The Air Force was born of

Transcription

1 End of the Cold The Air Force wa born of the Cold War, a conflict that defined the ervice and haped it force, organization, and focu for decade. Then, in the late 1980 and early 1990, the Cold War came to an end fater than almot anyone predicted even a few year earlier. The Berlin Wall came down in 1989, Germany reunited, and the Soviet Union diolved in December Where would the Air Force go from there? The Air Force had already debuted a new trategic framework backed by a weeping reorganization. Thi wa the handiwork of Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice and Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill A. McPeak. The Air Force wa not and could not afford to be on autopilot, Rice later wrote. Out went the ingular focu of US defene trategy: the confrontation in Europe. In came a new national ecurity Merrill McPeak and Donald Rice dramatically rehaped the Air Force in 1991 and 1992, creating the organization till ued today. trategy in March The trategy embraced the end of the Cold War and prepared for an uncertain new world order where the main military challenge would come from regional conflict. A we re pulled on the one hand by a changing world and on the other by a contricting budget, a fundamental quetion emerge: What role will the Air Force play in a new world order? aked Lt. Gen. Jimmie V. Adam, then USAF deputy chief of taff for plan and operation, in The anwer i increaingly clear: a role that i the eence of airpower the ability to react fat, far, and overwhelmingly. Rice quickly captured thi eence in The Air Force and US National Security: Global Reach, Global Power, a hort paper publihed in June The paper main thrut wa introducing a new tructure for airpower in national defene in cenario from humanitarian operation to major theater war. Conventional force were eential for regional conflict, o the new force planning called for an in- MAC SAC STRATCOM AMC TAC ACC 40

2 War Air ForceBy Rebecca Grant AFSC AFLC AFMC Ye, it wa a complicated a it look. Gen. Merrill McPeak (l) and Air Force Secretary Donald Rice peak jointly to reporter at the Department of Defene. Air Force reorganization wa a top priority for them. creaed emphai on force projection capabilitie even more flexible, rapidly reponding, precie, lethal force with global reach. The White Houe alo put the ervice on notice that it wa time to reform. Preident George H. W. Buh advocated not merely reduction, but retructuring of the military in a peech in Apen, Colo., in Augut What to do next ended up quarely in the hand of Rice and a new Chief of Staff, McPeak, who took over in October 1990 when hi predeceor and friend, Gen. Michael J. Dugan, wa fired after jut two month on the job during the buildup for the Perian Gulf War. I went in immediately to Don Rice office, McPeak recalled. I aid, Let reorganize the Air Force. He aid, OK, how do you want to do it? McPeak erved a a fighter pilot in the 1960, including combat time in Vietnam. He d come up in a rough 41

3 working-cla childhood with no father, and the Air Force opened up another world for him. A a general officer, he worked on the US Air Force in Europe taff, held the Air Staff top program and reource job, and commanded Pacific Air Force from 1988 to Rice came from a buine-oriented family and hi father wa mayor of Frederick, Md. Rice earned a degree in chemical engineering from Notre Dame, erved in the Army, and worked a a Whiz Kid in the McNamara Pentagon before taking over RAND Corp. in 1972, at age 32. He tranformed RAND from a boutique Air Force think tank to a broad-baed policy intitute erving the Air Force, Army, and other DOD agencie and doing reearch for the federal government. Rice and McPeak were cool, cerebral peronalitie. Both in their early 50, they were profeional at the top of their game and eized the chance provided by fat-moving event to remake the Air Force. The time wa right, depite the hectic pace of event leading up to Operation Deert Storm. The Goldwater-Nichol Act of 1986 had taken the military department out of the warfighting chain and gave a ervice Secretary and Chief coniderable room to maneuver in the area of organizing, training, and equipping the ervice. McPeak wanted to move fat. He felt a four-year term wa not much time 42 DOD photo by R.D. Ward Rice brief the pre corp on the B-2 program in Rice and McPeak made Air Combat Command the centerpiece of the pot-cold War Air Force. to drive change into the fabric of USAF. I aw organization a my job, he aid. Rice wa ready, too. He let me do tuff no other Secretary would have had the courage to do, McPeak later aid. By Dec. 31, 1990, Rice and I had made all the fundamental deciion, McPeak recalled. Including ome mitake we made. It wa not jut the end of the Cold War that drove them. Both were motivated by deep conviction about how to optimize USAF. It wa a deire to make a tronger Air Force, McPeak aid. To be ure, USAF budget were tumbling. The four fical year from 1990 to 1993 aw USAF budget decline from $103.6 billion to $83.9 billion, a meaured in contant Fical 1993 dollar. Still, trategy came firt. The Air Force focu i on evolving US national ecurity need, Rice wrote in Global Reach, Global Power, and not imply on fical contraint, though they too are real. We would want to purue thee initiative even if there were no budget preure to do o, McPeak inited a the reorganization took hold. The ummer of 1992 found USAF upending organizational tructure from the quadron level to major command. Soon the Cold War behemoth Strategic Air Command wa gone and maive decentralization acro the ervice puhed general officer out of headquarter taff to command wing at bae. SAC, MAC, and TAC By the time Rice and McPeak initiative were fully implemented, practically every airman in the force had a new mater and the Air Force wa primed for an era of expeditionary operation. With Rice new trategic framework in place, it wa time to focu the Air Force on what McPeak aw a it core tak: prevailing in manned, winged combat, in hi word. Thi treamlined operational philoophy prized implicity and eliminating clutter at every level of organization from bae to major command. What important around here? wa the quetion McPeak aked himelf. Perhap the No. 1 goal wa achieving greater agility for airpower in regional conflict mall and large. That called for command reorganization to better integrate force. McPeak had experienced problem with force integration while he commanded Pacific Air Force. PACAF had C-130 at Yokota AB, Japan, but they belonged to Military Airlift Command. Similarly, Strategic Air Command owned the tanker baed at Kadena AB, Japan. The Perian Gulf War provided momentum to rationalize the command tructure. The unified employment of airpower in Deert Storm confirmed that change wa needed within the Air Force, Rice later explained. Rice and McPeak had plenty of latitude for change, and a oon a Deert Storm ended, hint of the reorganization emerged. Firt up were SAC and Tactical Air Command. I never could undertand the difference between a bomb dropped from a bomber and a bomb dropped from a fighter, McPeak aid. What eparate trategic from tactical? The target doen t care. Deert Storm wiped away the trategic and tactical ditinction, a F-117 fighter flew trategic miion and B- 52 provided tactical, front-line upport. Rice and McPeak decided to create one ingle command Air Combat Command a the centerpiece of theater airpower. Air Combat Command will poe all the bomb dropping, bullet hooting, and upport capabilitie that we know mut be integrated in modern air combat, McPeak aid at the time. In other word, it will itelf be able to conduct independent, integrated air operation. The ubtext here reonated with iue raied by Air Force operation from Vietnam through Deert Storm. In thoe conflict, SAC had kept jealou control of it bomber and it crucial tanker. Regional air force commander had to work out agreement with SAC for ue of their aet, a SAC till had a nuclear deterrent to maintain. However, commander chafed at having to deal with SAC while alo deploying and fighting. Dimantling SAC, long viewed a the crown jewel of Air Force organization, wa no eay tak. The toried command wa a Cold War icon, teeped

4 in tradition and pretige. Step 1 wa the retirement of SAC Commander Gen. John T. Chain Jr., who would never have acquieced to the command diolution, aid McPeak. McPeak believed that intercontinental nuclear war wa not olely an Air Force miion. SAC had led the way in the firt year of nuclear deterrence, but the miion had become joint at the end of the Eienhower era. The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff wa created in 1960 to convert broad national trategy into the detailed ingle integrated operational plan. Going forward, Rice and McPeak wanted conventional bomber ready for theater warfare. Hence came the need to break bomber out of SAC. The impetu for dietablihing SAC wa to integrate manned, winged combat force, McPeak aid. That why the manned bomber force had to come over. McPeak propoed to Army Gen. Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, that SAC convert to a new joint command with leaderhip rotating between the Air Force and the Navy. US Strategic Command, baed at the SAC headquarter ite of Offutt AFB, Neb., would overee DOD nuclear planning and warfighting. USAF leaderhip did not worry about preerving the nuclear culture of SAC becaue TAC had a nuclear miion, too. McPeak and countle other commander in TAC had long experience with USAF photo McPeak during hi tenure a PACAF chief. A USAF Chief of Staff, he moved fat to implement organizational change within the Air Force. nuclear training, alert miion, and weapon handling. I had 300 nuclear weapon at Upper Heyford [UK], and no one wa better at keeping track of them than me, McPeak aid. What about the ICBM? McPeak decided they, too, were hooter and ordered them to ACC, which wa baed at TAC old headquarter of Langley Air Force Bae in Virginia. That wa tupid and I undid that a quick a I could, without it looking like I pilled ketchup on my tie, he aid later. It made no ene to move the ICBM to Langley. He chalked the ICBM deciion up to being too eager to get the reorganization under way. On another point, he heitated and later regretted it. It wa a mitake not to put all tanker at Langley under the control of Air Combat Command, Mc- Peak later aid. There i no capability more critical to theater air warfare than air refueling. On June 1, 1992, Rice and McPeak tood up ACC in the morning then flew to Scott AFB, Ill., to turn Military Airlift Command into Air Mobility Command. We now undertand that the real requirement i for mobility that i, deployability and utainability in combination, McPeak aid at the ceremony. Air Combat Command wa baed on trong principle about how air force hould deploy for war. McPeak wanted ACC to pick up and fly off to war fat. Little did leader realize how quickly it would be teted, a expeditionary operation oon began to dominate Air Force operation. The tak of ending expeditionary air force to numerou location on a moment notice wa greatly facilitated by the new ACC and AMC command. Other change moved on apace. Field operating agencie were retructured, too. We needed to look at every echelon down to quadron level and ak: I thi a imple a it can be? McPeak later aid. If tructure are not imple they will fail. Breaking up functional tovepipe wa another major goal. Weather wa one of the bet example. At one point in time, the Air Weather Service wa part of MAC and boated 5,000 people and ix weather wing. Rice and McPeak took it apart and et up a field operating agency with 1,100 people, headed by a brigadier general reporting to the Air Staff. The change hed people, put policy at headquarter, and decentralized operation out of Wahington. It wa textbook for what the Chief and Secretary wanted. The bulwark of the Rice-McPeak change wa the concept of one bae, one wing, one bo. Previouly, colonel uually commanded combat wing. McPeak himelf had been a colonel when he commanded the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing at Upper Heyford. Now Rice and McPeak wrung billet for general officer out of headquarter and elevated many wing command to one-tar rank. Thi wa a fundamental change for operational airpower. At the peak, 65 wing out of 115 had general officer commander. (Today, roughly 18 out of 96 wing are commanded by brigadier general.) Some change have occurred ince, but the tructure ha endured. Wing acquired operation, logitic, and upport group a cornertone of wing organization. Thi provided accountability for miion accomplihment, Rice and McPeak noted in a September 1991 white paper. Another innovation wa the creation of compoite wing of multiple type of aircraft. Thi did not take root o deeply, but it did puh USAF thinking on how to prepare force for air intervention. Sytem + Logitic = Materiel Air Force Sytem Command and Air Force Logitic Command uffered imilar fate a SAC and TAC. The four-tar Sytem Command houed at Andrew AFB, Md., had been o redeignated in 1961 after everal year of debate about how bet to handle reearch, development, and rik management. Pot-World War II review by luminarie uch a Theodore von Karman and Jimmy Doolittle had long recommended a eparate R&D command. McPeak believed Sytem Command had been eential in the large-cale development of the 1950 and early 1960 and a key ingredient in winning the Cold War. There wa a period when we needed a four-tar Sytem Command, he aid. 43

5 By 1990, technology had moved on. The civilian ector, not USAF, led information technology development. With the SAC, TAC, and MAC reorganization, Rice and McPeak were guided by operational experience. They had le to go on in tructuring what remained of USAF-led reearch, development, acquiition, and utainment. Peronnel reduction were a factor. We decided nationally we had a Cold War legacy which we would cah in on, recalled Gen. Lawrence A. Skantze, who led Sytem Command from 1984 to But there wa more to the tory. The Goldwater-Nichol reform removed mot acquiition authority from ervice major command and into a chain of authority running from the Office of the Secretary of Defene to the ervice Secretariat acquiition deputie. We no longer need to provide four-tar leaderhip for what ha become, in important repect, an adminitrative upport activity, explained McPeak. The operator alo had beef with Sytem Command, which produced pretty good equipment, but when they handed it off, [the operator] found it wa hard to maintain, McPeak recalled. Thi wa more a ymptom of increaing complexity in the weapon ytem, but in 1990, many thought better planning would olve the problem. Skantze confirmed that by 1990 there wa little love lot for Sytem Command outide of the organization itelf. Previou chief had encounter with Air Force Sytem Command which left omewhat of a bad tate, aid Skantze. Likewie, Don Rice had been preident of RAND and had everal encounter with the Sytem Command hierarchy. The net reult, according to Skantze, wa that the idea of abolihing Sytem Command did not eem to be too difficult. McPeak aid the primary goal for merging Air Force Sytem Command with Air Force Logitic Command wa to create one commander reponible for life-cycle weapon ytem upport. In line with other theme of the reorganization, the merger reduced headquarter while keeping power and reource in the field. In the proce, we liberate 17 more general officer, McPeak noted at the time. Beyond thi, it wa thought that the new Air Force Materiel Command could reduce maintenance and depot cot by anticipating requirement early in ytem deign If it all work like we hope, McPeak added. 44 It wa done very quietly, in camera, Skantze aid of the deciion. The merger wa the lat moment of ilence. McPeak oon found himelf vociferouly defending the move. There lay the problem. Following World War II and on the eve of the greatet takeoff in aeronautical engineering technology, the eential difference in management of aircraft logitic upport veru contracting for reearch and development wa recognized a a ditinction of firt importance, wrote author and analyt A. G. B. Metcalf. Thoe difference are jut a true and far greater today, Metcalf aid. Skantze concurred. I think the problem wa that Sytem Command and Air Force Logitic Command had entirely different philoophie. The two didn t match up very well. The logitic focu of AFMC wa a ucce, but the Air Force truggled to repair lating damage to it acquiition capabilitie. Skantze felt that the AFMC commander had no leeway to rebuild acquiition or conduct ummit and quarterly program review. The AFMC commander i taggering under the requirement for intenive logitic upport to Air Force flying and ground force half a world away, Skantze pointed out. It i a continuou 24/7 challenge that outrank any other concern. Honing the Bayonet Harder to gauge wa the overall lo of finee in managing reearch and development. However, the tranfer of power to OSD wa already a fait accompli. We had lot our deputy chief of taff for R&D, aid McPeak. The authority moved over to an aitant ecretary of the Air Force for acquiition. He and Rice parred over who would hold requirement authority. McPeak wanted requirement in the XO requirement hop, the forerunner of today A3/5, but many billet were moved to the Secretariat ide. You mean to tell me you want civilian aying how harp the bayonet ha to be? McPeak demanded of Rice. Reponibility for etting requirement came back to the Air Staff. Ultimately, the end of the Cold War gave Rice and McPeak a golden opportunity and they took full advantage of it. A they knew, their retructuring ultimately touched every man and woman in the Air Force. In le than two year, ix four-tar Majcom were conolidated or renamed and ignificantly revamped. The change continued at a lightly lower level a well. A erie of major command led by two- or three-tar general alo lot their tand-alone Majcom tatu. Air Force Communication Command, Air Univerity, Alakan Air Command, and Air Force Intelligence Command all ceaed to be major command between 1990 and The reorganization left behind an Air Force with a flatter organization, clear prioritie, and a meaty logan in Global Reach, Global Power. The impler tructure wa not et up to feed operation in Iraq, Bonia, Koovo, Afghanitan, and around the world. Yet that wa exactly what it did, creating the building block for the expeditionary air force rotational tructure developed by future Chief of Staff Gen. Michael E. Ryan and Gen. John P. Jumper in the 1990 and Rice and McPeak were not hy about explaining each tep. Dry humor crackled on occaion. Our tenure ha been characterized by change I hope, contructive change, McPeak aid in the midt of it all in June Other might call it turmoil, even confuion! There were many more innovation. McPeak had come to believe training wa more important than equipment and well worth a four-tar command. Rank i the bet ign of incerity in the military, he aid, and the three-tar Air Training Command conequently became a four-tar major command in December 1992 and wa redeignated Air Education and Training Command in July Certainly USAF wa lucky in having two bold leader committed to the unique viion of how the Air Force erved America. The trategic viion brought the Cold War focu to an abrupt end in the bet poible way: by clearing the path to remake the Air Force into a tructure exquiitely in touch with the uncertain future operational environment. Are we properly organized? aid McPeak. That omething every Chief hould ak. n Rebecca Grant i preident of IRIS Independent Reearch. Her mot recent article for Air Force Magazine wa Linebacker I in the June iue. See alo The Short, Strange Life of PSAB, thi iue, p. 50.