Return of Experience on the approval processes for projects of retro-fit and upgrade vehicles with an ETCS On Board subsystem

Transcription

1 Return of Experience on the approval processes for projects of retro-fit and upgrade vehicles with an ETCS On Board subsystem M.Peralta, L. Helleputte, 31/10/2013

2 Introduction The object of this presentation is: to share Alstom observations and experiences with approval processes encountered in different projects, where existing vehicles were upgraded with an Command and Control Signalling On Board (CCS OB) structural subsystem in the sense of the directive. and to bring some proposal to facilitate the deployment of the ERTMS signalling system in Denmark. Areas that need to be better understood: The position of the Control and Command Signalling On Board (CCS OB) subsystem in the overall Railway System The interface between the CCS OB with the Rolling Stock subsystem The application of the Common Safety Methods regulation Safe integration Safety Conference- Copenhaguen 31/10/ P 2

3 System overview interfaces of the on-board CCS subsystem Corridor A NSA WG version 14 of 16/07/2013 edited: Stefan Bode specific vehicle type APS vehicle for CR: for HS: TSI NOI TSI PRM TSI SRT TSI LOC&PAS LOC&PAS SS LOC&PAS TSI ENE ENE SS ENE TSI RST RST SS RST 3 class B CCS 2 TSI CCS IC on-board: - EVC - STM interface - odo - GSM-R voice - SIMcard - GSM-R data 1 SS on-board CCS 6 TSI OPE OPE 5 4 TSI NOI TSI PRM TSI SRT specific infra TSI ENE nat. part SS ENE TSI INF nat. part SS INF Nat. part class B GSM-R voice/data train detection TSI CCS IC trackside: - RBC - balise/loop - RIU - LEU SS trackside CCS APS trackside CCS SS OPE Interfaces of the on-board CCS SS: 1) between ICs inside the on-board CCS subsystem, 2) with Class B, 3) with the SSs of the vehicle (RST, ENE) 4) between on-board CCS and trackside CCS Note: interfaces 2), 3), 4), 5) and 6) include TSI- and national aspects Interfaces between vehicle and line: 5) interaction not specific to CCS (weight, dynamics, EMC, ) 6) with the SS operation

4 Coverage of the CCS Subsystem Verification The certification process of CCS OB subsystem is a well known and well managed process; and has been carried out by Alstom in many different countries, with many different types of vehicles. The CCS subsystem verification covers all the constituents verification, and the interface with the Rolling Stock. ISA and NoBo Reports, based on the evidence provided in the Specific Application Safety Case, prove that the CCS OB subsystem, installed and integrated in a given vehicle, is safe and conforms to the applicable European rules (TSI). The DEBO Report states also the compliance with applicable national rules. Safety Conference- Copenhaguen 31/10/ P 4

5 Interface between the Control and Command Signalling and the Rolling Stock subsystems Generally, an upgrade of the Control and Command Signalling On Board subsystem does not require modifications of the Rolling Stock subsystem further than the interface between the RS and the CCS subsytems that is contemplated in the TSI of the CCS. The characteristics and performance of the Rolling Stock (brake, gauge, etc.) are not impacted. When a vehicle is upgraded with a new CCS on board subsystem, a new technical file is needed to account for this modification, but it is not necessary to revisit the whole Dossier of the vehicle! Safety Conference- Copenhaguen 31/10/ P 5

6 The weight impact on installing an ETCS OB equipment in a locomotive It is like adding 300 kg on a 86 Tons loco. Safety Conference- Copenhaguen 31/10/ P 6

7 Application of the Common Safety Method regulation by the Manufacturer The Common Safety Methods is to be applied to the whole system. The Control and Command Subsystem is only a brick in the system. The suppliers of signalling equipment applied the CENELEC standards (50126, 50128, and 50129) for risk assessment and safety assurance of the product we developed and delivered. The safety of the CCS OB subsystem, its constituents, and its interfaces, is covered extensively by the Subsystem Verification. The Common Safety Methods assessment appears then to be quite redundant with what has been done previously. And a CSM is to be applied at all, then it should take the evaluation of the ISA and the NoBo as input to avoid repetitions. The application of the CSM regulation to assess the risk associated to the changes brought by a new signalling system in the operation of a railway network has to be performed by the relevant entities (e.g., maintenance, operation, infrastructure, etc.) Safety Conference- Copenhaguen 31/10/ P 7

8 Safe integration, and who is responsible for it? At every level of definition of the system, the safe integration must be assessed by the relevant integrator at that system level. Safe integration between the parts of the CCS OB subsystem Safe integration between the CCS OB Subsystem with the Rolling Stock in a vehicle. Safe integration between the signalling system on board and the signalling system implemented in the track. Safe integration between the upgraded vehicle and the infrastructure (including train/route compatibility). Safe integration of the upgraded vehicle operation, and maintenance. Safety Conference- Copenhaguen 31/10/ P 8

9 Need of a clear definition of roles and responsibilities There is a need to have well defined roles to ensure that responsibilities of all actors are well defined, and that all actors involved are aware of their responsibilities, so that it can be guaranteed that every task will be executed by the right people By avoiding redundant and useless works, we will facilitate the approval process. Safety Conference- Copenhaguen 31/10/ P 9

10 Shaping the future Thanks for your attention Alstom Transport, Amerika Plads 19, 2100 Copenhagen Safety Conference- Copenhaguen 31/10/ P 10