The Political Impact of Spy Satellites - during the Cold War - today Pat Norris Manager Space & Defence Strategy author of Spies in the Sky

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1 The Political Impact of Spy Satellites The Political Impact of Spy Satellites - during the Cold War - today Pat Norris Manager Space & Defence Strategy author of Spies in the Sky ISU 2009 Strasbourg, 19 Feb Logica All rights reserved The Other Space Race - the causes the atomic bomb in 1945 and then the H-bomb in 1952 plus the long range bomber gave the USA unique ability to eliminate an enemy anywhere in the world: demonstrated at Hiroshima & Nagasaki the Soviets surprised the US by developing the A-bomb in 1949 and the H-bomb in 1953 the US maintained a lead in numbers of nuclear weapons for a few more years the Soviets decided not to match the US in long range bombers instead leap-frog to the long range ballistic missile Hiroshima hastened the end of WW-II No. 2 1

2 Monitoring the Soviets the US had great difficulty discovering what was happening inside the Soviet Union most of the enormous country was out of bounds to foreigners information came from defectors and from surveillance aircraft near Soviet borders rumour and speculation influenced policy one famous 1955 case led to a build-up in US bombers the U-2 was developed to fly above Soviet air defences and bring back strategic imagery 1954: Senator Joseph McCarthy whips up anti-communist feelings No. 3 Origins of the spy satellite U-2 flights were risky and provocative authorised rarely and when lack of intelligence became critical a U-2 flight imaged only a small part of the Soviet Union in 1954 (~3 years before Sputnik) the USAF began to develop a surveillance satellite development of long range missiles suggested that a rocket capable of launching a satellite into orbit would soon be available Polaroid inventor Edwin Land and MIT President James Killian led the panel that recommended the project to establish the rights of satellites to over-fly all countries, the USA also began development of: a scientific satellite a rocket not derived from a missile to be launched before the spy satellite No. 4 2

3 Sputnik! the Soviet launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik-1, on October 4 th 1957 made these developments more urgent the Soviet rocket that launched Sputnik was adapted from their first Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) so the Soviets could now reach the US with a nuclear warhead US politicians of all Parties and the media decried an apparent Soviet weapons lead: a missile gap, which was a political issue for the 1960 Presidential election Sputnik: 83 kg publicity stunt Sergei Korolev: Soviet space leader No. 5 The birth of CORONA the US surveillance satellite was late and over-budget designed to develop the film inside the satellite, scan the resulting image and radio it to ground this concept was soon applied to deep space missions but couldn t cope with the enormous volume of surveillance imagery as a stop gap, a less ambitious concept was developed called CORONA the undeveloped film was returned to earth in a capsule caught by a plane as it drifted down on its parachute No. 6 3

4 14 th time lucky in January 1959 (15 months after Sputnik) the first CORONA launch blew up on the pad the rocket failed again in February the 3 rd launch in April got into orbit but the capsule came down near Spitzbergen and the Soviets may have recovered it by the end of 1959, nine attempts had failed a mix of rocket, satellite and camera problems May 1 st 1960: U-2 shot down by the Soviets; pilot Gary Powers captured finally in August 1960 the 14 th attempt was successful (an instrumented probe) followed on 18 August by the launch of the first successful imaging mission No. 7 CORONA - continued fourteenth launch 10 August 1960 next launch 18 August 1960 produced first images Mys Schmidta airfield Soviet Union One of 64 previously unknown airfields detected President Eisenhower receives the US flag returned in the recovery capsule A C-119 caught the capsule on its third pass No. 8 4

5 The real missile gap in mid-1961 the last pre-corona intelligence estimates forecast the no. of Soviet ICBMs in 1963: USAF said 700 US Navy and Army said 150 CIA said successful CORONA flights in June, July & August 1961 changed this estimate to: <25 at that time <100 by 1963 by 1962 the estimate had come down to <10 Soviet ICBMs, of which 6 were operational there was a missile gap - in America s favour undercutting the US hawks who were arguing for a pre-emptive attack on the Soviet Union No. 9 The Soviet Zenit 2 Soviet knowledge of the USA was much more complete: you could buy maps of the USA, walk around the perimeter of USAF bases, buy local magazines containing interviews with base personnel, read political debates, etc. in 1960 when the US Tiros weather satellite beamed down pictures of the Soviet Union for all to see, the Kremlin woke up to the power of surveillance satellites they used the Vostok satellite with its recovery capsule (2 dogs in Aug. 1960) first failed launch attempt Nov 1961 first successful images recovered Aug 1962 No. 10 5

6 Production line CORONA wide-area surveillance satellite launched every ~4 weeks 145 launches last one in 1972 (>120 successful) 866,000 images taken from July 1963 a GAMBIT high resolution satellite launched ~5 weeks initially each satellite stayed in orbit for 3-4 days Zenit launched every 2-3 weeks stayed in orbit 8-12 days 81 Zenit 2 launched over 7 years (58 full success) 74 Zenit 4 launched duration gradually increased with the addition of extra re-entry capsules No. 11 Super-power stand-off after the 1962 Cuban crisis the Soviets begin a massive missile build-up by the late 1960s there is rough nuclear parity some US hawks throughout the late 1950s and 1960s advocated a preemptive strike against the Soviets before that became impossible nearly happened during the Cuban crisis surveillance satellites had a dual use capability: monitor the build-up of the adversary s strategic weapons stabilising provide targeting information for your own strategic weapons provocative No. 12 6

7 The power of satellite imagery Credit US Geological Survey US image of Soviet submarine pens near Murmansk, June 1966 June 1961 image shows empty field June 1962 image Credit NRO No. 13 shows typical SS-7 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) CORONA, Zenit-2 and their successors provided the information allowing the US and the Soviets to agree to stop the arms race SALT-I in 1972 gave the Soviets a numerical missile superiority, but the US a warhead superiority: 1,600 versus 1,050 missiles 2,000 versus 4,000 warheads escalation continued slowly in terms of missiles, rapidly in warheads when SALT-II halted the escalation in 1979: USA had ~9,000 strategic warheads Soviets had ~3,000 both SALT agreements were designed to be verifiable by satellite, e.g.: missile silos instead of warheads bombers not bombs submarines instead of their missiles tested systems not theoretical ones President Carter & Premier Brezhnev sign SALT-II No. 14 7

8 A stabilizing factor The first public acknowledgement of American military surveillance (i.e.: spy) satellites was on 1 October 1978 at the Kennedy Space Center when President Jimmy Carter stated: Photographic reconnaissance satellites have become an important stabilizing factor in world affairs in the monitoring of arms control agreements. They make an immense contribution to the security of all nations. No. 15 Today s nuclear threat nuclear weapons have proved irrelevant in the many wars fought since 1945 the consequences of using a nuclear weapon are so severe as to make them an irrational choice blackmail by an unscrupulous nuclear-equipped country is seen as a threat use by suicide bombers and fanatical terrorists is also a concern the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) is the world s answer to these threats the nuclear powers agree to phase out their nuclear weapons and help other countries develop nuclear energy other countries agree to forego nuclear weapons IAEA Vienna monitors NPT compliance No. 16 8

9 Strategic roles for spy satellites today monitor strategic weaponry of potential enemies: ensure decisions about nuclear weapons are based on reliable information as former UN Weapons Inspector chief Hans Blix put it: defectors didn t want inspection, they wanted invasion not all nuclear powers have reliable access to surveillance satellites monitor conformance to the non-proliferation treaty: the IAEA uses satellites to complement its inspection powers countries considering developing nuclear weapons might be reassured if they had reliable access to surveillance satellite imagery in both of these roles, there is a case for guaranteed access to imagery to all countries: imagery of UN-approved forces could be excluded from coverage such a scheme could be piloted by a regional entity such as the EU confirm the demand for such imagery fine-tune the requirements work out the operational concepts and constraints would reduce tensions No. 17 Regional systems The EU Satellite Centre (EUSC, Torrejon) has demonstrated the benefits of coordination at European level other regions might also benefit from this concept an African regional centre could support UN and African Union (AU) peace-keeping forces throughout Africa requirements span a very wide area: from Congo to Sudan, hence satellites are only viable option credibility of the service depends on the AU having shutter control could help the AU become more effective No. 18 9

10 West & central Asia Activities of the EU and its member states in Afghanistan (and Iraq) are expected to move towards nation building military and EUSC resources can perhaps be made available, but a regional system could have advantages: could gradually be handed over to the local government could provide an independent source of information in contested situations could engage with Russian, Islamic and other resources multi-flagging of spy satellites is a stabilising factor (US DoD, London 17 Sept. 2008) No. 19 Surveillance satellites Many topics not covered, e.g.: US and Russia today the designs of the satellites UK, France, China & India: their roles during the Cold War their plans and options today ballistic missile defence Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) tactical use of surveillance satellites the legacy of the German V2 negotiating SALT-I and II commercial & low cost surveillance satellites what was the most important use of satellites in the first 50 years of the space age? the Hollywood view of surveillance satellites copies available today price 25 or online at Amazon.fr Amazon.de, etc. see No

11 QUESTIONS? No. 21 Car number plate, headline, face, golf ball 10 cm resolution 1 cm resolution 1 mm resolution No