The sling and the stone.

Transcription

1 The sling and the stone. Prologue The escort carriers(cve) were slow, badly armed, worst armoured. They had few aircraft on board and they were three time smaller than their elder sisters (CV). When they met enemy warships, they were as lambs in front of the wolves. They could, in fact, protect the convoys, give support to the landing troops, but nothing they could against battleships and cruisers. And what about their smaller brothers, the slow, lightly armed escort destroyers(de)? And however, one day, those wrecks found themselves in the middle of a decisive battle. A battle where the enemy battleships, cruisers and destroyers were more numerous than the waves of the sea. And they, the Jeep carriers and the escort units, did all they could. Better: they did more than they could. They did not fight as sons of a smaller god: they fought as real aircraft carriers, as real battleships. The leapfrogging In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, Admiral Ernest King, commander in chief of the Navy, had planned, in four phases, the strategy for the Pacific sector. In a first stage, the USA should have had to hold in check the enemy; in a second stage, they might have led limited offensives; in a third stage they should have launched large scale offensives ; in the fourth stage, finally, Japan would have been attacked in force. In short, the King s strategy had its starting point in a defensive stage and its ending point in an offensive stage, passing, respectively, through a defensive-offensive stage and through an offensive-defensive stage. After Midway( the first stage), after Guadalcanal( the second stage), the American strategy have become, on the operational plane, the so called island hopping ( or leapfrogging ). It consisted to strike the Japanese in their weakest positions, by occupying the islands that were not very defended and by cutting off the strongest positions. Those latter, isolated and without any possibility to receive reinforcements and supplies, would slowly have withered on the vine. Acting in this way, the United States would have contained the foe and, contemporarily, step after step, island after island, offensive after offensive, they would have put Japan under threat of their bombers and created the conditions to attack her in force( the fourth stage of King s strategy). The island hopping had been conducted by two uncommon personalities: Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific s fleet, and General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the sector of south-western Pacific. The first, hopping from island to island, had advanced in the Gilberts, in the Caroline Islands, in the Marshalls and in the Marianas; the latter, by adopting the same tactic, had brought the star and stripes banner in New Guinea and in the Bismarck Archipelago. The question at this point was the following: what would have been the following move? In other words: on which island would the frog have leaped? In Nimitz s opinion, attacking Formosa -- close both to Japan and to China-- would have been the best move; for his part, MacArthur would have wanted to occupy the Philippines. The Nimitz s tactical and strategic point of view was free from every personal conditioning; MacArthur, instead, was involved more emotionally. Three years before, he had been forced to leave the Philippines and, leaving them, he had solemnly promised to come back. And his I shall return, together with the obvious tactical and strategic assessments, were the reasons of his choice. MacArthur repeated

2 continually: if we do not return in the Philippines, we betray a solemn promise and we lose prestige and credibility. The issue was subjected to President Roosevelt and Roosevelt chose the Philippines. Nimitz renounced to his idea to attack Formosa and began to collaborate. As a prologue of the invasion, many aerial and naval missions were launched against Formosa and towards the Philippines. They caused many losses to the Japanese, both in terms of men and in terms of warships and aircraft. When all was ready, the American landing force steamed to the Philippines. Destination: the island of Leyte. Victory On October 20, the Marines of the Sixth Army under General Walter Krueger s command, covered by the Seventh Fleet 1, land at Leyte. With them, also General MacArthur lands. The first words of his first proclamation to the Philippines people are : I have returned! The Japanese countermove is quick. The plan to face the invasion plans a decoy manoeuvre and a main manoeuvre. The VA Ozawa s fleet is to be the bait: his task is to lure far from Leyte the Admiral Halsey s aircraft carriers. In the same time, VA Takeo Kurita with the main force is to come out north of Samar island through the San Bernardino Strait, while the units of VVAA Nishimura and Shima are to force south the Surigao Strait, to converge northwards and to join with the Kurita s fleet to neutralize the American landing force. It is the so called Operation Sho-1 ( Victory 1) 2. A vital operation for the Japanese Combined Fleet s commander, Admiral Soemu Toyoda. Losing the Philippines, in fact, would be a disaster for the Japanese: no more oil from the Dutch Indies towards the motherland; no more weapons and ammunitions from the motherland towards the fleet. By conquering the Philippines, the Americans would cut the Japanese supply roads from north to south and vice versa. Admiral Toyoda is aware of it. He says: If we lose the Philippines, also our fleet becomes useless. And so he decides to put all at stake, throwing into the battle every surface unit at his disposal, using the aircraft carriers as a bait, the same aircraft carriers formerly pride of the Japanese Navy and now almost useless for lacking of airplanes and experienced pilots. It is a game lost already from the beginning. The Americans have more ships, more men, more aircraft. But the chance, some blunders, a lack of attention, the perfect carrying out of the operation Sho-1 might be the American more vulnerable and make their starting advantage vain. Perhaps Toyoda is trusting in the warrior spirit of his men, in the monstrous 460 mm guns of the battleships Yamato and Musashi or in the divine wind that is about to blow. But Toyoda's embarked airplanes are less numerous than the American destroyers. And this would be sufficient to kill every hope. The invisible bait. All the more so as, for the Japanese, things go soon wrong. Two American submarines, the Dace and the Darter, sight, between 23 and 24 October, off Cape Palawan not the Ozawa s bait fleet, but the Kurita s main fleet. They follow it steaming on the surface, signal its presence to the Third Fleet, dive, launch their torpedoes sinking a couple of cruisers and damaging a third one. Kurita intercepts the Darter s message, but, despite this, he does not deploy his ships in a anti-submarine deployment, paying his bill. Alerted by the Darter s message, Halsey makes move forward his Third Fleet 3. But it is not, at the time, at full power. Two Task Groups, in fact, are steaming towards the Ulithi base in the Caroline Islands to rearm and refuel. After the Darter s communication, Halsey calls one of them back in a hurry, but allows the other one to continue the route towards

3 Ulithi. But this second Group ( VA Mc Cain) counts three aircraft carriers and about 40% of the whole embarked air force. Fighting without it in a crucial moment, signifies give the enemy a big advantage. Halsey, then, calls back also the second Group. But, in the meanwhile, Kurita has been sighted, almost by chance, by a search plane of the carrier Intrepid. Halsey prepares to face him. But some problems do not lack: the closest Group to Kurita the Admiral Bogan s Group- is also the weakest: the lacking of Mc Cain s airplanes reduces the Third Fleet s power. In the meanwhile, Ozawa is like a cat on hot bricks. He wishes to be detected, but nobody notices him. How is it possible? the admiral thinks. Is it possible that Americans do not see my four aircraft carriers, my two battleships, my three cruisers and my eleven destroyers? Are perhaps they blind? It is useless: although he make all to be detected, nobody sights him. I really did not need this, the admiral swears. If nobody sees me, how can the Operation Sho work? If Halsey does not take the bait, what will happen to Kurita and to Nishimura? And, in effect, Kurita is-- it has to be said-- in a sea of troubles. The fighters airplanes based on Luzon have not arrived, leaving the fleet without aerial cover; the Third American Fleet is waiting for him; Ozawa has not been sighted. Sure, his ships can open a deadly barrage, but will his inexperienced artillerymen be able to do it? The divine fury? Surely it will be useful, but keeping calm and a good shot would be more useful. And yet, in the middle of so many potential troubles, at first he is lucky. Some bombers coming from Luzon attack the Sherman s Group and, despite they suffer heavy losses, are able to hit the carrier Princeton. Exploding, the ship brings with herself also three hundred crew of the cruiser Birmingham, come close for help her. The Halsey s bombers and torpedo bombers, then, when they arrive, launch themselves as hungry wolves on the Musashi, hitting her with bombs and torpedoes and sinking her. It is a half victory. By concentrating their attacks on the super-battleship, the American warplanes give other Kurita s units the possibility to steam far from their range. If the McCain airplanes had been here, certainly it would have been another end and the battle would have been won there, in the Subuyan Sea. On the contrary, except the Musashi (sunk )and the heavy cruiser Myoko ( damaged), the Kurita s fleet is able, after five hours of combat, to get away and to continue its mission. The black cat In the meanwhile, around Capo Engaño, Ozawa is nervous and anxious and he is at his wits end. He has sent very long messages hoping to be intercepted. Nothing. He has sent in flight some airplanes hoping they were sighted. Nothing. When around 9 a.m. a search airplane communicates to him the presence of Sherman s Third Group, he sends in flight about eighty Vals and Kates to attack it. Damaging the enemy ships is not the Ozawa's aim: being finally detected is his real aim! ( This is the actual condition of the Kido Butai, the Japanese Carriers Striking Force, formerly invincible!). However, for a few hours, nothing changes. No Japanese aviator comes back from his mission, the Americans do not arrive. The inexperienced Japanese pilots are shot by the Sherman s AA. The survivors prefer landing on the Luzon s surer strips than landing on the Zuikaku s deck. At 4:00 p.m., finally, an American spotting plane sights Ozawa. And at this point the play comes back to the start. The Japanese carriers are in bad shape, they have not more than twenty operational airplanes, but Halsey is unaware of it. For him, the Ozawa s force is the Japanese main force. And thus, he orders his fleet to steam north with three Groups, as he communicates to Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, the expression with three Groups generates a huge misunderstanding. Halsey, in fact, had formerly communicated to have the intention to form a fourth Group, the Task Force

4 34 under command of RA Willis Ching Lee to guard the San Bernardino Strait. Thus Nimitz thinks if three Groups are moving against Ozawa, the forth Group remains. And if it remains, it signifies that the San Bernardino Strait is guarded. And this is also the conviction of the Seventh Fleet commander s, Admiral Kinkaid. Inexplicably, nobody has notified the message to him ; but Kinkaid got to know this message, because his wireless operators have intercepted it. 4 But Halsey has not still formed the fourth Group: he has only planned to form it. In other words the Lee s group is operational only on paper. Result : all the Third Fleet s units, included the Lee s ships, steam northward for hunting Ozawa. Kurita, whose units are now steaming along the Strait, finds an open highway. Sho 1 is still operational. Why does Halsey leave that so important sector without any guard? And without communicating his decisions to Admiral Kinkaid? Usually he does not make blunders like those. And thus why does do it? Is he overestimating the Ozawa s force? Is he underestimating the Kurita s force? Is he fearing a trap by the Japanese carriers? Is he considering Kurita out after what had happened during the battle of the Subuyan Sea? In truth, Halsey makes clearer in a following message the role and the function of the Lee s Group. But Kinkaid neither receives it, nor intercepts it. When a search plane Catalina on night patrol a Black Cat, as it was called sights the Kurita s fleet steaming along the strait, RA Bogan communicates the information to Halsey, but the officer who receives the communication answers him, almost with a condescending air: Yes, we already have this information. But the meaning is: Do not annoy us with these silly things! RA Lee insists: This is a trap!, but nobody listen to him. Also the tactical commander of the Task Force 38, VA Marc Mitcher, awakened and informed by his collaborators, does not send any communication to Halsey. I know him. If he wants my opinion, he will ask it to me. And he goes to bed. And meanwhile, out of the San Bernardino Strait there was no American ship. Not even a destroyer. Crossing the T. Meanwhile, in the southern zone of the sector, Nishimura and Shima, steaming toward the Surigao Strait, are spotted and Kinkaid prepares to face them. He must act in a hurry and he can not get any mistake. Considering the foe s route and speed, Kinkaid has to fight a night conventional battle, ship against ship: in the darkness, in fact, the airplanes can not be used. But, also they could be used, Kinkaid could not do it: the Halsey s fleet with its embarked aircraft is by now far from him. Thus Kinkaid orders to catapult in flight the few airplanes at his disposal, sends them to Leyte and prepares to fight the battle. He is worried: the Japanese have, in fact, demonstrated in many occasions to be almost unbeatable in the night naval fights. However, the RA Jesse Oldendorf, commander of the bombing Group of the Kinkaid s fleet, plans a perfect plan. The waters of the Strait not are very deep, the manoeuvre space is narrow, the Japanese ships will be forced to sail in column. It is a good chance for crossing the T, the dream of every Navy commander. Oldendorf, thus, deploys his battleships at the end of the Strait, in a row, bow against stern and he protects them with a screen of destroyers toward the open sea for avoiding the eventual Japanese submarines attacks. In front of the battleships he deploys, in an advanced positions on both sides of the Strait, the cruisers and the escort destroyers. The dancing is opened by the Patrol Torpedoes, those PT aboard of which, during the conflict, the future President of the US John F. Kennedy was on duty as lieutenant. In the moonless, dark night, three of them sight the Nishimura s ships almost halfway into the Strait, but both theirs and the following attempts of other PT to strike the Japanese ships with torpedoes fail. However the radio messages sent by the PTs allow Oldendorf to keep

5 under control, mile after mile, the Nishimura s movements. When the time comes, the American admiral makes move two groups of destroyers: the first from the western side of the Strait, the latter from the eastern side. The destroyers must attack using the torpedoes only. The battery fire is expressly forbidden: the enemy must not have any point of reference. Tense, with their heart in their mouth, the destroyers crews steam toward the Nishimura s fleet and toward the deadly Japanese Long Lances torpedoes, in ambush in the darkness. More or less in the same moment, Kurita enters the San Bernardino Strait. When he steams out from San Bernardino Strait, the battle of Surigao is already over. Struck by the torpedoes launched by the destroyers of the first and the second wave; hit by the American battleships and cruisers bombs, some ships, among which a couple of battleships( Fuso and Yamashiro), had been sunk, forcing Nishimura to withdraw. Steaming forty miles behind him, Shima had arrived on the struggle s place when already Nishimura was withdrawing and he had followed him. By neutralizing the southern force, destined to join with the main force for attacking Leyte, Oldendorf had kept away to Sho-1 the last chance to work. At around 5:30 a.m. Kurita receives the news of the Surigao s disaster. In that moment, he feels that his certainties are wavering. But steaming forward, at all cost, is his order. And thus the Japanese admiral, devoted to duty, steams forward. Confiding on the divine help. Three Taffies When Kurita comes out from San Bernardino Strait, he is astounded: there is no enemy ship, the sea is completely empty. Is it perhaps a damned trap? Also the pilot who is flying over the Strait does not believe his eyes: off Samar, four Japanese battleships, six cruisers and eleven destroyers, are steaming full speed towards Leyte. It is 5:45 a.m. He communicates immediately the information to the fleet. Answer: are you sure you have not made a mistake? Are you sure that is the Kurita s fleet? Perhaps it could be the Nishimura s fleet steaming away from the Oldendorf's ships. But if also it were the Japanese main fleet, it is Task Force 34 s ( Admiral Lee s Group) which must face it. Isn t it? But is there the Task Force 34? And, above all, where is it? To await Kurita there are, instead of the Task Force 34, three escort carriers groups, called Taffy one, Taffy two, and Taffy three. Altogether they have about four hundred aircraft, armed, for the most part, with depth bombs. The CVE s task was, in fact, as we have seen, hunting the submarines. Slow, almost without armour, armed with a five inches gun only, they were sarcastically called by their crew Combustible, Vulnerable, Expendable. Well, now those units and their thin escort of destroyers are about to be struck by the strength of a giant. David versus Goliath, if we want use a simile of which one abuses in cases like these and of which was abused for a long time also in the aftermath of the battle. An officer of an escort destroyer will strengthen the legend, telling: We were feeling like David without his sling. The Leyte s David is, without any doubt, Taffy three, the closet one to the Kurita s fleet. It is commanded by RA Clifton Ziggy Sprague. Commander of battleships and cruisers, he had been in duty on the aircraft carriers initially as a commander of Air Squadron and then as first commander. He has married the writer Scott Fitzgerald s sister. Spotted Kurita, Sprague sends a message to Kinkaid, and soon afterward, he arms his sling as he can. For his part, the Japanese admiral believes to face the Halsey s Third Fleet and not a handful of Taffies. It is a misunderstanding destined to weight on the battle. But it is not the sole. Also on the American side there some misunderstandings. One, in particular has remained famous.

6 The world wonders Once received the Sprague s message, Kinkaid asks Halsey for help: we need reinforcements because we are attacked by a huge enemy force. Why is the Lee's Task Force not here? And so on. Nimitz intercepts the Kinkaid s message and, for his part, sends a code message to Halsey asking where be the Task force 34. For deceiving the foe, the code messages were preceded and followed by sentences apparently without sense or not linked with the main communication. The message sent by Nimitz to Halsey has both the sentences. It starts with the image of a turkey that is trotting to water (turkey trots to water), continues asking where is the Lee s Task Force( main message: Where is, RPT- repeat- where is the Task Force 34) and ends with a verse of the English poet Tennyson, the singer of the Light Brigade s charge at Balaclava( The world wonders. In the original Tennyson s poem: the world wonder d). But the verb to wonder in English has a double meaning. Depending on the context, to wonder signifies both to think or speculate curiously to doubt and to be filled with admiration, amazement or awe. In the Tennyson s ballade, for instance, the world wonders, i.e. it is filled with admiration with the bravery of the heroic six hundred cavalrymen of the Light Brigade. Usually, the head and tail sentences were cancelled by the decipherer who received the message: the message had to be clear and never ambiguous. In our case, instead, only the first sentence ( turkey trots to water) is cancelled, but the second sentence in not cancelled. Thus, this is the message which Halsey reads: Where is, repeat, where is the Task Force 34? The world wonders. Halsey interprets the world wonders as The world is thinking curiously, and, for this reason, as a rebuke. Is perhaps Nimitz criticizing his operate, his expertises, his tactical choice to pursuit the Japanese decoy fleet? Shocked, demoralized, Bull Halsey is even unable to speak. When he returns to his senses, he casts about for an excuse, he says it is necessary refuelling his ships, loosens his grip on Ozawa and only three hours after having received the Kinkaid s message he orders to send some units for helping Taffy three. They will arrive when it is all over. Of course Nimitz did not have any intention to criticize Halsey, and the choice of that ambiguous tail sentence had not been his. The Nimitz s intention was knowing where were the Task Force 34, not being aware of what the world were curious to know or for what the world were filled with admiration. But who had to add the bait-sentences to the message had written the first thing he had thought or, perhaps, showing off his knowledge, he had wanted to remember the 90 th anniversary of the Battle of Balaclava, fought on October 25 ( 1854). And who should have depurated the message taking away every fake sentence before delivering it to Halsey, had not gone whole hog, perhaps convinced that the sentence The world wonders had a precise meaning. A basic rule, in fact, had been broken: never inserting fake sentences the meaning of which could be linked, in any way and even only vaguely, with the text of the message. Writing The world wonders could have seemed not unrelated with the meaning of the message, but on the contrary, congruent. In short, a huge misunderstanding.

7 General attack. And what about the Japanese? When the Kurita s sailors sight Taffy three a Lilliputian they mistake it for a giant. There where only small flattops are, they see big aircraft carriers; there where only light destroyers are steaming, they see fierce battleships. Kurita took the bait. Rather than to deploy his units according a logic plan, individuating objectives, priorities and coordinating the times of the action, he orders to arm the guns with armour- piercing shells and unleashes a general attack. Said in other words, he permits to his commanders to fight as they want. Scattering his powerful armada and making it weaker. For his part, Sprague plays his -- few--cards right. He sends in flight the embarked aircraft to attack with the depth bombs -- and, if necessary, even with the machine guns-- the enemy units; he orders the escort destroyers to make a wall of smoke and heads his CVEs towards a sudden storm in the vicinity. The Japanese armour-piercing shells fall around and on the CVEs, sometimes they go through CVE s hull and then fall in the sea. While all this is happening, an American destroyer changes her course and attacks. Damn it, boys. They re getting away! She is the Johnston(DD57) commanded by Lt. Commander Ernest E. Evans. And she is the sling s stone. Of native American ancestry ( half Cherokee), Evans according to one of his officers- does not know the meaning of the word withdrawal. On his own initiative, he advances zigzag towards the foe, heading where the last missed shot has fallen, sure that the Japanese artillerymen will adjust their target and they won t repeat it. When he reaches the useful distance, he orders to arm the Johnston's ten torpedoes. While the Johnston is steaming out from the wall of smoke, north the game is almost over. Ozawa is hit and hit again by overwhelming forces. He has already lost the glorious Zuikaku and a couple of other carriers, he is suffering the torments of hell. Then from Pearl Harbor that request and that affirmation: The world wonders.. For a little bit of time Ozawa's fleet is not struck. The Johnston gets off her torpedoes and immediately steams to hide behind a smoke screen. When she comes out from it, she has in front of herself a heavy cruiser, the Kumano, heavily damaged. The crew has no time to rejoice. Another enemy cruiser, the Kongo, opens fire and sweeps the Johnston s deck. A splinter cuts two fingers of the Evans right hand. But now, the Johnston is not alone. Other destroyers are heading to the Kurita s fleet. They are close, very close. The Japanese gunners are in troubles for adapting the sights of their guns to strike the new targets. Other torpedoes hit their target. And other warplanes are arriving, in waves, from Taffy one and from Taffy two. They land at Leyte, rearm, take off and hit again. The Chokai and the Chikuma are sunk. Also the battleship Yamato is struck and, for ten decisive minutes, she is taken away from the battle. Elsewhere the destroyer Hoel is attacked by numerous ships-- too many in respect with her real dangerousness --- consenting to the escort carriers to steam far from the foe. The Johnston with her engine out of action and her deck partly destroyed is still fighting and her 130 mm guns strike on several times the Japanese ships. Then, suddenly, the turn of the events. Around 9:30 a.m. Kurita decides to steam away. Why does he do this? Convinced to face Halsey and his Third Fleet and not Taffy three, does he not want to loose other ships? Is not hoping any more to reach the real target of the whole operation, i.e. the American landing force? Does he want to regroup his ships, scattered here and there as a consequence of the General attack? Seeing him steaming

8 away, the astounded sailors of Taffy three are speechless. Then, one of them exclaims : Damn it, boys. They re getting away! The Japanese ships are steaming away ( or getting away), but the Japanese aircraft are still fighting. For the first time in the war, upon a couple of escort carriers, the divine wind, the kamikaze, strikes harshly. The first escort carrier is damaged, the latter- CVE Saint Lo- is sunk. Epilogue The Johnston is almost a wreck, when Evans orders to abandon her. She has fought till the last, firing with her 130 mm guns. But the Japanese fire has been too powerful. The most part of the crew comes down on the lifeboats, other sailors dive into the sea. In this moment, Evans is with them. Once rescued, the survivors look for their commander. In vain. For the protagonist of that battle on which none would have bet a cent, a Medal of Honor was ready. A posthumous decoration will be conferred to him. Admiral Halsey, during the battle author of many blunders, will be celebrated as a new Horatio Nelson. Map of the battle.

9 1 The Seventh Fleet ( Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid) included the landing force and the related escorts. In particular: six battleships, eighteen escort carriers(cve), four heavy and five light cruisers, eighty-three destroyers(dd), twenty-five escort destroyers(de), eleven frigates and forty-four patrol torpedoes(pt). It was organized in two groups: Bombardment and Support Group( Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf) and Escort Carriers Group( RA Thomas L. Sprague). The Escort Carriers Group was structured in three subgroups: Taffy One (RA Thomas L. Sprague); Taffy Two ( RA Felix B. Stump), Taffy Three( RA Clifton A.F. Ziggy Sprague). The Escort Carriers Group and in particular Taffy Three-- will have a main role during the battle. 2 It is the first of four operation called SHO( Victory), planned to defend the Japanese soil. The Imperial High Command, however, although had prepared the defence of the Japanese Islands, believed as more probable an American attack to the Philippines than to Japan. The Japanese northern force, the bait of the trap, commanded by Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, included an aircraft carrier ( Zuikaku), three light carriers, two battleships, three light cruiser and eight destroyers. The main force ( or Force A), commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita included five battleships ( among them there were also the super-battleships Yamato and Musashi), ten heavy and two light cruisers and fifteen destroyers. The Force C, under command of Vice Admiral Shisij Nishimura, included two battleships, a heavy cruiser and four destroyers. The support force ( VA Kiyohide Shima) included two heavy cruisers a light cruiser and seven destroyers. 3 The Third Fleet ( Admiral William Bull Halsey) pivoted on the Task Force 38 ( VA Marc Mitcher) was formed by eight aircraft carriers ( CV), eight light carriers, six battleships, six heavy cruisers, nine light cruisers and fifty-eight destroyers. It was organized in four Groups, under the command, respectively, of VA John S. Mac Cain and of the RRAA Gerald F: Bogan, Frederick C: Sherman, Ralph E. Davison. 4 The American chain of command was not very effective. Admiral Halsey had Admiral Nimitz( Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet) as his superior, while Admiral Kinkaid had General Mac Arthur( Commander in Chief in the south-western Pacific) as his superior. In short, at Leyte a unique commander lacked, a commander able to coordinate the whole operation and able to take, at the moment, the appropriate decisions. Perhaps for this reason Halsey informed his direct superior ( Nimitz), but not Kinkaid. Or perhaps it was a misunderstanding or an oversight.