AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC STUDIES

Transcription

1 AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC STUDIES

2 Published by Macmillan in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies Studies in International Security Hedley Bull: HEDLEY BULL ON ARMS CONTROL James Cable: GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY, Donald C. Daniel: ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND SUPERPOWER STRATEGIC STABILITY Paul Dibb: THE SOVIET UNION: The Incomplete Superpower Lawrence Freedman: THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (editor): ARMED FORCES AND THE WELFARE SOCIETIES: Challenges in the 1980s Hanns W. Maull: RAW MATERIALS, ENERGY AND WESTERN SECURITY Adam Roberts: NATIONS IN ARMS: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence International Institute for Strategic Studies conference papers Christoph Bertram (editor): NEW CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND EAST-WEST SECURITY PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s THE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE THIRD-WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 1980s DEFENCE AND CONSENSUS: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security Robert O'Neill (editor): THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE 1980s NEW TECHNOLOGY AND WESTERN SECURITY POLICY DOCTRINE, THE ALLIANCE AND ARMS CONTROL Barry Buzan AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC STUDIES: Military Technology and International Relations Fram;ois de Rose: EUROPEAN SECURITY AND FRANCE Series Standing Order If you would like to receive future titles in this series as they are published, you can make use of our standing order facility. To place a standing order please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address and the name of the series. Please state with which title you wish to begin your standing order. (If you live outside the UK we may not have the rights for your area, in which case we will forward your order to the publisher concerned.) Standing Order Service, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, RG212XS, England.

3 An Introduction to Strategic Studies Military Technology and International Relations Barry Buzan Senior Lecturer Department of International Studies University of Warwick M in association with the MACMILLAN PALGRAVE MACMILLAN PRESS

4 International Institute for Strategic Studies 1987 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1956 (as amended), or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 7 Ridgmount Street, London WClE 7AE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published 1987 Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world Typeset by Wessex Typesetters (Division of The Eastern Press Ltd) Frome, Somerset British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Buzan, Barry An introduction to strategic studies: military technology and international relations.-(studies in international security) 1. Security, International I. Title II. International Institute for Strategic Studies III. Series 327.1'16 JX1952 ISBN ISBN (ebook) DOI /

5 To Deborah, who wisely doesn't let the grass grow under her feet, and whose partnership happily prevents me from letting it grow too much under mine

6 Contents List of Tables List of Abbreviations Foreword 1 Introduction: Strategic Studies and International Relations Strategic Studies and International Relations The Agenda of Strategic Studies and the Organization of the Book 7 xii xiii XV PART I MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY 2 The Revolution in Military Technology 2.1 The History of the Revolution Firepower Protection Mobility Communications Intelligence 2.2 The Civil Foundations of the Revolution 2.3 The General Consequences of the Revolution 2.4 The Consequences of the Revolution for Strategic Thinking 3 The Global Spread of Military Technology 3.1 The Interaction between Spread and Qualitative Advance 3.2 The Mechanisms of Spread 3.3 The Historical Process of the Spread 3.4 The Current Position and the Outlook 3.5 The Arms Trade Literature and its Controversies 4 The Special Case of Nuclear Proliferation 4.1 The Process of Proliferation 4.2 Controlling Proliferation vii

7 Vlll Contents PART II STRATEGIC RIVALRY AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGY: THE ARMS DYNAMIC 5 Arms Racing and the Arms Dynamic Controversies about the Term 'Arms Racing' The Arms Dynamic: An Alternative Framework for Analysis 72 6 The Action-Reaction Model The Idiom of Action-Reaction The Variables of Magnitude, Timing and Awareness in the Action-Reaction Process Magnitude Timing Awareness Motives 90 7 The Domestic Structure Model The American Case How Applicable is the Domestic Structure Model to Other Cases? Completing the Picture The Technological Imperative Model Relating the Three Models Technological Imperative Action-Reaction Domestic Structure Problems in Studying the Arms Dynamic Working with the Distinction Between Arms Racing and the Maintenance of the Military Status Quo The superpowers: Arms Race or Maintenance of the Military status quo? Conclusion Problems in Developing a Theory of Arms Racing The Level of Analysis Problem Arms Production and the Arms Dynamic Conclusion 130

8 Contents IX PART III DETERRENCE 10 Introduction: Deterrence and Defence Retaliation versus Denial in Deterrence Strategy Deterrence Theory as a Western Artifact The Evolution of Deterrence: Theory and Policy since The First Wave The Golden Age The Coming of Bipolarity as the Background to the Golden Age The Central Ideas of Golden Age Theory The Problem of Extended Deterrence After the Golden Age: a Third Wave? The Relative Gain of Soviet Military Power Changes in Military Technology The Future of Deterrence The Logic of Deterrence Basic Logic: What Produces Inaction in Opponents? The Impact of Nuclear Weapons: Is Nuclear Deterrence Easy or Difficult? The 'Easy' School The 'Difficult' School The Policy Implications of 'Easy' versus 'Difficult' Intervening Variables in Deterrence Logic Polarity Technology Geography The Deterrer's Political Objectives: Core versus Extended Deterrence Political Relations Conclusions on Intervening Variables Deterrence Logic and Deterrence Policy 193

9 X Contents 13 The Debates about Deterrence Deterrence versus Defence The Issue of Ends and Means in Warfighting Strategies for Deterrence Defence as Escape from Deterrence: SDI The Method of Deterrence Logic: The Assumption of Rationality Deterrence and Ethics The Ethical Strengths of Deterrence The Ethical Weaknesses of Deterrence Deterrence and the Arms Dynamic Conclusions: Deterrence and Foreign Policy 222 PART IV RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY MEANS 14 Military Means as a Security Problem Military Means as a Problem in Themselves Disagreements About the Nature and Seriousness of the Problem Military Versus Political Approaches to the Problem Disarmament The Military Logic The Economic Logic The Political Logic Arms Control The Military Logic Reasons for Rivals to Co-operate The Impact of Strategic Doctrine on Arms Control Dilemmas of the Technological Approach The Economic Logic The Political Logic Non-Provocative Defence 17.1 The Military Logic 17.2 The Economic Logic 17.3 The Political Logic

10 18 Summary and Conclusions Bibliography Index Contents Xl

11 List of Tables 12.1 The calculation of deterrence logic 13.1 Ends and means in military policy 14.1 Opinion on military means as a problem Xll

12 List of Abbreviations ABM AD ASAT ASW BMD CBM CBW CTB C3I ECM ED GCD GLCM GNP IAEA ICBM IISS INF LNO LNW LoW LRTNW MAD MIRV MIT NATO NPT NTM PGM PNE Pu239 R&D RUSI SALT SD SDI anti-ballistic missile assured destruction anti-satellite anti-submarine warfare/weapons ballistic missile defence confidence-building measures chemical and biological warfare/weapons comprehensive test ban command, control, communications and intelligence electronic countermeasures extended deterrence general and complete disarmament ground-launched cruise missile gross national product International Atomic Energy Agency intercontinental ballistic missile International Institute for Strategic Studies intermediate-range nuclear forces limited nuclear options limited nuclear war launch -on-warning long-range theatre nuclear weapons mutually assured destruction multiple, independently manoeuvrable, re-entry vehicle Massachusetts Institute of Technology North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-proliferation Treaty national technical means precision-guided munitions peaceful nuclear explosion plutonium 239 research and development Royal United Services Institute Strategic Arms Limitation Talks strategic defence Strategic Defence Initiative xiii

13 XIV SDV SIPRI SLBM SSBN START TNW U235 U238 List of Abbreviations strategic delivery vehicle Stockholm International Peace Research Institute submarine-launched ballistic missile ballistic missile-carrying nuclear submarine Strategic Arms Reduction Talks tactical or theatre nuclear weapons uranium 235 uranium 238

14 Foreword This book is addressed to everyone who wants to understand the contemporary strategic debate in some depth. Many of these people will be students taking first courses in Strategic Studies. Some will be students in the related subjects of International Relations and Peace and Conflict Research. Some, I hope, will be individuals whose interest is driven not so much by the need to pass an exam as by concern about the implications of the strategic debate for the future of humankind. The book has a long history. I intended to write something like it in the late 1970s, but the work I began then led me instead to write the volume on the concept of security that was published in Robert O'Neill proposed this project to me in December 1982, and I am grateful to him for encouraging the direction of my writing. In many senses this book is an outgrowth of the earlier one, though it is much more specific in focus. The earlier book tried to explore a subject about which too little had been written. This one tries to make sense of a subject where some of the confusion arises because so much has been written. It will only have succeeded if it charts a clear path through the jungle of the literature as well as over the landscape of the subject. The book posed two intellectual problems: how to cope with the enormous body of literature, and how to define Strategic Studies. Given the size of the literature, and the speed with which it grows, it was clear to me that I could not possibly read everything. In addition, there was the problem posed by the newly-emergent literatures on strategic defence and non-provocative defence. Both of these subjects occupied important sections in my intellectual scheme, and yet neither literature was fully-enough developed so that I could confidently characterise its major features. Most of what I eventually read is in the list of references. I adopted a strategy of diminishing returns, which is to say that I read in an area until I felt that I was no longer learning anything more of basic importance. This doubtless caused me to miss some worthwhile works, and perhaps some important insights. I apologise to their authors, and plead only that one has at some point to repay one's sponsors, and to unburden one's mind, by writing oneself. If some authors like XV

15 XVI Foreword Colin Gray and Robert Jervis seem to have been given generous treatment, that is because they write copiously and well, and represent major schools of thought clearly. The problem of how to define Strategic Studies turned out to be much more difficult than I anticipated. One cannot write a textbook without a clear idea of the boundaries of the subject, but the more I thought about it the more it became apparent that Strategic Studies does not have clear boundaries. Since I felt strongly that the purpose of an introduction should be to offer a coherent interpretation of the field, the option of simply presenting a menu of chapters reflecting the average contents of first courses in Strategic Studies did not appeal to me. My eventual solution is explained in Chapter 1. It will probably not convince everyone, but it does allow the book a greater thematic coherence than would otherwise be possible. I do not think that there is any formulation of the subject that would escape criticism. My hope is that the approach I have taken will put the subject into a clear and interesting perspective, and provide a basic referent that others can use to sharpen their own understanding of the field. One penalty of this approach is that the book is structured around a cumulative argument, and is therefore best read in sequence. The individual Parts and Chapters are not as selfcontained as would ideally be the case for a textbook, and I have tried to compensate for this by cross-referencing. I am grateful to the many people who have given me their time and mental energy to help this work along. The fact that they did so is a tribute to the collective realities of the academic enterprise despite its often egocentric appearance. Jonathan Alford, Pamela Divinsky, Mariangela Franchetti, Richard Little, Robert O'Neill, Gerald Segal, Robert Skidelsky, and Steve Smith laboured through the whole manuscript, and by so doing saved me from some errors and much obscurantism. Lawrence Freedman and Kenneth Waltz did the same on earlier parts, and a passing remark of Ken Booth's helped me to find a way around what at the time appeared to be an impasse. All of these people deserve a share of the credit for such merit as the book possesses, and I am happy to field the brickbats for whatever errors and infelicities of judgement remain. My wife Deborah cheered me up through the deepest of the difficulties, and came to my rescue when the collapse of my old word processor required a painful midstream switch of format. My thanks also to the University of Warwick, which allowed me two terms of study leave without which I could never have found the level of

16 Foreword XVll concentration necessary to pull together a first draft, and to the IISS. I am particularly grateful to the late Col. Jonathan Alford, the deputy director of the IISS, who dealt willingly with both the substantive and the administrative aspects of the project right up until his unexpected death. His contribution to this book is but one of the many ways in which he contributed to the development of Strategic Studies. The field will be the poorer for his untimely demise. BARRY BuzAN