decks provided the afloat spport npport boat- Original plans phs called dkd for stationing the LSTs at the moths of the Delta rivers, bt heavy seas ~ eas and chz'1ges chmges in the focs of operations forced the LSTs inland Earlier in 1966, an LSD had reporte:i reportd the loss of as mch as half its operating time becase of Of heavy winds and seas Game Warden shore siore bases in 1966 were at Cat Lo, Nha Be Be, My Tho, Vinh Long, Lag, Long Xyen, Can T!la, Tho, and Sa Dec Dec, Naval Spport Activity at Saigon was responsible respmibk for base spport n rnid-1966, aid-1966, an LSD was stationed between the moths of the Co CO Chien and Bassac Rivers; Rivers: a:cl ad beginning in November, an LST was stationed on the Bassac Bass= By September 1968, Garne Gzre Warden forces were based at 4 shore bases at Nha htha Be, My Tho, Sa Dec, and Binh 11l1'1 TLL! (figre 4); 3 on-station LSTS; and 5 other bases afloat :\ o

19 [ r--- L -- ~ r---', c-- [ ~,!,! BNH THY :,:,-16- :,-,,, ' ~, - ' ; i CAN TWin'' ;!,, i FG4: PBR SHORE BASES \

20 When the 4 Game Warden LSTs were operational, operational 3 remained On on Station station on the Bassac, Co Chien, and Ham Long Rivers; the forth was Ot-of-CO~tr'y ot-of-contry for maintenance The LSTs were overcrowded and lacked the maintenance capabilities of the shore bases There- Therefore, after being based on = an LST for abot 5 months, a PBR PER river section wold rotate with a shore-based nit PBRs PERs fond, however, that operating from an LST Or or one of the 5 other afloat bases offered mch more flexibility in contering the threat By the end of 1966, it was obvtos obvios that more boats wold be needed to respond to the growing grovring nmber of enemy incidents in the Delta On 28 Febrary 1967, CNO approved a force level of 250 PBRs By April 1968, the river patrol force had grown to 200 PBRs and, by ate late 1968, to 250 (appendix F) Recognizing the need for increased force levels, ComhlavForV ComNavForV recommended a second generation PBR, PER, the Mk, T, in September 1966 n March 1967, a contract to by 80 Mk s Ts was signed ith \lith nitd nited Boatbilders; 60 of these new PBRs PERs were to be assigned to the Delta, and 20 were to be sd sed in a new river division in Corps1 Helicopters were the most sitable aircraft for PBR PER gnfire spport Since the Navy had no helicopter gnships of its own, the S Army 197th Aviation Company frnished the armed H-1B -lb toqois iroqois helicopters sed by Game Warden forces (see appendix E) n March 1966, SecDef directed Navy crews to take over all Game Warden helicopter operations ations as soon as possible to free the Army h y of that responsibility By the end of the year, Navy crews manned 8 Game Warden W- Army H-lBs; H-Bs; 6 of the helos operated in spport sppon of Game Warden while 2 were in the maintenance pool at Vng Ta oper- / /' i ~ [ By the end of 1967, 22 Game Warden helos were organized orgadzed into 11 light helicopter fire teams Three fire teams operated from the Game Warden LSTs, 4 teams from fixed bases at l\'ha h%a Be, Dong Tam, Vinh Long, and Binh Thy, and 8 helicopters remained in the maintenance pool at Vng Vxng Ta By 1968, Vinh Long was also designated as a maintenance base Each detachment detachmat had 2 fll crews so one crew cold be kept on 24-hor alert Helos cold then be available availzble to all PBRs FBRs within 20 mintes The helicopter shore bases and the LSTs were located so that the maximm patrol distance from the base or ship Ship was limited to 35 nmi or less from most incidents Helo firepower helped PBRs carry cany ot Ot preplanned - 1 'PBRs had first operated 0perVed otside the Delta and RSSZ in September 1966 They were sed to protect spplies moving north from Danang to Tha Thien! Thien'and Qang Qmg Tn Tri Provinces Prwlnces ltimately, this river division evolved into a task force called Clearwater 0 o i] o j ~~ l

21 - /',,/ t i [: ( ; [ i t: [ [! [] l lj [ attacks against fixed enemy positions, POsitions, especially when these positions were located in areas that were not accessible to PBRs withot nreasonable risk As part of their secondary mission, the helicopters performed aerial reconnaissance arid and were involved in medical evacation, evacation SEALs (sea, air, land, reconnaissance teams), highly specialized in contergerrilla warfare, were first sed in the RSSZ in 1966 By 1968, there were also SEAL teams attached to each Game Warden task grop in the Delta, Delta Abot 90 percent of the SEAL effort was devoted to gathering intelligence Most often, SEALs were carried into their area of operation at night either by PBRs or fast patrol craft of their own SEAL operations sally consisted of ambshes, establishing listening posts, or raiding in VC territory Coordination within TF 116 and Kith "ith other Commands CTF 116 and sbordinate commanders were served by Navy Operations Centers (NOC), the eqivalent of Command nformation Centers ashore All NOCs cold commnicate with the operations centers Of of other commands in their areas Helo spport was reqested throgh the NOC, and PBR operaions operations were coordinated by the NOC CTF 116 headqarters was located at Can Tho or Binh Thy, near Can Tho, for mch of the operation Can Tho, centrally located in N rv Corps and the largest city in the Delta, was the headqarters of the SVN army's commanding general and the senior S advisor for that corps t was also the headqarters of the VNN'Forth Riverhe Riverine Area Each task grop commander--ctg 1161 and was also an advisor to the VNN The locations of Game Warden bases at VNN bases eased the advisory dties of CTF 1161 and 1162 Vietnamese liaison personnel worked with Game Warden crews to help in jnk and sampan searches and to commrnicate commnicate with Vietnamese craft and shore nits nits, They also advised S crews on local caditions conditions and cstoms VNN officers and enlisted men generally handled liaison At tines, times, Game Warden athorities reqested additional help from the National RF/PF PF boat companies (see appendix C) By anary 1968, TF 116 was ras reorganized, expanding from 2 to 4 task grops The new river task grops had commands co-s on the Bassac River (TG 1161), l), Co Chien River (TG 1162), My Tho River (TG 1163), and in the RSSZ (TG 1164) Althogh the RSSZ patrol grop commander still fnctioned htioned as an advisor, the 3 new Delta task grop com- com~ manders did not have that respnsibility responsibility A new advisory billet for the TV rv Riverine Riverhe Area (the post formerly held by CTG 1161) was set p otside Game Warden's chain of command : '==_-=-=-=-::--=-::---::::---:::;;_ =======-;:;::_= :;::_==--1c':8""-=== ::: :::,, :';':::'=='=--:::'=-:--::::-"====-:::'-=--===O:=-~ _- ~~ -- n: d ",,'_ ' :' ~ _, -,,',-: iiiiiliii Tiii - " -,;j, iiii-""iii iii " iiii -'iii - ii 1iiiiii1i-ii ;;; i!!!!!!""

22 Each of the 4 new task grop commands was assigned abot the same nmber of PBRs, helos, and SEALS MSBs were assigned in the RSSZ, and an LST was assigned to each Delta task grop The LSTs cold operate as far pstream as the Bassac-Mekong crossover n ne 1968, another task grop (TG 1165) was established in the pper Delta The river patrol force had no precedents to rely on for gidance Operational methods and concepts developed largely from immediate i=ediate experience as the force evolved The 1966 OpOrder encoraged task grop and nit commanders to exercise their initiative and act fairly atonomosly They kept their speriors informed of their actions by daily sitation reports and on-the-spot reports of significant incidents, ncidents They were athorized to arrange local joint operations with With other S and SVN armed forces and with SVN district and province government representatives There was actally little coordination bemeen between S Game Warden forces and the VNN River Force n addition, the mtal distrst benveen between the VNN River Force and the SVN army limited the former to blocking operations and patrols The S Army Occasionally occasionally sed VNN RAGS RAGs in ill amphibios operations, bt coordination was poor C-'-"======----:::--::::-c::;:-:o:-=:---"-c =----c:::==ccc::-=--::::-=- ---:::c---c:--:::=c::= ""_-:,--_-=:::==:::::::===== ^ - -""- ~ ~ /' ~:-L ~ -9 / ; ]1, [ o li \

23 : (,, ' / l: (! [ l [ l' [' i [ i,,,' PBR PER OPERATONAL TACTCS AND TECHNQES Game Warden forces were tasked to enforce SVN government crfews; interdict VC infiltration, movement, and respply; and eliminate the VC insrgency n in their" theiiareas of operations To accomplish these goals, Game Warden forces performed harassment hzrassment and interdiction operations, river patrols, and minesweeping operations, especially along the main Saigon shipping channels Game Warden forces were athorized to visit and search all river craft except foreign flag steel-hll merchant ships, warships, and military, police, or cstoms craft nless specifically specifically athorized by CTF 116 (see appendix G) The Mekong River and its navigable branches were, by treaty, international waterways watenvays and open to those nations recognized diplomatically by SVN, SV" Cambodia, and Laos ( By 1966, the Vietnamese Cstoms Agency enforced reglations governing transit by merchznt merchant ships (see appendix H) f merchant ships on international inland waterways watenvays offloaded cargo to watercraft, or if they dropped items overboard, Game Warden forces were spposed to make every effort to to,apprehend the craft pon their departre from alongside the ship and to recover items dropped overboard Game Warden PBRs noted one sch incident n ly 1966, 2 PBRs on random patrol established radar contact with a ship that had 3 smaller boats alongside When the PBRs approached them, $hem, the small craft headed for the river banks and the ship weighed anchor The ship was identified as a tanker, the Mekong Phnom Penh of Cambodian registry, flying only a Soth Vietnamese flag aft t was impossible to determine whether the tanker had been offloading contraband for VC forces in the area ft &t the ship's s activity and the fact hct that it was anchored in a Prohibited prohibited area made this a strong possibility PER operations were based on 2-boat patrolg, patrol~, each bat boat within radar range of the other and normally in midstream Each patrol lasted abt abot 12 hors The PBRs had neither the armor nor the firewer firepower to attack the river banks OpOrder emphasized the need for random patrols to avoid mining and ambshes and the need to be alert a@nm against booby traps traps t also pointed mt ot that silence was crcial, especially at night, and recom- recommended patrolling on a single engine when possible When a task nit \lit began pztrolling patrolling 'a a new area, the commander gave an area indoctrina- indoctrination and familiarization for hts his men nitial patrols, in an area were made with local RAGE RAGs &fore Before starting their patrol, patrola, PBR crews were briefed on any pertinent intelligence Briefings also covered the S- scope and dration of the patrol, friendly forces in the area, recognition signals, available appoa, spport, commnications procebres, procedres, -Znd 'and special circm- circmstances Debriefs Deoriefs after a Wrol patrol inclded intelligence, reslts, and nsal activities noted by the participants - - :>- ; - ",:

24 Precationary measres were taken to prevent the VC ve from determining the emct exact location of PBR patrols There were the random midstream patrols: patrols; in addition, addition radio commnications were restricted to a minimm The enemy had captred S eqipment, eqipment and it was assmed that he cold and wold monitor S circits f the PBRs were the victims of sniping by small-caliber, nonatomatic weapons, weapons they wold be warned against sing atomatic weapon fire in retrn nless they had pinpointed the sorce of the sniping to avoid disclosing the exact location and armament of the PBR All river trafftc trafiic was considered sspect, sspect especially dring the nighttime crfew crfew Xlring Dring daytime, daytime PBRs randomly searched watercraft when there were too many for all al1 to be searched Abot 60 percent of all jnks and sampans detected were inspected or boarded, according to CinCPac in ly 1967 This inclded a check of identification papers for all al1 persons aboard A Soth Vietnamese national policeman was sally on board one of the PBRs to provick provide an SVN "presence"" He expedited the checking of papers and the qestioning When sspects were detained dring searches, searches S forces maintained cstody ntil the sspect was chssified classified as prisoner of war (POW), (?OW) retrnee, retrnee civil Civil defendant, defendant or inno- innocent WWs rows were pkced placed f camps by military police Retrnees were trned over to the nearest Chie Hoi ceaer center Civil defendants were delivered to the national police or mili- military nits; and innocez innocent Vietnamese were released and retrned to where they were captred PBRs were warned to approach contacts at an angle that allowed the most weapons to bear on the target Approach to a contact at night was made at high speed with the PBR darkened The contact was illminated at close range When a PBR was within optimm range for illmination illmlnztion of a contact, it called for the boat to pll alongside All occpants of the sspicios boat b3at were ordered to make themselves visible before coming alongside the PBR All sean:hes searches were to be done in midstream if POSSible, possible, and PBRs were instrcted not to moor thems~!lves themselves to the boat being searched When a contact came Erne alongside the PBR PBR, the latter was vlnerable to hand grenades or mines PBR Ct(!WS crews were warned to be catios of ve VC decoy tactics The VC vc wold station a boat with legitimate e&imate papers and no contraband contrahand in a position to be searched while another boat carrying contral::end contrabnd wold evade search The ve VC also took advantage advanrage of PBR FBR medical aid by sing a sampan to hail a PBR to evacate a wonded person while a ve VC boat escaped detection bstecrion lchie 'Chie Hoi was the tb "Q?en-arms" "qn-arms" program in which VC? wh<?_defected who " were rehahwtated rehawed and allowed to reenter reear Soth Vietnamese society -2~~:-c:; ~ =:=-:='= / ::::_=",,-c:;; := = =::-:;:: = =:c====== _- ], 1 '-l ~l :] ~ ] ] ]

25 [ ; l While one PBR searched a contact, a second PBR PER covered the shore and positioned itself to have a clear line of Of fire to both sides of the river The bat :xlat condcting condctfng the search was instrcted to maintain a 50-caliber weapon and lookot covering the shore to the - nengaged side of the boat Enforcing the crfews was a contining problem Crfews generally lasted from 2000 or 2100 hors to 0600 hors CiVilians Civilians in a patrol section were informed of the restric- restrictions thogh throgh leaflet drops and lodspeaker annoncements Crfew effectiveness depended largely on promlgrttion promlgation at the village and district level level, and it varied from area to area l C] [1 For example, in April , a fire team spotted 7 sampans in a restricted zone near Can Gio village in the RSSZ The fire team reqested permission to strike Permission was granted after the VNN watch officer at h%a t-'ha Be 5? checked with Can Gio district head- headqarters The he10 helo strike was a 2 sccess ft ht it was later discovered throgh the Can Gio advisors that the sampans held friendly fishermen flly aware of the crfew reglations The village chief had p;led gra;:ed the people permission to fish Crfew restrictions imposed financial hardship on the people by limiting their fishing time Crfews were necessarf necessary, however, to sccessflly combat nighttime infiltration n 1967, CinCPac determined tht that the crfew had not stopped VC river crossings crossings, bt it was being observed observed by the local 10c-d?eople This made the task of detecting VC river cross cross- reglaing attempts mch simpler After PER PBR crews developed a 2 tamiliarity hmiliarity with their patrol areas and the natre of the enemy, they developed severaillew seven1 3% tactics One of these was a planned ambsh to intercept a possible VC river crossmg crosshg Amtshes Ambshes were based hsed on intelligence reports or on the jdgment of the boat commxkr commander The tactic was tested in one x incident when Commander, River Patrol Section 531, reacted to intelligence reports of a probable enemy crossing He took 4 PBRs to the ass s- pected crossing to interdict ene:ny xsy movements The VNN RAG G commander at My Tho sent 3 additional addltional river patrol CRY craft The PBRs PERs drifted silently into the crossing cros sing area and detected the enemy after abo'!t bs 23 an hor Althogh no large spply of weapons was detected, the enemy action was evalated 2s as an attempt by a tax collector to move nder the protection of gerrilla troops PBRs at Can Tho sed a nee ll"w techniqe for sampan srveillance after receiving intel- intelligence concerning a possible VC river crossing sotheast of Can Tho n addition to centering normal PBR patrols h in ttbf! h sspected area, Game Warden forces established an observation post on a sampan -=ed aed by one S Naval officer and 3 enlisted men The sampan was a former VC crak craft overhaled by Naval Spport Activity Detachment at Can Tho Commnications to the?e;\s as on patrol and to Can Tho was by radio This intertactic l! -~ A

26 ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ / / provided continos srveillance of the entire sspicios area This kind of srveillance was considered valable when sed with discretion periodically in areas where the river was wide enogh to provide secrity for the sampan Becase PBRs had been allowed to fire only warning shots to Stop stop sampans and jnks for visits or searches, many sspicios craft had evaded Game Warden searches h n Octobr October 1966, the rles of engagement (appendix G) were changed to Pennit permit PBRs to direct fire against evading jnks or sampans after all other methods to stop them failed To conter the movement of contraband in small qantities, a new search procehre, procedre, code-named Ferret, was established in 1967 throghot the Blta Delta Ferret entailed ran- randomly stationing PBRs twice a week in known VC crossing areas dring the peak traffic hors of 0700, 1200, and 1700 hors A Soth Vietnamese policeman and policewoman were embarked The patrols stopped and searched all river traffic nspections inclded a thorogh probing of cargo, the passing of lines or poles nder hlls to check for contraband ss- sspended beneath keels, mels, and the checking of passengers against lists Of of h0wn known VC Each effort was copled with 1ith civic action and psychological operations to ease the inconven- inconvenience to innocent travelers To frstrate and anti discredit PER PBR patrol methods, the VC confiscated identification cards of innocent civilians This reslted in delays in searching and inconvenience to the civilians and local Loczl athorities L [ ~ By the end of 1967, the VC were sing heavier weapons--recoilless rifles, mortars, moms, rockets, and heavy machine gns gns, The psrge in enemy activity clminated in the Tet offensive of anary anvg 1968 After that, CTF 116 noted that the enemy was sing firing bnkers, which provided relative secrity from PER PBR sppressive fire Continos grond sweeps in enemy areas rarely retrned significant reslts To TO deal with increasing enemy capabilities, TF sed 'qick-reaction forces combining S S Navy, VNN, and RF/PF nits These forces were called on short notice Originally, it was WE standard procedre for PERs PBRs when fired pon to retrn the fire and call for help while leaving the area of contact After Tet, it was obvios that the!'brs PBRs were able to sppress enemy fire, and the procedre was changed ckanged to allow PERs PBRs (at the discretion of the boat bat commanders) to remain and fight mproved intelligence inte!igence became available to CTF 116 dring 1968 A new and very qiet srveillance aircraft, &raft, the QT-2PC, QT-2FC proved its effectiveness in providing pmviding intelligence to Game Warden nits nita by detecting 8 large jnks jmk'at night nfght near the moth of Of the Bassac River Two PERs PBRs and 2nd a helicopter helicopter fire team responded and destroyed or heavily heady damaged allthe jnks ~ - ~~ -23"- --' o o " '! i L [